EUROPEAN POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS

A Comparative Government Reader

William G. Andrews



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

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European Political Institutions

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Edited by

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TO BILLY

WITH GRATITUDE FOR THE PUNCTUATION

SUPPLIED BY HIS TWO SIX-SHOOTERS,

SUB-MACHINEGUN, AND "BOWLIN' ARROWS"

Preface

This book is designed to make available to the student of comparative government readings on the principal political institutions of Great Britain, France, Germany, and the Soviet Union. An effort has been made to include material distinctly different from the usual textbook material. Though the textbook approach is essential, supplementary readings should offer the student new perspectives.

For that reason, most of the items selected provide "inside" views of government, meant to complement the detached, descriptive material of most textbooks. The reader of this book may see government through the eyes of high-level participants or, by means of illustrative material, with his own eyes. I have found that the different and immediate character of this first-hand material is intellectually stimulating to students.

Another purpose of this collection is to offer a trenchant introduction to the *styles* of government and politics in the countries covered. It is, of course, of primary importance in understanding government and politics to have full, accurate, and objective descriptions and analyses; textbooks and lectures can provide these most satisfactorily. But clear impressions of the styles of political systems are also very useful. The most perceptive and expressive observer is less able than the participating statesmen to capture and convey style accurately and vividly. Who can transmit an image of Churchill's wartime leadership as intensely and forcefully as do his own words in his "blood, sweat, and tears," "we shall never surrender," and "finest hour" speeches? Who can adequately describe de Gaulle's austere elegance or the wooden Marxist jargon of Stalin? Yet these characteristic styles impart flavor to the systems.

The same train of thought explains why policy declarations of the British Labour Party and of the French Socialist Party are set in juxtaposition. The pragmatism of the former and the doctrinaire bent of the latter can be described, but a reader can become more aware of the differences by reading the two documents. The role of parliament in a strong-assembly system, even when portrayed with great clarity, may

not penetrate the reader's mind as deeply and as painlessly as when presented in excerpts from the *Journal officiel* of the Fourth Republic, especially when they can be compared with a similar selection on the weak assembly of the Fifth Republic. Other examples spring easily to mind.

Anyone familiar with the exploding universe of comparative government will appreciate the dilemmas in reducing the vast amount of available, suitable material so as to confine it within the covers of a book priced for supplementary classroom use. I hope my omissions will be understood and tolerated.

The temptation to bring at least some of the exciting new regimes within the student's horizon was resisted because of the realization that this would result in a loss of balance in the coverage of the traditional "Big Four." The limitations of the editor's familiarity with the new systems fortified that decision. It is hoped that a later companion volume in this series will repair the deficiency. Similar considerations squeezed out material on smaller European systems that would have permitted more broadly based comparative treatment. I had also planned to include the United States, but later decided to place most of the American selections in a separate brief book being published in this series as *American National Political Institutions: Some Key Readings.* Comparative government instructors treating all five systems may find the parallel materials in that collection a handy complement to this book.

Within the limited framework, I have centered attention on the aspects of government on which instructors were most likely to want supplementary material. Guided by correspondence, conversations, and my crystal ball, I settled on political parties, elections, legislatures, and executives, plus some general discussions of governmental structures.

Some of the selections perform a double service: many of the policy statements of political parties define and highlight issues concerned with the functions of government; some of the readings on the Soviet government illustrate the relationship between State and economy.

The number of selections could have been increased within the same format by extensive abridgment, but I felt that this would impair their usefulness. Abridgment has sometimes been necessary, especially of legislative debates. Legislators are not notoriously parsimonious in expression, and statesmen rarely produce brief monographs on political institutions; so it has usually been necessary to rely on excerpts from speeches and memoirs.

Another temptation besetting an anthologist is to append extensive

commentaries. I resisted this in the belief that, if so extended, the product would be less useful as a collection of readings without thereby becoming adequate as a descriptive textbook.

More than half the selections are translations. If not otherwise attributed, the translation was made by the author and appears here in English for the first time. The only exception is de Gaulle's Bayeux speech, which appears in translation also in the English edition of part two of the third volume of his memoirs. Whether through revision by the author or through inaccurate translating, that version departs at many places in significant ways from the original French speech. My wife rendered invaluable assistance in making the new translation and in executing other editorial chores.

My debt is great to colleagues who gave me advice and encouragement as I encountered the dilemmas mentioned above. In particular, I am indebted to Professors Mario Einaudi, Clinton Rossiter, Herbert W. Briggs, and Robert E. Cushman for their patient tolerance of my graduate school foibles at Cornell University and for their aid, direct and indirect, since then. My colleagues in Government 6 at Dartmouth College were equally kind in assigning selections experimentally to their students. Some of them, especially Professors Laurence I. Radway, Elmer E. Smead, and Franklin Smallwood, aided me with their suggestions.

Others who have helped and encouraged me include Professors Henry W. Ehrmann, now of Dartmouth College; Sigmund Neumann of Wesleyan University; Carl J. Friedrich and Nicholas Wahl of Harvard University; James F. Tierney and Maurice Harari of the Ford Foundation; George McT. Kahin and Steven Muller of Cornell University; Alan Fiellin and Allen Ballard of the City College of New York; Martin Needler of the University of Michigan; Kwanha Yim of Bowdoin College; Jerome B. King of Williams College; Luther Allen of the University of Massachusetts; Allen A. Kuusisto of the University of New Hampshire; Gerhard Loewenberg of Mt. Holyoke College; Ernest Miller of the University of California (Davis); H. Gordon Skilling of the University of Toronto; and Arthur M. Wilson, Gene M. Lyons, and Samir Anabtawi of Dartmouth College.

The editorial advice of Professor Franklin L. Burdette of the University of Maryland was invaluable.

H. Lee Graham, Geraline McCarthy, Lucille Flanders, Mary Read, Carole Rondelli, and my wife bore most of the burden of preparing

the manuscript, and the staff of Baker Library at Dartmouth College rendered innumerable services.

The kind permission of copyright holders and authors for the use of some of the selections is greatly appreciated.

WILLIAM G. ANDREWS

Belmont, Massachusetts
September 1961

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Part I

INTRODUCTION

Introduction

Governments are not made; they grow. They develop in response to the demands of the communities they rule and serve. Governments do for communities what the members of the communities believe should be done with the authority that is provided to the State to implement each community's collective will. Because governments are the instruments of that will, the purposes for which they are used and the manner of their use depend on the will of the community. Furthermore, they are not rigid and concrete like hammers or shovels; they are abstractions, intangible definitions of relationships among men and their collective resources. Therefore, not only may the application of the instrument vary with changes in the demands of the community, but also the instrument itself may be transformed in adjusting to new tasks. In that sense, governments grow. They are the products of the communities they rule. Communities are living, vital organisms, constantly changing as a result of reciprocal action among their component elements as well as external forces. Because the communities change, their governments change.

Sometimes a government does not respond when the community changes. It fails to rise to new challenges or new demands presented to it by the governed. When that happens the government is cast aside as an outworn and useless tool or it is burst asunder with the explosive force of a revolution. Here again, however, it must be remembered that governments generate no volition, no structure, no dynamism spontaneously. They have only what is imparted to them by the community or the dominant portion of it. Consequently, if the government fails to evolve, it is because men and women who control enough of the community's resources to be able to do so prevent its response to the conflicting demands of other members of the community. Government is the rubber band stretched beyond the breaking point, not the hands that stretch it.

Most modern communities attempt to define verbally the practices and relationships that develop or that they intend should develop in

their governments. These definitions are often expressed in documents called Constitutions. When an abrupt and sweeping change is made in the government, a new Constitution is usually framed. When a minor departure in practice is made from the text deliberately and consciously, an amendment to the document is commonly adopted. Often, however, the changes will be so gradual, unconscious, and even so indirect as to be imponderable, that they will get no documentary notice. The rise of political parties radically transformed governmental practice in both the United States and Great Britain without gaining textual recognition in either country.

This discussion has made no distinction among different types of government. Community will is being accepted as the dynamic force in governments generally, whether authoritarian or democratic, autocratic or constitutional, totalitarian or liberal. Two points require mention here. In the first place, democratic government is regarded here as involving something more than mere responsiveness to the popular will. It requires also the participation in some way of the people in their government and thus both their identification with it and their acceptance of collective responsibility for its actions. A non-democratic government may function in perfect accord with the popular will without any active participation of the people in it. The people, in fact, in most stable dictatorships probably *will* that the government not permit such participation. In the second place, the term "community will" is used rather than "popular will" to call attention to the fact that the directing will is animated by the preponderant element in the community and not necessarily by its most numerous element. In fact, it is probably true that only when the preponderant elements are also the most numerous can a government become a viable democracy.

Having emphasized so far the impact of society on government, it now becomes necessary to redress the balance slightly. It is true that governments are inert, passive relationships. It is also true that they are the products of their social environments. But, once a government has been created in an environment, it becomes possible to distinguish among men on the basis of differences in their relationships with government. Those differences and, indeed the very fact that they exist, become a part of social reality and have an impact on that environment. Not only does the action of the government in response to the community affect the individuals in that community and, thus, ultimately the community in its collective capacity, but also the particular structure and mode of operation of the government will evoke

corresponding reactions from the governed. This impact of the *machinery* of government (as distinct from its *substance,* which is simply the expression of community will) is decidedly weaker than the influence of the community on it, but is not insignificant in many cases.

So far this discussion has treated governments as undifferentiated organisms. Of course, they are not. All political systems contain a great number and variety of organs ranging from the neighborhood fire company to the national legislature or the highest court in the land. The forms and operations of these units are institutionalized manifestations of the character of the regime. The government of Britain, for instance, is a mere idle abstraction until it is seen in the cabinet, the Commons, the monarchy, the Lords, the courts and parties and pressure groups, the civil service, the nationalized industries and health service and control boards and military establishment, etc., etc. Each of these agencies from top to bottom is specialized, developed to play some distinct role in eliciting or implementing the community will. All together they form the mechanism for performing those functions which the community believes it should perform in its collective capacity.

On closer examination it will be seen that the public organs can be grouped into two categories: those which have as their principal function contributing toward the determination of the community will and those whose main purpose is to apply that will to the individual citizen. Individual attitudes concerning public questions (and concerning what should be a public question) trickle up through parties and interest groups, passing through the crucible of elections, to the great deliberative organs of State: the legislature and the executive. At each stage they are processed and refined. Amorphous, indistinct public sentiment becomes party program and party program becomes public policy. Then the policy trickles back down through the administrative and judicial structures to the individual citizen to render or require services as willed by the community. Administrative regulations are devised to carry out the intentions of the policy formulations. Equipment is obtained, personnel is assigned, notice is served to or applications are solicited from Mr. John Doe. In foreign affairs, the object of the government's attention may be a foreign power instead of a national citizen.

The organs that aid in the trickling up process may properly be called political institutions. They formulate public policy. The organs that bring the policy into operation may be regarded as governmental

institutions for they impose the authority of the State on its citizens. The pages that follow deal with the former type of institution. They are designed to show, primarily, not what government does, but how it decides what to do. Of course, in the process of deciding what to do there is discussion of the substance of policy and the perceptive reader should also gain an impression of prevailing attitudes in the respective political systems concerning the principal contemporary political issues.

Because politics is a dynamic process and institutions are inert abstractions, the emphasis here is on the institutional activity rather than the structure. In general, descriptions of institutions are included chiefly when they have been presented by men who have had a major role in the operation of the institution. Otherwise, our major concern is to see at first hand how the political process operates. What do parliamentarians say in debating the merits of a policy or a governmental action? How do the various political parties present their views to the electorate? What are their views? What is the style in which they are presented? How do the men who have directed the executive power in the various systems conceive of their authority? their function?

The formation of policy is dynamic and therefore concerns institutional action. This action forms a process. In every political system there is a series of steps through which the raw material of policy passes en route from undirected popular sentiment confronted by a problem to the formal expression of official public policy. Political parties absorb through their structures myriad manifestations of popular sentiment. These are refined by men who give the business of politics their professional attention. Consideration is given to the feasibility of implementing particular sentiments. Deliberately or by instinct each expression is considered within the universal constellation of political sentiments and assigned its due weight. It is evaluated from the point of view of internal party questions and past party policy. It is assessed with a view toward party electoral prospects. It is examined with an eye on competing parties and on the national interest. All of these factors and others are fed into the policy-making machine of the party and eventually a statement of beliefs and intentions emerges into the public view. This is the party platform which is presented along with the party candidates for consideration by the voters.

The ceremony that begins with the presentation of platforms and candidates and ends in the polling booth is the election campaign. The manner in which campaigns are conducted, the substance of the

appeals, the varying concepts of the purpose and function of elections all contribute toward giving a regime its distinctive character. The extent to which the politics of a nation are oriented toward pragmatism or toward ideology; the extent to which men or measures, personnel or policies, predominate; the nature of the questions at issue; the tone and style of the political combat—light is shed on all of this by the sparks struck off in the clash of the rival forces.

With the convocation of the legislature the battle moves to a different arena; acquires new dimensions, a new tone, and a higher refinement; comes to bear on new objects with altered force; and is conducted with greater polish and sometimes, more ferocity. It was once thought that legislatures legislate and executives execute. It is now seen that the distinctions are quite different and that the functions of each organ vary considerably from system to system. In general, though, the main burden for formulating policies now falls almost everywhere on the executive. The sanction of parliament is almost as universally necessary if the policy is to be official and legitimate, though the sanction may sometimes be implicit. The extent to which that sanction is a mere formality without political significance or, alternatively, the extent to which its acquisition represents the decisive factor in the development of policy varies from issue to issue from time to time and from system to system. The manner in which parliamentary debates are conducted reveals, in part, the nature of the executive-legislative relationships in a system.

In reaching decisions concerning the policies and issues to be presented to the legislature, the executive must also bring conflicting, or at least divergent, viewpoints into confrontation. But the executive branch is the secretive branch. All is supposed to be harmony in the well-run executive. Rarely is this actually so, but the extent to which the fiction is maintained is, in itself, a clue to the character of the regime. Because of the "private" nature of the political processes within the executive branch, descriptions and illustrative materials concerning them are both more difficult to obtain and present and, also, less informative. Fortunately, there is another characteristic of the executive branch that opens the way to other, more useful materials. This other characteristic is its unity at the top. There are normally several hundred legislators in a political system, but, with rare exception, only one executive. Therefore, it is possible to obtain through the eyes of the men who rise to that level of responsibility clear statements of their views on the nature and functions of the organ they direct.

In the case of de Gaulle's France, Adenauer's Germany or Stalin's

Russia, one man played such a dominant role in the development and exercise of the executive power that they deserve special consideration. In the Soviet Union, constitutionalism—the definition external to the present holders of office of governmental limitations and procedures—has such little authority that a man like Khrushchev is able, in a few short years, to transform radically the character of the executive power.

A special word should be added concerning Soviet institutions in general. Even in the West there is considerable variation from country to country in functions performed by organs that are outwardly quite similar. Between the West and the Soviet Union, the differences increase immensely. This fact will emerge in the reading and should be kept in view. Attention to the manner in which the Soviet regime differs in each case should contribute to the overall picture of the system. But it should also be remembered that policy does not flow the same way through the Soviet structure as it does in the Western counterparts.

The last four parts of this book present material on the four principal types of institutions that participate in the political process. In each case, illustrative material on comparable institutions in Great Britain, France, West Germany, and the Soviet Union is juxtaposed to facilitate comparison. But these institutions do not operate in isolation; they are woven into integrated political systems. Therefore, it is also useful to have an overall view of the systems provided by men who have played important parts in their development and operation. It is that type of material that the first part of the book contains.

Part II

GOVERNMENTAL SYSTEMS

A. The United Kingdom

1. British Parliamentary Democracy*

BY HERBERT MORRISON

The framework of the British system of government, unlike that of the American, was not created at a given time by identifiable men. Therefore, it is not possible to examine the intentions of its founders. Nor is there an institution in Britain comparable to the United States Supreme Court in expounding authoritatively the principles of British government.

For an inside view of the British system we must go to the words of the men who have had a hand in its operation. Because constitutional practices constantly evolve, recent political leaders may be expected to be more authoritative spokesmen. Unfortunately, successful British governmental chieftains are often little inclined to engage in general, theoretical political speculation or observation. This, in itself, is significant, for it reflects the pragmatic character of British politics. The editor was unable to find any extended general discussion of the British governmental system by any of the recent occupants of the office of Prime Minister.

On the other hand, the Right Honorable Herbert Morrison (now the Earl of Lambeth) was Deputy Prime Minister, Lord President of the Council, Leader of the House of Commons, and, for a few months, Foreign Secretary during the Labor government from 1945-51. He was a member of the Labor Party Executive Committee for thirty years and Deputy Leader of the Opposition from 1951-55.

This essay is based on a lecture at the University of Paris, May 6, 1949.

* From *Parliamentary Government in Britain*, Hansard Society, London, 1949, pp. 1-12. Reprinted by permission.

I AM not surprised that the British Parliamentary system is still often misunderstood. Some people are misled by the survival of ancient forms and customs into thinking that it is a premachine age institution, a relic of feudalism, which ought to be streamlined in accordance with modern needs. They mistake the forms for the substance. Judged by the results, I would go so far as to claim that the British Parliament is one of the most efficient and up-to-date instruments for its purpose in the world. Some people also fail to see the practical utility of what seem to them to be mere anachronisms. Why all the panoply and pomp attaching to Mr. Speaker, the extreme deference with which he is addressed, his wig and gown, the convention of bowing to the Chair on leaving and entering the Chamber? Why the seemingly outworn courtesies of debate under which even the most bitter opponent is "the Honourable Member," or "the Honourable and Gallant Member," or "the Honourable and Learned Member," or "the Right Honourable Gentleman"? Members when they first enter the House are inclined to think that much of the ceremony is old-fashioned nonsense. It is not long before they come to realize that it serves the real purposes of contributing to the proper authority of the Chair and to orderly debate, and of emphasizing the dignity and corporate spirit of the House.

What of traditions such as the peremptory interruption of the Commons' proceedings by the King's messenger, Black Rod, summoning the Commons to the Royal presence in the House of Lords, and the still more peremptory bolting and shutting of the door in Black Rod's face? It goes back to the occasion in 1642 when King Charles I came to the House in person to arrest the five Members who escaped by boat down the Thames to take refuge in the City of London. It is an assertion of the right of the House to exclude even the King himself unless he comes by permission. True, it is no longer necessary to assert independence of the King, but the continuance of the ceremony is a reminder to the House and to the public of the importance of even the newest Member as a champion of British liberties against the encroachment of arbitrary government whatever form it takes.

Much of the pomp and ceremony is valuable because it helps Parliament and the parliamentary system to keep their hold on the imagination of the people. There is more than a little in what Walter Bagehot said three-quarters of a century ago about the importance of an element of magic in government. I never cease to be moved by the pageantry and dignity of a State Opening of Parliament when the King attends in person to read the Speech from the Throne. Pageantry lends colour to democracy and helps it to work with smoothness and amidst general respect. No matter that the Speech has been prepared by His Majesty's Minister. Call it, if you like, the British love of make-believe or British romanticism. I am sure that it helps in identifying King and People and Government, in breaking down the antithesis between the "we" who are governed and the "they" who do the governing, which must be removed if a democracy is to be truly popular.

Another type of misunderstanding arises from a natural tendency to confuse the letter of the Constitution with the spirit as embodied in its conventions. It is asked, for example, how we can claim to be democratic as long as we have a hereditary Second Chamber whose powers except in financial matters and to the limited extent that they are tempered by the Parliament Act of 1911 are equal to those of the House of Commons. I hold no brief for the House of Lords and I took a leading part in supporting the present Government's Bill for the further reduction of its powers. The fact none the less is that there are few, if indeed any, countries in the world where the popularly

elected Chamber is more powerful than in Britain. At the same time there are also few Second Chambers where the standard of debate is higher than in the British House of Lords. That is because the effective House of Lords consists in the main not of the hereditary peers but of fifty or a hundred distinguished men, many of them former Members of the House of Commons, who have been made peers because of their records of public service.

Why is it that we meet in a Chamber which cannot accommodate all the Members without some of them crowding the gangways and sitting on the floor? Why is it that in the new Chamber which will be ready by 1950 to take the place of the old House which was destroyed in the blitz on London we are proposing to perpetuate what must seem to many people an absurd piece of inefficiency? The reason is that we believe that a small Chamber is more practical and more effective than a large one. We do not believe in separate seats for everyone. The intimacy of a small Chamber—incidentally with Members speaking from their places and not from a rostrum—is more suited to all but the more important occasions (and even then the crowded Chamber adds to the drama of the concluding speeches of a keen debate), and more suited to the workmanlike thrust and counter-thrust of debate which in our experience makes for more useful discussion than does oratory. We also propose in the new Chamber to retain the rectangular shape, with the Government on one side and the Opposition facing it on the other, which again we think facilitates discussion and is an expression of the tradition of an organized Government and a counter-organized Opposition.

There is a tendency to misunderstand the British Parliamentary system because of the historic misunderstanding for which a great Frenchman, Montesquieu, who was a great admirer of the British Constitution, was responsible in his *Esprit des Lois*. I refer to the doctrine of the separation of the powers—legislative, executive and judicial—which Montesquieu thought he saw in England. As a contribution to political analysis it is still valuable, but it has very serious dangers if it is not realized that in practice there is never the clear demarcation between the legislature and executive which Montesquieu envisaged. Nor is it desirable that there should be. What Montesquieu failed to see was that, as was already the case when he wrote and is very much truer now, the British system is based upon a close partnership between the executive and the legislature.

One of the consequences of the emphasis which since Montesquieu's day has so often been placed on the separation of powers is that we all of us tend to think of Parliament first and foremost as the legislature. It is of minor account that this ignores the share of the Government in framing legislation, and the existence of extra-Parliamentary legislation. It is of greater account that it obscures the fact that legislation is only one of the functions which Parliament performs, and it is arguable that it is not the principal one.

We are proud that the "Mother of Parliaments" has survived for more than seven hundred years and is as vigorous as she ever was. A great English historian, Professor A. F. Pollard, said that "Parliament has been the means of making the English nation and the English State. It is really coeval with them both." It has been the forum in which some of our greatest men have graduated to eminence, among whom I count one from our own generation, Mr. Winston Churchill.

If I had to summarize the history of Parliament in a sentence, I would say that it was and is "the High Court of Parliament." It originated in the King's Court. The King called into counsel

first the barons temporal and spiritual and then representatives of the Commons, or the communities of which the nation was composed. Parliament —consisting of the Kings, the Lords, and the Commons—was in those days not only an instrument of government but had important judicial functions. Most of the work of some of the early Parliaments was to deal with petitions on all manner of subjects from every part of the country. Traces of these early judicial duties survive in the position still occupied by the House of Lords as the highest Court of Appeal—though its judicial work is now done in practice by a small group of eminent lawyers—and in the jurisdiction of the House of Commons—in this case the whole House—in the interpretation and enforcement of the law relating to its own rights and privileges. Parliament was the "grand inquest" of the nation.

Legislation was comparatively unimportant until as late as the nineteenth century. Parliament was mainly useful to the King as an instrument for informing himself of what we should now call public opinion, and of obtaining, if he could, the assent of Lords and Commons to his policies; and secondly, and increasingly, to his proposals for raising taxation. In return for this assistance, Parliament for its part enjoyed the right of criticism and of ventilating grievances.

I will not detail the events which led by the eighteenth century to the emergence from the King's Privy Council of a small group of Ministers —or Cabinet—in whom more and more the exercise of the executive powers of the Crown came to rest. I only want to make two points. The first is that it was soon found that the Cabinet could only maintain power if it commanded the support of the House of Commons; and the second is that it proved to be impossible to do so unless the members of the Cabinet were Members of Parliament (Lords or Commons) of the same point of view as the majority of the House of Commons. The consequence was the development of the party system, and it was rightly said by Walter Bagehot that "party government is the vital principle of representative government" and by Benjamin Disraeli that "without party, parliamentary government is impossible."

What had emerged by the end of the eighteenth century could hardly be described as democratic—only a small minority of the population had the right to vote—but it did provide solid foundations on which effective government could be combined with democratic control. Parallel with the extension of democratic forms went a transformation of the party organizations upon whose efficiency, integrity, and zeal for the public good the health of any modern democracy in no small measure depends.

The first essential of the British system is that the Cabinet has the responsibility for governing in the national interest. This is a responsibility which it can share with nobody else, and members of the Cabinet are collectively responsible for the omissions as well as the commissions of their colleagues no less than being individually responsible for every action which is done by them or by any of their civil servants. The Cabinet is in effect a committee of Parliament. It draws its members from Parliament, it accounts to Parliament, it derives its inspiration very largely from Parliament, and it is removable by Parliament. In the final resort, when it believes that the public interest so demands, it must take its own course or resign if it find itself in major disagreement with the House of Commons. Parliament always has the last word.

On the other hand the Cabinet is not helpless before Parliament. The Prime Minister can advise the King to dissolve Parliament, and then Government and private Members alike must justify themselves to the electorate. The power which this gives to

the Government is sometimes exaggerated, but it is an essential feature of the British system and it has the great merit that it gives the individual Member of Parliament a sense of the responsibility which he must share for seeing that effective government is carried on. The Government has to work with Parliament, but Parliament has also to work with the Government. Neither is the creature of the other because each can get rid of the other and force an appeal to the electorate. It is up to both to work harmoniously together in the public interest if they can.

It is not the function of Parliament to carry on the executive administration. Its main function is not even to legislate. It is still the "grand inquest" of the nation, and its main functions are to decide what the character of the Government of the day shall be; to remove that Government if it thinks the time has come to do so; to make sure that the Government is kept fully in touch with public opinion; to ventilate grievances; and to criticize. That is where the Opposition comes in, and why it has such a decisive part in our system. Not that criticisms are confined to the Opposition. Far from it. A great deal of nonsense has been talked about the docile Government back-bencher who hardly opens his mouth and is cowed by the Government Whips. Do not believe it. Do not believe the stories of Parliament being a mere sausage machine for turning out legislation promoted by the Government. If you have any doubts, get hold of a copy of *Hansard,* and go through the Parliamentary Questions with which the day's proceedings begin, and the main Debates of the day, and finally the half-hour Debate on the Adjournment when private Members can raise any matter affecting any Minister provided that legislation is not involved. It will be a strange day if you do not find that more than one Minister has taken some hard knocks at the hands of Government supporters. And Parliamentary Questions and Debates are not the only ways in which private Members can bring their criticisms to bear. A talk with the Minister, a letter, a speech in a Party meeting, may be just as effective. You will also see if you look through *Hansard* how, like its ancestors of centuries ago, Parliament today is giving up much of its time to the grievances great and small of the men and women of Britain, why a disabled ex-serviceman is not receiving a higher pension, why a civil servant was dismissed, or why there are not better postal services in a country village.

The Government back-bencher can undoubtedly make his influence felt, but it is upon the Opposition that the main responsibility for discharging the historic duty of criticism rests. That is why we have what seems at first sight a contradiction in terms—"His Majesty's Opposition"—and why, to go further, the Leader of the Opposition is entitled to a salary of £2,000 a year from public funds. To return to Bagehot, "It has been said that England invented the phrase 'Her Majesty's Opposition': that it was the first Government which made criticism of administration as much a part of the polity as administration itself. This critical opposition is the consequence of Cabinet government."

It is because we believe in the value of criticism that we have exalted His Majesty's Opposition in this way. But the criticism, to be effective, should be responsible, and the more constructive it is the more it will be effective. One reason why I think that this method of organizing criticism has worked well is the two party system, the effect of which is that the Opposition must be more than an Opposition. It must also be an alternative Government, ready to step into the shoes of the Government which it is criticizing.

The British system lays great stress on the individual responsibility of Ministers and of every Member of

Parliament. Like Burke, one of the greatest students of the British Constitution, we believe that the Member of Parliament should not be a mere delegate, a mere puppet of his constituents. He should be their representative, making up his own mind after taking into account all the circumstances—not least his constituents' views—and acting as it seems to him the general public interest requires.

It is also one of the advantages of our system that it provides a salutary deterrent against the temptation to the private Member to be irresponsible in a different sense. The course recommended by the Government may not always be a popular one—it may be particularly unpopular in a Member's own constituency—but the Government back-bencher has to realize that one of his primary responsibilities is to see that the Government is carried on. If as a result of his opposition the Government is defeated, he must face the consequence that the alternatives are either a Government formed by the Opposition, or a general election in which he will be involved.

It is also important that only the Government can propose expenditure or taxation. The Opposition and private Members can propose reductions, but the responsibility for the national Budget should rest in one place and one place only—with the Government. Any other system would be inconsistent with the Government's responsibilities for a coherent financial policy.

Lastly, there is the party system itself, and that for practical purposes means the two-party system. There have been times in British history when there have been three parties with substantial followings in the House of Commons, but we have always returned to two parties. Hardly anybody could have predicted in 1906, when the Liberal Party under Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman was returned triumphantly to power, that in less than twenty years the Liberal Party would be taking second place to the Labour Party, and that in less than forty years its representation in the House of Commons would have been reduced to a handful. Why has this happened? All sorts of explanations have been given. One is that it is connected with the British electoral system. I think that this is a safeguard against the development of minor or splinter parties. One of the reasons why most British people are opposed to proportional representation is that it tends to foster splinter parties which have no chance of forming a Government and no chance of getting their policies adopted except as a result of bargaining with other parties. Nor do we favour the second ballot because we think that everything should be done to present the electors with a clear choice of possible alternative Governments. There is, however, no reason at all why our electoral system should not throw up three major parties, and I am sure that the explanation is more fundamental. It springs from the recognition by the British people—who are a very practical people—that when they vote they are voting for a Government, and that their votes are wasted if they are spent upon a party which has no chance of forming a Government at any foreseeable date.

Our system is designed—if designed is the right word where the design is less the result of conscious thought than of centuries of experience—for two parties, one of which is to form an effective Government and the other an effective opposition. This necessarily means that the parties play an extremely important role in British democracy. It is within the parties that broad agreement is obtained on the general lines on which a Government based on the particular party would be conducted, and the secret of such success as the party system has had in Britain lies in the sense among both parties that in the last resort the broad public interest—not local or sectional interests—must prevail.

What is the choice which lies before

a democratic country in which there are a great many interests and points of view to be reconciled? One method is to organize each of the main interests and points of view in separate parties, and for the reconciliation between them to take place as a result of bargaining at the General Election and in Parliament itself. Alternatively the different points of view can be reconciled within the framework of the parties, each of which within itself contains the elements from which a Government can be formed. This is the method we prefer.

Professor R. M. MacIver has said that "to find the best means of combining responsibility with representation is one of the most important problems of the modern state." We have gone a long way towards solving this problem in Britain. We have a strong Executive, but no stronger than is necessary to maintain an efficient and consistent administration in accordance with the popular will. We think that it is better that both Parliament and the Government should be strong and vigorous, and that each should be ready and able to take its responsibility without either one sheltering behind or deferring excessively to the other.

Then there is the press. I have often been a critic of certain sections of the press, but my criticisms have been based on a deep realization of the importance of a free and responsible press in a democracy, and, though there are exceptions, the British press as a whole can stand comparison with any in the world. It was said by Thomas Carlyle that there were Three Estates in Parliament, "but in the Reporters' Gallery yonder, there sat a Fourth Estate more important far than them all." There is an element of truth in Carlyle's epigram, and we recognize the special importance of the press by the rights and privileges which we accord to the Parliamentary press reporters and the political correspondents who form what is called the "Lobby". The newspapermen who cover the House of Commons reciprocate by the responsible way in which they discharge their duties and respect the confidences which are often entrusted to them. The press is a check both on the Government and on Parliament.

What of the future of British Parliamentary democracy? There is no doubt that it is as firmly established as ever, and the war was evidence of its vitality and strength. Throughout the bombing of London, Parliament did its work. The signal failure of totalitarian parties either of the Left or the Right to get a hold in Britain is evidence of the confidence which the British people have in the Parliamentary system. In saying this, I do not mean to suggest that our system is perfect, or that it could not be improved, or, still more, that it could necessarily be transplanted to other countries with different histories, traditions, national characteristics, and problems.

There are two things which I find particularly encouraging for the future. The first is the evidence which the past few years have provided of the place which Parliament occupies in the imagination and the interest of the British people. This is extremely important because there is no more dangerous threat to democracy than apathy and indifference on the part of the ordinary man and woman. "In all forms of government," said Burke, "the people is the true legislator." If the people do not play their part, Ministers and Members of Parliament alike are bound to be sterile and remote from realities. I do not say that there is not room for improvement in this respect. We want our democracy to be even more active and we want a still more informed and politically-educated electorate.

All the same I find reassurance in the many signs of the hold which Parliament has on the British people. It is exemplified by the extraordinary interest which has been taken in recent by-elections, and in a different

way by the long queues that day after day wait their turn for admission to the Public Gallery of the House of Commons. It is a healthy sign that something of the order of two and a half to three million people listen each week to Saturday evening broadcasts on the radio in which Members of Parliament describe "The Week in Westminster," and of the order of one and a half to two million every evening last thing at night turn on "Today in Parliament", a review of the day's proceedings. It is no less encouraging that *Hansard*—in some ways a formidable volume—should sell an average of 11,000 to 12,000 copies compared with about 1,500 before the war.

Another sign of the times has been the foundation in 1944 and the subsequent growth of the Hansard Society. Like many things in Britain, the name of this Society conceals the scope of its objects, which are: To promote interest in and spread information throughout the world about the institution of Parliament. Membership of the Society is open to any person believing in these objects. The Society now numbers about two thousand members including many firms and institutions, and publishes an increasing amount of literature, including its quarterly journal, *Parliamentary Affairs*.

The experience of the present Parliament has also shown the flexibility of our parliamentary institutions and how efficiently they can cope with the abnormally heavy demands of the post-war period. The Government has set about the business-like planning of the legislative programme in a way not paralleled before. At the same time, with the general agreement of the House of Commons, a number of important reforms have been made in procedure. These have been designed to reduce repetition, to save time, and to relieve the pressure on the House as a whole by greater delegation to committees, but none of the changes has fettered effective Parliamentary discussion, either of legislation or of all the many aspects of the Government's executive administration.

I am not ashamed of the pride which, as a British citizen and an old parliamentarian, I take in British parliamentary democracy. I am afraid that the British system is not always logical, though in all essentials I would say that it was thoroughly logical. But the British people—for good or ill, I am not trying to dogmatize—are not very much worried about anomalies and illogicalities provided that an institution works. And the supreme justification for our system is that in our British conditions it works very well.

This is not a party matter, and you will not be surprised if I quote once again from a political thinker from whom the Conservative Party derive much of their inspiration—Edmund Burke. Burke said: "Government is a contrivance of human wisdom to provide for human wants. Men have a right that these wants should be provided for by this wisdom." British parliamentary democracy can stand up better than most to this criterion, and I am quite content that it should be judged by this practical test.

2. The Merits of the British System*

BY WINSTON S. CHURCHILL

The author was Prime Minister for nine years, longer than any other person in this century. He was leader of the Opposition for six years and has been a member of the House of Commons almost without interruption since 1906, longer than any living person.

I have searched through his 50-odd volumes of published works for a general discussion of the British system of government. The scrap below is all I found. It was spoken during a House of Commons debate.

If it be true, as has been said, that every country gets the form of government it deserves, we may certainly flatter ourselves. The wisdom of our ancestors has led us to an envied and enviable situation. We have the strongest Parliament in the world. We have the oldest, the most famous, the most honoured, the most secure and the most serviceable monarchy in the world. King and Parliament both rest safely and solidly upon the will of the people expressed by free and fair election on the basis of universal suffrage. Thus this system has long worked harmoniously both in peace and war. . . .

* *H. C. Deb.*, May 15, 1945, col. 2307.

3. The Essential Nature of the Constitution*

BY L. S. AMERY

The author was a member of the House of Commons from 1911 to 1945 and a top-ranking leader of the Conservative party for many years. He served in high governmental or ministerial posts from 1917 to 1929 and was a member of the cabinet from 1940 to 1945.

The British Constitution has never been set out in a written document reflecting the political theories of a particular group of men or the prepossessions of a particular age. It includes some memorable declaratory and statutory milestones of its historic evolution, from Magna Carta to the Statute of Westminster. But some of its most important features are no part of its formal and legal structure and have little other sanction beyond use and precedent. It is only in quite recent years that our legislative vocabulary has even acknowledged the existence of such vital and long-established elements as the Cabinet and the Prime Minister. The whole, like the law of the land of which it is a part, is a blend of formal law, precedent, and tradition. It is a living structure, shaped by the interaction of individual purposes and collective instincts with changing external circumstances. It has followed the laws of its own growth, and not a preconceived intellectual plan designed to control and confine that growth. There has never been a complete break in its continuity, and it can truly be said with Hearn in his *Government of England* that it is still the 'very constitution under which the Confessor ruled and which William swore to obey.' On the other hand, it has been subject to incessant modification in order to meet changing circumstances and changing ideas. No picture of it in any one generation is wholly true of it in another, any more than the picture of a man at some particular stage of his life can hold good for a later stage. That, indeed, must be my justification for attempting to portray the working of the Constitution as I see it to-day and in the light of the many changes which have taken place in the fifty years in which I have been in contact with parliamentary and public life.

At the same time our Constitution, throughout all the changes in its working, has retained its essential and original character. It is based on certain main features and inspired by certain vital principles which have remained constant and which have continued to

* Chapter One of *Thoughts on the Constitution* (2nd edition), Oxford University Press, New York, 1953, pp. 1-32. Reprinted by permission. The author's footnotes, except bibliographic citations, have been omitted.

assert, or reassert, themselves according to circumstances. It is not so much flexible as elastic, tending to revert to form as the influences which have deflected it in one direction or another have weakened or been superseded. It is to these main and vital features that I wish to draw your attention in this first lecture, because they may not only help to explain some of the changes of recent years, but also afford some guidance as to the nature of the even greater changes which may follow the political and economic developments of the years immediately ahead of us.

There are, as Dicey points out in *The Law of the Constitution,* two main features from which all our constitutional development has proceeded. The one is 'the Rule or Supremacy of Law' and the other 'the omnipotence or undisputed supremacy throughout the whole country of the central Government.' The former feature was one deep-seated, not only in Saxon, but in all medieval thinking, until superseded elsewhere by the influence of Roman Law. The latter owes everything to the insight and masterful personality of William the Conqueror. With a clean slate to write upon he took care so to distribute the spoils of conquest among his followers as to prevent the building up of large territorial fiefs which might in course of time dispute the royal supremacy. In this way he laid the foundation of a strong centralized government which had no parallel in medieval Europe. In the long run, indeed, the clear gap thus created between the King and his subjects, great or small, tended to draw the latter together in resistance to arbitrary royal power and in defence of the recognized law and custom of the land. The barons and citizens who met together at Runnymede represent the obverse of William's policy when the royal power he created fell into tyrannous but weaker hands. At the same time William utilized the existing Saxon shire as a means of by-passing feudal authority through his sheriff, who, sitting in its court of freeholders as the King's representative and at the same time bringing the King's government in touch with local need, foreshadowed the centralized parley between the Crown and the Commons or 'communities' of later days.

From William's day onwards the key to our constitutional evolution is to be found in the interaction between the Crown, i.e. the central governing, directing, and initiating element in the national life, and the nation in its various 'estates' i.e. classes and communities, as the guardian of its written and unwritten laws and customs. The ambitions or needs of the Crown continually demanded changes in the law which the nation was only prepared to accept after discussion or parley with its representatives and on terms. Out of that parley, progressively more continuous and more intimate as needs increased, and out of those terms, grew our system, as we know it, of Government in and with Parliament, subject to the ever increasing influence of public opinion and to periodic review by the nation as a whole. i.e. ELECTIONS

The story of that evolution is so familiar to you that I need only touch on a few of its most salient features. The financial needs of the Crown long furnished the main lever by which Parliament increased its power. At the same time, the provision of actual money freed the Crown from dependence on feudal services and reinforced its effectively centralized authority. The same process of discussion and bargaining led to other changes or restatements of the law—at first suggested to the Crown by way of petitions, but from the fifteenth century onwards embodied in detailed Bills. These, whether initiated by or on behalf of the Crown or by Parliament itself, were then in their final form submitted to the King for his personal approval. No less important was the development by which the occasional parliamentary disapproval of the ex-

ecutive action of individual servants of the Crown, expressed in impeachment or attainder, grew into that milder but constant day-by-day questioning and criticism of Ministers with which we are familiar. Out of that development, helped by the doctrine that the King can do no wrong, sprang that division between the personal and the official powers of the Crown which is one of the most characteristic features of our Constitution.

The essential point to keep in mind is that in this process the Crown as an institution, in other words the element of government and direction, has maintained and, indeed, enormously increased the sum total of its power and influence. The Monarchy itself, divorced from arbitrary personal power, has become increasingly the symbol of the unity and continuity of our national and Imperial life. But that conception has not been without its profound psychological influence on the position of the Crown in its official capacity, both in the sense of responsibility which it infuses into Ministers and in the instinctive tendency of the nation to acquiesce loyally in their decisions, however open to criticism. That Ministers are His Majesty's servants does mean something both to themselves and to the public, however well known it may be that they, in fact, receive no orders from the Monarch in person, and that his power of dissenting from their conclusions on public affairs has shrunk by usage and sufferance to the narrowest of spheres. It is, indeed, customary to speak of that power as if it were limited in these days to a very occasional option in the choice of a Prime Minister among more or less equally eligible candidates. Of that I shall have something to say presently.

Meanwhile it is enough to say that in the present century the Monarch has carefully refrained from any such measure of intervention in matters of policy or display of political partisanship or of personal objection to appointments as Queen Victoria frequently exercised. But, within the limits of strict impartiality, the King has more than once in recent years played a mediating part in a political crisis, as for instance in connexion with the Parliament Act of 1911, over Home Rule in 1914, and again in the financial crisis of 1931. It is believed, too, that the King's right to encourage as well as to warn was not without its influence on the settlement of the Irish question in 1921.

What is, however, important to keep in mind, from the constitutional point of view, is that the Monarch's personal power has never been abrogated or its precise limits defined. Circumstances might conceivably arise in which it might on some particular issue be reasserted with national approval. There is, for instance, the suggested hypothetical case of a majority using the Parliament Act in order to prolong its own life for purely partisan purposes. The question can only be decided in the light of all the circumstances of the time, and the verdict of the nation alone will settle whether such an assertion of the royal authority will have been constitutional or not. I would only add the obvious comment that such action, unless clearly of a quite exceptional character and confirmed by the judgement of the nation, might gravely affect the position of the Monarchy as the symbol of our national unity and as such above all party controversy.

All I wish to stress is that there is no absolute definition of the limits of that authority which can hold good for all time or for all circumstances. In the Dominions that authority, by usage somewhat wider than here, has in our time ceased to be exercised with reference to advice from a Secretary of State in London, and is exercised solely on the personal judgement and discretion of the Governor-General or Governor in his ultimate responsibility

to the nation or State concerned. This was clearly established by Lord Byng's refusal in 1926 to consult me, as Dominions Secretary, when he decided to reject Mr. Mackenzie King's demand for a dissolution on the ground that the Leader of the Opposition in the Canadian House of Commons, Mr. Meighen, was able to carry on without one. In 1926 when an issue affecting the Governor's powers arose between Sir Dudley de Chair, then Governor of New South Wales, and the State Premier, Mr. Lang, the latter sent over his Attorney-General, Mr. McTiernan, in order to secure from me either assent to the principle that a Governor must always subscribe to his Minister's wishes or at least some definition of the limits of his rights to differ. With neither of these requests was I prepared to comply, basing myself on my statement in Parliament on 15 March 1926 that "it would not be proper for the Secretary of State to issue instructions to the Governor with regard to the exercise of his constitutional duties." Sir Philip Game, subsequently, in 1932, dismissed Mr. Lang, basing his action on the latter's illegal conduct in instructing State officials to prevent payments being made under Commonwealth legislation whose validity had been upheld by the High Court. The result of the subsequent election confirmed the Governor's decision.

Still less capable of definition, of course, is the scope of the personal influence of one who not only enjoys the natural prestige of his position as Sovereign, but may have the advantage of an even longer experience of the inside of government than his Ministers, and who is entitled to seek advice in every quarter, even if there is only one source of advice which he is constitutionally bound to follow. It has, indeed, been suggested that the whole course of our constitutional evolution might have been modified if Queen Victoria had continued to enjoy for another generation the support of so able and farseeing a private counsellor as the Prince Consort.

To return to the main thread of my argument. I need not go in detail into the well-known story, whether strictly correct or apocryphal, of the origins of the Cabinet as the outcome, in part, of Harley's informal Saturday dinners, and, in part, of George I's reluctance to attend Ministerial Councils at which, as he knew no English and his Ministers no German, discussion had to be confined to such Latin as they could muster between them. The essential point is that the growth of the system of collective responsibility, based on previous private discussion, strengthened the hands of the Ministry not only as against the Monarch but also as against Parliament. To single out an individual for dismissal or denunciation is far easier than to denounce or urge the dismissal of a team, especially if the only alternative is another and even less welcome team.

Similarly, the most significant of all our constitutional innovations, whose beginnings go back to Walpole and reached their definite shape before the end of the eighteenth century, namely, the selection of a term of Ministers from among members of Parliament who could guarantee a working majority, while in one sense subordinating the policy of the Crown to party exigencies, yet, in another, meant an accession to the actual power of Government, as such, in exercising control over Parliament. It meant converting the leading poachers into the 'Crown's' gamekeepers. It meant converting the majority in Parliament into place-men, within at least the penumbra of office and influence, while at the same time under constant threat of losing their places (and nowadays their members' salaries) if their lack of support to the Government should cause the latter to dissolve Parliament.

At the same time neither Ministers nor their supporters have, in their in-

dividual capacity, ceased to remain representatives of the nation or of their individual constituencies. Nor have they entirely abandoned to the Opposition the original critical and debating function of Parliament. Subject to the varying strength of party discipline, government supporters can still criticize this or that feature of the Government's legislation or administration in public—and even more freely behind the scenes to the Whips or at party meetings in committee rooms. So, too, Ministers feel a kinship with other members, with whom they share the responsibilities and problems with which they have to deal in their constituencies. What is more, they hope, even if they lose office, to remain in Parliament and so continue to exercise their influence over affairs pending their return to power. They are parliamentarians first and for the greater part of their public life; Ministers of the Crown at intervals. It is as parliamentarians that they are first tested and judged, both for ability and for character, by their seniors and their fellows, that they win and then keep or lose their right to office. Above all, whether Ministers or back-benchers, in office or in opposition, they are all subject to the firm and impartial control of Mr. Speaker, as the embodiment of the traditions of Parliament and of the rights of its humblest member. All these factors have combined to keep Parliament as the centre and focus of the nation's affairs, the conspicuous stage on which the great drama is acted, the great game of politics played. It is their interlocking and interchangeability which have maintained the unity and harmony of our political life, and it is in that sense that we rightly boast of our system as one of parliamentary government.

All the same, throughout the evolution of that system, the two main elements of our political life have remained distinct, though progressively harmonized and integrated. Our Constitution is still, at bottom, based on a continuous parley or conference in Parliament between the Crown, i.e. the Government as the directing and energizing element, and the representatives of the Nation whose assent and acquiescence are essential and are only to be secured by full discussion. The whole life of British politics, to quote Bagehot, "is the action and reaction between the Ministry and the Parliament.' One might also say to-day 'between the Ministry and the Opposition,' for it is the latter upon which has devolved most of the original critical function of Parliament.

Montesquieu was not, in fact, so wide of the mark as is sometimes thought when he made the division and equipoise of powers in our Constitution its chief characteristic and the secret of its success. It must be remembered that when he published his *Esprit des Lois* in 1748 the solution of ensuring stable majorities for the Crown in Parliament by entrusting office to those who could guarantee those majorities had not been fully explored. In any case he was contrasting the English give and take between independent and coequal political forces and the independence of our judges—the natural and logical consequence of our conception of the reign of law—with the rigid centralization of all power in the French Monarchy. To that extent he was only in line with Blackstone's dictum: 'herein consists the true excellence of the English government that all the parts of it form a natural check upon each other.'

Where Montesquieu went astray was in treating the division as one between the executive and legislative functions, abstractions bearing no relation to the reality of our political life. Parliament is not, and never has been, a legislature, in the sense of a body specially and primarily empowered to make laws. The function of legislation, while shared between 'King, Lords and Commons in Parliament assembled,' has always been predominantly exercised by Government which, indeed,

has never allowed Parliament as such to take any initiative in one of its most important fields, that of finance. The main task of Parliament is still what it was when first summoned, not to legislate or govern, but to secure full discussion and ventilation of all matters, legislative or administrative, as the condition of giving its assent to Bills, whether introduced by the Government or by private members, or its support to Ministers.

Montesquieu's error remains of interest, for on it the Fathers of the American Constitution based a constitutional structure which they believed reproduced the best features of the British Constitution. The practical inconveniences resulting from this artificial severance between functions which, in the nature of the case, are largely interdependent is an obvious weakness of the American Constitution. On the other hand, the President's freedom from the vagaries of parliamentary interference and his fixed tenure of office were, no doubt, in the past steadying factors in a young community continuously absorbing new elements with no common tradition. The Fathers of the American Constitution were, however, under no illusion as to one essential difference in the character of the two constitutions. Inspired in part by the republican tradition of the Puritans and even more by current individualist theories of the foundation of the State, they made the individual citizen the starting-point and motive power of the political process, the creator both of the President as the embodiment of the citizen's executive authority and of Congress as the embodiment of his power over legislation. On that issue they knew they were departing directly from the British tradition. It may, indeed, be said that for the underlying British conception of balance and adjustment between two coequal elements, each enjoying original and independent authority, they substituted the citizen voter, or the numerical majority of citizen voters, as the antecedent and ultimate source of authority.

More serious in its consequences, not so much for ourselves, perhaps, as for other countries, was the misreading of the essential nature of our Constitution in the last century by writers of the dominant Liberal individualist school, of whom Bagehot was the typical or, at least, most popular exponent. Interpreting the parliamentary situation of their own time in the light of their general prepossessions, they persuaded themselves that our Constitution had, in fact, become what they thought it ought to be, namely a system based on the delegation of authority by the electorate to a Parliament which, in its turn, delegated the day-by-day exercise of that power to a Cabinet which was, in substance, only a committee—to use Bagehot's phrase—of the parliamentary majority. That reinterpretation, though queried by eminent authorities like Seeley and Lowell, and contested fundamentally by so thoughtful a constitutionalist as Hearn, became the prevalent text-book theory, and still colours most current journalistic and political phraseology.

There was, indeed, much in the external circumstances of the time to encourage their assumptions. The mutual interlocking of Government and Parliament had by then been fully achieved. The *laissez-faire* theories of the age in economic matters and the absence of any serious external menace since Trafalgar and Waterloo had reduced the active work, both of administration and of legislation, to a minimum. A few broad issues of general policy could be spread over prolonged and eloquent debates. Parliamentary debate as such dominated the attention of the public and created the great parliamentary figures of that day. In the comparatively evenly balanced and less strictly disciplined Parliament of the time, with both parties and the electorate itself drawn from a limited social stratum, it was not unnatural to conclude that Parlia-

ment, which so frequently upset Government, was in fact the body which governed and did so in response to the positive wishes of an actively interested electorate.

What was not foreseen by the Radical reformers of those days was that the progressive extension of the franchise, on the one hand, and the continuous increase in the volume of government work, on the other, would, by leading to stronger party organization in the country and to stricter party discipline in Parliament, reinforce an inherent tendency, in our system, for government, as such, to reassert itself whenever the opportunity or the need might arise. As for the fears of Conservative critics, whatever dangers or disadvantages may, or may not, have resulted from the spread of democracy in this country, the weakening of government has not been one of them. The strength of the innate tendency of our governmental tradition has been sufficient to overcome the danger which Burke foresaw in democracy, as preached by the individualist school, when he wrote:*

"No legislator has willingly placed the seat of active power in the hands of the multitude; because then it admits of no control, no regulation, no steady direction whatever. The people are the natural control on authority; but to exercise and to control together is contradictory and impossible."

In that respect our Constitution has throughout conformed to that principle of balance between initiative and control which Burke laid down. It has never been one in which the active and originating element has been the voter, selecting a delegate to express his views in Parliament as well as, on his behalf, to select an administration conforming to those views. The starting point and mainspring of action has always been the Government. It is the Government which, in the name of the Crown, makes appointments and confers honours without consulting Parliament. It is the Government, in the name of the Crown, which summons Parliament. It is the Government which settles the programme of parliamentary business and directs and drives Parliament in order to secure that programme. If Parliament fails to give sufficient support it is the Government, or an alternative Government, which, in the name of the Crown, dissolves Parliament.

At a general election the voter is not in a position to choose either the kind of representative or the kind of government he would like if he had a free choice. There is a Government in being which he can confirm or else reject in favour of the alternative team. The candidates before him—the only candidates worth taking seriously —are either supporters of the team in office or of its rivals for office. It is within those narrow limits that his actual power is exercised. He may be influenced by the personality of the candidates, still more by that of the leaders of the parties, by a Government's record or by its opponents' promises, by sheer party loyalty or light-hearted desire for a change. No doubt, too, he has had his continuous share in the making of that public opinion which helps to shape parties and influence governments. But by the time it comes to an actual decision his function is the limited and essentially passive one of accepting one of two alternatives put before him.

Our whole political life, in fact, turns round the issue of government. The two-party system is often referred to as if it were the happy result of an accidental historical development, or as the consequence of a natural division between two types of mind. Both statements contain a substantial element of truth. But the decisive and continuous influence has been the fact that a governing team with a majority in Parliament can normally only be displaced by another team capable of

* "Appeal from the New to the Old Whigs."

securing an alternative majority. Parties which are not in a position to make their own government may, like the Labour party in the early years of the century, represent the intrusion of a new school of political thought, content to make its voice heard and its influence felt, pending the day when they can take office for themselves. Or, like the Liberal party to-day, they may be survivals of a past political alinement, not yet despairing of resuscitation or at least of influence as a balancing factor. But they are essentially transition phenomena. The two-party system is the natural concomitant of a political tradition in which government, as such, is the first consideration, and in which the views and preferences of voters or of members of Parliament are continuously limited to the simple alternative of 'for' or 'against.' It is, indeed, only under the conditions created by such a tradition that there can be any stability in a government dependent from day to day on the support of a majority in Parliament.

It is precisely on that issue that the nineteenth century Liberal exponents of our constitutional system so grievously misled the outside world. They created the belief that it was possible successfully to combine the British form of Constitution with the prevalent continental conception, derived from the French Revolution, of political power as a delegation from the individual citizen through the legislature to an executive dependent on that legislature. That conception naturally involves the widest freedom in the citizen's choice of party regarded as the end in itself. In many countries it has led to the almost indefinite multiplication of parties. Another consequence has been the adoption of systems of proportional representation, usually based on party lists, in order to secure for the individual voter or individual party their fair share of the composition of the legislature. It equally implies the right of the legislature to the initiative in all respects, including finance, and the denial to the Government of the power of dissolution. All these logical deductions have, indeed, been asserted as self-evident consequences of popular and parliamentary sovereignty by the great majority of those who have been engaged in drafting the new French Constitution [*of the Fourth Republic*].

Such a system of government, not in and with Parliament, but by Parliament, is bound, by its very nature, to be weak and unstable, subject to the continual shifting and reshuffling of coalition ministries and to the influence of personal ambitions. Face to face with the growing need of the age for more governmental action and more definite leadership, it has almost everywhere broken down. The rise of dictatorships and of one-party governments has been the almost inevitable consequence of the ineffectiveness of constitutions which reproduced the outward form of the British Constitution without that spirit of strong and stable government which is of its essence. The danger in Europe to-day is that we seem to be laying all our emphasis on urging the reproduction everywhere of those same externals, and asserting that same misinterpretation of the character of British 'democracy,' instead of laying stress on the need for strong and stable government first and then leaving it to each country in the light of its particular conditions to find the way to reconciling that essential with public opinion and popular consent. We may thus be only too successful in paving the way for the spread of Communism or of some variant of Fascism that will offer what Europe most needs and what we seem unable to supply. Nor is the danger confined to Europe. All over the East and, not least, within our own Empire, we have created a demand for constitutional forms which can only work in a homogeneous community like ours and under a tradition in which all the emphasis lies

on the strength and stability of government. We have never tried to think out alternative forms which could preserve the real character of our Constitution adapted to wholly different conditions.

Democratic government based, in principle, at least, on delegation from below can, no doubt, be made to work. But in order to do so, the Government, however chosen, may enjoy a real measure of independence and for a reasonably long period. The United States affords one example. An even better example is Switzerland, where the executive is directly elected by the legislature and reflects its composition, but once elected, remains independent for the lifetime of the legislature. In France General de Gaulle, with a just insight into the weakness of the existing French political outlook, has recently proposed, in order to ensure continuity and as the only safeguard against the danger of dictatorship, a blend of the American and British systems in which executive power and initiative are effectively centred in the President and the Ministry and not in the Chamber. What cannot work, as Mill himself admitted, and as Cromwell decided somewhat more forcibly before him, is government by an elected assembly or subject to continual direct dictation and interference by such an assembly. In any case that is not the kind of government under which we live ourselves. Our system is one of democracy, but of democracy by consent and not by delegation, of government of the people, for the people, with, but not by, the people.

How far astray the prevalent mid-Victorian theory of our Constitution was from the reality even of that age, and still more so of ours, may be seen if we compare Bagehot's definition of the Cabinet as a committee of Parliament, or rather of the majority in Parliament, with the actual process by which Cabinets come into being and are, in fact, constituted. A committee usually implies definite appointment in detail by the parent body. Nothing of the sort takes place in the creation of a British Cabinet. The starting-point is the selection by the Monarch of a Prime Minister. The Monarch's choice, like that of the voter, may in most cases be very limited. If the majority party has a recognized leader, that is the obvious person to send for. Still there may be occasions when the Monarch's personal judgement can be exercised as between possible alternatives. The most recent case quoted by the text-books is that of Queen Victoria's selection of Lord Rosebery instead of Sir William Harcourt, whom the House of Commons would have preferred, or of Lord Spencer whom Mr. Gladstone would have recommended, if asked, in 1894.

There are, however, later instances. King George V's decision in 1923 to send for Mr. Baldwin instead of Lord Curzon (Mr. Bonar Law declining to make any recommendation) is often referred to as having been the natural consequence of the latter's being in the House of Lords and so under modern conditions disqualified. As a matter of fact Lord Curzon's appointment was practically settled when two junior members of the Cabinet, the late Lord Bridgeman and myself, intervened with Lord Stamfordham and urged reconsideration in favour of Mr. Baldwin as likely to be more acceptable to his colleagues and to the rank and file of the party. Lord Balfour, who was called up from the country, agreed and suggested Lord Curzon's peerage as a sound reason for passing him over. The final decision was, to the best of my belief, made mainly on the issue of the personal acceptability of the two candidates. If a constitutional precedent was created, it was largely as the *ex post facto* cover for a decision taken on other grounds. Again, when Mr. MacDonald resigned in 1931 it was the King's personal appeal to him and to the Opposition leaders that kept him in office as the head of a coalition, and that weighed with Mr.

Baldwin in not pressing his natural claim to be invited to form a government.

Far wider is the field of choice open to a newly appointed Prime Minister. No doubt he has to consider the claims and views of leading members of his party in both Houses. But, subject to Parliament putting up with his selection of his colleagues and his arrangement of offices, he has a very free hand in shaping his government according to his own view of what is likely to work best and according to his personal preferences. It is for him to decide on the size of the Cabinet and what Ministers to include in it. He may consult a few leading colleagues or the Chief Whip or his personal cronies. In 1929 Mr. MacDonald settled his chief appointments in consultation with Messrs. Snowden, Clynes, Henderson, and Thomas. What formal or informal consultations may have taken place in the formation of the present Cabinet is not within my knowledge. Hitherto, in this country, at any rate, the Prime Minister has never been under any sort of direct dictation either from Parliament or from a Party Executive outside in making up his government. He may go outside the party ranks, or even outside Parliament, to choose someone whom he may think specially fitted for a particular post. Thus in 1903 Mr. Balfour offered the Colonial Office to Lord Milner, who was then still High Commissioner in South Africa and had never played any part in parliamentary life. In 1923 Mr. Baldwin offered the Chancellorship of the Exchequer to Mr. McKenna, a Liberal ex-Cabinet Minister, who declined on grounds of health, while Mr. MacDonald in 1924 made Lord Chelmsford, a non-party ex-Viceroy, First Lord of the Admiralty. Even more remarkable in its disregard of his party's views was Mr. Baldwin's appointment in that same year of Mr. Churchill to the Exchequer. At that time Mr. Churchill was almost the last person to whom Conservatives would have dreamt of entrusting that key position, not only because he had until only quite recently been a political opponent, but because he was known still to be vehemently opposed to the main constructive policy of the Party. But the appointment was made and the Conservative Party in Parliament, though never quite reconciled to it, grumbled and submitted.

Few dictators, indeed, enjoy such a measure of autocratic power as is enjoyed by a British Prime Minister while in process of making up his Cabinet. In France or in any other continental country which has imitated the outward form, but not the essentials, of our Constitution, newly appointed Prime Ministers have had to go round hat in hand to appeal for co-operation from political rivals each determined to make his own bargain as to the particular office he might wish to hold or as to the filling of other offices, and by no means sure that he might not do better for himself by holding back and waiting for the next ministerial reshuffle. With us there has been no instance of a Prime Minister failing to form a government owing to the irreconcilable claims or views of party colleagues since Russell's failure to form a government in 1845 because Grey would not serve with Palmerston. It was, indeed, widely bruited about in 1905 that Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman could not form a workable government in face of the anticipated refusal of the Liberal Imperialist leaders, Asquith, Grey, and Haldane, to serve under him. But when it came to the point the strength of the Prime Minister's position easily asserted itself and they joined unconditionally. In 1916 Mr. Asquith resigned in the confident but, as the event proved, mistaken belief that, except for Mr. Bonar Law and Sir Edward Carson, no Conservative or Liberal of any standing would be willing to serve under Mr. Lloyd George.

A British Prime Minister may, no

doubt, while forming his Cabinet, be besieged by insistent candidates for this or that office, but rarely is such a candidate prepared to reject the Prime Minister's final allocation. Refusal may mean exclusion from office, not merely for that Parliament, but for good and all. In 1924 Sir Robert Horne, who had been a successful President of the Board of Trade and Chancellor of the Exchequer, refused the Ministry of Labour which Mr. Baldwin offered him. He was never considered for office again. It is only exceptionally forceful or fortunate political rogue elephants that, once extruded from the governing herd, can find their way back into it, as both Mr. Churchill and your present lecturer discovered for a decade after 1929.

This power of the Prime Minister to appoint, reshuffle, or dismiss his colleagues continues throughout his term of office. It is, no doubt, mainly influenced by considerations of administrative or parliamentary success or failure. But it is a purely personal authority and makes the Prime Minister something very much more than a *primus inter pares* in the Cabinet. His exact position must always depend in large measure upon his own personality and that of his colleagues in the Cabinet, as well as upon parliamentary and party influences outside. He is, in effect, both captain and man at the helm, enjoying, as undisputed working head of the State, a power far greater than that of the American President—so long as he does not actually forfeit the allegiance of naturally deferential and loyal colleagues in the Cabinet or of his followers in Parliament.

The fact that Parliament does not appoint but accepts a Prime Minister and a Cabinet is even more strikingly evident in time of war or acute crisis. Mr. Asquith's Coalition Cabinet of 1915 resulted immediately from Lord Fisher's resignation as First Sea Lord and from consequent negotiations with the Conservative leaders. It may, however, be said to have conformed to a general desire on the part of the House of Commons that he should strengthen his government by including the leaders of the Opposition. But the Lloyd George War Cabinet at the end of 1916 was not one that could have emerged from any method of ascertaining the wishes of Parliament beforehand. Few Liberals and still fewer Conservatives would have actually chosen Mr. Lloyd George as Prime Minister. Nor was there any demand, outside a very small circle, for a drastic change in the structure and working of the Cabinet as such. The whole affair was, in effect, a Palace Revolution brought about by a handful of men in the inner circle of the Asquith Government who were convinced that the war could not be won under the existing leadership and by the existing methods.

Still more notable, in that respect, was the formation of the MacDonald-Baldwin-Samuel Coalition of 1931. It is doubtful whether a Gallup poll taken in advance in favour of that particular solution would have secured even 10 per cent. support from either Socialists or Conservatives in Parliament. The bulk of the Socialist party, indeed, broke away as soon as it was formed, and the Conservatives only acquiesced on the most explicit assurances given by Mr. Baldwin to a party meeting that the emergency arrangement would be terminated the moment a balanced budget had been passed. By then, however, Ministers had begun to feel at home in their offices and to persuade themselves that the economic emergency still called for a 'National Government.' Unable to agree upon any policy to meet the emergency, they appealed to the country for a 'doctor's mandate.' The public, impressed by the vigour of the effort to balance the budget, and persuaded by a vast consensus of political and non-political 'expert' authority of

the imminent danger of inflation and soaring prices, gave, by its vote, a majority in Parliament of ten to one, not so much for the Coalition, as against the unhappy and bewildered rump of the Socialist party. The subsequent necessity of having some sort of positive economic policy was met, for several months, by the fantastic expedient of certain Ministers dissociating themselves from the collective responsibility of the Cabinet and voting against its measures, and by their resignation after the Ottawa agreements.

The change of government in 1940 was, indeed, the direct result of a parliamentary demonstration of dissatisfaction with Mr. Neville Chamberlain's war leadership, and Mr. Chamberlain's recommendation to the King to send for Mr. Churchill coincided with the general feeling that the latter had the gifts which the occasion needed. As the basis of his government Mr. Churchill started with a more or less conventional inter-party coalition. But he freely enlarged and strengthened his administration by bringing in able outsiders to political life, fixing them up with seats in one or other House of Parliament as might be convenient.

I have purposely dwelt at some length on these particular instances in order to make it clear that, however essential it may be for a British government, once formed, to be sufficiently acceptable to Parliament to secure support in the division lobbies, its formation is in no sense the result of a parliamentary initiative and that its composition may bear little relation to the wishes and views of Parliament at the time. They are the result of an independent process beginning with the Monarch and carried on by the Prime Minister. It is still the Monarch who selects the individual who is likely to make the most effective Prime Minister and that individual acts on his own responsible judgement of the situation. The Cabinet which he has formed then unite to support him to the best of their ability in administration and in debate, while those useful adjuncts to the Cabinet system, the Government Whips, fullfil their day-by-day duty of exhortation, encouragement, or discreet menace, in order to maintain the disciplined support of the back benches. Government and Parliament, however closely intertwined and harmonized, are still separate and independent entities, fulfilling the two distinct functions of leadership, direction, and command, on the one hand, and of critical discussion and examination on the other. They start from separate historical origins, and each is perpetuated in accordance with its own methods and has its own continuity.

The continuity of government in our system is symbolized in the person of the Monarch. But it is also maintained in substance by the fact that the vast majority of the servants of the Crown carry on their duties permanently. What we call a change of government is, in fact, only a change in that small, if important, element which is required to direct the general policy, while securing for it parliamentary and public support or at least acquiescence. A change of government, to quote Hearn, means that:

'The vigour and uniform action of the Executive are maintained; but the direction of its forces is altered according to the wishes of the legislature. . . . the vessel of state is entrusted to other hands and proceeds upon a different course. But it is essential to the success of the operation both that the crew should be skilled in their work and that they should render due obedience to their commander for the time being, whoever he may be.'

The parallel, perhaps, suggests a much greater freedom than does in fact exist to change the ship's course—or, rather, the course of a fleet composed of a number of separate ships. Each of our great departments of State

has its own tradition and policy, founded on long experience. Its crew has an accumulated knowledge of wind and weather, of reefs and shoals, by which a new captain is inevitably guided. It has its own private cargoes and destinations which a new captain soon tends to make his own and to advocate with vigour and conviction at the captains' conference. It may have projects for which the last captain could not secure that conference's assent and may return to the charge with better hope. In any case by far the greater part of the field of administration, and even of policy, is governed by factors which cannot be changed by party theories or prepossessions, or at any rate not to the extent which Ministers may have thought or said when in Opposition. The advent of a Socialist Government has not noticeably softened the heart of M. Molotov, or overcome the antagonisms of Hindu and Moslem in India or of Jew and Arab in Palestine. Housing raises the same issues of materials and man-power, of the relation of the central government to the local authorities, of the wishes of the people to be housed, whatever the political complexion of a government. The emphasis may be changed, new methods introduced. But much of whatever is done has to be a continuation of what was done before.

Our system of government is usually described as Parliamentary Responsible Government. It would be difficult to find a better description. But it must be remembered, first of all, that Parliamentary Government means government, not by Parliament, but to use the old phrase, government 'by the King in Parliament.' Secondly, that the responsibility is not merely one towards the majority in Parliament. Ministers on taking office accept a first and dominant responsibility to the Crown, as representing the unity and continuity of the life of the nation and of the Empire, for defending the wider national and Imperial interest. They accept, as I have pointed out just above, a corresponding individual responsibility towards the particular services over which they have been called to preside. As members of a Cabinet they accept, over and above their individual ministerial responsibility, a responsibility to and for their colleagues which is the basis of the collective responsibility of the Cabinet. As members of Parliament themselves they are responsible to Parliament as a whole and to the nation for the effective working of Parliament as the centre of our national life, for the maintenance of full and free discussion of every aspect of government policy, and for support of the Speaker in upholding the dignity and impartiality of debate. It is only subject to these wider responsibilities that, as party leaders, they owe a responsibility to their own party for promoting its particular views and forwarding its interests.

The word 'responsibility' has, however, two senses. It connotes not only accountability to an outside or final authority. It also connotes a state of mind, which weighs the consequences of action and then acts, irrespective, it may be, of the concurrence or approval of others. It is the strength of our constitutional system that it encourages and fosters responsibility in that higher sense. A British government is not merely responsible to those who have appointed it or keep it in office in the sense in which an agent is responsible to his principal. It is an independent body which on taking office assumes the responsibility of leading and directing Parliament and the nation in accordance with its own judgement and convictions. Members of Parliament are no mere delegates of their constituents, but, as Burke pointed out, representatives of the nation, responsible, in the last resort, to their own conscience.

Nor is the responsibility of the Opposition in these various respects any less than that of the Government and

of its supporters. On the Opposition rests the main responsibility for what was once the critical function of Parliament as a whole, while at the same time it directs its criticisms with a view to convincing public opinion of its own fitness for office. It is with the importance of this responsibility in mind that Lowell in his *Government of England* said that:

> "The expression 'His Majesty's Opposition' . . . embodies the greatest contribution of the 19th century to the art of government, that of a party out of power which is recognised as perfectly loyal to the institutions of the State and ready to come into office without a shock to the political traditions of the nation."

The same point was made by Lord Simon: *

> "Our parliamentary system will work as long as the responsible people in different parties accept the view that it is better that the other side should win than that the constitution should be broken."

The combination of responsible leadership by government with responsible criticism in Parliament is the essence of our Constitution. Our aim must be to preserve it through the inevitable changes which the needs and demands of each generation bring about in its outward structure and in the adjustment of its parts.

* In an address to the Empire Parliamentary Conference in 1937 (*Ed. note*).

B. France

4. The Need for a Strong State*

BY CHARLES DE GAULLE

A little known army general named Charles de Gaulle fled France at the time of its surrender to Nazi Germany in 1940 and established the Free French Forces, based initially in England, to carry on the war. By 1944 he had attained general recognition as head of a provisional French government, from which position he resigned in January, 1946.

In May, 1946, the French electorate defeated a proposed new constitution that would have created a regime dominated by a virtually omnipotent legislature. Although de Gaulle had said nothing during the referendum campaign, his opinion of the draft constitution is apparent in the speech reprinted below. The second constituent assembly modified the first draft constitution in certain respects, but it did not meet de Gaulle's criticisms and was confronted by his active opposition. Nevertheless, the French voters approved the second draft constitution, which served as the basis of the Fourth French Republic from 1946 to 1958.

After the collapse of the Fourth Republic and the return of de Gaulle to power, he sponsored the drafting of another constitution corresponding more closely to the views he expressed in the Bayeux speech. The de Gaulle constitution was approved by referendum in September, 1958, and is the basic document of the Fifth French Republic. De Gaulle was elected first president of the new republic in December, 1958, and has wielded power virtually unlimited by other political organs since his installation.

* Speech delivered at Bayeux, June 16, 1946.

In our Normandy, glorious and mutilated, Bayeux and its surroundings witnessed one of the greatest events in history. We know that they were worthy of it. It was here that, four years after the initial disaster of France and the Allies, the final victory of the Allies and France began; it was in these events that the decisive justification was found for the efforts of those who had never yielded and around whom, after June 18, 1940, the national spirit was gathered and the power of France was re-formed.

At the same time, it was here on the soil of our ancestors that the State reappeared. The legitimate State, because it rested on the interest and the feelings of the nation; the State whose real sovereignty was born of war, of liberty, and of victory, while servitude kept only its appearance. The State safeguarded in its rights, its dignity, and its authority, in the midst of vicissitudes, destitution, and intrigue; the State saved from foreign interference; the State capable of re-establishing around itself a national and imperial unity, of gathering all the forces of France and of the French Union, to carry the war through to its final end together with the Allies, to deal as an equal with the other great nations of the world, to preserve public order, to render justice, and to begin our reconstruction.

If this great work was accomplished outside the framework of our former governmental institutions, it was because they did not respond to the needs of the nation and thus could not function. Salvation had to come from elsewhere.

It came first from an élite, sprung spontaneously from the depths of the nation, which, well above any party or class concern, devoted itself to the fight for the liberation, the grandeur, and the renovation of France. A feeling of its moral superiority, an awareness of pursuing a sort of religious sacrifice and example, a passion for risk and venture, scorn for unrest, pretense, outbidding, a supreme confidence in the strength and astuteness of its powerful conspiracy as well as in victory and in the future of the country, all these factors made up the psychology of this élite sprung from nothing which, despite heavy losses, led all the Empire and all of France.

This élite would not have succeeded, however, without the approval of the French masses. With their instinctive will to survive and to triumph, they had seen in the disaster of 1940 only a single vicissitude in a world war in which France stood as the vanguard. If many were forced to bow to circumstances, the number of those who accepted them in their minds and their hearts was literally infinitesimal. Never did France think that the enemy was anything but the enemy and that her salvation lay elsewhere than on the side of the forces of freedom. As the veils were torn away, one by one, the profound feelings of the country emerged in their real character.

Wherever the Cross of Lorraine appeared, the scaffolding of an imaginary authority collapsed, even though it appeared to be founded on the Constitution. So true is it that governmental authority is valid in fact and in law only if it conforms to the highest interests of the country, and if it rests on the confident support of the citizens. As far as governmental institutions are concerned, to build on something else would be to build on sand. It would be to risk seeing the edifice collapse once more at the time of one of those crises to which, by nature, our country finds itself so often exposed.

That is why, once the salvation of the State had been assured by the victory we won and the national unity was maintained, the greatest and most urgent duty was the establishment of new French governmental institutions. As soon as that was possible, the French people were, therefore, invited to choose a constituent assembly while placing definite limits on its mandate

and reserving for themselves the final decision. Then, once the train was set on the tracks, we * withdrew from the scene, not only to avoid embroiling in party battles that which by virtue of events we symbolize and which belongs to the whole nation, but also so that no consideration relative to one man while head of the State could falsify in any way the work of the legislators.

However, the nation and the French Union are still waiting for a Constitution made for them that they can approve. Truly, though it may be regretted that the edifice remains to be built, everyone will certainly agree that a success somewhat deferred is preferable to a rapid, but unsatisfactory, achievement.

In the course of a period of time no longer than twice a man's life, France has been invaded seven times and has had thirteen regimes. Everything is to be found in a people's misfortunes. So many shocks have accumulated poisons in our public life which intoxicate our old gallic propensity to dissension and quarrels. The unparalleled trials that we have just undergone naturally aggravated this state of affairs. The present world situation, in which the powers—between which we are placed—confront one another behind opposing ideologies cannot fail to introduce into our political struggles a factor of impassioned agitation. In brief, the rivalry of parties is in our country a fundamental characteristic, always questioning everything and before which, too often, the higher interests of the country are obscured. That is a patent fact arising from the national temperament, from the vicissitudes of history, and from the commotions of the present; but, because of this, it is indispensable to the future of the country and of democracy that our governmental institutions become aware of this and protect themselves in order to preserve respect for the laws, the cohesion of the governments, the efficiency of the administration, and the prestige and the authority of the State.

It is a fact that confusion in the State leads to the disaffection of the citizens toward the governmental institutions. A single incident, then, is enough to cause the menace of dictatorship to appear. This is still more true with the rather mechanical organization of modern society which renders good order in the control and regular functioning of the machinery more necessary and more desirable each day.

How and why did our First, Second, and Third Republics end? How and why, then, did Italian democracy, the German Weimar Republic, the Spanish Republic give way to the regimes we know? And yet, what is dictatorship but a great adventure? Undoubtedly its beginning looks advantageous. In the midst of the enthusiasm of some and the resignation of others, by the rigor of the order it imposes, by means of a gleaming front and one-sided propaganda, it takes at first a dynamic turn which contrasts with the anarchy that preceded it. But it is the fate of dictatorship to go too far in its undertakings. As impatience with restraints and nostalgia for liberty emerge among the citizens, it must at all costs offer them increasingly greater successes as compensation. The nation becomes a machine to which the master imparts a frenzied acceleration. In both its domestic and foreign policies, purposes, risks, and efforts gradually exceed all measure. With every step obstacles multiply both at home and abroad. In the end the mainspring breaks. The grandiose edifice collapses in misfortune and blood. The nation finds itself broken, worse off than it had been before the adventure began.

It is enough to consider this in order to understand to what extent it is necessary that our new democratic in-

* De Gaulle often refers to himself in the first person plural (*Ed. note*).

stitutions offset the effects of our perpetual political effervescence. There is also a question of our life or death in the world and in the century in which we live, where the position, the independence, and the very existence of our country and of our French Union are clearly at stake. To be sure, it is the very essence of democracy to repress opinions and, through the suffrage, to orient public action and legislation along its views. Also, all the principles and all experience require that the organs of public authority—legislative, executive, judiciary—be clearly separated and carefully balanced and that above political contingencies be established a national arbitration capable of providing continuity in the midst of the intrigues.

It is clearly understood that the final vote of the laws and budgets belongs to an Assembly elected by universal and direct suffrage. But the first moves of such an Assembly are not necessarily completely clear-sighted and serene. It is necessary, then, to attribute to a second Assembly, elected and composed in another way, the function of examining publicly what the first has taken under consideration, of formulating amendments, and of proposing plans. For, though the great currents of politics are naturally reproduced within the Chamber of Deputies, at the local level, there are also political tendencies and rights. They exist in metropolitan France. They exist, above all, in the overseas territories which are linked to the French Union by very different bonds. They exist in that Saar for which the nature of things, discovered by our victory, designates once more its place beside us, the sons of the Franks. The future of the 110 million men and women who live under our flag is in an organization of federative form, the details of which will gradually evolve, but whose beginning must be marked and whose development must be organized by our new constitution.

All this leads us to institute a second Chamber whose members, essentially, will be elected by our general and municipal councils. This Chamber would complement the first by bringing it, if necessary, either to revise its own plans or to examine others and by respecting in the making of the laws, this factor of administrative order which a purely political body has a tendency to neglect. It will be normal to include in it, on the other hand, representatives of economic, social, and intellectual organizations, so that, within the State itself, the voices of the great activities of the country can make themselves heard.

Meeting with representatives of the local assemblies of the overseas territories, the members of this Assembly would form the great council of the French Union that would be qualified to deliberate on the laws and problems pertaining to the Union: budgets, foreign relations, domestic affairs, national defense, economy, and communications.

It is obvious that the executive power cannot emanate from a Parliament, composed of two Chambers, exercising the legislative power, without risk of leading to a mixing of powers in which the government would soon be only an assemblage of delegations. Undoubtedly, it was necessary, during the present period of transition, to have the Constituent National Assembly elect the President of the Provisional Government, since, with a clean slate, there was no other acceptable method of designation. But that can only be a temporary arrangement. In truth, the unity, the cohesion, the internal discipline of the Government of France must be sacred if we are not willing to risk seeing the very leadership of the country become rapidly powerless and disqualified.

Now, how could this unity, this cohesion, this discipline be maintained in the long run, if the executive power emanated from that other power which

it must balance, and if each member of the Government, collectively responsible to the national representation as a whole, was at his post only the holder of a mandate from a party? The executive power must, therefore, emanate from the Chief of State, placed above the parties, elected by a body that includes the Parliament but is much larger and is composed in such a way as to make him the President of the French Union as well as of the Republic.

It would be the duty of the Chief of State to reconcile, in the choice of men, the general interest with the orientation that emerges from the Parliament; it would be his mission to nominate the ministers and, of course, firstly the premier who is to direct the policy and the work of the Government; it would be the function of the Chief of State to promulgate the laws and to issue the decrees, for it is toward the State as a whole that citizens are obligated by them; he would have the task of presiding over the cabinet meetings and exercising there the influence of continuity without which a nation cannot survive; he would serve as arbiter above political contingencies, either normally through the Council, or, in moments of grave confusion, by inviting the country to make known its sovereign decision through elections; he would have, if it were to happen that the nation were in peril, the duty to safeguard national independence and the treaties concluded by France.

Some Greeks once asked the wise Solon: "Which is the best Constitution?" He answered: "Tell me first for which people and in which era?" Today, it is for the French people and the peoples of the French Union and in an era very hard and very dangerous. We must take ourselves as we are. We must take the century as it is. We must accomplish successfully, despite immense difficulties, a profound renovation that will lead each man and each woman among us to an easier life, more security, more happiness and that will increase our numbers, make us more powerful and more fraternal.

We must preserve the liberty that was saved at the cost of so much sorrow. We have to ensure the destiny of France in the midst of all the obstacles that arise in her path and in that of peace. We must do what we are able to do for our brotherhood of men to help our poor and aged mother, the Earth. Let us be lucid enough and strong enough to make for ourselves and to observe rules of national life that will tend to rally us when we are driven ceaselessly toward division! Our whole history is the alternation of the immense sufferings of a disunited people and of the fruitful grandeur of a free nation grouped under the aegis of a strong State.

5. Outline of the New Constitution*

BY CHARLES DE GAULLE

On September 4, 1958, General de Gaulle presented to the French people the draft of the Constitution that had been prepared under his authority. He delivered the speech reprinted below to an immense crowd at the Place de la République in Paris. This opened the campaign preceding the referendum of September 28, in which the new Constitution was approved by a majority of nearly eighty per cent.

It was at a time when it had to reform or be shattered that our people first had recourse to the Republic. Until then, down the centuries, the *ancien régime* had achieved the unity and maintained the integrity of France. But, while a great tidal wave was forming in the depths, it showed itself incapable of adapting to a new world. It was then—in the midst of national turmoil and of foreign war—that the Republic appeared. It was the sovereignty of the people, the call of liberty, the hope of justice. That is what it was to remain through all the restless vicissitudes of its history. Today, as much as ever, that is what we want it to remain.

Of course, the Republic has assumed various forms during the successive periods when it has held sway. In 1792, we saw it—revolutionary and warlike—overthrow thrones and privileges only to succumb, eight years later, in the midst of abuses and disturbances that it had not been able to master. In 1848, we saw it rise above the barricades, set its face against anarchy, prove itself socially minded within and fraternal without, but soon fade away once more through its failure to reconcile order with the enthusiasm for renewal. On September 4, 1870, the day after Sedan, we saw it offer its services to the country to redeem the disaster.

In fact, the Republic succeeded in putting France back on her feet again, reconstituting her armies, recreating a vast empire, renewing firm alliances, framing good social laws and developing an educational system. So well did it do all this that, during the first World War, it had the glory of ensuring our safety and our victory. On November 11, when the people gather and the flags are dipped in commemoration, the tribute that the nation pays to those who have served it well is paid also to the Republic.

Nevertheless, the regime contained

* Official translation courtesy of the French Press and Information Service.

functional defects which might have seemed tolerable in a more or less stable era, but which were no longer compatible with the social transformations, the economic changes and the external perils that preceded the second World War. Had not this situation been remedied, the terrible events of 1940 would have swept everything away. But when, on June 18, the struggle for the liberation of France began, it was immediately proclaimed that the Republic to be rebuilt would be a new Republic. The whole Resistance Movement constantly affirmed this.

We know, we know only too well what became of these hopes . . . We know, we know only too well that once the danger had passed, everything was turned over to the discretion of the parties. We know, we know only too well, what were the consequences of this. By reason of inconsistency and instability and—whatever may have been the intentions and, often, the ability of the men in office—the regime found itself deprived of the authority in internal affairs and the assurance in external affairs, without which it could not act. It was inevitable that the paralysis of the State should bring on a grave national crisis and that, immediately, the Republic should be threatened with collapse.

The necessary steps were taken to prevent the irreparable at the very moment that it was about to occur. The disruption of the State was, by a narrow margin, prevented. They managed to save the last chance of the Republic. It was by legal means that I and my Government assumed the unusual mandate of drafting a new constitution and of submitting it to the decision of the people.

We have done this on the basis of the principles laid down at the time of our investiture. We have done this with the collaboration of the Consultative Committee instituted by law. We have done this taking into account the solemn opinion of the Council of State. We have done this after very frank and very thorough discussion with our own Council of Ministers. These Councils were formed of men as diversified as possible as to origin and inclination, but resolutely united. We have done this without meanwhile doing violence to any right of the people or any public liberty. The nation, which alone is the judge, will approve or reject our work. But it is in good conscience that we propose this Constitution to them.

Henceforth what is primordial for the public powers is their effectiveness and their continuity. We are living at a time when titanic forces are engaged in transforming the world. Lest we become a people out of date and scorned, we must evolve rapidly in the scientific, economic and social spheres. Moreover, the taste for progress and the passion for technical achievements that are becoming evident among the French, and especially among our young people, are equal to this imperative need. These are all facts that dominate our national existence and that, consequently, must order our institutions.

The necessity of renovating agriculture and industry; of procuring—for our rejuvenated population—the means of livelihood, of work, of education, of housing; and of associating workers in the functioning of enterprises: the necessity to do all this compels us to be dynamic and expeditious in public affairs. The duty of restoring peace in Algeria, next of developing it, and finally of settling the question of its status and its place in our great whole, impels us to arduous and prolonged efforts. The prospects offered us by the resources of the Sahara are magnificent indeed, but complex. The relations between Metropolitan France and the Overseas Territories require profound adjustment. The world is crossed by currents that threaten the very future of the human race and prompt France to protect herself while playing the role of moderation, peace

its independence which remains the guardian of individual liberty. Thus will the competence, the dignity, the impartiality of the State be better guaranteed.

A Community formed between the French nation and those of the Overseas Territories that so desire, within which each Territory will become a State that governs itself, while foreign policy, defense, the currency, economic and financial policies, use of raw materials, the control of justice, higher education, long distance communications will constitute a common domain over which the organs of the community—the President, Executive Council, Senate and Court of Arbitration—will have jurisdiction. Thus, this vast organization will renovate the human complex grouped around France. This will be effected by virtue of the free determination of all. In fact, every Territory will have an opportunity, through its vote in the referendum, either to accept France's proposal, or to refuse it, and, by so doing, to break every tie with her. Once a member of the Community, it can in the future, after coming to an agreement with the common organs, assume its own destiny independently of the others.

Finally, during the four months following the referendum the Government will be responsible for the country's affairs and, in particular, will establish the system of elections. In this way, through a mandate from the people, the necessary measures may be taken for the setting up of the new institutions.

Here, women and men of France, is what inspires and what makes up the Constitution which, on September 28, will be submitted to your vote. With all my heart, in the name of France, I ask you to answer: Yes.

If you do not vote thus, we shall return, that very day, to the bad old ways with which you are familiar. But if you do, the result will be to make and fraternity dictated by her mission. In short, the French nation will flourish again or will perish according as the State will or will not have enough strength, constancy and prestige to lead her along the path she must follow.

Therefore, it is for the people we are, for the century and the world in which we live, that the proposed Constitution was drafted. The country effectively governed by those to whom it gives the mandate and to whom it grants the confidence that makes for lawfulness. A national arbiter—far removed from political bickering—elected by the citizens who hold a public mandate, charged with the task of ensuring the normal functioning of the institutions, possessing the right to resort to the judgment of the sovereign people, accountable, in the case of extreme danger, for the independence, the honor and integrity of France and for the safety of the Republic. A Government made to govern, which is granted the necessary time and opportunity, which does not turn to anything other than its task and which thereby deserves the country's support. A Parliament intended to represent the political will of the nation, to enact laws and to control the executive, without venturing to overstep its role. A Government and Parliament that work together but remain separate as to their responsibilities, with no member of one being at the same time a member of the other. Such is the balanced structure that power must assume. The rest will depend upon men.

A Social and Economic Council, appointed outside politics by the business, professional and labor organizations of France and the Overseas Territories that gives advice to Parliament and to the Government. A Constitutional Committee, free of any attachment, empowered to judge whether the laws that have been passed are constitutional and whether the various elections have been properly held. A judicial authority assured of

the Republic strong and effective, provided that those in positions of responsibility know, hereafter, the meaning of determination. But there will also be, in this positive display of the national will, the proof that our country is regaining its unity and, by the same token, its opportunity for grandeur. The world, which understands full well what importance our decision will have for it, will draw the inevitable conclusion. Perhaps it is already drawing the conclusion.

A great hope will arise over France. I think it has already arisen.

Vive la République! Vive la France!

6. The New Constitution*

BY MICHEL DEBRÉ

During World War II, while playing a significant role in the French Resistance, Michel Debré also established himself as a constitutional theoretician of some note. A draft constitution he proposed for a liberated France received wide circulation. In it already were many features that later became prominent in Gaullist proposals.

In the postwar period, Debré, using the upper Chamber of the Fourth Republic as his podium, became one of General de Gaulle's most devoted and outspoken supporters. After the General was commissioned in the suicidal session of the Fourth Republic's National Assembly to prepare a new constitution, he assigned to Debré the principal responsibility for drafting the instrument. Hence, although he was instructed by de Gaulle, assisted by a team of experts, and the document was reviewed and amended in some respects on the advice of political and civil service leaders, Debré well deserves the title of author of the Constitution of the Fifth French Republic.

The speech reproduced below was made by Debré on August 27, 1958, in presenting the text of the new constitution to the French Council of State, a group of high civil servants advisory to the Government on legal and constitutional questions, for its opinion.

With the establishment of the new institutions, Debré became the first Premier of the Fifth Republic, which post he still (January 1962) holds.

* Translated from "La Nouvelle Constitution," *Revue française de science politique,* March, 1959, pp. 7-29.

With unprecedented rapidity during recent years, the unity and strength of France have deteriorated, our essential interests have been gravely menaced, our existence as a free and independent nation called into question. Many factors have contributed to this major political crisis. The bankruptcy of our political institutions is emphatically one of these factors; our institutions were no longer suitable—to say the least—and their unsuitability was aggravated by political immorality that they failed to correct.

The purpose of the constitutional reform is thus clear.

It is, first and foremost, to try to reconstruct the governmental authority without which there is neither State nor democracy, that is, as far as we are concerned, neither France nor Republic.

It is next, in the superior interests of our security and of the equilibrium of the world, to safeguard and renovate an assemblage that we traditionally call overseas France.

The Constitution alone does not enable us to achieve these two objectives. But it must be constructed in such a manner that it will not be an obstacle and, on the contrary, that it may aid powerfully.

One of the primary aims that has dominated this project has been to rebuild the parliamentary regime of the Republic. A second aim has led to provisions for establishing, around France, a Community.

I. TO GIVE FRANCE A PARLIAMENTARY REGIME

The government has wished to renovate the parliamentary regime. I would even be tempted to say that it wishes to establish it, because for numerous reasons the Republic has never succeeded in installing it.

The reason for this choice is simple. Assembly government or government by convention is impracticable and dangerous. The presidential regime is at present out of the question in France.

THE IMPOSSIBLE ASSEMBLY GOVERNMENT

Government by assembly or convention is that regime in which the totality of power, in law and in fact, is vested in a Parliament, and more precisely, in a single Assembly. The Assembly not only has the legislative power and budgetary control. It is the political organ of government and the cabinet, which draws from it the origin of its authority and is dependent on its arbitrariness, is only its agent. Its decisions can be criticized by no one, even if they are contrary to the Constitution. Its domain is unlimited and all the public powers may be used at its discretion. The operation of the Assembly enables it to exercise this task: sessions which have practically no end; many, powerful committees; proxy voting which permits the multiplication of sittings and balloting.

Do I need to continue the description? This regime is the one under which we have been living. Attempts were made to correct its faults by revising the rules of the Assembly. Time wasted! Those revisions of the rules contrary to the operation of the Assembly regime were not applied, or they were powerless. A new remedy was tried by increasing the powers of the second assembly. Again a waste of time! The division into two Chambers is a good rule for parliamentary regimes for it permits an independent government to find, in the second assembly, useful aid against the first; in an Assembly regime the arbitrariness of one Assembly is neutralized, or rather reduced, by the other without creating authority. Finally, coalitions or contracts among parties have been tried as a remedy. Still a waste of time! The agreement among factions does not resist the feeling of irresponsibility that the Assembly regime gives to each of them and to their members.

THE MAJOR DIFFICULTIES OF THE PRESIDENTIAL REGIME

The Presidential Regime is the form of democratic regime that is the opposite of the Assembly Regime. It is characterized by the importance of the power given, in law and in fact, to a chief of state elected by universal suffrage.

The powers, in such a regime, are not concentrated. They are, on the contrary, very rigorously separated. The legislative Assemblies are deprived of all governmental influence: their domain is that of the law, and it is a domain that is well defined. They also approve the budget and, normally treaties. In the case of conflict, the president has at his disposal such weapons as the veto or the power of promulgation to resolve it. The judiciary is set apart and usually privileged in order to assure the protection of individuals against this very powerful leader and against the consequences of an accord between him and the Assemblies.

The virtues of the presidential regime are evident. The State has a leader and democracy has power. The temptation is great, after having suffered from anarchy and weakness, the consequences of an Assembly regime, to seek refuge in the order and authority of the presidential regime.

Neither Parliament, in its will to reform as demonstrated by the law of June 3, nor the government when it presented and then applied this law has succumbed to this temptation and it was, I believe, wise. Democracy in France presupposes a Parliament endowed with political power. Two assemblies that are only legislative and budgetary—that is, subordinate—can be imagined. But we must assert that this conception does not coincide with the traditional and, in many respects, legitimate image of the Republic.

Added to this legal reason are two facts, either of which is decisive.

The President of the Republic has overseas responsibilities; he is also the president of the Community. Is an electorate envisaged that includes all the men, all the women of continental France, Algeria, tropical Africa, Madagascar and the Pacific islands? This would not be reasonable and would likely be harmful both to the unity of the whole and to the consideration that is owed to the leader of the state.

On the other hand, let us look at the domestic French situation and speak politically. We want a strong France. Is it possible to rest authority on an electorate so deeply divided? Can it be overlooked that an important part of this electorate, caught up by the difficulties of recent years, adopts toward the national sovereignty an attitude of revolt that a certain party* captures for aims that the responsible national and governmental leaders cannot accept?

The cause seems obvious to me. The presidential regime is dangerous, at present, to put into effect.

THE CONDITIONS OF THE PARLIAMENTARY REGIME

Not an Assembly regime, not a presidential regime, the way before us is narrow; it is that of the parliamentary regime. To the concentration of powers in a single Assembly, to the strict separation of powers with priority to the chief of state, is to be preferred the collaboration of powers—chief of state and parliament separated and englobing a government issuing from the first and responsible to the second, between them a division of powers giving to each a similar importance in the operation of the state and providing the means to resolve the conflicts which are, in any democratic system, the price of freedom.

The draft constitution as it is submitted to you seeks to create a parliamentary regime. It does so by four measures or series of measures:

* The Communist party (*Ed. note*).

1. Strict regulation of parliamentary sessions,

2. An effort to define the domain of law,

3. A profound reorganization of legislative and budgetary procedure,

4. A reform of the juridical mechanisms that are indispensable to the equilibrium and the proper operation of the public functions.

1. *The Regulation of the Sessions.* The assemblies, in a parliamentary regime, are not the permanent organs of political life. They are confined to sessions of closely-regulated length, long enough that the legislative work, the passage of the budget and the control of policy may be assured in proper conditions, but arranged in such a way that the government has time to reflect and to act.

The constitution which is submitted to you provides for two ordinary sessions, one in the autumn for two and a half months and intended above all for consideration of the budget, the other in the spring for no longer than three months and intended primarily for legislative work. Special sessions can be called at will by the government or the majority of parliament: their purpose and their length are limited. They may be prolonged automatically if the government has not submitted the budget in the prescribed time or if the opposition, by a motion of censure, proposes to impose a debate on general policy. New elections or a special message from the President of the Republic can also lead to short special sessions.

This regulation, strict but liberal, must satisfy the exigencies of the government as well as those of the opposition.

2. *The domain of law.* The article in which a definition of the domain of law has been attempted is among those which have provoked the greatest astonishment. This reaction is surprising. From the point of view of principles, the definition is normal and it is the blurring of the distinction between law, rule, and even of individual measures which is an absurdity. In point of fact, our juridical system has fallen into such a state of confusion and congestion that one of the most frequent, but unsuccessful, efforts in recent years was to "disencumber" a parliamentary agenda that was overwhelmed by the excessive number of laws passed over so many years in domains where parliament does not normally have legislative competence. An observer of our parliamentary life could have noted between the wars, but even more since the Liberation, this double deviation of our political organization: a parliament overwhelmed by bills and rushing in disorder toward the multiplication of detailed speeches, but a government treating without parliamentary interference the gravest national problems. The result of these two observations led to a double crisis: the impotence of the state because of the fact that the administration was bound by inexcusable laws, the anger of the nation because of the fact that a partisan coalition placed in the government put before it serious measures decided without having been submitted previously to serious study. To define the domain of law, or rather of parliament, is not to reduce parliamentary life; it is, by determination of the responsibilities of the government, to assure between the cabinet and the assemblies a necessary distribution of tasks.

Everything concerning civil liberties and individual rights can be regulated only by laws. Everything which concerns the public powers and the fundamental structures of the state can be regulated only by laws. In other domains—for instance, the powers of the state in economic and social life—laws establish the principles. The budget and important treaties are in the domain of law. Parliament must ratify the declaration of a state of siege. It alone is competent to declare war. The constitutional committee envisages that an organic law, after consideration,

can extend this domain. To this corrective, which must be employed with prudence, the government cannot impose obstacles for it will give useful flexibility to a division, the principle of which is necessary.

The definition of the domain of law gives to regulations, that is to the responsibility of the government, an extended domain. In addition, a weapon must be given to the government to avoid future trespassing. This is the exception of inadmissability which can be contested by the assembly, in which case the Constitutional Council, of which I will speak later, has the mission of arbitrating.

The government can accept, on occasion, parliamentary intervention outside the domain of law. This intervention does not change the division nor its consequences. On the other hand, the Parliament can delegate to the government the right to issue decrees in legislative matters. Upon the expiration of the delegation, the legislature recovers its domain.

3. *The Legislative and Budgetary Procedure.* Our legislative and budgetary procedure was one of the clearest characteristics of assembly government to be found in our democratic regime. The constitution being submitted for your consideration proposes modifications which may seem secondary to some; in law and in fact, they are fundamental.

The government can exercise a decisive influence in the organization of the agenda of the assemblies. It has the right, in effect, to require priority for its bills as well as for the private members' bills that it accepts. Thus, no more will a government submit a bill and then become disinterested in its fate. Thus, no more will an assembly impose on the government a political discussion simply to set in operation the legislative procedure. If the government "nourishes" the assemblies they will work in concert with it. This rule has its normal counterpart: one day a week is reserved for questions from the members of parliament. The voice of the opposition is thus assured of being able to make itself heard.

The number of permanent committees is reduced to six in each assembly and in no case can the bill written by the committee be substituted for the government's bill. The committees are useful organs for study and control provided that they are not too specialized—then they substitute themselves for the administration or exercise on it an influence which is not good—and provided that they give advice on the bill which is presented to them, without having the inadmissible authority to write another, against which the government—which is responsible for it—finds itself in a defensive position, that is, one that is perilous or, in any case absurd.

The legislative procedure is profoundly renovated and, if I may say so, improved. The rule is again that of the 1875 laws.* The agreement of the two assemblies is needed. Also maintained in force is the traditional rule of the French parliament, that of the right of amendment by any member of parliament. But important transformations have been decided upon.

First the right of amendment can be regulated. That is, the assemblies can stipulate a time beyond which new amendments may not be submitted. This time is that of the end of committee consideration. The government can also require a vote on the rejection of a series of amendments.

Next the government can hasten the legislative discussion by calling, after the first reading in each chamber has disclosed opposition, a meeting of a committee composed of equal numbers of deputies and senators. The bill issuing from the deliberations of this committee is to be proposed to the two chambers. In case this procedure does not succeed and after a new examination by the two chambers, the govern-

* The laws establishing the Third Republic (*Ed. note*).

ment can ask the National Assembly to legislate, as a last resort. This procedure has worked abroad. It is of such a nature as to create a true and effective parliamentary deliberation.

This description of the new legislative procedure would not be complete if it were not followed by the indication of the precise rules that the project fixes for the budgetary procedure. The debating time is limited for the two chambers and amendments which would reduce receipts or increase expenditures are forbidden. When the debating time has expired—provided the budget was submitted in the stipulated time—the government can promulgate the appropriations bill. The experiences that we have lived through for too many years justify this procedure which may seem brutal to those who do not know of similar brutality in all disciplined parliamentary regimes.

A last innovation remains to be noted. Its purpose is to reduce arbitrariness, governmental as well as parliamentary, in everything concerning the public powers.* The constitution cannot regulate everything in this domain. It is not good, nevertheless, that a law may be hastily drafted and voted. A special procedure, distinguished simply by a longer period for reflection and by increased powers for the Senate is intended to give the organic laws greater stability—that is, as it must be—to encompass them with greater respect. The functioning of the assemblies, the basic rules for the organization of the state and of the system of justice will be regulated by organic laws.

4. *The Mechanisms of Parliamentary Operation.* The draft Constitution, prepared in the light of a long and costly experience, contains certain very precise mechanisms which would have no place in a text of this character if we did not know that they are necessary in order to change morals. When one wishes to break bad habits, rigorous imperatives are necessary. In this category of measures are ranged the obligation to vote personally, the designation of incompatibilities for ministerial functions, the control of the constitutionality of laws, and finally the detailed provisions concerning the motion of censure.

The obligation to vote personally is both a moral and a political requirement. For more than half a century the French parliament was the only one in the world which could deliberate in the absence of parliamentarians thanks to the outrageous system of *"boîtiers."* * In truth, one can find no better test of the assembly regime, for this mechanism enabled parliament to sit continuously and reduce the government to servitude. No regulatory effort permitted this situation to be redressed. Indeed, on the contrary, the requirement under the previous Constitution, for extraordinary majorities on questions that, if not ordinary, were at least common, resulted necessarily in giving a constitutional character to voting by proxy. Neither a clearer manifestation nor a more dangerous cause of the deviation of our regime can be imagined. Proxy voting is so customary that the draft text has not dared to abolish it completely, but the provisions made must cause it to disappear. The proxy must, in fact, remain very exceptional. When it is permitted, no one can cast more than two ballots. This is already an immense and deep change and it must be hoped that the enforcing law is most strict.†

The incompatibility of ministerial

* That is, the executive and legislative branches of government. (*Ed. note*).

* Literally, "boxes" or "cases." This system permitted the designation of deputies who acted as proxies for other deputies who were their political friends. Thus a deputy could vote in absentia by having a *"boîtier"* cast his ballot for him (*Ed. note*).

† This limitation on proxy voting was also intended to reduce the effectiveness of the Communist and Socialist parliamentary delegations by abolishing one of the devices by which their leaders imposed discipline on their members (*Ed. note*).

functions and parliamentary membership has caused and will continue to cause much ink to flow. It can be argued, in fact, that such a measure does not correspond to the nature of the parliamentary system. Certainly, incompatibilities are necessary, but in the Anglo-Saxon parliamentary countries they exist instead between the local and parliamentary office-holding. It is the presidential regime that practices separation between minister and deputy or senator. But French practice, which has known virtually no incompatibilities, has favored instability in such a manner that it would be culpable not to react against it! The ministerial function has become a rank insignia, a star, or rather a longevity stripe such as soldiers have, and which give recognition for a campaign. There are politicians who are distinguished by the number of hash-marks they wear on their sleeves! Power is no longer exercised for the sake of power. It is sought for the title it gives and the career opportunities or influence it procures to those who have approached it or are still eligible to approach it. At the beginning of the Third Republic morals were different. That was the time when the personal vote was still in force and the parliamentarians who became ministers did not vote, did not retain their seats. Jules Ferry,* on the eve of the debate on the Langson affair † which he realized could be fatal to him, reminded his ministers of this rule. How our morals have declined since that period! The rule of incompatibility has become a sort of necessity to end that which has come to be called the "portfolio race," a game fatal for the State. The draft constitution sets forth in a way clear to all that henceforth one may acquire ministerial functions only on condition that he devote himself entirely to them.

Finally, it is necessary to suppress this *parliamentary arbitrariness* which, under the pretext of sovereignty, not of the Nation (which is right), but of the assemblies (which is fallacious), called into question, without limitation, the value of the Constitution and of the law, and the authority of the governments.

The creation of the "Constitutional Council" demonstrates the will to subordinate the law, that is the decisions of Parliament, to the higher law decreed by the Constitution. It is neither in the spirit of the parliamentary regime nor in the French tradition that the court, that is in effect, any person with access to the court,* have the right to examine the value of the Law. The draft constitution, therefore, envisages a special institution that can be called upon by only four authorities: the President of the Republic, the Premier, the two presidents of the Assemblies. Other powers have been given to this council, notably to review the parliamentary rules of the assemblies and pass judgment on contested elections in order to end the scandal of partisan invalidations. The existence of this Council, the authority which it must have, represents a great and necessary innovation. The Constitution thus creates a weapon against deviation from the parliamentary regime.

The difficult procedure of the *motion of censure* must temper a defect that we know well and have known for too long a time. The question of confidence is the weapon of the government, and of it alone. The deputies can use only the motion of censure and it is proscribed by conditions which are disputed only by those who do not wish to remember. Experience has led to the additional provision of a somewhat unusual device to assure that, despite maneuvering, indispensable laws may be voted.

Let us recapitulate. Control of the

* A leader of the Left in the early years of the Third Republic, a premier and later President of the Republic (*Ed. note*).

† An armed clash between French and Chinese troops at Langson, Vietnam, in 1885 (*Ed. note*).

* *Justiciable* in the original (*Ed. note*).

sessions, of the domain of law, of legislative procedure, of the mechanisms for the operation of the assemblies. In truth, there is nothing there which is not inspired by the will to assure the proper functioning of the parliamentary institutions.

If it were not for the powers of the Senate, the incompatibility of ministerial functions and the detailed regulation of the motion of censure, it could be said that there is nothing new in the draft constitution, for everything else can be found in the constitutions or traditions of parliamentary countries, especially Great Britain. Moreover, it is easy to understand why France needs a powerful second chamber, ministers who are independent of Parliament, and a difficult procedure for the motion of censure: *our electoral structure prevents us from having the coherent majorities which would assure, without detailed rules, the proper functioning of the parliamentary regime.* Ah! if we had the possibility to cause a clear and constant majority to emerge tomorrow it would not be necessary to create a Senate of which the principal role is to support, if need be, a government against an assembly encroaching too much because it is too divided; it would not be necessary to make order and stability reign by cutting the bonds between the parties and the government; it would not be worthwhile to spell out at great length the details of the motion of censure. But no matter how one may wish for a new, majoritarian electoral law and no matter how necessary it may be, no one has the right in France, at the present time, to issue a check against a future that we know only too well will have for a long time yet political divisions, that is, majorities menaced too readily by collapse and which must be compelled to be wise. *Because in France governmental stability cannot result initially from the electoral law, it must result, at least in part, from the constitutional stipulations and that is what gives this draft its decisive explanation and its historical justification.* If we wish that the future parliamentary regime of French democracy not be government by the legislature, it is not possible to act otherwise.

II. THE CREATION OF A COMMUNITY

[*This section, which explains the provisions of the Constitution pertaining to the new "Community" of nations, has been omitted as tangential to an understanding of domestic French institutions. Furthermore, many of these provisions of the Constitution have not and cannot become operative.—Ed. note.*]

III. THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC

If you will permit me a figure of speech borrowed from architecture, I will say that this new parliamentary regime . . . needs a keystone. This keystone is the President of the Republic.

HIS POWERS

Each time in our constitutional history, as you know, that there has been discussion concerning the powers of the President of the Republic, a curious movement could be observed. A certain conception of democracy sees, *a priori,* in any President of the Republic or chief of State a danger and a menace to the Republic. This movement still exists today. But let us not carp on this; rather let us admire the continuity of our constitutional ideologies.

The President of the Republic must be the keystone of our parliamentary regime. Without a true chief of State, the cabinet—given the state of our public opinion and given our traditional quarrels—lacks a support it normally needs. That is, the President of our Republic cannot be, as in any

parliamentary regime, only a chief of State who nominates the Prime Minister and perhaps the other ministers, in whose name the international negotiations are conducted and treaties signed, and under whose authority are placed the army and the administration. In our France where intestine divisions have such power on the political scene, he is a higher judge of the national interest. In this capacity, he may ask, if he believes it useful, a second reading of laws before the expiration of the time allowed for their promulgation * (a provision already contemplated and which now becomes reality); he can also (and his new powers are of considerable interest) refer laws to the Constitutional Committee if he has doubts about their constitutionality. He can evaluate a proposed referendum, which must be asked of him by the Premier or by the Presidents of the Assemblies, to see if it corresponds to a national need. Finally, he has at his disposal that leading weapon in any parliamentary regime, the power of dissolution.

Is it necessary to emphasize what dissolution represents? It is the instrument of governmental stability. It can be a reward for a government which appears to have succeeded and punishment for a government which appears to have failed. It permits, between the chief of the State and the nation, a short dialogue which can settle a conflict or make the voice of the people heard at a crucial time.

This rapidly sketched picture shows that the President of the Republic, as it must be, has no other power than that of appealing to another power: he appeals to parliament, he appeals to the Constitutional Committee, he appeals to the electorate. But this power to appeal is fundamental.

As President of the Community, the President of the Republic has at his disposal, powers which are not of the same character for he is no longer, as such, the head of a parliamentary State. He is the head of a collegiate political regime intended through the authority of its president and through the authority of the member governments, to facilitate the creation of a common policy. The President of the Community represents the entire Community and it is in this regard that his authority in matters of national defense and foreign affairs is essential. He presides over the executive council and convenes the Senate of the Community.

To these normal powers of the Chief of the State, either as parliamentary President of the Republic or as president of the Community, the proposed Constitution adds exceptional powers. They have been talked about so much that one no longer speaks of them for, undoubtedly, some have been a bit hasty in criticizing before reading attentively. When grave conditions, internal or external, clearly defined in a precise text, impede the functioning of the public powers, it is normal in our critical era to seek to give a legitimate basis to the action of him who represents legitimacy. It is also normal, it is even indispensable to fix in advance certain fundamental responsibilities. Apropos of this article the past has been spoken of often. The future has been spoken about less and yet it is the future for which it was made. Can one, in 1958, disregard the modern forms of war? To this question the answer is clear: one does not have the right, neither in this case nor in the others, to disregard the possibility of profound troubles in our constitutional life. It is for this possibility of profound troubles that the responsibilities, that is, the possibilities of action, must be solemnly marked out.

DESIGNATION OF THE PRESIDENT

His normal responsibilities as Chief of State in a parliamentary regime, his normal responsibilities as Chief of State at the head of the Community,

* Fifteen days (*Ed. note*).

and his extraordinary responsibilities as Chief of State during emergencies, it is this which requires that his appointment be surrounded by particular safeguards.

Can we, in accord with our tradition since 1875, have him appointed by the two houses of parliament? We know where such an electoral college leads; the President of the Republic would be an arbiter among the member parties in Parliament and this arbiter, no matter what his moral stature, would find it very difficult to escape the narrow domain in which he has been confined, less by the constitutional texts than by his mode of election. The Republic and the Community need a personality who is much more than an arbiter among the parties and it is hardly likely than an electoral college composed only of the Parliament can produce the desired result. In addition, the Parliament, henceforth, will be only the Republic, that is, continental France, the overseas *départements,** and several territories. But the representatives of the Community must be present if the double role of the President of the Republic is to be observed from the outset.

Universal suffrage is not a normal electoral body in a parliamentary regime. The President, who is elected by universal suffrage, is a political leader bound by the daily work of government and command; to have recourse to universal suffrage is to have recourse to a presidential constitution which was ruled out for reasons given at the beginning of this statement.

One is led, then, by the very nature of things to an electoral college the members of which are elected politically but are not only parliamentarians: members of the general councils and of the municipal councils.* The only difficulty presented by such a college is constituted by the large number of small communes and the relative under-representation of the great cities. This problem is a political problem, but it is well to see that it is posed by a national characteristic that we must concede, at least so as to bury it in ideology. France is composed of thousands and thousands of communes: this fact is a French fact, one of the fundamental aspects of our sociology. The inconveniences of this considerable force of small communes must, it is true, be corrected. The proposal being submitted to you accords to the large cities an equitable representation by giving to their municipal councils the possibility of electing supplementary electors proportionate to the population. In addition, by reducing the representation of the municipal councils of the communes and small towns to only the mayor, to only the mayor and his deputies, or to a small number of municipal councillors, the proposal establishes a reasonable balance. At the same time, an identical basis can be used to arrive at an equally fair representation for the territories and future States of the Community in the electoral college of the President of the Republic.

In order to insure the legitimacy of the President of the French Republic the electoral college must be given an image conforming as closely as possible to that of political France. In order to insure the legitimacy of the future leader of the Community, adequate representation for the member States in the electoral college must be assured. The proposal is designed to accomplish that double objective; it has not produced, therefore, as you

* The *département* is the administrative subdivision next below the Republic. It is somewhat larger than most American counties (*Ed. note*).

* The general and municipal councils are elected bodies in the *départements* and municipalities, respectively, with functions of rather restricted scope, largely advisory to the prefects or sub-prefects (*Ed. note*).

see, a mechanism which might have been invented to insure the election of General de Gaulle. He has no need of such a mechanism! The proposal has as its aim to rest the election of the President of the Republic on a basis that conforms to the requirements of this century.

CONCLUSION

Reform of the parliamentary system, effort to construct a Community, finally, and for the one as for the other, definition of the new functions of the President of the Republic and precise provision for his electoral corps, need I tell you, in closing, that this task has been undertaken in accord with the principles laid down by agreement between the government of General de Gaulle and the parliamentary assemblies, an agreement which took form in the law of last June 3.

Universal suffrage is the only source of power. For both the legislature and the executive this rule has been respected. The electoral college, the form of balloting for electing the President of the Republic have been set out in the Constitution itself. As far as the Assemblies are concerned, we have remained in the Republican tradition: the electoral laws for both are outside the framework of the Constitution. It is simply understood that the deputies will be elected by universal suffrage and that the Senate assures representation for the territorial collectivities. The fundamental rules of French democracy have thus been retained.

The executive power and the legislative power must be effectively separated. Some men of intelligence have suggested that the separation of powers is an outmoded dogma. If they are teaching us that there is no absolute separation of powers but that, in fact as in law, power is "one," I have not waited for these men to learn that and I have even written that before they. But what they do not say is that without separation in the nomination and the organization of the different functions followed by a division of the tasks, the regime heads toward dictatorship. No matter how dead may be the doctrine of the separation of powers, these essential functions of power must nevertheless be divided if one wishes to avoid arbitrariness and seek to unite authority with liberty. The text which is presented to you establishes for the first time in our constitutional history in such a clear manner the separation of the authorities at the source of their power and their collaboration to achieve unity of thought and action.

The government must be responsible to Parliament. This principle is the guiding rule of the parliamentary system that this proposal seeks to institute. This principle does not signify that the responsibility is equal before both Houses. The Parliament of the Republic includes, as it must, according to our tradition, a National Assembly and a Senate, but this second chamber (which resumes its former name) must not depart from its eminent role: legislative and budgetary. The political attributions belong to the National Assembly and it is only in exceptional circumstances that the Senate can, by request of the government, depart from its normal role. Neither does the responsibility of the government signify that it may be called into question in an unlimited manner as a daily occurrence; on this point the best reasoning is worth nothing and it is experience that counts. The responsibility of the government is established in accordance with procedures which must avoid the risk of instability.

The judicial authority must remain independent. A special title in the constitution affirms the independence of the judiciary, retains the irremovability of magistrates from the bench, reconstitutes a High Council of the Magistracy and makes of the President

of the Republic the guarantor of the eminent qualities of the judicial power. Organic laws will be submitted to you soon which will apply, in a clear and more precise manner than has ever been the case, those principles necessary for the equilibrium of the democratic power.

The Constitution must permit relations to be organized with the associated peoples. Of this immense effort you have had, at least from a juridical point of view, a glimpse. And the policy of the government, represented above all else by the action of General de Gaulle, indicates the orientation given to this effort of association.

After this review of the principles of the law of June 3, and before concluding, I will take up three articles of the proposal which, from the point of view of freedom, are of major interest: the article on the political parties, the article on the liberty to question the government which is recognized for the opposition, and the article on the judicial power in respect to individual freedom.

The article dealing with political parties has been viewed as a dangerous war machine. What has happened to us that an affirmation such as, "the parties must respect the principle of national sovereignty and democracy" raises cries about arbitrariness? We live in a world where deceit is king. What right have those whose mission it is to fortify France and consolidate the Republic to open wide the gates to the institutions of the State for groups which have no respect for the principles without which there would be neither France nor Republic? The silence of the Constitution would have been grave and the criticisms would then have been justified!

It has not been said often enough that this affirmation is the consequence of another. The proposal declares: "The parties and political groupings compete in the balloting. They form and exercise their activities freely." These two sentences are of capital importance. They are, from a constitutional point of view, the negation of any totalitarian system which postulates a single party. In the most categorical manner and, at the same time the most solemn, our future Constitution proclaims its democratic faith and founds the institutions on that fundamental expression of political liberty, a multiplicity of parties.

One article in the proposal, after having given, to the government in the first paragraph, a major responsibility for fixing the agendas of the Assemblies, stipulates next: "One sitting a week is reserved, by priority, to questions by members of the Parliament and to the responses of the government." This provision is the decisive mark of a parliamentary regime and of the rights recognized in the regime to the opposition. The government, responsible for the State, thus for the legislation, is normally master of the assemblies' agenda. No delay can be tolerated for the examination of a governmental project, except that which results from its study. The law, the budget, and all the affairs which are within the competence of Parliament are not a monopoly of the Parliament. The intervention of the assemblies is a control and a guarantee. Nevertheless, a government must not monopolize the work of the assemblies to the point that the opposition cannot manifest its presence. Although it must not have the power to obstruct, it must have the power to question. That is the purpose of the "one day a week" reserved for questions. It is well understood that these questions cannot, at the will of the interpellator, terminate by a motion of confidence or of censure. Only the government can pose the question of confidence and the motion of censure is subjected to a procedure under the new Constitution which was inspired by proposals in the process of receiving the approbation of the National Assembly [of the Fourth Republic]. But

the constitutional existence of the right of interpellation is the touchstone of parliamentary liberty.

At the close of the title in the constitution dealing with the judicial authority is an article which has escaped both criticism and eulogy. It is the one which says: "No one may be detained arbitrarily. The judicial authority, guardian of individual liberties, shall insure that this principle is respected in accordance with conditions prescribed by law." As you know, the provision in Anglo-Saxon law called "habeas corpus" is often cited as the model. It is a breach of justice not to arraign a citizen within a day of his arrest. The guarantee is broad and it is the keystone of any regime which seeks to respect civil liberties. The flexibility of English constitutional rules permits this requirement to be combined with another requirement: state security. In time of war or disturbance an act of Parliament suspends application of "habeas corpus." Our rigid system prevents such a happy combination. To affirm in an article the principle of immediate and total judicial competence, then to give to the government the right [to suspend it (?)], by decree, even though it be submitted for ratification, does not and cannot produce a good effect. Still, the government of General de Gaulle wished, in order to affirm the liberalism of France, to go further than has been done so far. After laying down the principle—no one may be arbitrarily detained—it gives to the judiciary sole competence to apply it and refers to the law. This law will be prepared and promulgated in terms which will try to combine the fundamental requirements of individual rights and the rights of the State and to assure the security of both the nation and the citizens. We can, in this respect, do even better than Anglo-Saxon law.

Freedom for political parties (a freedom essential to democracy), freedom to interpellate the government (a freedom essential to the parliamentary regime), freedom for each citizen guaranteed by judicial power (a freedom essential to the individual): the draft constitution is inspired by a most generous respect for freedom.

This constitutional reform is the last chance given to the men and the parties which believe that France can remain both one of the powerful nations of the world and a democracy. The last chance: it is General de Gaulle who has pronounced these words and he had the right to pronounce them, he, without whom this chance could not have been seized, he, without whom our State and our liberty would now be facing the gravest perils.

Naturally, texts are texts and only that. What will be the movements in the world tomorrow? What will be the domestic political forces? No one can with assurance reply to these questions which dominate our destiny. Our task in the meanwhile must be influenced by the fact that these movements will be profound and brutal, that these political forces will be impassioned. Our task must also be influenced by this other fact that we have already survived a thousand difficulties. Our epoch is one of imbalance, of instability, of problems recurring without respite.

If we do not wish France to drift, if we do not wish that France be doomed, a first condition is necessary: governmental authority. We wish to give authority to the Republic. We wish to give authority to the Community.

Our ambition can go no further. A Constitution can do no more than give an opportunity to politicians of goodwill who, for the nation and for liberty, want a State, that is, above everything, a government.

C. Germany

7. The Development of Parliamentary Institutions in Germany, 1945-1954*

BY KONRAD ADENAUER

The author has been the dominant political and governmental leader in West Germany since World War II. He emerged as a leading figure even before the Federal Republic of Germany was established in 1949, became its first Chancellor, and has remained in office continuously since. As a result of the intentions of the framers of the constitution and through the force of Dr. Adenauer's personality, the chancellorship has developed into the most powerful governmental organ in the Bonn Republic.

In the early summer of 1945 it looked as though the utter collapse of the German people at the end of Hitler's calamitous war was final. No one could see how a German State could ever rise again from the chaos of these days. Hardly eight years later, on 6th September, 1953, the people of the Federal Republic of Germany with rare unanimity pledged themselves to the principles of parliamentary democracy and to the ideals of the Christian and Western spirit.

The result of the *Bundestag* elections demonstrated the agreement existing between the great majority of the people and the government on all the great issues of domestic and foreign policy, as well as the stability of the still young parliamentary democracy. On such a strong foundation, steady development is possible. The ultimate objective is a reunited democratic Germany as part of a free and united Europe.

What was the situation in Germany in 1945? The victorious Allied forces occupied the entire German territory after the High Command of the German Wehrmacht, as the last supreme organ still functioning, had unconditionally capitulated on behalf of the German forces on all fronts. At the same time, the Allies claimed to be liberators from the tyranny of National Socialism. The attempted rising of 20th July, 1944, and the thou-

* From *Parliamentary Affairs*, vol. VII, no. 3, 1954, pp. 279-286. Reprinted by permission.

sands of people murdered and executed for political reasons are sufficient proof that broad sections of the German people had longed for many years for this liberation from the yoke of National Socialism.

After the capitulation there was no central German authority left, no Parliament, no Head of the State, no High Court of Justice. The destiny of the German people was thus inevitably placed in the hands of the victors.

The immediate result was the elimination of all central *Reich* authorities. The same applied to the intermediate *Land* * authorities. Only the smallest administrative districts were able to retain a minimum of vital functions. The mayors and regional commissioners appointed by the Allies were executive agents of the occupying powers, whose orders they had to carry out. The Allies looked upon the suppression of National Socialism as one of their foremost tasks. Non-National Socialist political groups were allowed, under allied control, to form political parties at the regional level. Progress in this direction was different in the various occupation zones. As early as July, 1945, the Communist Party, the Socialist Party, the Liberal-Democratic Party and the Christian Democratic Union were licensed in the Soviet zone and in Berlin. In the summer and autumn of 1945, numerous local party organizations came into being in the western zones.

The great question was whether these newly-founded parties were to link up with the old parties of the Weimar Republic, or whether new forms were to be evolved. The Social Democrats reverted to their former party organization. The Communist Party built up its organization in alliance with the Soviet occupation power. The non-Marxist groups proceeded along different lines. They realized that the real reason for the failure of the Weimar Republic was to be found in the political disintegration of the Centre. Furthermore, very many Catholic and Protestant Christians had united in resistance to National Socialism; they recognized their common Christian purpose. Rejecting all former party groupings, the Christian Democratic Union (known in Bavaria as Christian Social Union) was constituted as a new political organization.

Other political groups appeared. These included the Free Democratic Party as a rallying centre of liberal elements; the German Party as a regionally-limited conservative-federalist group; and, for the promotion of certain political interests, the League of Expellees, which shortly before the second *Bundestag* elections changed its name to All-German Bloc/League of Expellees. Smaller splinter parties were formed but remained insignificant or soon disappeared entirely.

Even after the western occupation powers had permitted the merging of regional party groups into *Land* and zonal unions, the parties had no decisive political influence. Members of the legislatures in the *Laender* were nominated by the occupation powers and not elected by free vote. They did not reflect the real political will of the people. In particular, the influence of the Communists, whom the occupation powers erroneously believed to be truly democratic, was greatly over-estimated.

In the U.S. occupation zone the first municipal elections were held in January, 1946, and the first district elections in April, 1946. The British and French zones followed, with the first district and city council elections later in 1946. Elections for the *Land* legislatures were held in the U.S. zone at the end of 1946 and in the British and French zones in the spring of 1947; they produced for the first time a genuine reflection of the political attitude of the German people.

Legislative power was increasingly

* A *Land* is a State or Province forming part of the German federation (*Ed. note*).

transferred to the various *Land* legislatures. The *Laender* adopted constitutions, all of which (with the exception of Bavaria) provided for a single-chamber system. Legislative and executive powers were separated, and the judicial power was re-established. The Premiers of the various *Laender* coordinated their work by occasional joint consultations. Currency reform was implemented by the western occupation powers with German assistance on 20th June, 1948, thus creating the indispensable conditions for economic recovery in the three western zones. It furnished the Soviet Military Government with the occasion for isolating its zone still more, for still further encroaching on democratic activities within that zone, and for practically liquidating the four-power administration of Berlin.

As a result of the London Six-Power recommendations of 7th June, 1948, the Military Governors presented to the eleven West German Premiers the so-called "Frankfurt Documents." Document I authorized these Premiers to summon a constituent assembly which was to meet not later than 1st September, 1948.

After prolonged discussions it was decided on 26th July, 1948, to summon the "Parliamentary Council." Every Premier submitted to his *Land* legislature a draft law for the election of the deputies to this Parliamentary Council. For every 750,000 inhabitants, there was one deputy nominated by the *Land* legislatures.

The Parliamentary Council met in Bonn on 1st September, 1948. It comprised twenty-seven deputies each of the Christian Democratic/Christian Social Union and of the Social Democratic Party, five deputies of the Free Democratic Party, and two deputies each of the German Party, the Centre Party, and the Communist Party. At the first meeting it was decided to include five representatives of Berlin in a consultative capacity. Thus, the greater part of the German people for the first time after sixteen years had a freely, although indirectly, elected parliamentary assembly. Its task was to draw up a provisional constitution, the "Basic Law" of what was to become the Federal Republic. On 8th May, 1949, the Basic Law was agreed to. Subject to a few reservations, the Basic Law was approved four days later by the three Military Governors. The most important of these reservations was that the "Occupation Statute" would take precedence over German legislation. Other reservations provided for a limitation of the police powers of the Federation and for the exclusion of Berlin from the Federation. On 23rd May, 1949, the Basic Law was promulgated and brought into force by the Parliamentary Council, after approval had been given by the various *Land* legislatures.

The "Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany" is only provisional. According to article 146, it "shall become invalid on the day when a constitution adopted in a free decision by the German people comes into force." In its preamble it is stated that the Basic Law acts "also on behalf of those Germans to whom participation was denied."

According to the fundamental rights laid down in the Basic Law, men and women enjoy equal rights; no one must be prejudiced or favored because of his or her sex, race, language, parentage, faith, or political opinion. Associations which have objectives which conflict with the constitutional order or the concept of international understanding are prohibited. According to article 9, paragraph 3: "The right to form associations to safeguard and improve working and economic conditions shall be guaranteed to everyone and all professions." The right to form trade unions is guaranteed; nationalization on payment of compensation is permitted. Victims of political persecution enjoy the right of asylum.

Germany is a democratic and social Federal State. All State power ema-

nates from the people. Political parties must conform to democratic principles in their internal organization; anti-democratic parties are unconstitutional. The Constitutional Court decides on the question of the constitutionality of legislation. The Federal Republic may transfer sovereign powers to international organizations. Actions liable to disturb peaceful international cooperation are punishable, especially the preparation of an aggressive war. The exercise of State powers is vested in the *Laender* in so far as the Basic Law does not provide otherwise.

The *Bundestag,* or lower Chamber of Parliament, is directly elected by the people for four years on the basis of a special electoral law. In the event of earlier dissolution, new elections must be held within sixty days. The *Bundesrat,* the Upper Chamber, represents the *Land* Governments, and each *Land* has at least three votes, the larger ones up to five. The votes of each *Land* must be cast as a single block vote.

In the course of the deliberations on the Basic Law an attempt was made to avoid the errors of the Weimar Constitution; consequently, the Basic Law differs materially from the Weimar example. The Federal President has now been given genuine representative functions. The *Bundesrat,* unlike the *Reichsrat* of the Weimar Republic, not only has advisory functions but may participate in legislation and the administration of the Federation. The structure of the Federal Republic is marked by federalist features to a far greater extent than was the Weimar Republic. Above all, the position of the Federal Chancellor (Prime Minister) is very much stronger. The provisions relating to the so-called "constructive vote of no confidence" make him immune against the irresponsible exercise of parliamentary majorities, for according to article 67 of the Basic Law "the *Bundestag* can express its lack of confidence in the Federal Chancellor only by electing a successor by a majority of its members." The Federal Constitutional Court—the guardian of the constitution—was added to the democratic authorities.

The electoral law was of decisive importance. The system of proportional representation which applied in the Weimar Republic encouraged the disintegration of parties. The Parliamentary Council's solution—a combination of the system of relative majority vote and proportional representation—avoided similar mistakes. One half of the deputies were to be elected to the *Bundestag* by relative-majority vote and the remainder by proportional vote. The three Military Governors, however, amended this electoral law so that the ratio of the deputies elected under the two systems was 60:40.

Elections for the first *Bundestag* were held on 14th August, 1949, in an atmosphere of calm and political prudence. Some seventy-eight per cent of the electors went to the polls. The *Bundestag* was constituted as follows:

Christian Democratic Union/ Christian Social Union	139
Social Democratic Party	131
Free Democratic Party	52
Bavarian Party	17
German Party	17
Communist Party	15
Centre Party	10
Others	21

There were added eight, and later nineteen, Berlin deputies who were not entitled to vote. These figures clearly reveal the growing concentration of support for the big parties. A government was formed resulting from the coalition of C.D.U./C.S.U., Free Democrats, and German Party

In September, 1949, the new Occupation Statute came into force. This signified a considerable curtailment of the exercise by the western occupation powers of supreme power, but still constituted a restriction of German

sovereign rights. The earnest German efforts to secure some relaxation of these restrictions have led to several revisions since then. [When the Bonn Conventions entered into force in 1955, the Occupation Statute was abolished. —*Ed. note.*]

The tasks of the first German *Bundestag* were enormous. Not only had Germany been without parliamentary institutions for sixteen years, but she had to try and make good in the political, economic and social sphere, the effects of a lost war. The extraordinary objectivity with which the *Bundestag* tackled its tasks provided gratifying evidence of the change in the general atmosphere. The few extremist elements on the left and right presented no danger. The Communists—not least as a result of developments in the Soviet occupation zone and of the continued retention of German prisoners-of-war in the Soviet Union—lost followers at an ever-increasing rate, and the formation of neo-Nazi groups was confined to a few bigoted extremists. The provision of the Basic Law on the maintenance of the democratic order had positive effects.

The legislative period of the first *Bundestag* expired in the summer of 1953. During those four years, more than 500 laws were passed, and more than 200 others reached the preparatory stages. Apart from the many laws serving to consolidate public life in the Federal Republic, there were measures which aimed at the reintegration of Germany within the free world, the establishment of new forms of international co-operation, and the preservation of the inalienable values of Christian and Western culture. The first *Bundestag* has furnished proof that the parliamentary system in Germany has prevailed again and that the Federal Republic was able to return into the democratic community.

The electoral law for the second *Bundestag* signified a further step towards the consolidation of political conditions. By this law, every voter was given two votes. With the first he chooses one candidate listed by name and with the second he endorses a certain party which presents its candidates by *Land* lists. The total number of mandates is then calculated by the maximum figure procedure on the basis of the number of second votes cast for them. The so-called five per cent clause renders more difficult the emergence of splinter parties. Only those parties are considered which poll at least five per cent of all the valid second votes cast in Federal territory or, alternatively, gain a mandate directly in a constituency.

The election for the second *Bundestag* on 6th September, 1953, produced the surprisingly heavy poll of 86 per cent, a proportion never reached in *Reichstag* elections under the Weimar Republic. Of the second votes cast the C.D.U./C.S.U. secured 45.2 per cent, the Socialists 28.8 per cent, the Free Democrats 9.5 per cent, the All-German Bloc 5.9 per cent, the German Party 3.2 per cent, the Communists 2.2 per cent, and the other parties together 5.2 per cent. The *Bundestag* now consists of 487 deputies (with an additional 22 Berlin representatives without a vote), including 244 deputies of the C.D.U./C.S.U., 151 of the Social Democratic Party, 48 of the Free Democrats, 27 of the All-German Bloc, 15 of the German Party and 2 of the Centre Party. For the first time in the history of German parliamentary institutions a political party (the C.D.U./C.S.U.) had obtained an absolute majority in Parliament. This result was the outcome of the tenacious and successful Government policy during previous years, and at the same time furnished proof of the consolidation of political conditions in the Federal Republic. By the free decision of the electorate, the splinter parties and all extremist anti-democratic elements on the right and left have disappeared from Parliament. C.D.U./C.S.U., Free Demo-

crats, German Party, and All-German Bloc have formed a coalition Government. The situation in the Federal Republic is to an even greater extent than before marked by the concentration of political effort and by the stability of democratic institutions.

The German electorate has rejected extremism. By their choice the voters have encouraged the preservation and development of the policy of the Federal Government and, at the same time, demonstrated their confidence in parliamentary democracy.

[*In the 1957 parliamentary elections the C.D.U. won 270 seats with 50.2 per cent of the vote, compared to 169 seats and 31.8 per cent for the Socialists, 41 seats and 7.7 per cent for the Free Democrats, 17 seats and 3.4 per cent for the German Party, and 4.6 per cent of the vote but no seats for the Refugee League. Seats and percentages in the 1961* Bundestag *elections were: C.D.U., 241, 45.3; Socialists, 190, 36.3; Free Democrats, 66, 12.7. No other parties won seats or approached five per cent of the vote.—Ed. note.*]

D. The Soviet Union

8. The 1936 (Stalin) Constitution*

BY JOSEF V. STALIN

At the height of the blood purges of the 1930's with the unmistakable evidence of tyranny and completely arbitrary rule present in the daily lives of the Soviet peoples, a new constitution was promulgated and proclaimed as the most democratic in the history of the world. This contradiction between reality and legality and the internal contradictions apparent in the text can be resolved only when viewed in the context of Marxist theory and with an awareness that words do not have the same meaning in Marxist jargon that they have otherwise.

Although the heirs to the great dictator's mantle of authority have repudiated much that he did, his constitution with some amendments remains the framework of the Soviet State. Early in 1962, it was reported that the preparation of a new constitution had begun.

Comrade Stalin's appearance on the rostrum is greeted by all present with loud and prolonged cheers. All rise. Shouts from all parts of the hall: "Hurrah for Comrade Stalin!" "Long live Comrade Stalin!" Long live the Great Stalin!" "Hurrah for the great genius, Comrade Stalin!" "Vivat!" "Rot Front!" "Glory to Comrade Stalin!"

* Reprinted from J. V. Stalin, *On the Draft Constitution of the U.S.S.R.: Report delivered at the Extraordinary Eighth Congress of Soviets of the U.S.S.R.*, November 25, 1936, Cooperative Publishing Society of Foreign Workers in the U.S.S.R., Moscow, 1936.

I. FORMATION OF THE CONSTITUTION COMMISSION AND ITS TASKS

COMRADES, the Constitution Commission, whose draft has been submitted for consideration to the present Congress, was formed, as you know, by special decision of the VII Congress of Soviets of the U.S.S.R. This decision was adopted on February 6, 1935. It reads:

"1. To amend the Constitution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in the direction of:

"*a*) further democratizing the

electoral system by replacing not entirely equal suffrage by equal suffrage, indirect elections by direct elections, and open ballot by secret ballot;

"*b*) giving more precise definition to the social and economic basis of the Constitution by bringing the Constitution into conformity with the present relation of class forces in the U.S.S.R. (the creation of a new socialist industry, the demolition of the kulak class, the victory of the collective farm system, the consolidation of socialist property as the basis of Soviet society, and so on).

"2. To instruct the Central Executive Committee of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to elect a Constitution Commission which shall be instructed to draw up an amended text of the Constitution in accordance with the principles indicated in Clause 1 and to submit it for approval to a Session of the Central Executive Committee of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

"3. To conduct the next ordinary elections of the organs of Soviet government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the basis of the new electoral system."

This was on February 6, 1935. A day after this decision was adopted, i.e., February 7, 1935, the First Session of the Central Executive Committee of the U.S.S.R. met and, in pursuance of the decision of the VII Congress of Soviets of the U.S.S.R., set up a Constitution Commission consisting of 31 persons. It instructed the Constitution Commission to make a draft of an amended Constitution of the U.S.S.R.

Such are the formal grounds and instructions of the supreme body of the U.S.S.R. on the basis of which the work of the Constitution Commission was to proceed.

Thus the Constitution Commission was to introduce changes in the Constitution now in operation, which was adopted in 1924, taking into account the changes in the direction of socialism which have been brought about in the life of the U.S.S.R. in the period from 1924 to the present day.

II. CHANGES IN THE LIFE OF THE U.S.S.R. IN THE PERIOD FROM 1924 TO 1936

What changes in the life of the U.S.S.R. have been brought about in the period from 1924 to 1936 which the Constitution Commission was to reflect in its Draft Constitution?

What is the essence of these changes?

What was the situation in 1924?

This was the first period of the New Economic Policy, when the Soviet government permitted some revival of capitalism while taking all measures to develop socialism; when it calculated, in the course of competition between the two systems of economy—the capitalist system and the socialist system—on securing the preponderance of the socialist system over the capitalist system. The task was, in the course of this competition, to consolidate the position of socialism, to achieve the liquidation of the capitalist elements and to consummate the victory of the socialist system as the fundamental system of national economy.

Our industry presented an unenviable picture at that time, particularly heavy industry. True, it was being gradually restored, but it had not yet raised its output to anywhere near the pre-war level. It was based on the old, backward and poorly equipped technique. Of course, it was developing in the direction of socialism. The proportion of the socialist sector of our industry at that time represented about 80 per cent of the

whole. But the capitalist sector still controlled no less than 20 per cent of industry.

Our agriculture presented a still more unsightly picture. True, the landlord class had already been liquidated, but, on the other hand, the agricultural capitalist class, the kulak class, still represented a fairly considerable force. On the whole, agriculture at that time resembled a boundless ocean of small individual peasant farms with backward, mediaeval technical equipment. In this ocean, like small dots and islands, were the collective farms and state farms, which, strictly speaking, did not yet have any serious significance in our national economy. The collective farms and state farms were weak, while the kulak was still strong. At that time we spoke not of liquidating the kulaks, but of restricting them.

The same must be said about trade in the country. The socialist sector in trade represented some 50 or 60 per cent, not more, while all the rest of the field was occupied by merchants, profiteers and other private traders.

Such was the picture our economy presented in 1924.

What is the situation now, in 1936?

At that time we were in the first period of the New Economic Policy, the beginning of the New Economic Policy, the period of some revival of capitalism; now, however, we are in the last period of the New Economic Policy, the end of the New Economic Policy, the period of the complete liquidation of capitalism in all spheres of national economy.

To begin with, there is, say, the fact that during this period our industry has grown into a gigantic force. Now it can no longer be described as weak and technically ill-equipped. On the contrary, it is now based on new, rich, modern technical equipment, with a powerfully developed heavy industry and an even more developed machine building industry. But the most important thing is that capitalism has been banished entirely from the sphere of our industry, while the socialist form of production is now the system which has undivided sway in the sphere of our industry. The fact that as regards volume of output our present socialist industry exceeds that of pre-war industry more than sevenfold cannot be regarded as a trifle.

In the sphere of agriculture, instead of the ocean of small individual peasant farms with their poor technical equipment and strong kulak influence, we now have mechanized production, conducted on a scale larger than anywhere else in the world, with up-to-date technical equipment, in the form of an all-embracing system of collective farms and state farms. Everybody knows that the kulak class has been liquidated in agriculture, while the sector of small individual peasant farms, with its backward, mediaeval technical equipment, now occupies an insignificant place; and its proportion in agriculture as regards area of cultivation does not amount to more than two or three per cent. We must not overlook the fact that the collective farms now have at their disposal 316,000 tractors with a total of 5,700,000 horse power, and, together with the state farms, a total of over 400,000 tractors of 7,580,000 horse power.

As for trade in the country, the merchants and profiteers have been banished entirely from this sphere. All trade is now in the hands of the state, the cooperative societies and the collective farms. A new, Soviet trade, trade without profiteers, trade without capitalists has arisen and developed.

Thus the complete victory of the socialist system in all spheres of national economy is now a fact.

And what does this mean?

It means that the exploitation of man by man has been abolished, liquidated, while the socialist ownership

of the implements and means of production has been established as the unshakable foundation of our Soviet society. [*Prolonged applause.*]

As a result of all these changes in the sphere of the national economy of the U.S.S.R., we now have a new, socialist economy, which knows neither crises nor unemployment, which knows neither poverty nor ruin, and which provides citizens with every opportunity to lead a prosperous and cultured life.

Such, in the main, are the changes which have taken place in the sphere of our *economy* during the period from 1924 to 1936.

In conformity with these changes in the sphere of the economy of the U.S.S.R., the *class structure* of our society has changed also.

The landlord class, as you know, had been liquidated already as a result of the victorious conclusion of the civil war. As for the other exploiting classes, they have shared the fate of the landlord class. The capitalist class in the sphere of industry has ceased to exist. The kulak class in the sphere of agriculture has ceased to exist. And the merchants and profiteers in the sphere of trade have ceased to exist. Thus all the exploiting classes have now been liquidated.

There remains the working class.

There remains the peasant class.

There remains the intelligentsia.

But it would be a mistake to think that these social groups have undergone no change during this period, that they have remained as they were, say, in the period of capitalism.

Take, for example, the working class of the U.S.S.R. By force of habit it is often called the proletariat. But what is the proletariat? The proletariat is a class bereft of the implements and means of production under an economic system in which the implements and means of production belong to the capitalists and in which the capitalist class exploits the proletariat. The proletariat is a class exploited by the capitalists. But, in our country, as you know, the capitalist class has already been liquidated, the implements and means of production have been taken from the capitalists and transferred to the state, the leading force of which is the working class. Consequently, there is no longer a capitalist class to exploit the working class. Consequently, our working class, far from being bereft of the implements and means of production, on the contrary, possesses them jointly with the whole people. And since it possesses them, and the capitalist class has been liquidated, all possibility of the working class being exploited is precluded. After this, can our working class be called the proletariat? Clearly, it cannot. Marx said that if the proletariat is to emancipate itself, it must smash the capitalist class, take the implements and means of production from the capitalists and abolish those conditions of production which give rise to the proletariat. Can it be said that the working class of the U.S.S.R. has already created these conditions for its emancipation? Undoubtedly it can and should be said. And what does this mean? It means that the proletariat of the U.S.S.R. has been transformed into an entirely new class, into the working class of the U.S.S.R. which has abolished the capitalist system of production, which has established the socialist ownership of the implements and means of production and is directing Soviet society along the road to communism.

As you see, the working class of the U.S.S.R. is an entirely new working class, a working class emancipated from exploitation, the like of which the history of mankind has never known before.

Let us pass to the question of the peasantry. It is customary to say that the peasantry is a class of small producers, the members of which are atomized, scattered over the face of the land, ploughing a lonely furrow on their small farms, with their backward

technical equipment, that they are slaves to private property and are exploited with impunity by landlords, kulaks, merchants, profiteers, usurers and the like. And, indeed, in capitalist countries, the peasantry, if we take it in the mass, is precisely such a class. Can it be said that our present-day peasantry, the Soviet peasantry, taken in the mass, resembles that kind of peasantry? No, this cannot be said. There is no longer such a peasantry in our country. Our Soviet peasantry is an entirely new peasantry. In our country there are no longer any landlords and kulaks, merchants and usurers to exploit the peasants. Consequently our peasantry is a peasantry emancipated from exploitation. Further. Our Soviet peasantry, the overwhelming majority, is a collective farm peasantry, i.e., it bases its work and wealth, not on individual labor and on backward technical equipment, but on collective labor and up-to-date technical equipment. Finally, the farming of our peasantry is based, not on private property, but on collective property, which has grown up on the basis of collective labor.

As you see, the Soviet peasantry is an entirely new peasantry, the like of which the history of mankind has never known before.

Lastly, let us pass to the question of the intelligentsia, to the question of the engineers and technicians, of workers on the cultural front, of employees in general, and so on. The intelligentsia, too, has undergone great changes during this period. It is no longer the old hidebound intelligentsia, which tried to place itself above classes but which actually, for the most part, served the landlords and the capitalists. Our Soviet intelligentsia is an entirely new intelligentsia, which by its very roots is bound up with the working class and the peasantry. In the first place, the composition of the intelligentsia has changed. Those who came from the aristocracy and the bourgeoisie constitute a small per cent of our Soviet intelligentsia; 80 to 90 per cent of the Soviet intelligentsia have come from the working class, the peasantry and other strata of the working population. Finally, the very nature of the activities of the intelligentsia has changed. Formerly, it had to serve the wealthy classes, for it had no alternative. Today it must serve the people, for there are no longer any exploiting classes. And that is precisely why it is now an equal member of Soviet society in which, side by side with the workers and peasants, pulling together with them, it is engaged in building the new, classless, socialist society.

As you see, this is an entirely new, working intelligentsia, the like of which you will not find in any other country on earth.

Such are the changes which have taken place during this period in the sphere of the class structure of Soviet society.

What do these changes signify?

Firstly, they signify that the dividing line between the working class and the peasantry, and between these classes and the intelligentsia, is being obliterated, while the old class exclusiveness is disappearing. This means that the distance between these social groups is steadily diminishing.

Secondly, they signify that the economic contradictions between these social groups are subsiding, are becoming obliterated.

And lastly, they signify that the political contradictions between them are also subsiding and becoming obliterated.

Such is the position in regard to the changes in the sphere of the *class structure* of the U.S.S.R.

The picture of the changes in the social life of the U.S.S.R. would be incomplete if a few words were not said about the changes in yet another sphere. I refer to the sphere of *national* relationships in the U.S.S.R. As you know, within the Soviet Union there are about sixty nations, national

groups and nationalities. The Soviet state is a multi-national state. Clearly, the questions of the relations between the peoples of the U.S.S.R. cannot but be one of first rate importance for us.

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, as you know, was formed in 1922 at the First Congress of Soviets of the U.S.S.R. It was formed on the principles of equality and voluntary affiliation of the peoples of the U.S.S.R. The Constitution now in operation, adopted in 1924, was the first Constitution of the U.S.S.R. That was the period when the relations between the peoples had not yet been properly adjusted, when survivals of distrust towards the Great Russians had not yet disappeared and when centrifugal forces still continued to operate. Under these conditions it was necessary to establish fraternal cooperation between the peoples on the basis of economic, political and military mutual aid by uniting them in a single, federated, multi-national state. The Soviet government could not but realize the difficulties of this task. It had before it the unsuccessful experiments of multi-national states in bourgeois countries. It had before it the failure of the experiment of old Austro-Hungary. Nevertheless, it resolved to make the experiment of creating a multi-national state, for it knew that a multi-national state which has arisen on the basis of socialism is bound to stand every test.

Since then fourteen years have elapsed. A period long enough to test the experiment. And what do we find? This period has shown beyond a doubt that the experiment of forming a multi-national state based on socialism has been completely successful. This is the undoubted victory of Lenin's national policy. [*Prolonged applause.*]

How is this victory to be explained?

By the absence of exploiting classes, which are the principal organizers of strife between nations; the absence of exploitation, which cultivates mutual distrust and kindles nationalist passions; the fact that power is in the hands of the working class, which is an enemy of all enslavement and the true vehicle of the ideas of internationalism; the actual practice of mutual aid among the peoples in all spheres of economic and social life; and, finally, the flourishing national culture of the peoples of the U.S.S.R., culture which is national in form and socialist in content—all these and similar factors have brought about a radical change in the aspect of the peoples of the U.S.S.R.; their feeling of mutual distrust has disappeared, a feeling of mutual friendship has developed among them, and thus, real fraternal cooperation between the peoples was established within the system of a single federated state.

As a result, we now have a fully formed multi-national socialist state, which has stood all tests, and the stability of which might well be envied by any national state in any part of the world. [*Loud applause.*]

Such are the changes which have taken place during this period in the sphere of *national relations* in the U.S.S.R.

Such is the sum total of changes which have taken place in the sphere of the economic and social-political life in the U.S.S.R. in the period from 1924 to 1936.

III. THE PRINCIPAL SPECIFIC FEATURES OF THE DRAFT CONSTITUTION

How are all these changes in the life of the U.S.S.R. reflected in the draft of the new Constitution?

In other words: What are the principal specific features of the Draft Constitution that is submitted for consideration to the present Congress?

The Constitution Commission was instructed to amend the text of the Constitution of 1924. The work of the Constitution Commission has resulted in a new text of the Constitution, a draft of a new Constitution of the U.S.S.R. In drafting the new Consti-

tution, the Constitution Commission proceeded from the assumption that a Constitution must not be confused with a program. This means that there is an essential difference between a program and a Constitution. While a program speaks of what does not yet exist, of what has yet to be achieved and won in the future, a Constitution, on the contrary, must speak of what already exists, of what has already been achieved and won now, at the present time. A program deals mainly with the future, a Constitution with the present.

Two examples by way of illustration.

Our Soviet society has already, in the main, succeeded in achieving socialism; it has created a socialist system, i.e., it has brought about what Marxists in other words call the first, or lower phase of communism. Hence, in the main, we have already achieved the first phase of communism, socialism. [*Prolonged applause.*] The fundamental principle of this phase of communism is, as you know, the formula: "From each according to his ability, to each according to his work." Should our Constitution reflect this fact, the fact that socialism has been achieved? Should it be based on this achievement? Undoubtedly, it should. It should, because for the U.S.S.R., socialism is something already achieved and won.

But Soviet society has not yet reached the higher phase of communism, in which the ruling principle will be the formula: "From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs," although it sets itself the aim of achieving the higher phase of communism in the future. Can our Constitution be based on the higher phase of communism, which does not yet exist and which has still to be achieved? No, it cannot, because for the U.S.S.R. the higher phase of communism is something that has not yet been achieved, and which has to be achieved in the future. It cannot, if it is not to be converted into a program or a declaration of future achievements.

Such are the limits of our Constitution at the present historical moment.

Thus the draft of the new Constitution is a summary of the path that has been traversed, a summary of the gains already achieved. Consequently, it is the registration and legislative consolidation of what has already been achieved and won in actual fact. [*Loud applause.*]

This is the first specific feature of the draft of the new Constitution of the U.S.S.R.

Further. The constitutions of bourgeois countries usually proceed from the conviction that the capitalist system is immutable. The main foundation of these constitutions consists of the principles of capitalism, of its main pillars: the private ownership of the land, forests, factories, works and other implements and means of production; the exploitation of man by man and the existence of exploiters and exploited; insecurity for the toiling majority at one pole of society, and luxury for the non-toiling but secure minority at the other pole, etc., etc. They rest on these and similar pillars of capitalism. They reflect them, they give them legislative consolidation.

Unlike these, the draft of the new Constitution of the U.S.S.R. proceeds from the fact that the capitalist system has been liquidated, from the fact that the socialist system is victorious in the U.S.S.R. The main foundation of the draft of the new Constitution of the U.S.S.R. consists of the principles of socialism, its main pillars, which have already been won and achieved: the socialist ownership of the land, forests, factories, works and other implements and means of production; the abolition of exploitation and of exploiting classes; the abolition of poverty for the majority and of luxury for the minority; the aboli-

tion of unemployment; work as an obligation and honourable duty for every able-bodied citizen, in accordance with the formula: "He who does not work, neither shall he eat." The right to work, i.e., the right of every citizen to receive guaranteed employment; the right to rest and leisure; the right to education, etc., etc. The draft of the new Constitution rests on these and similar pillars of socialism. It reflects them, it gives them legislative consolidation.

Such is the second specific feature of the draft of the new Constitution.

Further. Bourgeois constitutions tacitly proceed from the premise that society consists of antagonistic classes, of classes which own wealth and classes which do not own wealth, that no matter what party comes into power the guidance of society by the state (the dictatorship) must be in the hands of the bourgeoisie, that a Constitution is needed for the purpose of consolidating a social order desired by and beneficial to the propertied classes.

Unlike bourgeois constitutions, the draft of the new Constitution of the U.S.S.R. proceeds from the fact that there are no longer any antagonistic classes in society, that society consists of two friendly classes, of workers and peasants, that it is these classes, the toiling classes, that are in power, that the guidance of society by the state (the dictatorship) is in the hands of the working class, the most advanced class in society, that a Constitution is needed for the purpose of consolidating a social order desired by and beneficial to the toilers.

Such is the third specific feature of the draft of the new Constitution.

Further. Bourgeois constitutions tacitly proceed from the premise that nations and races cannot have equal rights, that there are nations with full rights and nations without full rights, and that, in addition, there is a third category of nations or races, for example in the colonies, which have even fewer rights than the nations without full rights. This means that, at bottom, all these constitutions are nationalistic, i.e., constitutions of ruling nations.

Unlike these constitutions, the draft of the new Constitution of the U.S.S.R. is, on the contrary, profoundly internationalistic. It proceeds from the fact that neither difference in color or language, cultural level or level of political development, nor any other difference between nations and races, can serve as grounds for justifying national inequality of rights. It proceeds from the fact that all nations and races, irrespective of their past and present position, irrespective of their strength or weakness, must enjoy equal rights in all spheres of the economic, social, political and cultural life of society.

Such is the fourth specific feature of the draft of the new Constitution.

The fifth specific feature of the draft of the new Constitution is its consistent and thoroughgoing democracy. From the standpoint of democracy bourgeois constitutions may be divided into two groups: one group of constitutions openly denies, or actually nullifies, the equality of rights of citizens and democratic liberties. The other group of constitutions readily accepts and even advertises democratic principles, but at the same time it makes reservations and limitations which utterly mutilate democratic rights and liberties. They speak of equal suffrage for all citizens, but in the same breath limit it by residential, educational, and even property qualifications. They speak of equal rights for citizens, but in the same breath they make the reservation that this does not apply to women or only partly applies to them. And so on and so forth.

The specific feature of the draft of the new Constitution of the U.S.S.R. is that it is free from such reservations and limitations. For it, active and passive citizens do not exist; for it, all

citizens are active. It does not recognize any difference in rights as between men and women, "residents" and "non-residents," propertied and propertyless, educated and uneducated. For it, all citizens have equal rights. It is not property status, not national origin, not sex, not office that determines the position of every citizen in society, but personal ability and personal labor.

Lastly, there is still one other specific feature of the draft of the new Constitution. Bourgeois constitutions usually confine themselves to fixing the formal rights of citizens without bothering about the conditions for exercising these rights, about the possibility of exercising them, about the means by which they can be exercised. They speak of the equality of citizens, but forget that there cannot be real equality between master and workman, between landlord and peasant, if the former possess wealth and political weight in society while the latter are exploited. Or again: they speak of freedom of speech, assembly and the press, but forget that all these liberties may be merely a hollow sound for the working class if the latter cannot have access to suitable premises for meetings, good printshops, a sufficient quantity of printing paper, etc.

The specific feature of the draft of the new Constitution is that it does not confine itself to fixing the formal rights of citizens, but shifts the center of gravity to the guarantees of these rights, to the means by which these rights can be exercised. It does not simply proclaim equality of rights for citizens, but ensures it by the legislative consolidation of the fact that the regime of exploitation has been abolished, of the fact that the citizens have been emancipated from all exploitation. It does not simply proclaim the right to work, but ensures it by the legislative consolidation of the fact that crises do not exist in Soviet society, of the fact that unemployment has been abolished. It does not simply proclaim democratic liberties but legislatively ensures them by providing definite material resources. It is clear, therefore, that democracy in the draft of the new Constitution is not the "ordinary" and "universally recognized" democracy in general, but *socialist* democracy.

Such are the principal specific features of the draft of the new Constitution of the U.S.S.R.

Such is the reflection in the draft of the new Constitution of the progress and changes that have been brought about in the economic and social-political life of the U.S.S.R. in the period from 1924 to 1936.

IV. BOURGEOIS CRITICISM OF THE DRAFT CONSTITUTION

A few words about bourgeois criticism of the Draft Constitution. The question of the attitude of the foreign bourgeois press towards the Draft Constitution is undoubtedly one of some interest. Inasmuch as the foreign press reflects the public opinion of various strata of the population in bourgeois countries, we cannot ignore the criticism which it has levelled against the Draft Constitution.

The first signs of the reaction of the foreign press to the Draft Constitution were expressed in a definite tendency to hush up the Draft Constitution. I am referring here to the most reactionary press, the fascist press. This group of critics thought it best simply to hush up the Draft Constitution and to pretend that there is no such thing, and never has been. It may be said that silence is not criticism. But that is not true. Silence, as a special method of ignoring things, is also a form of criticism—a stupid and ridiculous form, it is true, but a form of criticism, for all that. [*laughter and applause.*] But their silence method failed. In the end they were obliged to open the valve and to inform the world that, sad though it may be, a Draft Constitution of the U.S.S.R.

does exist, and not only exists but is beginning to exercise a pernicious influence on people's minds. Nor could it be otherwise, because, after all, there is some public opinion in the world, readers, living people, who want to know the truth about facts, and to hold them in the vise of deception for long is quite impossible. Deception will not carry one far. . . .

The *second* group of critics admits that there really is such a thing as a Draft Constitution but considers that the draft is not of much interest because it is really not a Draft Constitution but a scrap of paper, an empty promise, calculated, by performing a certain manoevre, to deceive the people. And they add that the U.S.S.R. could not produce a better draft, because the U.S.S.R. itself is not a state, but only a geographical concept [*laughter*], and since it is not a state, its Constitution cannot be a real constitution A typical representative of this group of critics is, strange as it may appear, the German semi-official organ, *Deutsche Diplomatische-Politische Korrespondenz.* This journal bluntly says that the Draft Constitution of the U.S.S.R. is an empty promise, a fraud, a "Potemkin village." It unhesitatingly declares that the U.S.S.R. is not a state, that the U.S.S.R. "is nothing more nor less than a strictly defined geographical concept" [*laughter*], that in view of this, the Constitution of the U.S.S.R. cannot be regarded as a real constitution.

What can one say about such critics, if you please?

In one of his tales the great Russian writer Shchedrin portrays a pigheaded official, very narrow and obtuse but self-confident and zealous to the extreme. After this bureaucrat had established "order and tranquillity" in the region "under his charge" by exterminating thousands of its inhabitants and burning down scores of towns, he looked around him and on the horizon he espied America, a country which is little known, of course, where, it appears, there are liberties of some sort or other which stir up the people and where the state is administered in a different way. The bureaucrat espied America and became indignant: What country is that, how did it get there, what right has it to exist? [*laughter and applause.*] Of course, it was discovered accidentally several centuries ago, but couldn't it be shut up again so that not a ghost of it remains? [*Laughter.*] Thereupon he wrote an order: "Shut America up again!" [*Laughter.*]

I think that the gentlemen of the *Deutsche Diplomatische-Politische Korrespondenz* and Shchedrin's bureaucrat are as like as two peas. [*Laughter and applause.*] The U.S.S.R. has long been an eyesore to these gentlemen. For nineteen years the U.S.S.R. has stood like a beacon, spreading the spirit of emancipation among the working class all over the world and rousing the fury of the enemies of the working class. And it turns out that this U.S.S.R. not only exists but is even growing, is not only growing, but is even flourishing, and is not only flourishing, but is even composing a draft of a new Constitution, a draft which is stirring the minds of the oppressed classes and inspiring them with new hope. [*Applause.*] How, after this, can the gentlemen of the German semi-official organ be anything but indignant? What country is this?—they howl; what right has it to exist? [*Laughter.*] And if it was discovered in October 1917, why can't it be shut up again so that not a ghost of it remains? Thereupon they resolved: Shut the U.S.S.R. up again; proclaim publicly that the U.S.S.R., as a state, does not exist, that the U.S.S.R. is nothing but a geographical concept! [*Laughter.*]

In writing his order to shut America up again, Shchedrin's bureaucrat, despite all his obtuseness, evinced some sense of reality by adding to himself: "However, it would seem that same is not in my power." [*Roars of laughter*

and applause.] I do not know whether the gentlemen of the German semi-official organ are intelligent enough to suspect that while, of course, they can "shut up" this or that state on paper, speaking seriously, however, "same is not in their power." . . . [*Roars of laughter and applause.*]

As for the Constitution of the U.S.S.R. being an empty promise, a "Potemkin village," etc., I would like to refer to a number of established facts which speak for themselves.

In 1917 the peoples of the U.S.S.R. overthrew the bourgeoisie and established the dictatorship of the proletariat, established a Soviet government. This is a fact, not a promise.

Further, the Soviet government liquidated the landlord class and transferred to the peasants over 150,000,000 hectares of former landlord, government and monasterial lands, and this over and above the lands which were already in the possession of the peasants. This is a fact, not a promise.

Further, the Soviet government expropriated the capitalist class, took away their banks, factories, railways and other implements and means of production, declared them to be socialist property and placed at the head of these enterprises the best members of the working class. This is a fact, not a promise. [*Prolonged applause.*]

Further, having organized industry and agriculture on new, socialist lines, with a new technical base, the Soviet government has today attained the position where agriculture in the U.S.S.R. is producing one and a half times as much as was produced in pre-war times, that industry is producing seven times more than was produced in pre-war times and that the national income has increased fourfold compared with pre-war times. All these are facts, not promises. [*Prolonged applause.*]

Further, the Soviet government abolished unemployment, introduced the right to work, the right to rest and leisure, the right to education, provided better material and cultural conditions for the workers, peasants and intelligentsia and ensured the introduction of universal, direct and equal suffrage with secret ballot for its citizens. All these are facts, not promises. [*Prolonged applause.*]

Finally, the U.S.S.R. produced the draft of a new Constitution which is not a promise but the registration and legislative consolidation of these generally known facts, the registration and legislative consolidation of what has already been achieved and won.

The question arises: What, after all this, does all the talk of the gentlemen of the German semi-official organ about "Potemkin villages" amount to if not an attempt on their part to conceal from the people the truth about the U.S.S.R., to mislead the people, to deceive them.

Such are the facts. And facts, it is said, are stubborn things. The gentlemen of the German semi-official organ may say: So much the worse for the facts. [*Laughter.*] But then, we can answer them in the words of the well-known Russian proverb: "Laws are not made for fools." [*Laughter and prolonged applause.*]

The *third* group of critics are not averse to recognizing certain merits in the Draft Constitution, they regard it as a good thing, but, you see, they doubt very much whether a number of its principles can be put into practice because they are convinced that these principles are generally impracticable and must remain a dead letter. These, to put it mildly, are sceptics. These sceptics are to be found in all countries.

It must be said that this is not the first time we have met them. When the Bolsheviks took power in 1917 the sceptics said: The Bolsheviks are not bad fellows, perhaps, but they will not be able to govern; they will fail. Actually it turned out, however, that it was not the Bolsheviks who failed, but the sceptics.

During the civil war and foreign intervention this group of sceptics said:

The Soviet government is not a bad thing, of course, but Denikin and Kolchak, plus the foreigners, will, we venture to say, come out on top. Actually, it turned out, however, that here too the sceptics were wrong in their calculations.

When the Soviet government published the First Five-Year Plan the sceptics again appeared on the scene and said: The Five-Year Plan is a good thing, of course, but it is hardly feasible. The Bolsheviks' Five-Year Plan is not likely to succeed. The facts proved, however, that once again the sceptics were unlucky: the Five-Year Plan was carried out in four years.

The same must be said about the draft of the new Constitution and the criticism levelled against it by the sceptics. No sooner was the draft published than this group of critics again appeared on the scene with their gloomy scepticism and their doubts about the practicability of certain principles of the Constitution. There is not the slightest ground for doubt that in this case also the sceptics will fail, will fail today as they have failed more than once in the past.

The *fourth* group of critics, in attacking the draft of the new Constitution, characterizes it as a "swing to the Right," as the "abandonment of the Bolshevik regime." "The Bolsheviks have swung to the Right, this is a fact." they say in different tones of voice. Particularly zealous in this respect are certain Polish newspapers and also some American newspapers.

What can one say about these critics, if you please?

If they interpret the broadening of the basis of the dictatorship of the working class and the transformation of the dictatorship into a more flexible, and, consequently, a more powerful system of guidance of society by the state, not as strengthening the dictatorship of the working class but as weakening it, or even abandoning it, then it is legitimate to ask: Do these gentlemen really know what the dictatorship of the working class means?

If they call the legislative consolidation of the victories of socialism, the legislative consolidation of the successes of industrialization, collectivization and democratization a "swing to the Right," then it is legitimate to ask: Do these gentlemen really know the difference between Left and Right? [*Laughter and applause.*]

There can be no doubt that these gentlemen have entirely lost their way in their criticism of the Draft Constitution, and, having lost their way, they confuse right with left.

One cannot help recalling, in this connection, the "wench" Pelageya in Gogol's *Dead Souls.* Gogol relates that Pelageya offered to act as guide to Chichikov's coachman, Seliphan; but not knowing the right side of the road from the left, she lost her way and became embarrassed. It must be admitted that, notwithstanding all their pretensions, the intelligence of our critics on the Polish newspapers is not much above that of the "wench" Pelageya in *Dead Souls.* [*Applause.*] If you remember, the coachman Seliphan thought fit to chide Pelageya for confusing right with left and said to her: "Oh, you, dirty-legs . . . you don't know the difference between right and left." It seems to me that our luckless critics should be chided in the same way: "Oh, you, sorry critics . . . you don't know the difference between right and left." [*Prolonged applause.*]

Finally, there is yet another group of critics. While the last-mentioned group accuses the Draft Constitution of abandoning the dictatorship of the working class, this group, on the contrary, accuses it of not changing anything in the present situation in the U.S.S.R., of leaving the dictatorship of the working class intact, of not granting freedom to political parties and of preserving the present leading position of the Communist Party in

the U.S.S.R. And this group of critics believes that the absence of freedom for parties in the U.S.S.R. is a symptom of the violation of the principles of democracy.

I must admit that the draft of the new Constitution really does preserve the regime of the dictatorship of the working class, just as it also preserves unchanged the present leading situation of the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R. [*Loud applause.*] If our esteemed critics regard this as a flaw in the Draft Constitution, it is only to be regretted. We Bolsheviks regard it as a merit of the Draft Constitution. [*Loud applause.*]

As to freedom for various political parties, we adhere to somewhat different views. A party is a part of a class, its foremost part. Several parties, and, consequently, freedom for parties, can exist only in a society in which there are antagonistic classes whose interests are mutually hostile and irreconcilable, in which there are, say, capitalists and workers, landlords and peasants, kulaks and poor peasants, etc. But in the U.S.S.R. there are no longer such classes as capitalists, landlords, kulaks, etc. In the U.S.S.R. there are only two classes, workers and peasants, whose interests are not mutually hostile, but, on the contrary, are friendly. Consequently, in the U.S.S.R. there is no ground for the existence of several parties, and, consequently, for freedom for these parties. In the U.S.S.R. there is ground only for one party, the Communist Party. In the U.S.S.R. only one party can exist, the Communist Party, which courageously defends the interests of the workers and peasants to the very end. And that it defends the interests of these classes not at all badly is a matter about which there can hardly be any doubt. [*Loud applause.*]

They talk about democracy. But what is democracy? Democracy in capitalist countries, where there are antagonistic classes, is, in the last analysis, democracy for the strong, democracy for the propertied minority. In the U.S.S.R., on the contrary, democracy is democracy for the toilers, i.e., democracy for all. But from this it follows that the principles of democracy are violated, not by the draft of the new Constitution of the U.S.S.R., but by the bourgeois constitutions. That is why I think that the Constitution of the U.S.S.R. is the only thoroughly democratic Constitution in the world.

Such is the position with regard to the bourgeois criticism of the draft of the new Constitution of the U.S.S.R.

V. AMENDMENTS AND ADDENDA TO THE DRAFT CONSTITUTION

Let us pass to the amendments and addenda to the Draft Constitution proposed by citizens during the nation-wide discussion of the draft.

The nation-wide discussion of the Draft Constitution, as you know, produced a fairly large number of amendments and addenda. These have all been published in the Soviet press. In view of the great variety of amendments and the fact that they are not all of equal value, they should, in my opinion, be divided into three categories.

The distinguishing feature of the amendments in the first category is that they do not deal with constitutional questions but with questions which come within the scope of the current legislative work of the future legislative bodies. Certain questions concerning insurance, some questions concerning collective farm structure, some questions concerning the structure of our industries, financial questions—such are the subjects with which these amendments deal. Evidently the authors of these amendments were not clear as to the difference between constitutional questions and questions of current legislation. This is precisely why they strive to squeeze into the

Constitution as many laws as possible, thus tending to convert the Constitution into something in the nature of a code of laws. But a Constitution is not a code of laws. A Constitution is the fundamental law, and only the fundamental law. A Constitution does not preclude but presupposes current legislative work on the part of the future legislative bodies. A Constitution provides the juridical basis for the future legislative activities of these bodies. Therefore, the amendments and addenda of this kind, having no direct bearing on the Constitution, should, in my opinion, be sent to the future legislative bodies of the country.

To the second category should be assigned amendments and addenda which strive to introduce into the Constitution elements of historical references, or elements of declarations concerning what the Soviet government has not yet achieved and what it should achieve in the future. To note in the Constitution the difficulties the Party, the working class and all the toilers have overcome during the long years of struggle for the victory of socialism; to indicate in the Constitution the ultimate goal of the Soviet movement, i.e., the building of complete communist society—such are the subjects with which these amendments deal, in different variations. I think that such amendments and addenda should also be set aside as having no direct bearing on the Constitution. The Constitution is the registration and legislative consolidation of those gains which have already been achieved and secured. If we do not want to distort this fundamental character of the Constitution, we must refrain from filling it with historical references to the past, or with declarations concerning the future achievements of the toilers of the U.S.S.R. For this we have other ways and other documents.

Finally, to the third category should be assigned amendments and addenda which have direct bearing on the Draft Constitution.

A considerable number of amendments in this category are a matter of wording. They could therefore be handed over to the drafting commission of the present Congress which I think the Congress will set up, with instructions to decide on the final text of the new Constitution.

As for the rest of the amendements in the third category, they have more material significance and in my opinion a few words should be said about them.

1. First of all about the amendments to Article 1 of the Draft Constitution. There are four amendments. Some propose to substitute for the words "state of workers and peasants," the words "state of the toilers." Others propose to add the words "and working intelligentsia" to the words "state of workers and peasants." A third group proposes to substitute for the words "state of workers and peasants," the words "state of all the races and nationalities inhabiting the territory of the U.S.S.R." A fourth group proposes to substitute for the word "peasants" the words "collective farmers" or "toilers of socialist agriculture."

Should these amendments be adopted? I think they should not.

What does Article 1 of the Draft Constitution speak of? It speaks of the class composition of Soviet society. Can we Marxists ignore the class composition of Soviet society? Can we Marxists ignore the class composition of our society in the Constitution? No, we cannot. As we know, Soviet society consists of two classes, workers and peasants. And it is of this that Article 1 of the Draft Constitution speaks. Consequently, Article 1 of the Draft Constitution properly reflects the class composition of our society. It may be asked: What about the working intelligentsia? The intelligentsia was never a class, and never can be a class —it was and remains a stratum, which

recruits its members from among all classes of society. In the old days the intelligentsia recruited its members from among the aristocracy, the bourgeoisie, partly from among the peasantry, and only to a very inconsiderable extent from among the workers. In our Soviet times, the intelligentsia recruits its members mainly from among the workers and peasants. But no matter how it recruits its members and whatever character it may bear, the intelligentsia is nevertheless a stratum and not a class.

Does this circumstance encroach upon the rights of the working intelligentsia? Not in the least! Article 1 of the Draft Constitution does not deal with the rights of the various strata of Soviet society, but with the class composition of that society. The rights of the various strata of Soviet society, including the rights of the working intelligentsia, are dealt with mainly in Chapters X and XI of the Draft Constitution. It is evident from these chapters that the workers, peasants and working intelligentsia enjoy entirely equal rights in all spheres of the economic, political, social and cultural life of the country. Consequently, there can be no question of the rights of the working intelligentsia being encroached upon.

The same thing must be said about the nations and races comprising the U.S.S.R. In Chapter II of the Draft Constitution it is stated that the U.S.S.R. is a free union of nations possessing equal rights. Is it worth while repeating this formula in Article 1 of the Draft Constitution, which does not deal with the national composition of Soviet society, but with its class composition? Clearly it is not worth while. As to the rights of the nations and races comprising the U.S.S.R., these are dealt with in Chapters II, X, and XI of the Draft Constitution. From these chapters it is evident that the nations and races of the U.S.S.R. enjoy equal rights in all spheres of the economic, political, social and cultural life of the country. Consequently, there can be no question of national rights being encroached upon.

It would also be wrong to substitute for the word "peasant" the words "collective farmer" or "toiler of socialist agriculture." In the first place, in addition to collective farmers, there are still over a million households of non-collective farmers among the peasantry. What is to be done about them? Do the authors of this amendment propose to strike them off the books? That would be unwise. Secondly, the fact that the majority of the peasants have started collective farming does not mean that they have already ceased to be peasants, that they no longer have their own allotments, their own households, etc. Thirdly, for the word "worker" we would then have to substitute the words "toiler of socialist industry," which, however, the authors of the amendment for some reason or other do not propose. Finally, have the working class and the peasant class already disappeared? Since they have not disappeared, is it worth while deleting from the lexicon the established names for them? Evidently, what the authors of the amendment have in mind is not present society, but future society, when classes will no longer exist and when the workers and peasants will have been transformed into toilers of a single communist society. Consequently, they are obviously running too far ahead. But in drawing up the Constitution one must not proceed from the future, but from the present, from what already exists. The Constitution should not and must not run too far ahead.

2. Then follows an amendment to Article 17 of the Draft Constitution. The amendment proposes completely to delete from the Constitution Article 17 which reserves to the Union Republics the right of free secession from the U.S.S.R. I think that this

proposal is a wrong one and therefore should not be adopted by the Congress. The U.S.S.R. is a voluntary union of Union Republics with equal rights. To delete from the Constitution the article providing for the right of free secession from the U.S.S.R. is to violate the voluntary character of this union. Can we agree to this step? I think that we cannot and should not agree to this step. It is said that there is not a single republic in the U.S.S.R. that wants to secede from the U.S.S.R., and that therefore Article 17 is of no practical importance. It is, of course, true that there is not a single republic that wants to secede from the U.S.S.R. But this does not in the least mean that we ought not fix in the Constitution the right of Union Republics freely to secede from the U.S.S.R. In the U.S.S.R. there is not a single Union Republic that wants to oppress another Union Republic. But this does not in the least mean that we ought to delete from the Constitution of the U.S.S.R. the article dealing with the equality of rights of the Union Republics.

3. Then there is a proposal to add a new article to Chapter II of the Draft Constitution to the following effect: that on reaching the proper level of economic and cultural development, Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics may be transformed into Union Soviet Socialist Republics. Can this proposal be adopted? I think that it should not be adopted. It is a wrong proposal not only because of its content, but also because of the condition it lays down. Economic and cultural maturity can no more be urged as grounds for transferring Autonomous Republics to the category of Union Republics than economic or cultural backwardness can be urged as grounds for leaving any particular republic in the list of Autonomous Republics. This would not be a Marxist, not a Leninist approach. The Tatar Republic, for example, remains an Autonomous Republic while the Kazakh Republic is to become a Union Republic; but this does not mean that from the standpoint of cultural and economic development the Kazakh Republic stands higher than the Tatar Republic. The very opposite is the case. The same must be said, for example, of the Volga German Autonomous Republic and the Kirghiz Union Republic, of which the former is on a higher cultural and economic level than the latter, although it remains an Autonomous Republic.

What are the grounds for transferring Autonomous Republics to the category of Union Republics?

There are three such grounds.

First, the republic in question must be a border republic, a republic that is not surrounded on all sides by U.S.S.R. territory. Why? Because since the Union Republics have the right to secede from the U.S.S.R., a republic, on becoming a Union Republic, must be able logically and in fact to raise the question of its seceding from the U.S.S.R. And this question can be raised only by a republic which, say, borders on some foreign state, and, consequently, is not surrounded on all sides by U.S.S.R. territory. Of course, none of our republics would actually raise the question of seceding from the U.S.S.R. But since the right to secede from the U.S.S.R. is reserved to the Union Republics it must be so arranged that this right does not become a meaningless scrap of paper. Take, for example, the Bashkir Republic or the Tatar Republic. Let us assume that these Autonomous Republics are transferred to the category of Union Republics. Could they logically and in fact raise the question of seceding from the U.S.S.R.? No, they could not. Why? Because they are surrounded on all sides by Soviet Republics and regions and, strictly speaking, they have nowhere to go to if they secede from the U.S.S.R. [*Laughter and applause.*] Therefore, it would be wrong to transfer such republics to the category of Union Republics.

Secondly, the nationality which gives its name to a given Soviet republic must constitute a more or less compact majority within that republic. Take the Crimean Autonomous Republic, for example. It is a border republic, but the Crimean Tatars do not constitute the majority in that republic; on the contrary, they are a minority. Consequently, it would be wrong and illogical to transfer the Crimean Republic to the category of Union Republics.

Thirdly, the republic must not have too small a population; it should have a population of, say, not less but more than a million, at least. Why? Because it would be wrong to assume that a small Soviet republic with a very small population and a small army could hope to maintain an independent state existence. There can hardly be any doubt that the imperialist beasts of prey would soon grab it.

I think that unless these three objective grounds exist, it would be wrong at the present historical moment to raise the question of transferring any particular Autonomous Republic to the category of Union Republics.

4. Next it is proposed to delete from Articles 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, and 29 the detailed enumeration of the administrative territorial division of the Union Republics into territories and regions. I think that this proposal is also unacceptable. There are people in the U.S.S.R. who are always ready and eager to go on tirelessly recarving the territories and regions and thus cause confusion and uncertainty in our work. The Draft Constitution puts a curb on these people. And that is very good, because here, as in many other things, we need an atmosphere of certainty, we need stability and clarity.

5. The fifth amendment concerns Article 33. The creation of two Chambers is regarded as inexpedient, and it is proposed that the Council of Nationalities be abolished. I think that this amendment is also wrong. A single-chamber system would be better than a dual-chamber system if the U.S.S.R. were a single-nation state. But the U.S.S.R. is not a single-nation state. The U.S.S.R., as we know, is a multi-national state. We have a supreme body in which are represented the *common* interests of all the toilers of the U.S.S.R. irrespective of their nationality. This is the Council of the Union. But in addition to common interests, the nationalities of the U.S.S.R. have *their special, specific* interests connected with their specific national characteristics. Can these specific interests be ignored? No, they cannot. Do we need a special supreme body to reflect precisely these specific interests? Undoubtedly, we do. There can be no doubt that without such a body it would be impossible to administer a multi-national state like the U.S.S.R. Such a body is the second chamber, the Council of Nationalities of the U.S.S.R.

Reference is made to the parliamentary history of European and American states; it is pointed out that the dual-chamber system in these countries has only produced negative results; that the second chamber usually degenerates into a centre of reaction and a brake on progress. All this is true. But this is due to the fact that there is no equality between the two chambers in those countries. As we know, the second chamber not infrequently is granted more rights than the first chamber, and, moreover, as a rule the second chamber is set up undemocratically, its members not infrequently being appointed from above. Undoubtedly, these defects disappear when equality between the chambers is established and when the second chamber is set up as democratically as the first.

6. Further, an addendum to the Draft Constitution is proposed calling for the same number of members in both chambers. I think that this pro-

posal might be adopted. In my opinion, it has obvious political advantages, for it emphasizes the equality of the chambers.

7. Next comes an addendum to the Draft Constitution which proposes that the members of the Council of Nationalities be elected by direct election as in the case of the members of the Council of the Union. I think that this proposal might also be adopted. True, it may create certain technical inconveniences in elections; but, on the other hand, it would be of great political advantage, for it would enhance the prestige of the Council of Nationalities.

8. Then follows an addendum to Article 40 which proposes that the Presidium of the Supreme Council be granted the right to pass provisional acts of legislation. I think that this addendum is wrong and should not be adopted by the Congress. We must at last put an end to a situation in which not one but a number of bodies legislate. Such a situation runs counter to the principle that laws should be stable. And we need stability of laws now more than ever. Legislative power in the U.S.S.R. must be exercised only by one body, the Supreme Council of the U.S.S.R.

9. Further, an addendum is proposed to Article 48 of the Draft Constitution demanding that the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the U.S.S.R. be elected not by the Supreme Council of the U.S.S.R. but by the whole population of the country. I think that this addendum is wrong because it runs counter to the spirit of our Constitution. According to the system of our Constitution there must not be an individual president in the U.S.S.R. elected by the whole population on a par with the Supreme Council and able to put himself in opposition to the Supreme Council. The president in the U.S.S.R. is a collegium, it is the Presidium of the Supreme Council, including the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Council, elected, not by the whole population, but by the Supreme Council and accountable to the Supreme Council. The experience of history shows that such a structure of the supreme bodies is the most democratic and safeguards the country against undesirable contingencies.

10. Then follows another amendment to Article 48. It reads as follows: that the number of Vice-Chairmen of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the U.S.S.R. be increased to eleven, one from each Union Republic. I think that this amendment might be adopted for it would be an improvement and would only enhance the prestige of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the U.S.S.R.

11. Then follows an amendment to Article 77. It calls for the organization of a new All-Union People's Commissariat—a People's Commissariat of the Defense Industry. I think that this amendment should likewise be accepted [*applause*], for the time has arrived to separate the defense industry and give it the proper People's Commissariat form. It seems to me that this would only improve the defense of our country.

12. Next follows an amendment to Article 124 of the Draft Constitution demanding that the performance of religious rites be prohibited. I think that this amendment should be rejected as running counter to the spirit of our Constitution.

13. Finally, there is one other amendment of a more or less material character. I refer to an amendment to Article 135 of the Draft Constitution. It proposes that ministers of religion, former Whiteguards, all the former rich and persons not engaged in socially useful occupations be disfranchised, or, at all events, that the franchise of the people in this category be restricted to the right to elect but not to be elected. I think that this amendment should likewise be rejected. The Soviet government did not disfranchise the non-working and exploiting elements for all time, but temporarily,

up to a certain period. There was a time when these elements waged open war against the people and resisted the Soviet laws. The Soviet law depriving them of the franchise was the Soviet government's reply to this resistance. Not a little time has elapsed since then. During this period we have succeeded in abolishing the exploiting classes, and the Soviet government has become an invincible force. Has not the time arrived for us to revise this law? I think the time has arrived. It is said that this is dangerous, as elements hostile to the Soviet government, some of the former Whiteguards, kulaks, priests, etc., may worm their way into the supreme bodies of the country. But what is there to be afraid of? If you are afraid of wolves keep out of the woods. [*Laughter and loud applause.*] In the first place, not all the former kulaks, Whiteguards or priests are hostile to the Soviet government. In the second place, if the people in some place or other do elect hostile persons, it will show that our propaganda work was very badly organized and we shall fully deserve such a disgrace; if, however, our propaganda work is conducted in a Bolshevik way the people will not let hostile persons slip into their supreme bodies. This means that we must work and not whine [*loud applause*], we must work and not wait to have everything put before us ready-made by official order. As far back as 1919, Lenin said that the time was not far distant when the Soviet government would deem it useful to introduce universal suffrage without any restrictions. Please note: *without any restrictions.* He said this at a time when foreign military intervention had not yet been liquidated and when our industry and agriculture were in a desperate condition. Since then, seventeen years have elapsed. Comrades, is it not time we carried out Lenin's behest? I think it is.

This is what Lenin said in 1919 in his *Draft Program of the Russian Communist Party.* Permit me to read it:

> "The Russian Communist Party must explain to the toiling masses, in order to avoid a wrong generalization of transient historical needs, that the disfranchisement of a section of citizens does not in the Soviet Republic affect, as was the case in the majority of bourgeois-democratic republics, a definite category of citizens disfranchised for life, but applies only to the exploiters, only to those who, in violation of the fundamental laws of the Socialist Soviet Republic, persist in defending their position as exploiters, in preserving capitalist relationships. Consequently, in the Soviet Republic, on the one hand, every day of added strength for socialism and diminution in the number of those who have objective possibilities of remaining exploiters or of preserving capitalist relationships, automatically reduces the percentage of disfranchised persons. In Russia at the present time this percentage is hardly more than two or three per cent. On the other hand, in the not distant future the cessation of foreign invasion and the completion of the expropriation of the expropriators may, under certain conditions, create a situation in which the proletarian state power will choose other methods of suppressing the resistance of the exploiters and will introduce universal suffrage *without any restrictions.*" (Lenin, *Collected Works,* vol. XXIV, j. 94, Russ. ed.)

This is clear, I think.

Such is the position with regard to the amendments and addenda to the Draft Constitution of the U.S.S.R.

VI. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE NEW CONSTITUTION OF THE U.S.S.R.

Judging by the results of the nation-wide discussion, which lasted nearly

five months, it may be presumed that the Draft Constitution will be approved by the present Congress. [*Loud applause and cheers. All rise.*]

In a few days' time the Soviet Union will have a new, socialist Constitution, built on the principles of extensive socialist democracy.

It will be an historical document dealing in simple and concise terms, almost in the style of minutes, with the facts of the victory of socialism in the U.S.S.R., with the facts of the emancipation of the toilers of the U.S.S.R. from capitalist slavery, with the facts of the victory in the U.S.S.R. of full and thoroughly consistent democracy.

It will be a document testifying to the fact that what millions of honest people in capitalist countries have dreamed and still dream of has already been achieved in the U.S.S.R. [*Loud applause.*]

It will be a document testifying to the fact that what has been achieved in the U.S.S.R. is fully possible of achievement in other countries also. [*Loud applause.*]

But from this it follows that the international significance of the new Constitution of the U.S.S.R. can hardly be exaggerated.

Today, when the turbid wave of fascism is bespattering the socialist movement of the working class and besmirching the democratic strivings of the best people in the civilized world, the new Constitution of the U.S.S.R. will be an indictment against fascism, declaring that socialism and democracy are invincible. [*Applause.*] The new Constitution of the U.S.S.R. will serve as moral assistance and real support to all those who are today fighting fascist barbarism. [*Loud applause.*]

Of still greater significance is the new Constitution of the U.S.S.R. for the peoples of the U.S.S.R. While for the peoples of capitalist countries the Constitution of the U.S.S.R. will have the significance of a program of action, for the peoples of the U.S.S.R. it is significant as the summary of their struggles, the summary of their victories on the front of the emancipation of mankind. After the path of struggle and privation that has been traversed, it is pleasant and joyful to have our Constitution which deals with the fruits of our victories. It is pleasant and joyful to know what our people fought for and how they achieved this victory of worldwide historical importance. It is pleasant and joyful to know that the blood our people shed so plentifully was not shed in vain, that it has produced results. [*Prolonged applause.*] This spiritually arms our working class, our peasantry, our working intelligentsia. It impels them forward and rouses a sense of legitimate pride. It increases confidence in our strength and mobilizes us for fresh struggles for the new victories of communism. [*Thunderous cheers and applause. All rise. Shouts from all parts of the hall: "Long live Comrade Stalin!" All stand and sing the "International," after which the cheering is resumed. Cries of "Long live our leader comrade Stalin!"*]

9. The Evolution of the Soviet State*

BY NIKITA S. KHRUSHCHEV

In the struggle for leadership after Stalin's death, one of his lieutenants, Nikita S. Khrushchev, gradually emerged in the dominant position. His increasing power was evidenced by his more and more conspicuous prominence, by his assumption of the title of First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and later of Premier, and the general manner in which he conducted himself. By the time of the 21st CPSU Congress in 1959 there remained no doubt that he was "top dog," although in no way as powerful as Stalin had been. The material below is taken from his principal speech at that Congress.

Marxism-Leninism teaches that under communism the state will wither away and that the functions of public administration will lose their political character and will turn into management of society's affairs directly by the people. But one cannot over-simplify and conceive of the process of the withering away of the agencies of state as something like the turning of leaves in autumn, when the branches are left bare as the leaves fall.

If we approach it dialectically, the question of withering away of the state is a question of evolution of the socialist state toward communist public self-government. Under communism, too, there will remain certain public functions similar to those now performed by the state, but their nature and the methods by which they will be accomplished will differ from those obtaining in the present stage.

The chief trend in the development of the socialist state is the utmost unfolding of democracy, the enlisting of the broadest strata of the population in the management of all affairs of the country, enlistment of all citizens in participation in the management of economic and cultural construction.

The Social-Democratic theoreticians and revisionists try every variation to discredit and vilify socialist democracy. In their view, "democratization" should mean renunciation of the leading role of the working class and its party under socialism, a return to the forms of bourgeois democracy. Without this, in their view, there is neither democracy nor socialism. To them democracy is the opportunity to engage in glittering parliamentary ora-

* From "Khrushchev's Speech to the 21st Party Congress—4," *Current Soviet Policies—III,* published by Columbia University Press, New York, 1960, pp. 66-67. Reprinted by permission.

tory, to play at political deals among the parties, to set up a flowery screen of "free elections" behind which capital is omnipotent and the people are actually disenfranchised. To us, democracy is genuine rule by the people, the fullest development of the initiative and activity of the masses of working people, self-government of the people. [*Applause.*]

It is already clear that many functions performed by government agencies will gradually pass to public organizations. Take, for instance, certain aspects of cultural services. It is not at all essential that they remain in the hands of government organizations. Public organizations can deal with them successfully.

Life suggests also that it is necessary to change the organization of health services and resort facilities. Evidently the conditions are ready for turning over more and more public health matters in the cities to the trade unions and in the countryside, at the present stage, directly to the local Soviets.

Up to now the physical culture movement in our country has been directed by a government agency, the Committee on Physical Culture and Sports. Now a more expedient structure for the physical culture movement has been formed; public organizations participating in this movement will play the decisive role in it. A Federation of Public Sports Societies, not a governmental but a public organization, is being set up.

Problems of enforcing public order and the rules of the socialist community should likewise come increasingly under the jurisdiction of public organizations. There are now no cases in the Soviet Union of people being tried for political crimes. This is undoubtedly a great achievement. It testifies to an unprecedented unity of political convictions of our entire people, to their solidarity with the Communist Party and Soviet government. [*Prolonged applause.*]

But there are still many instances of violation of public order, and a resolute struggle must be waged against them. Can the Soviet public cope with the violators of socialist law and order? Of course it can. Our public organizations have no less adequate capacities, means and forces for this than the militia, the courts, and the Prosecutor's Office!

Matters are approaching a situation in which public organizations, alongside and parallel with such state agencies as the militia and the courts, will perform the functions of safeguarding public order and security. This process is now under way. The size of the militia has been sharply reduced; the state security agencies in particular have been considerably reduced.

Socialist society forms such voluntary organizations for safeguarding public order as the people's militia, comrades' courts, and the like. They all employ new methods and find new ways of performing public functions. The voluntary detachments of people's militia should undertake to keep public order in their respective communities and to see that the rights and interests of all citizens are respected and protected.

The time has come when more attention should be paid to the comrades' courts, which should seek chiefly to prevent assorted kinds of law violations. They should hear not only cases concerning behavior on the job but also cases of everyday deportment and morality, cases of improper conduct by members of the group who disregard the standards of social behavior.

When the comrades' public courts function actively and the public itself delegates persons to ensure public order, it will be much easier to combat transgressors. It will be possible to spot a transgressor before he commits a misdemeanor or crime, when he first shows a departure from the standards of public behavior that might lead

him into antisocial acts. People could exert timely influence on such a person to curb his evil propensities. Measures are required that will prevent and subsequently completely preclude individuals' commission of acts harmful to society. The chief thing is preventive, educational work.

Of course, definite functions will remain with the courts, the militia and the Prosecutor's Office. These agencies will continue to function in order to exert influence on persons who maliciously refuse to submit to socialist society's standards of behavior and are not amenable to persuasion.

The transfer of some functions of state agencies to public organizations should be carried out without undue haste. In some circumstances it should be done more resolutely; in others only the first, exploratory steps should be taken in order to accustom people to safeguard public order themselves.

Obviously, the transfer to public organizations of some functions now performed by state agencies does not at all mean weakening the role of the socialist state in the building of communism. The fact that public organizations will perform a number of the present functions of the state will broaden and strengthen the political base of socialist society and will ensure further development of socialist democracy.

It is not only we Communists and Soviet people who see that the Soviet system rests on firm foundations. This must be admitted even by the persons who come to us from abroad to see whether the Soviet system is not breaking down and who go back with sour mien when the picture they find is not the one they had wished to see. They put off to a future date their hopes that the Soviet state will be weakened, but the future prospects for our country are brighter than ever. [*Stormy applause.*]

In the future, the Soviet Union will be able to concentrate more attention on developing the economy, the material base of our system. "Under the bourgeois system," Lenin said, "the bosses and not state agencies ran the economy, but in our society economics is the affair of all. This is the politics that interests us most" (*Works* [in Russian], vol. XXXII, pp. 406-407).

The tasks of the socialist state in safeguarding peace, in the sphere of defense against the threat of armed attack by the imperialist powers, are especially important and great. As long as the Western powers' aggressive military blocs exist, we are obliged to strengthen and improve our glorious Armed Forces, which stand guard over the great achievements and peaceful labor of the Soviet people. [*Stormy, prolonged applause.*] The state security agencies, which direct their spearhead primarily against agents sent into the country by imperialist states, must be strengthened, as must other agencies which have the mission of blocking the provocational actions and intrigues of our enemies from the imperialist camp. Our enemies are spending enormous sums on subversive work against the socialist countries. How, then, can we abolish agencies which have the duty of safeguarding the security of the socialist state! That would be foolish and criminal . . . .

Leninism teaches that the state will wither away with the complete triumph of communism. To weaken the socialist state in present conditions would be to help our enemies. The imperialists cannot crush us now, but the revisionists are inviting us, in effect, to disarm, abolish the state agencies that ensure defense of the country and thus leave ourselves to the mercy of our enemies. The functions of defending the socialist Fatherland, now performed by the state, can wither away only when the danger of an imperialist attack on our country or on countries allied with ours is completely removed.

Part III

POLITICAL PARTIES

A. Parties of the Authoritarian Right

10. The Proclamation of Mussolini's Quadrumvirate, 1922*

WHEN, in 1922, Benito Mussolini organized the March on Rome by his Fascist militia, which ended in his being summoned to the Prime Ministership by the King, he appointed a four-man directorate to lead the assault. Reprinted below is the proclamation issued by them to rally popular support for their endeavor. In style, tone, and content it reflected the characteristics of the party that ruled Italy under Mussolini for nearly twenty-one years.

Fascisti! Italians!

The hour of decisive battle has sounded. Four years ago, at this time, the national army started the supreme offensive that led to victory; today, the army of black shirts reasserts this mutilated victory and, desperately pushing on Rome, is leading it to the glory of the Campidoglio. From today on the *Principi* and *Triari* are mobilized. The martial law of fascism goes into full force. Under the order of the *Duce* the military, political, and administrative powers of the Party leaders are being assumed by a secret quadrumvirate of action with dictatorial powers.

The army, the reserve and supreme safeguard of the nation, must not take part in the struggle. Fascism renews its highest esteem for the army of Vittorio Venito. Nor is fascism marching against the officers of public order; but against a political class of imbeciles and delinquents who for four long years have not been able to give the nation a government. The classes that compose the productive bourgeoisie know that fascism wants to impose a single discipline on the nation and to aid all those forces that augment its economic expansion and welfare.

The laboring people, in fields and offices, on railroads, and in factories,

* Translation from Herbert W. Schneider, *The Making of the Fascist State,* Oxford University Press, New York, 1928, p. 302. Reprinted by permission.

have nothing to fear from fascist power. Their just rights will be loyally safeguarded. We shall be generous with harmless opponents; inexorable towards others.

Fascism draws its sword to cut the too many Gordian knots that bind and depress Italian life. We call God on high and the spirit of our five hundred thousand dead to witness that a single impulse drives us, a single will unites us, a single passion inflames us, to contribute to the salvation and greatness of our country,

Fascisti of the whole of Italy!

Apply your minds and forces like Romans. We must win. We shall win.

Viva l'Italia! Viva il Fascismo!

11. The German National Socialist Platform, 1920*

THE following statement of policy was drafted by Adolf Hitler and adopted by the German Workers' Party on February 24, 1924, in a meeting at the Hofbräuhaus in Munich. Less than six months later the party took the name *Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei* (N.S.D.A.P.), or German National Socialist Workers' Party.

Hitler had joined the microscopic party as its seventh member in September of the previous year. By early 1921 it had already enrolled 3,000 adherents, had a newspaper, and branch units in other South German towns. After the unsuccessful Munich "Beerhall Putsch" in 1924, the movement went into eclipse; but with the increasing economic difficulties late in the 1930's, it recovered. At the time Hitler was summoned to the chancellorship in January, 1933, the party had more than a million members.

Although the party made a number of tactical shifts both before and after its accession to office, the main outlines of its program always adhered closely to the platform Hitler drafted in 1920.

* From Raymond E. Murphy *et al., National Socialism,* U.S. Department of State Publication 1864, Government Printing Office, Washington, 1943, pp. 222-225.

THE Program of the German Workers' Party is limited as to period. The leaders have no intention, once the aims announced in it have been achieved, of setting up fresh ones, merely in order to increase the discontent of the masses artificially, and so ensure the continued existence of the Party.

1. We demand the union of all Germans to form a Great Germany on the basis of the right of the self-determination enjoyed by nations.

2. We demand equality of rights for the German People in its dealings with other nations, and abolition of the Peace Treaties of Versailles and St. Germain.

3. We demand land and territory (colonies) for the nourishment of our people and for settling our superfluous population.

4. None but members of the nation may be citizens of the State. None but those of German blood, whatever their creed, may be members of the nation. No Jew, therefore, may be a member of the nation.

5. Anyone who is not a citizen of the State may live in Germany only as a guest and must be regarded as being subject to foreign laws.

6. The right of voting on the State's government and legislation is to be enjoyed by the citizen of the State alone. We demand therefore that all official appointments, of whatever kind, whether in the Reich, in the country, or in the smaller localities, shall be granted to citizens of the State alone.

We oppose the corrupting custom of Parliament of filling posts merely with a view to party considerations, and without reference to character or capability.

7. We demand that the State shall make it its first duty to promote the industry and livelihood of citizens of the State. If it is not possible to nourish the entire population of the State, foreign nationals (non-citizens of the State) must be excluded from the Reich.

8. All non-German immigration must be prevented. We demand that all non-Germans, who entered Germany subsequent to August 2nd, 1914, shall be required forthwith to depart from the Reich.

9. All citizens of the State shall be equal as regards rights and duties.

10. It must be the first duty of each citizen of the State to work with his mind or with his body. The activities of the individual may not clash with the interests of the whole, but must proceed within the frame of the community and be for the general good.

We demand therefore:

11. Abolition of incomes unearned by work.

ABOLITION OF THE THRALDOM OF INTEREST

12. In view of the enormous sacrifice of life and property demanded of a nation by every war, personal enrichment due to a war must be regarded as a crime against the nation. We demand therefore ruthless confiscation of all war gains.

13. We demand nationalization of all businesses which have been up to the present formed into companies (Trusts).

14. We demand that the profits from wholesale trade shall be shared out.

15. We demand extensive development of provision for old age.

16. We demand creation and maintenance of a healthy middle class, immediate communalization of wholesale business premises, and their lease at a cheap rate to small traders, and that extreme consideration shall be shown to all small purveyors to the State, district authorities and smaller localities.

17. We demand land-reform suitable to our national requirements, passing of a law for confiscation without compensation of land for communal pur-

poses; abolition of interest on land loans, and prevention of all speculation in land.

18. We demand ruthless prosecution of those whose activities are injurious to the common interest. Sordid criminals against the nation, usurers, profiteers, etc. must be punished with death, whatever their creed or race.

19. We demand that the Roman Law, which serves the materialistic world order, shall be replaced by a legal system for all Germany.

20. With the aim of opening to every capable and industrious German the possibility of higher education and of thus obtaining advancement, the State must consider a thorough reconstruction of our national system of education. The curriculum of all educational establishments must be brought into line with the requirements of practical life. Comprehension of the State idea (State sociology) must be the school objective, beginning with the first dawn of intelligence in the pupil. We demand development of the gifted children of poor parents, whatever their class or occupation, at the expense of the State.

21. The State must see to raising the standard of health in the nation by protecting mothers and infants, prohibiting child labor, increasing bodily efficiency by obligatory gymnastics and sports laid down by law, and by extensive support of clubs engaged in the bodily development of the young.

22. We demand abolition of a paid army and formation of a national army.

23. We demand legal warfare against conscious political lying and its dissemination in the Press. In order to facilitate creation of a German national Press we demand:

(*a*) that all editors of newspapers and their assistants, employing the German language, must be members of the nation;

(*b*) that special permission from the State shall be necessary before non-German newspapers may appear. These are not necessarily printed in the German language;

(*c*) that non-Germans shall be prohibited by law from participation financially in or influencing German newspapers, and that the penalty for contravention of the law shall be suppression of any such newspaper, and immediate deportation of the non-German concerned in it.

It must be forbidden to publish papers which do not conduce to the national welfare. We demand legal prosecution of all tendencies in art and literature of a kind likely to disintegrate our life as a nation, and the suppression of institutions which militate against the requirements abovementioned.

24. We demand liberty for all religious denominations in the State, so far as they are not a danger to it and do not militate against the moral feelings of the German race.

The Party, as such, stands for positive Christianity, but does not bind itself in the matter of creed to any particular confession. It combats the Jewish-materialist spirit within us and without us, and is convinced that our nation can only achieve permanent health from within on the principle:

THE COMMON INTEREST BEFORE SELF

25. That all the fore-going may be realized we demand the creation of a strong central power of the State. Unquestioned authority of the politically centralized Parliament over the entire Reich and its organizations; and formation of Chambers for classes and occupations for the purpose of carrying out the general laws promulgated by the Reich in the various States of the confederation.

The leaders of the Party swear to go straight forward—if necessary to sacrifice their lives—in securing fulfilment of the foregoing Points.

12. General Policy Resolution French Union of the New Republic, 1959*

Several organizations supporting General de Gaulle united in October, 1958, under the name the Union of the New Republic to present candidates in the elections to the National Assembly in November of that year. U.N.R. candidates won 189 of the 470 seats in Continental France. Allies, affiliates, and Algerian deputies later raised this total to nearly half of the seats in the Assembly. Thus, a completely new political formation became the largest party in the French National Assembly and the first one in the history of Republican France to approach a majority of the membership.

The type of electoral system, the underlying plebiscitary character of the 1958 elections, and the great popularity of General de Gaulle are among the most important factors contributing to the U.N.R.'s strength. A realization by the U.N.R. of its indebtedness to de Gaulle's popularity is evident in the resolution reprinted below.

The Union of the New Republic is fully conscious that, if it now constitutes a great political force in the country and in Parliament, it owes this above all to the prestige of General de Gaulle, which was essential to its success in the elections of November 1958.

The fundamental doctrine of the Union of the New Republic has its source in the Bayeux speech of 1946 [*by General de Gaulle*],* in which are defined the main lines for the restoration of the State, based on the separation and balance of powers.

This doctrine inspired the Constitution of the Fifth Republic, which was ratified with the massive support of the French people on September 28, 1958.

The present government stability has already shown to the Nation the beneficial effects of this doctrine and has permitted it to carry forward its domestic recovery and at the same time to re-establish the position of France in the world.

* Adopted by the national congress of the U.N.R., November 13-15, 1959, presented by Louis Terrenoire, chairman of the U.N.R. group in the National Assembly, *Le Courrier de la Nouvelle République,* November, 1959, p. 4.

* See above, pp. 35-39.

Placed at the head of the State by a broad national electoral college, the President of the Republic has at his disposal essential prerogatives which must vest authority in him and maintain continuity through him. Recalling their thankless struggle for twelve years, the companions of the U.N.R. acclaim General de Gaulle as the one who incarnates that authority and that continuity in a manner that can most nobly assure the grandeur of France.

Guide and arbiter of the Nation, General de Gaulle can count entirely on our Union in all the great tasks that he undertakes, in particular when he recognizes the right of the people of Algeria to determine its destiny and when, after peace has returned and thanks to the Constantine Plan,* he gives it every reason to opt for France.

The U.N.R. has confidence in the Government, presided over with rare mastery by Michel Debré, and feels that it will conduct this policy with the authority and the effectiveness required. Also, it will support the Government with all its force so that it may strengthen French foreign policy ceaselessly, with its re-established independence. The purpose of this policy is to ease the tensions between East and West with respect for our alliances and a feeling of European solidarity. . . .

In full accord with the States of the Community, whose future promise the U.N.R. salutes, the French Government must give the world an example of an association of free peoples, attached to forms of civilization which, under a banner of equality and fraternity, ignores racial and religious differences.

As to domestic policy, the U.N.R. expects the Government to give the Fifth Republic renovated and decentralized administrative structures, without which the promises of effectiveness are in danger of remaining dead letters. We demand insistently that it change the men who no longer belong; otherwise the spirit of the new institutions will be continually misconstrued at different stages in their implementation.

Loyally associated in the policy of budgetary recovery and monetary stability practiced by the Government and supported by the votes of its parliamentarians, the U.N.R. notes with satisfaction its incontestable success, which it considers the indispensable condition for the energetic and expansive resumption of economic activity.

This expansion must respond to the increasing demands which result from our population growth, from European competition, from the rivalry between East and West, and from the need for aid to the underdeveloped countries. It requires the refurbishing of the nation as a condition for improved productivity.

Asserting that agriculture has the preponderant position in the French society and economy and noting the sacrifices it has accepted in defense of the currency, the Union believes that it must be returned to the front rank in the economic activity of the country, especially because of the opportunities for its expansion opened by the outlets of the Common Market. It must enjoy equal rights, treatment, and opportunities with the other national activities.

With a view toward improving coordination and planification, the U.N.R. advocates the creation of an authentic Ministry of National Economy. A less restrictive credit policy and a renovated tax structure must support and not restrain the efforts tending toward the production of more and more abundant wealth.

Without waiting for the increase in production to permit a better distribution of wealth through a policy of full employment, high wages, and incentive pay, the U.N.R. calls for emergency measures to protect the purchasing power of the workers by closing

* De Gaulle's plan for the economic development of Algeria (*Ed. note*).

the gap between wages and prices, the revision of wages through free bargaining within firms, and stable prices ensured to channels of distribution in which free competition will be put into practice effectively.

The U.N.R. expresses its determination to bring about the abolition of the proletarian condition by escaping from the capitalism-marxism dilemma.

In the triple domain, economic, social, and financial, the U.N.R. intends to assume a broader and more active part of the national responsibilities, for it is thus that it will confirm its double vocation as a party of Government* devoted to the advancement of the masses.

Five years from now our country will be the youngest in Europe. A rejuvenation of all forms of national activity must coincide with the rejuvenation of the French population. In order to accomplish this, the U.N.R. advocates the establishment of a ten-year plan, placed directly under the authority of the Prime Minister. At the same time, our education system must be adapted to the necessities of the modern world without sacrificing the emphasis on values which has been its distinction.

It is the task of the younger members of the U.N.R. to appeal to the French youth to seize the opportunities that the future of France offers to them, a future which has become great since General de Gaulle again presides over its destiny.

* That is, a party assuming responsibility for the conduct of government (*Ed. note*).

B. Conservative Parties

13. British Conservative Party Election Manifesto, 1959*

THE Conservative and Unionist Party, to give it the full official title, has probably the oldest continuous political tradition of any existing political party in the world. It is the highly organized continuer of the Tory party that can be traced back to the seventeenth century. During most of its long life it has dominated British politics. For instance, it has been in the opposition only eighteen years in the twentieth century, and it has directed the government for all but six years since 1931.

The manifesto below appeared on a 1959 election campaign flyer. Dominating the cover page were the personal electoral appeal of Prime Minister Harold Macmillan, Leader of the party, and Macmillan's photograph. This illustrates the emphasis placed by the party on its prime ministerial candidate.

As leader of the Conservative and Unionist Party I submit this Manifesto to the judgement of my fellow countrymen and women.

This constructive program—indeed its very title—will show you that we do not intend to rest in the next five years upon the achievements of the past. We must both defend and develop the great gains that we have made. Our policy can be simply stated: Prosperity and Peace.

I do not remember any period in my lifetime when the economy has been so sound and the prosperity of our people at home so widely spread; but we must also do what we can to extend a generous helping hand to the Commonwealth family and others overseas.

As for peace, it is of course the supreme purpose of all policy. I have lived through two wars and all my efforts are directed to prevent a third. Events of the last few months give me hope that we may be moving into a more constructive period. Vital in-

* By courtesy of the British Information Service.

ternational negotiations lie ahead and I ask you to continue to entrust them to a Conservative Government.

HAROLD MACMILLIAN (signed)

THE CONSERVATIVE RECORD

Eight years ago was a turning point in British history. The Labour Government had failed in grappling with the problems of the post-war world. Under Conservative leadership this country set out upon a new path. It is leading to prosperity and opportunity for all.

The British economy is sounder today than at any time since the first world war. Sterling has been re-established as a strong and respected currency. Under Conservative government we have earned abroad £1,600 million more than we have spent. Our exports have reached the highest peak ever. Overseas, mostly in the Commonwealth, we are investing nearly double what we could manage eight years ago. Capital investment at home, to build for the future, is over half as large again. To match this, and make it possible, people are saving more than ever before.

The paraphernalia of controls have been swept away. The call-up is being abolished. We have cut taxes in seven Budgets, whilst continuing to develop the social services. We have provided over two million new homes and almost two million new school places, a better health service and a modern pensions plan. We have now stabilized the cost of living while maintaining full employment. We have shown that Conservative freedom works. Life is better with the Conservatives.

In the international field, thanks to the initiative of the Conservative Government, the diplomatic deadlock between East and West has now been broken. The Prime Minister's visit to Russia in February began a sequence of events which has led to the present easing of tensions. The proposed exchange of visits between President Eisenhower and Mr. Khrushchev is the most recent proof of this. It is our determination to see that this process continues and to make a success of the important negotiations which we trust will follow.

The main issues at this election are therefore simple: (1) Do you want to go ahead on the lines which have brought prosperity at home? (2) Do you want your present leaders to represent you abroad?

SHARING PROSPERITY

Conservative policy is to double the British standard of living in this generation and ensure that all sections of society share in the expansion of wealth.

While we have been in charge of the nation's affairs, many more of the good things of life have been enjoyed by families large and small, and so long as we remain in charge they will be able to fulfill many more of their hopes and ambitions. But this is not enough. Conservatism is more than successful administration. It is a way of life. It stands for integrity as well as for efficiency, for moral values as well as for material advancement, for service and not merely self-seeking. We believe that, in this spirit and as a contribution to world peace, we British must make a big and sustained effort to help others, particularly within the Commonwealth, climb nearer to our own high level of prosperity.

By raising living standards and by social reform we are succeeding in creating One Nation at home. We must now carry this policy into the wider world where the gap between the industrialised and the underdeveloped nations is still so great. This can be done by individual service, by increased trade and by investment, public and private.

Under Conservatism annual invest-

ment overseas has been more than one per cent of the national income. We want to do better than this, but to do better requires more than a warm heart; we must earn a bigger surplus on our trade overseas.

So at the very forefront of our program for the next five years we place these three essential conditions of success—a strong pound, expanding trade and national unity,

1. *The Pound.* Sterling is the currency in which nearly half the world's trade is done. Our paramount aim will be to maintain international confidence in it as a sound and stable medium of exchange.

We shall use flexible monetary and other measures to achieve the right balance in the home economy, to keep the cost of living as steady as possible in the interests of the housewife, and to ensure that our goods and services are available at prices the world will pay.

2. *Trade Opportunities.* We shall concentrate on the further promotion of the export trade.

Half our trade is with the Commonwealth, and the new Commonwealth Economic Consultative Council will provide further opportunities for expansion. We shall continue to take steps to increase the flow of trade with America in which for the first time in a century our exports have exceeded our imports. We are about to join an economic association of seven European countries; our aim remains an industrial free market embracing all Western Europe. The recent trade agreement we made with Soviet Russia is already leading to more orders for British machinery and other goods.

3. *Unity.* Prosperity depends on the combined efforts of the nation as a whole. None of us can afford outmoded approaches to the problems of today, and we intend to invite the representatives of employers and trade unions to consider afresh with us the human and industrial problems that the next five years will bring.

EMPLOYMENT AND ECONOMIC CHANGE

So long as Conservative policies of sound currency and expanding trade are continued, and unity at home maintained, full employment is safe. But patches of local unemployment can be created by swift changes in markets, methods and machines. Our policy is to welcome technical progress, which can lead to dramatic increases in prosperity and leisure, but at the same time to deal with the problems it brings.

Our first major Bill in the next Parliament will be one to remodel and strengthen our powers for coping with local unemployment. This will be done in three ways—by ensuring that we can act anywhere in Britain where high local unemployment shows up; by adding to the places where we can now offer help, those where there is a clear and imminent threat of unemployment; and by offering capital grants to encourage the building of new factories where they are most needed, as an addition to subsidising the rent of Government-built factories. This policy will also feature the clearing of sites to make a district attractive to new industry.

These measures will be of particular help to Scotland and Wales. We shall continue to help the Government of Northern Ireland to deal with the special problem there.

Many individual industries have to adjust themselves to new conditions. The Government will play its part in assisting the aircraft industry to increase its sales, and will help in fostering research and Development. Shipping and shipbuilding depend on expanding world trade which our policies are directed to encourage. We shall do all we can to assist them in

their problems, and also intend to support the replacement of the *Queen* liners.

Reorganization and re-equipment of the Lancashire cotton industry has got away to a good start. With the help of the Act we have passed it can have a prosperous future. It is a condition of grants under this Act that compensation is paid to displaced operatives.

As part of our policy of easing general mobility of labor, measures will be taken to encourage re-training. Part of the capacity of the Government Training Centers will be used to make a direct contribution towards the provision of adequate opportunities for apprenticeship. We shall also continue our support of the Industrial Training Council which we took the initiative in setting up.

Many educational, industrial and official bodies have made provision since the war for management courses. We should welcome the creation of an Advanced Business School at one of the universities.

POLICY FOR PROGRESS

We are determined to keep Britain a great and go-ahead country, leading the world in important branches of technology, and translating its technological advance into productive capacity with a high and rising rate of investment.

This is how we shall set about this task in the next five years.

1. *Technical Advance.* One Cabinet Minister will be given the task of promoting scientific and technological development. While it would be wrong to concentrate all Government scientific work into a single Ministry, this Minister for Science will have responsibility for the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research, the Medical and Agricultural Research Councils and the Nature Conservancy, the atomic energy program, and the United Kingdom contribution to space research.

The development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes will be pressed ahead. A conference will be called of those concerned in industry and education to forward the spread and understanding of automation. We shall encourage new inventions and the development of new techniques.

Under the railway program over 3,000 new diesels will be delivered into service by 1965, 8,000 miles of track re-laid, and electric traction increased by 60 per cent. We shall go ahead with a 'round-the-world' telephone cable in co-operation with the Commonwealth, and maintain our lead in telecommunications by building a new large cable-laying ship.

2. *Modern Roads.* The rising volume of traffic, a yardstick of rising prosperity, must be matched by an intensive drive to build better and safer roads. Our road program is already the biggest we have ever had in this country. Over the next five years it will be twice as big as over the last five years.

Our first priority in England and Wales will be to complete the five major schemes and motorways, which with their urban links and through routes will provide the framework of a new road system. In Scotland we mean to complete the Forth Road Bridge, the two Clyde Tunnels and the reconstruction of the Carlisle-Glasgow-Stirling trunk road, and to speed up the programme of Highland road development.

At the same time there will be a country-wide drive to improve the existing road network and new schemes to relieve congestion in the towns. Severn and Tay Bridges will both be started.

3. *The Land.* Farming in Britain today is efficient and prosperous. Great progress has been made possible by our system of long-term price guarantees and the payment of grants for

modern buildings, equipment and techniques. This policy will be developed so as to ensure stability to farmer and farm worker.

We give a pledge that the long-term assurances to agriculture contained in our 1957 Act will continue for the life-time of the next Parliament. In the light of experience, we shall consider, in close consultation with the leaders of the industry any improvements and developments in agricultural policy including the small farmers scheme.

We shall continue to promote the well-being of the British fishing industry.

We confirm that horticulture must have support comparable with that given to agriculture generally. We shall continue to use the tariff as the main instrument of protection. Legislation will be passed to provide improvement grants of £7½ million and to help reform horticultural marketing, including a streamlining of the operation of the central London markets.

In the next five years, 300,000 acres will be planted by the Forestry Commission. Encouragement will continue to be given to private woodland owners. We attach importance to the prosperity of this industry, which would be further assured by the establishment of an effective marketing organisation.

There will be continued improvement in amenities for families who live on the land—a further extension of water, sewerage and electricity supplies, and better housing and schools. We have set up a Committee to help us solve the problem of public transport in the countryside.

4. *Nationalised Industries.* We are utterly opposed to any extension of nationalisation, by whatever means. We shall do everything possible to ensure improved commercial standards of operation and less centralisation in those industries already nationalised. In addition, we shall review the situation in civil aviation, and set up a new licensing authority to bring a greater measure of freedom to nationally and privately owned airlines.

To further the development of the Post Office as a modern business, we propose to separate its current finances from the Exchequer. Direct Ministerial responsibility to Parliament and the status of Post Office employees as Civil Servants will be retained.

OPPORTUNITY AND SECURITY

Conservatives want everybody to have a fuller opportunity to earn more and to own more—and to create a better life for themselves and their children.

We shall proceed in the next Parliament with our policy of reducing whenever possible the burden of taxation.

We shall encourage facilities for the small investor to have a stake in British industry.

1. *Education.* During the next five years we shall concentrate on producing a massive enlargement of educational opportunity at every level. The necessary work is already in hand. Four programs, each the biggest of its kind ever undertaken in Britain, are gathering momentum.

Training colleges for teachers, which will now provide a three-year course, are being expanded by nearly two-thirds so as to get rid of over-large classes; the number of students at universities is to be further increased by at least one-third; new technical college buildings are opening at the rate of one a week; and we shall spend some £400 million by 1965 to improve the quality of our school buildings.

We shall defend the grammar schools against doctrinaire Socialist attack, and see that they are further developed. We shall bring the modern schools up to the same high standard. Then the choice of schooling for chil-

dren can be more flexible and less worrying for parents. This is the right way to deal with the problem of the 'eleven-plus.' Already, up and down the country, hundreds of new modern schools are showing the shape of things to come. Our program will open up the opportunities that they provide for further education and better careers to every boy and girl; and by 1965 we expect that at least 40 per cent will be staying on after fifteen.

We have appointed a Committee to review the system of awards to students from public funds, including the present 'means test,' and improvements will be made when it has reported.

2. *Good Housing.* Our housing policy, so successful in the past, will be pressed ahead with vigour in the future so as to deal with up-to-date priorities. These are the clearance of the slums, the relief of over-crowding, and the needs of the old. By 1965 we intend to re-house at least another million people from the slums.

The local authorities will continue to play a big part along with private enterprise in meeting housing needs; but we reject as costly and bureaucratic nonsense the Socialist plan to take into council ownership millions of privately rented houses.

In the next Parliament we shall take no further action to decontrol rents. More houses must be built and recent rent legislation given time to have its full beneficial effect in increasing house-room.

In the last eight years, 750,000 families have bought their own new homes, and we want to see this process go on. Also, up to £100 million will be advanced by the Government to building societies for loans on older houses—and we shall consider increasing this figure if need be.

3. *Good Health.* As part of a major policy to promote good health, we shall not only clear the slums, but also wage war on smog by effective use of the Clean Air Act, and tackle the pollution of rivers and estuaries. We shall offer vaccination against polio to everyone up to the age of forty and to all specially vulnerable groups. Prevention of accidents on roads and in the home will be subjects of sustained campaigns.

On the curative side there will be a big program of hospital building. We already have sixteen new general or mental hospitals and some fifty major extension schemes under way; over the next five years our target is to double the present capital program.

The level of doctors' and dentists' pay in the health services will be considered as soon as the Royal Commission has reported. We shall also be ready to consider with representatives of the professions their status in the health services.

Local authorities will be encouraged to develop their health and welfare services. We shall set up a National Council for Social Work Training to help recruit and train the extra social workers who will be needed.

4. *Security and Retirement.* The rates of retirement pensions, which we have increased three times, have now a real buying power over ten shillings higher than in 1951. We pledge ourselves to ensure that pensioners continue to share in the good things which a steadily expanding economy will bring.

Our new pensions scheme will put national insurance on a sound financial footing, concentrate Exchequer help on those with the lowest earnings, and enable men and women with higher earnings to make increased provision for old age. At the same time, we are encouraging the growth of sound occupational pension schemes.

The weekly amount that can be earned without deduction of pension, by those who have retired or by widowed mothers, will be further increased.

We shall continue the preferential treatment which our recent legislation

has provided for widows and their children.

Those disabled in the service of their country will remain the subject of our special care. Particular attention will be given to providing more suitable vehicles for the badly disabled.

We shall continue to ensure that those dependent on national assistance have a share in the country's increasing prosperity.

Not only will our housing program cater more and more for the needs of the old, but we shall also try to make it easier for them to go on living at home. For example, better provision will be made for a 'meals on wheels' service for the old and infirm. The extension of the home help service and the provision of holiday rest homes will be encouraged.

5. *The Use of Leisure.* Two out of three families in the country now own TV, one in three has a car or motorcycle, twice as many are taking holidays away from home—these are welcome signs of the increasing enjoyment of leisure. They are the fruits of our policies.

But at the same time all this represents a challenge to make the growth of leisure more purposeful and creative, especially for young people.

Our policy of opportunity will therefore be extended. In particular, we propose to reorganize and expand the Youth Leadership and the provision of attractive youth clubs, more playing fields and better facilities for sport. We shall do more to support the arts including the living theatre. Improvements will be made in museums and galleries and in the public library service. Particular attention will be given to the needs of provincial centers.

6. *Liberty under the Law.* We believe that it is by emphasis on the home, enlargement of educational opportunity, development of services for youth and a spread of the responsibilities of property that national character can be strengthened and moral standards upheld. In addition, we shall revise some of our social laws, for example those relating to betting and gaming and to clubs and licensing, which are at present full of anomalies and lead to abuse and even corruption.

It will continue to be our policy to protect the citizen, irrespective of creed or color, against lawlessness.

We intend to review the system of criminal justice and to undertake penal reforms which will lead offenders to abandon a life of crime. A scheme for compensating the victims of violent crime for personal injuries will be considered.

The Legal Aid and Advice Acts will be extended to remaining courts and to certain tribunals, and the present income and capital limits will be reviewed to ensure that help is not denied to anyone who needs it.

We shall appoint a Committee to review the working of the Companies Act in the light of present conditions. Action will be taken to protect the public against the sale of sub-standard goods and to amend the law on weights and measures.

We mean to make quite sure that the Press have proper facilities for reporting the proceedings of local authorities.

In all these matters we shall act to strengthen Britain's traditional way of life, centered upon the dignity and liberty of the individual.

OUR DUTY OVERSEAS

While one hundred million people in Europe alone have, since the war, been forcibly absorbed into the Communist bloc and system, six times that number have been helped to nationhood within the British Commonwealth. It is our duty to ourselves and to the cause of freedom everywhere to see that the facts are known, and that misrepresentation about British 'colonialism' does not go unchallenged. Progressive expansion of overseas in-

formation services will remain our policy.

The Conservative Government will continue to work out in the Commonwealth the pattern of a community of free and sovereign nations. Next year Nigeria, and before long the West Indies, will acquire independence.

We shall discuss with our partners in the Commonwealth plans to deal with the status of members too small to be fully self-supporting and self-governing.

An advisory Commission, under Lord Monckton's chairmanship, is being set up in preparation for the review of the Constitution of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland which is to take place in 1960. Our central aim in multi-racial countries is to build communities which protect minority rights and are free of all discrimination on grounds of race or color. If democracy is to be secured, education must underpin the franchise; and the rapid expansion of education is the Commonwealth's most pressing need. We therefore undertake to increase training facilities for teachers and to make more English books available; and we will play a leading part in financing the new Commonwealth scheme of exchange scholarships and fellowships.

We emphasize the part that individual service can play. The need for teachers, doctors and technicians of every kind is almost unlimited, and an appeal to the adventurous spirit of youth must be made. We shall encourage the professions and industry to help those willing to do so to serve for a few years in the overseas Commonwealth without prejudice to their careers at home.

Further British capital will be made available through loans and grants for sound Commonwealth development. The Colombo Plan and other schemes of technical co-operation will be assisted to the full. We shall back the proposal for a new International Development Association. The Conservative Government will continue to support the United Nations' agencies in relieving poverty and combating disease, and will substantially increase the British contribution to the United Nations' Special Fund for economic development.

POLICY FOR PEACE

The next few years and even months will be critical and perhaps decisive. As a result of our policies the great powers of the world have closer contacts both personal and official than for a long time. Provided we use flexibility of method without abandoning firmness of principle, a great opportunity lies before us. Peace with justice is our aim.

1. *United Nations.* Peace cannot finally be secured until there is a world instrument with the power and the will to deal with aggression and ensure that international agreements are carried out. In view of the deep divisions between East and West, this is necessarily a long-term aim. We shall continue trying to build up the United Nations' strength and influence, but recognise that progress in improving East-West relations is an essential preliminary. Meanwhile, we shall give all our support to the work of conciliation and mediation which the United Nations machinery is well fitted to carry out.

2. *Relations with Russia.* We are opposed to the Communist system as being wholly contrary to the basic principles of our freedom and religious faith. We believe that if peace can be preserved these principles will not only survive in our own part of the world but spread. Owing to the destructiveness of modern warfare both sides have in common a greater interest in peace than ever before. If humanity is to survive both must therefore learn to live together. With this aim we have worked for a steady improvement in our relations with the Soviet Union. The steps we have

taken to expand trade, promote personal contact and discussions and improve means of communication will be pursued.

3. *Our Alliances.* Meanwhile it remains vitally important to maintain our defensive alliances throughout the world. In Europe while we will work for the inspection and reduction of armaments in areas to be agreed, we are opposed to plans which would alter the military balance and so weaken NATO.

We have sought to keep the alliance united on matters of principle and flexible in its diplomacy. For example, over Berlin we are resolved that the two and a quarter million West Berliners shall preserve their freedom to choose their way of life. Subject to that, we are ready to work out new arrangements to improve the existing situation.

4. *The Armed Forces.* Our armed forces are being reorganized on a voluntary basis and extensively re-equipped to suit them to the needs of the present day. The pay and living conditions of the Services have been vastly improved and we intend to keep them in line with standards in civilian life.

5. *Disarmament.* The power of modern weapons is appalling; but the fact that a nuclear war would mean mutual destruction is the most powerful deterrent against war. It is, however, war itself, not a particular weapon, which is the true enemy. Our aim, therefore, is to move forward by balanced stages towards the abolition of all nuclear weapons and the reduction of the other weapons and armed forces to a level which will rule out the possibility of an aggressive war. In doing this we must stick to the principle that disarmament can be effective only if it is subject to a proper system of international inspection and control. To this end, we have just reached agreement with the Soviet Union on a new body to consider disarmament and report to the United Nations. We shall place before it our comprehensive proposals.

6. *Nuclear Tests.* On British initiative the Conference of experts met last year and reached agreement on some aspects of controlling the suspension of nuclear tests. This was followed by the present Geneva Conference and no nuclear weapon tests have taken place since the Russian tests in November 1958. At the Conference, effective systems have been worked out for supervising a ban on nuclear tests in the air and under water, though more work is still to be done on supervising a ban on tests underground.

We have three objectives, achievement of each of which would be a great prize:

(*a*) The end of atmospheric tests and all that that implies. Since agreement in principle has been reached about the feasibility of controlling a ban on atmospheric tests, we see no reason why any such test need ever be undertaken again by the nuclear powers. It was in this hope that we suspended our tests.

(*b*) The establishment of the first experiment in a system of international control, which may well lead to effective measures of disarmament, both nuclear and conventional.

(*c*) The abolition under effective control of tests of all kinds.

This is a realistic and constructive approach. It maintains British influence in world affairs unimpaired and paves the way for wider agreements in the future.

THE ALTERNATIVE

Vital issues of defence and foreign policy divide the Socialists in Opposition and would continue to divide them if returned to power.

Remember their record at home! What have they to offer today that was not tried and found wanting when they last held office?

The country is disillusioned with nationalisation: but a Labour Govern-

ment would extend it. People are glad to be free of controls; but a Labour Government would clamp them on again. Everyone welcomes stable prices and lower taxes; but a return to Socialism is bound to mean a return to inflation and higher taxes. Britain lives by her trade; but Socialism would disrupt business at home and undermine confidence abroad.

The Socialists have learned nothing in their period of Opposition save new ways to gloss over their true intentions. Their policies are old-fashioned and have no relevance to the problems of the modern world.

Our policies look to the future and offer the best hope of prosperity and peace with justice.

14. The Policy of the French Independents*

BY ROGER DUCHET

Most of the traditional conservatives in France support the National Center of Independents, an organization established in 1948 to bring together under one roof adherents of a political point of view that had always before been split up into many small groups.

In the 1958 parliamentary elections the Independents and their affiliates won 19.9 per cent of the votes in the first round of voting, which is a more accurate reflection of political opinion than the run-off elections. This percentage was more than that of any other party. In the run-off elections, the Independents polled 23.6 per cent of the vote, exceeded only by the Gaullist U.N.R. with 26.4 per cent. The party and its affiliates elected 132 deputies, more than any group except the U.N.R.

Roger Duchet led the effort for the unification of the conservatives in the Center, and has been secretary-general of the organization continuously since its formation. The article below was a campaign statement issued in behalf of the party for the 1958 elections.

The Independents did not exist at the beginning of the Fourth Republic. Nevertheless, they were the most important political group in France at the end of the regime. Why? Quite simply because they had fought with courage the errors and the faults of the now-defunct system.

* From *Le Monde*, November 18, 1958.

The Independents were the first—and that was already ten years ago—to oppose the omnipotence of a single Assembly; to condemn the governmental instability and impotence; to demand and promote without rest the basic reform of a Constitution that they had not voted for and that they had for a long time been the only ones to declare baleful.

In 1952, after six years of muddling and inflation, it was one of their members, Antoine Pinay—as in the past it had been Poincaré *—who succeeded in redressing the financial situation; in saving the currency; in stabilizing prices and thereby rendering hopeful and secure the lowest-income families.

The Independents, assaulting the socialistic bureaucracy, have continuously defended free enterprise, industry, business, artisanry, engineers and managerial staffs, professional persons, family farming, workers in all social categories, in short that infinite diversity of middle classes that gives France its equilibrium and solidity.

Communism in 1946 had entrenched itself at the heart of power and of the governmental institutions. Everyone knows that it organized treason with impunity. The Independents were alone in opposing it vigorously; alone in demanding that the rigor of republican law be used against it; alone in defeating it in every by-election.

Finally, since 1955, the Independents, with Georges Bidault, Jacques Soustelle,† and myself, have led day after day an ardent fight to save French Algeria. The defeatists must be prevented from wrenching from our fighting men and from our youth the African prospects and the energy resources of the Sahara, with its opportunities for the future of France.

* Pinay was premier for ten months; Poincaré, a conservative, was premier in 1926-1927 (*Ed. note*).

† Bidault was a Christian democrat (MRP) and Soustelle was a Gaullist (Social Republican) at the time (*Ed. note*).

The Independents foresaw—they were reproached for it often enough—that the Fourth Republic would have to give way to a more honest and more stable regime. In February, 1952—nearly seven years ago—I in their name called for a government of public safety and for an appeal to General de Gaulle.

Last May, in order to save the country from civil war, Antoine Pinay, honorary president of the National Center of Independents, was the first to go to Colombey-les-Deux-Églises * to ask for the arbitration of him who incarnated the unity and grandeur of France.

And when the government of General de Gaulle proposed new institutions and held the referendum, the Independents campaigned everywhere and brought their three million votes to the new Republic on September 28.

The Independents have always condemned outdated ideologies, slogans, and demagogy. They have declared themselves for truth against compromise; in favor of realism against illusion; in favor of courage against the easy way out. They have called attention to the perils and pointed the way.

Then why didn't they play a more important role in French politics in the past? Because they were only one hundred deputies in an Assembly that numbered more than six hundred. Because an excess of parties prevented both majority and minority from being homogeneous. Because the governments, dependent on ephemeral coalitions, were doomed to impotence.

In the competition which is beginning the Independents ask the voters to make an unequivocal choice between the two orientations which are offered to our country: a policy of control which is desired by the Socialists or a policy of freedom which is advocated by the Independents.

The Socialists—it will be remembered—in eighteen months levied 500

* De Gaulle's country home (*Ed. note*).

billion francs * in new taxes, encouraged inflation and a catastrophic rise in prices. Their victory would lead us to a new decline in the currency, to economic recession, to restrictions, to unemployment, to social difficulties, and to a decline in French prospects. Only those wish for a Socialist victory who would profit from renewed harassment of free enterprise, from new extensions of socialistic bureaucracy, and from a new colonization of civil service posts. The Socialists are riveted to the past. The Independents have turned toward the future.

The national and social liberalism that they propose will call on both public and private initiative to give full scope to a rejuvenated France. That our national affairs, our finances, and our currency be put in order; a spirit of confidence, of saving, and of enterprise; continued economic expansion; a progressive elevation of the standard of living of all Frenchmen; social progress that at last is real; a France that is respected; that is what the Independents want.

* One hundred 1958 francs equal one new franc after De Gaulle's currency reform (*Ed. note*).

The country must choose between an outdated Socialist policy from whose misdeeds it has often suffered and a modern liberal policy that it has never known, but which has produced the prosperity of some great modern nations. All labels that do not correspond to this choice cause confusion in tomorrow's politics, even if they suddenly use capitalized letters to give themselves an appearance of novelty. They prepare the way for disorder, weakness, and a Chamber that would soon be ungovernable.

That is why the Independents urge the voters who condemn with them the frightening proliferation of candidates and parties to thrust aside the candidates who are causing division and dispersion. They call on them to vote for the candidates who have been designated through their investiture as the ones most capable of representing the National Center of Independents and Peasants.

The high number of Independent and Peasant deputies that the country will send to the new Assembly will express the hope that Frenchmen place in a national and social liberal majority and the confidence that they have in the new regime.

C. Liberal and Radical Parties

15. British Liberal Party Election Manifesto, 1959*

THE Liberal Party, which ruled Great Britain during much of the 19th century, has been reduced to a mere handful of M. P.'s in the House of Commons. In 1959 it won six seats in the 630-member chamber. Public opinion surveys indicate, however, that 20 to 25 per cent of the people still agree more with Liberal policies than with those of either major party.

This support disappears at the polls, where the voters realize that they are being called upon to place in office a government rather than express an ideological point of view. Because Laborites and Conservatives outnumber Liberals, the latter must choose between the other two parties.

Liberal leaders hope that they may some day increase their influence in parliament by holding the balance of power between the two goliaths or that their party may serve as the core of a major center party including Labor and Conservative dissidents. Lately, there has also been some talk of a merger between the Liberal party and the bulk of the Labor party, except the doctrinaire socialists, in a new left-of-center party.

PEOPLE COUNT

. . . and because more and more people are realizing that Liberals believe the People count there has been the recent remarkable increase in public support for the Liberal Party. At this Election we hope to consolidate and improve that position as a first stage to the eventual formation of a Liberal Government which will be able to create a Liberal society in this country.

That is our ultimate aim and we appeal to all progressively minded people to start by working and voting for Liberal candidates at this vital Election.

* By courtesy of the British Information Service.

Your Parliament. At the General Election the votes do not choose a Government, they choose a Parliament. The first task is for everyone to vote for a Member of Parliament and that Member should represent you and your neighbors.

You will get a Tory or Socialist Government after this Election, but the *kind* of Tory or Socialist Government you get will depend on the strength of Liberalism in the House of Commons and the strength of the Liberal vote in the country.

The House of Commons should be a strong influence on the Government. That is what it is for. Lately it has been far too much under the thumb of the Party machines and we must have more Liberals to save us from Tory or Labour reactionaries.

If the House of Commons is to be truly representative we must breathe new life into it to make it what you and I want. This has not been happening. First, most of the issues today are not between Conservatives and Socialists but between Liberals and the Government, whether it be Conservative or Socialist.

Workers' Security. For instance, the question of how industry should be run is largely one of providing encouragement for efficient management, giving a greater stake in it, and a greater sense of security to the worker and recognising the important part which the Trade Unions must play, not against management but in close cooperation with it. We all depend on the industries of this country to produce a higher standard of living.

Liberals believe that they should not only be efficient but provide a friendly and secure atmosphere in which everyone involved can have a sense of useful purpose in serving the community. The only people who continually hammer away at this are the Liberals.

The need to bring the Social Services up to date and to sweep away out of date restrictions on the individual is a Liberal task.

Western Unity. In Foreign Affairs are we to put ourselves at the head of a great movement for greater Western Unity as Liberals want—a unity which is vital if the summit talks are to succeed in establishing a genuine peace? This is a Liberal issue.

On Defence, the issue for years has been "Does Britain need to make its own A-Bombs." On this Tories and Labour have been united in saying 'yes.' Only recently (and possibly too late) has Labour begun to see that if every country makes its own bombs the risk of war is increased. Liberals for years have been saying that the H-bomb ought to be held in trust for all the free peoples and we should all make a contribution to its production.

Partnership in Africa. Again in Africa, the issue is a fundamental Liberal one about how you treat human beings, in which the irresponsible desire for domination of black by white or white by black must be eradicated in favor of a system in which all races mix freely with full respect for one another.

The Conservative and Labour Parties are not united internally on many of the important issues such as Defence and financial policy. We have seen resignations from the Government; we know the fierce arguments which go on behind closed doors in Socialist Committees.

These arguments should not be hidden from the light of day. They should take place in the House of Commons and in the open Council Chamber, but the last thing either the Conservative or Labour Party wants is to air their disagreements in public.

Honest Politics. We must have more Liberals in Parliament and Local Government for the sake of honest, aboveboard politics. We must have Liberals to raise these Liberal issues. The Conservative Party is clearly identified in the minds of the electors with employers and big business, and they cannot deal objectively or fairly with the problems continually arising be-

tween employer and employee. The Labour Party is in the hands of the Trade Union Leaders.

The return of a Socialist Government inevitably means that management is put on the defensive, for it does not know what is going to hit it next. The return of a Conservative Government means that the Trade Unions feel justified in going on to the offensive.

The whole nation is the loser from this crazy line up of power politics, and those who lose most in the struggle are those who live on fixed incomes, such as old age pensioners and a host of others who are solicited at Election time but are forgotten after the result is declared.

A Liberal vote is a protest against the British political system being divided up between two powerful Party machines, one largely financed by the employers and the other by the Trade Unions.

The Liberal Task. There is a vital task to be done in building up a Progressive alternative Party. The Labour Party have failed to appeal to youth; they have lost their enthusiasm: and so long as they remain tied to nationalisation (which is part of their constitution) and financed by the vested interests of the Trade Union establishment, they will never broaden their appeal sufficiently to embrace all the people who want a progressive party in this country.

England *is* a democracy and that means there is a Government and an Opposition, and one takes the place of the other from time to time. After all, even Tories do not presumably envisage a Tory Government for ever; there must be an alternative and it should be Liberal, not Socialist.

As a result of the failure of the Labour Party to free itself from sectional interests or keep up its momentum, there seems at the moment to be every likelihood of another Tory Government. If it is not to slip under the influence of its reactionary wing we must demonstrate that there is a strong non-socialist block of opinion in the country which will not tolerate oppression in Africa, another Cyprus, or complacency over inflation, Government expenditure, and the set-up in the nationalised industries.

A big Liberal vote would show that there are people who share Labour's concern about *poverty* but who are opposed to nationalisation. This would make it harder for Labour leaders to carry through the nationalisation of steel and other industries.

Consumers All. There are millions of Liberals in this country. There are also millions of young people and uncommitted voters who simply do not see themselves mirrored in the image of Tory bigwigs or Labour bosses. There are all the *consumers,* small business owners, professional men and technicians, craftsmen and farmers, fishermen, shopkeepers and pensioners who have no interest in the Capital v. Labour struggle and are greatly harmed by it. Now is their chance to make themselves felt in the New Liberal Party.

Below you can read some of the chief points in our policy but the immediate task is to build a non-Socialist Opposition whose arteries are not too hard to stand the flow of real blood of enthusiasm about the real issues of our time.

SENSIBLE PEOPLE COUNT ON LIBERALS

People Count. . . . ordinary people, exceptional people . . . people who succeed—those not so successful, the rich, the poor, the young and the old age pensioners.

In the interest of all we must spend to save on the right things. The biggest item of government expenditure is Defence.

The British H-bomb. Stop the manufacture and testing of nuclear weapons by this country and offer to contribute to a general Western

Nuclear Program and aim, through strengthening the unity of the West, at having a greater say in the circumstances in which it might be used.

The West must be adequately defended by possession of the ultimate deterrent and with conventional weapons, but this must be done through the partnership of the Western Alliance. THE FEWER NATIONS THAT MANUFACTURE THE H-BOMB, THE MORE SECURITY THERE WILL BE.

This step more than any other would—

Bring Down Taxes. Cutting out waste in nationalised industries and government services would do this too. The Gas and Electricity industries should be allowed to settle their own charges and wages and should be made to raise their own capital in the market. The coal industry should be broken down into smaller administrative units and the miners given some share in running them.

Too much of *your money* is being wasted. You are also paying too much for many of the goods you buy. So—

Cut Prices. Housewives would pay less if tariffs were reduced step by step, distribution costs cut and price fixing agreements effectively banned.

People count . . . and so do their children. So—

Invest in Education. Britain's future as a nation lies with the children. More teachers and more schools are needed. Secondary schools come first. Then the primary schools must be improved. There is room for public, grammar, comprehensive and independent schools in our system. Remember Russia spends seven times as much per head on education as we do. America spends twice as much. A big extension of University education is needed. The means test on University grants should be ended. Needed, too, for your children is—

Opportunity in Industry. The "bulge" years start in 1962—when the large number of children born after the war will need jobs. Britain's production and productivity lag. It must expand so that jobs are waiting for them—Restrictive practices both by management and labour must go. The causes of crippling industrial disputes must be eliminated. It can be done if rank and file trade unionists are ready to fight for more—

Industrial Democracy. Trade unions must be registered with the Registrar of Friendly Societies in such a way as to ensure fair elections and prevent victimisation.

People Count. This traditionally private-enterprise country must pull together to bring about . . .

Ownership for All. Liberals want co-ownership and co-partnership schemes encouraged through tax-reliefs. They want special tax-free employee savings accounts schemes brought in. They want more people to be able to buy their own homes. Schedule A income tax and Stamp duty must be abolished. To encourage mobility of labour, Liberals want temporary unemployment allowances increased.

People Count. . . . Too many people have to live in crowded cities.

In the Britain the Liberals want to create it is essential to revitalise—

The Countryside. This requires a new approach to agriculture. A land bank should be set up to provide cheap credit for farmers and rural industries. If this were done and tariffs on goods used by farmers cut, farmers will be made less dependent on the Government. Speed rural electrification and water supplies. Strengthen and improve the advisory services. Above all.

Spend on the Roads. Double the present expenditure. The roads are dangerous, inefficient and uneconomic. Traffic jams are costing £150,000,000 a year in wasted time. Build more and better roads in the countryside. Then industry can be dispersed and people can move from the over-

crowded cities. We must spend to save lives.

People count . . . in the family of Britain.

The new Liberals share the concern of their forbears for the old, the sick, the needy, the disabled.

Aid the Pensioner. The poverty of the pensioner shames our wealth. Raise the pension to £3 for a single person and £4 16s. for a married couple. Tie it to a special cost-of-living index. Make private pension schemes transferable.

Help the Sick. Make the Health Service more human and less 'Whitehall.' Provide effective out-patient and after-care facilities and special accommodation for the old. Invest more money on hospital building, pay and research.

Scotland and Wales. Liberals have long promised self-government for Scotland and Wales.

The Scots and Welsh are separate peoples, each with a great and distinctive tradition. Each country has special problems which cannot possibly be solved by a Government based on London.

Liberals would give Wales and Scotland Parliaments of their own.

The United Kingdom Parliament would remain responsible for foreign and defence policy, but the Scottish and Welsh Parliaments would be elected to cope with their own countries' needs.

We should *all* benefit, because the Parliament at Westminster would have more time to give to wider issues. As an immediate step, Wales should have its own Secretary of State in the Cabinet.

Commonwealth Partnership. The Commonwealth must be a really effective community of free nations. A Commonwealth Civil Service and a Commonwealth Development Fund should be set up to help the newer member states to build their economies. Set up a permanent Commonwealth Council of Ministers for closer consultations.

People Count . . . Their first desire is peace.

It is against the background of the great heritage we possess in the field of civil liberties, a prudent economy with a freely convertible pound and the rule of law that—

Britain Must Lead. Great Britain must demonstrate that what is morally right is economically right by giving aid to the newly developing countries, by leading a partnership in the Commonwealth, in Europe and through the United Nations. We must strengthen U.N.O. by establishing an international police force without delay. People count in Britain, in the Commonwealth, and throughout the world.

16. The Place of the French Radical Party in the New Republic*

BY FÉLIX GAILLARD

After dominating political life in the latter decades of the Third Republic, the Republican Radical and Radical-Socialist Party (to give the Radical party its full official name) went into an eclipse after World War II. By 1948, however, it had recovered most of its influence within parliament, though the numerical strength of its group in the National Assembly was relatively small throughout the Fourth Republic. During the latter years of the Fourth Republic, the party supplied more premiers and more ministers than any other group.

The reason for the resurgence of the Radicals lay primarily in their pivotal position at the political center of the Assembly and in the ideological heterogeneity and incohesiveness of its parliamentary delegation. In the first parliamentary elections of the Fifth Republic the Radical party sustained a severe defeat, but the senatorial elections in the spring of 1959 indicated that this may have reflected the plebiscitary nature of the earlier poll and that the party retains widespread support among the voters.

The author of the following election appeal was writing as president of the party.

Many Frenchmen believe that the vote on September 28 [, *1958, ratifying the constitution of the Fifth Republic*] has sealed the fate of the country for many years. The massive confidence accorded General de Gaulle will remain without doubt one of the capital elements of our political life. But the next electoral consultation [*to choose members of the National Assembly*] can have a singularly decisive influence for our future. The regime that was approved on September 28 by the majority of Frenchmen is, let us not forget, a parliamentary regime. The choice to be manifested by the electorate on

* *Le Monde*, November 22, 1958.

November 23 and 30 will determine the political composition of the future Assembly; it will confirm or cancel out that of the constitutional referendum.

The Assembly issuing from the next election will have the essential responsibility for the success or failure of the new institutions. Thus it is essential that the electorate know now the weight of its vote and, escaping momentary infatuations, that it permit the grouping of worthy men around a clear political program in the next Assembly. That is an indispensable condition for a coherent majority and for effective action. How can we contribute to the equilibrium that the country seeks and that it must find in the next Parliament?

The provisional stability ensured today by the prestige of General de Gaulle must be installed in a durable manner. Taking into account the French political temperament, this is possible only by the existence of a dynamic political balance wheel such as radicalism was under the Third Republic, but oriented toward the birth of a France modeled on the modern world. The Radical party represents this center of gravity, this balancing force. Its dualism between progress and wisdom, which is its apparent weakness today when the transformation of the country has hardly begun, will be its strength tomorrow. The Radical party is the party of the left of center. It is by definition a government party.* It is necessary to French political life.

Indeed, if the Radical party, by its past, its structure, and its orientation, is the image of the country, it translates her contradictions and profound undercurrents. Its internal divisions indicate in advance the aspirations which will animate the French people tomorrow. The party crisis preceded the French growth crisis; it foretold the latter. Therefore, the events of May 13 [*when the insurrection against the Fourth Republic began*] were no surprise to us. For twelve years we have continuously warned the country about the inevitable convulsions that logically had to arise from the chaos of our [*governmental*] institutions and from the hostility to all reform. We have spared no efforts to face up to this with solutions that were not accepted and that could be implemented only by the prestige of General de Gaulle.

Algeria has crystallized the national crisis. On this problem our party has continuously urged that alongside the necessary pacification must be found a political solution within the French framework and that this solution must be such that the Algerian peoples can make their voices heard and deliberate on their fate. By their negative and destructive attitude the extremists of right and of left defeated this liberal policy, which took concrete form in the "framework law" submitted by a Radical: Bourgès-Maunoury.* They did not permit the government over which I presided to hasten the return to reconciliation and peace that we unanimously desire. The Radical party thus defends Algeria, not according to the absurd and dangerous policy of the "ultras,"† but conscious that Algeria will be saved by the courage of our soldiers combined with the application of reforms that will truly raise the mass of the Moslems to the status of first-class citizens.

But if Algeria remains at the heart of our preoccupations, we do not wish to limit our actions to this unhappy problem. We desire a close relationship with tropical Africa and a sound currency, the only measure of economic development, progress, and social justice. We want to give to our youth every opportunity for the future. Every time that it has been possible

* That is, a party participating in or supporting the cabinet (*Ed. note*).

* Premier for four months in 1957 (*Ed. note*).

† Extreme colonialists in Algeria (*Ed. note*).

to do something, the Radicals have done it or have been associated in doing it. Every time it has been possible to undertake a major reform to pave the way for the future, Radicals have made large contributions to it and often have even laid the foundations for it.

They will carry on tomorrow as they did yesterday.

17. Declaration of the German Free Democratic Party for the 1961 Bundestag Election*

THE designation of the Free Democratic Party and its counterparts in Britain and France as "liberal" or "radical" does not mean that these labels have the colloquial American meaning of "tending toward the political left." These parties are liberal in the nineteenth century sense of favoring the broadest possible emancipation of the individual from government control in all spheres of activity, including personal, political, civil, and economic.

With the general acceptance by all parties of the first three forms of liberty listed in the paragraph above, the European liberal parties have come to be distinguished from their electoral competitors primarily by their advocacy of laissez-faire economics and, especially in France and Germany, their emphasis on a rigid separation of Church and State.

The absence of a viable conservative party in the traditional sense in Germany has led the Free Democrats further to the right than their British and French counterparts. This tendency has also been encouraged by the breadth of the appeal of the two major German parties, which has left very little tenable ideological ground free.

Caught in a sort of vicious circle, the Free Democrats have been able to maintain themselves as a viable political force in the most tenuous of circumstances. The party has been torn between and fragmented by the dilemma of impotent office-holding or sterile opposi-

* German text supplied by the party organization.

tion. After several years of coalition partnership, the bulk of the party's parliamentary group but none of its ministers passed into the opposition in 1956.

Its electoral percentage declined from 11.9 in 1949 to 7.7 in 1957, and its Bundestag representation from 52 to 41 in the same period.

In the 1961 elections the party drew 12.7 per cent of the vote and won enough seats (66) to prevent the Christian Democrats from forming a one-party government. The Free Democrats returned to office in a coalition cabinet under Chancellor Adenauer.

OUR Fatherland is divided. The East-West conflict can lead to catastrophe any day. The well-being of the Federal Republic conceals the danger to our national existence. Our people are not prepared for a grave, burdensome trial. This danger must be understood. Only a free, sound, and modern people can master it.

FREE PEOPLE

Twelve years after the founding of the Federal Republic we are not a step closer to reunification. Berlin lives in constant danger.

The Federal Government doesn't have the intelligence to win the public opinion of our allies to support the legitimate national aims on the division of Germany.

Even Western Europe is split into two economic blocs.

We dare not capitulate in the face of these bitter facts. It is again advisable to pursue a policy based on global considerations. The West seeks new ways. At this time we need a Federal Government that will express the firm will of the German people for reunification so clearly that the world takes it seriously. It is not enough for us to depend only on the policy of our allies. We must develop and carry through our own proposal for the solution of the German question.

The new Federal Government must

—show in future international conferences the quiet self-confidence that measures up to the national dignity of the German people.

—actively support all efforts for universal controlled disarmament.

—promote regional disarmament measures in Europe in so far as that will contribute toward the unification of a secure and free Germany.

—bring about negotiations on the military and political status of all of Germany within the framework of a European defense system.

—work for a just peace treaty for all of Germany without which the foundations of Germany's sovereign rights cannot be secured.

—use the relaxation of tensions between East and West to establish diplomatic relations with the States of the Eastern bloc, although, of course, this must not be purchased through renunciation of boundary claims.

—preserve the German claims for restoration to Germany of her 1937 boundaries.

—promote European cooperation—as long as it is not done at the cost of German reunification—and endeavor earnestly to overcome the economic division of Western Europe.

This policy of relaxation is possible only if it is supported by the self-asserted will of the German people. Our defense obligations and a policy of relaxation of tensions are not incompatible. As a free people we must accept responsibility for our own defense.

It is impossible to be defenseless in the face of heavily armed states. That invites the stronger to attack. As long as a universal or all-European defense system is not created, we must, for that reason, strengthen NATO.

Our freedom is indivisible—within the Federal Republic and in Berlin. Berlin must remain free and must again become the capital of Germany.

The Federal Republic will win the struggle over the political and social structure of all of Germany if it is itself an example of a free society. Neither a socialist nor a clerical-conservative State can triumph over the strength of Communism in free competition. Only a modern, liberal State is the answer to the Communist challenge.

We Free Democrats are fighting

—against the absolute majority of one party.
—against the depreciation of Parliament as the highest residuary of sovereignty in the democratic State.
—against the attempts to use influence in a one-sided way by television, radio, press, and movies.
—against the demands and power abuses of the large interest groups.
—against the abolition of freedom of association through compulsory membership in trade unions.
—against the restrictions on the right to choose one's domicile freely throughout Germany as a result of the exclusion measures of the Communists.

We Free Democrats are fighting

—for freedom of thought and conscience in place of political tutelage by the State and the misuse of religion in political competiton.
—for protection of the inalienable rights of the citizen and of Parliament.
—for a professional civil service based on performance and education and not on party membership or religious affiliation.
—for an independent judicial system, subordinate only to the law and with the broadest freedom from direction by the Attorney General.

HEALTHY PEOPLE

A healthy people must offer to every citizen the possibility to improve his position through ability and knowledge. The structure of society requires the support of all strata of the population. Therefore, the enterprising initiative of those who are self-employed in business, artisanry, industry, the liberal professions, and farming is indispensable.

The particular concern of the Free Democrats is the moral and material welfare of the wage-earners. Qualified workers must be kept employed. The unemployment and social security legislation must be adapted to this end. The social, pedagogical, and housekeeping occupations of women should be enhanced in social prestige and economic status. Broadly distributed property ensures a healthy society. Existing property should be preserved; that is especially true for longtime houseowners. All plans for taking over existing private property should be rejected.

The ability and desire of individuals to save should be encouraged without regard for occupation or place of work. Therefore, the Free Democrats demand:

—Reduction of the tax burden and of the social welfare levies.
—Development of tax allowances and a system of governmental savings-premiums for long-term savings.

—That the industrial productive capacity of the Federation, the *Laender,* and the municipalities be completely privately owned.
—Earmarking by the public authorities of part of the taxes from rental housing property for the purpose of making it possible for tenants to buy their dwellings.
—That the time be hastened when the public authorities yield to private enterprise their claims to the development of social housing construction.
—No new establishment of such enterprises by public authorities.

A prerequisite for a healthy social and economic structure is a sound currency. A sound currency requires the maintenance of the purchasing power of the Mark. Governmental and tariff policies must meet this need more than they have in the past.

Because tax collections are rising by billions of Marks every year, all increases in tax rates should be avoided. Unavoidable additional expenditures, such as for economic aid, must be covered by increased tax revenues, loans, and through governmental economies. The new Federal government should evaluate and classify according to their importance and urgency all public expenditures that arise; in accordance with that, it must set up a plan based on proven fiscal possibilities. The tax revenues of the Federation, the *Laender,* and the municipalities should be redistributed to correspond to the distribution of tasks. The revenue equalization must be readjusted at all levels and in all areas. We reiterate our demands in regard to the Federal fiscal administration.

A free society is unthinkable without a free economic system. We Free Democrats have obtained the successful free enterprise economy by struggling for it together; therefore we are against all socialistic and planned-economy controls and against exaggerated co-determination in any form.

The strongly competitive free enterprise system has shown itself to be the most productive economic system. It offers to broad categories of consumers the best terms and needs no competition from government-owned enterprises. Any undermining of the free enterprise economy through unnecessary technical and business combinations should be opposed. Here the government has lacked a strong and united will. This omission must quickly be repaired.

This is true also for the promotion of the professional and industrial middle classes. This aid is especially necessary with a view toward the larger Common Market and technical developments. For that reason reform is needed in the tax and social policies that thus far have increasingly encumbered the profits of the middle- and small-sized enterprise and have thereby prejudiced competition.

A healthy people needs a sound agriculture. The participation of the family farm in the collective development of the national economy is a commandment of social justice. The agricultural policy must ensure to the well-managed farm prices that will assure coverage of costs.

We are not prepared to sacrifice German agriculture to the Common Market. It needs equal starting conditions. Before the transition to the agricultural Common Market or to worthwhile cooperation on a larger scale we must, therefore, remove all impediments to competition.

The long-neglected complete reform of our social policies must finally be undertaken. An independent commission should investigate the foundations of the social policies in the light of today's social structure, to probe all social conditions, and to give publicity to the findings.

On this foundation a unified social welfare code should be based. It must take a general view and be understandable to everyone.

The governmental contribution to

old-age insurance must be so designed that its insurance plan benefits all groups in the population in the same way and with the same coverage.

Among the reforms of the social welfare policy that must be considered is an increase in the social security benefits intended solely for the low-income groups in the population.

He who provides for his old age himself must not be punished, but should be encouraged. Therefore, the private pension and savings plan should be put on the same tax basis with the governmental social security program. The old age pensions should be increased.

The termination of the levies for postwar rehabilitation must be postponed no longer. Therefore, the Free Democrats demand

—Reform of the system of compensation to war victims to permit legal claims to compensation for occupational losses on a basis of need.
—Equal treatment with the expellees for the refugees from the Soviet Zone and guaranteed compensation for proven losses.
—Accelerated disbursement of the major indemnities in the reparations settlement.

Without healthy families there is no healthy social order! Families must not be reduced to poorer social conditions because there are children; therefore we demand

—That tax deduction allowances for the vocational training and education of children be increased.
—Scholarship aid for gifted children.
—Child subsidies from tax sources.
—Encouragement by governmental means of: housing for large families, young couples (especially occupant-owned construction), and occupant-owned dwellings for single persons.

A healthy people cares for the aged. Enough suitable nursing homes and homes for the aged who cannot live with their families must be made available.

To maintain health is better than to heal. Therefore, throroughgoing reform measures must be applied to preventive medicine programs. The campaign against cancer and polio should be conducted more vigorously.

Debilitating diseases can now be prevented if the fight against air and water pollution and industrial and commercial noise is waged cooperatively by the Federation, the *Laender,* and the municipalities more energetically than has been the case so far.

Food inspection and regulation should be vigorously pressed.

No invalid should be turned away any more, no patient endangered because of a shortage of hospital beds. Medical reasons must be the only ones considered in choosing medicines. The free choice of doctors and consolidation of the right of privileged communication protect the relationships of confidence between doctor and patient. The healing and nursing professions should properly be esteemed as important activities for a healthy people.

MODERN PEOPLE

The modern mass society poses special problems which we must attack energetically and solve.

With technical advancement trade problems grow. They can be solved only in conformity with a comprehensive and long-range plan.

The highly developed industrial States of Europe must fulfill their obligations to the young nations of Asia and Africa.

The stability and development of a modern people definitely depends on the internal and external reforms in the educational system.

The transportation policy must include a harmonious interaction of transport and economy and among the various forms of transportation. Equal-

ity of rights between the private and public sectors of transportation should be maintained. All transportation taxes should be used for road building.

The expansion and modernization of our transportation system has not kept pace with the demands of the times. Falsely understood federalism, fuzzy jurisdiction, and clumsy administration—in short: a lack of a general concept—prevents attainment of the goal: more transportation facilities, more transportation safety!

Modern solutions of the problem of maintaining and expanding the highway network are necessary. Traffic requirements in congested areas make imperative a system of elevated highways and underground connecting roads which could also serve as civilian shelters.

We want more traffic safety through

—A simplification of the traffic regulations and the removal of the forest of signs which cannot be read.
—The construction of additional roads for pedestrians, cyclists, and motor scooters.
—Regular driving instruction in the schools.

The State railway system can hold its own in competition with the commercial transport system only if it is modern and managed according to commercial principles. The improvement of safety equipment should be accelerated. Social welfare and family policies must not be permitted to burden the State railway system.

The growth of our share of international trade requires modern, competitive German ports and canals. Transcontinental air traffic should be concentrated at a few large airports away from thickly settled areas. Local air service and feeder lines must be expanded without delay. Safety and noise control properly should be given priority. We urge the accelerated establishment of a unified flight safety system in Europe and its coordination with the corresponding military system.

Our contribution in development aid must not be limited to technical and economic help, but should especially include aid to education. We are contributing toward peaceful relations if we assist the young nations with our spiritual strength. With our help the establishment and maintenance of technical, industrial, and agricultural schools in the developing lands will awaken the strength of those people.

We call on the German youth to realize the great significance for their own future of cooperation with the developing lands. Work in these young States is fruitful. It must be promoted and must not be permitted to cause damage to their personal professional development.

The freedom and well-being of our people will be justified above all through intellectual discussion. The German youth must be able to succeed in competition with other peoples. Expenditures for education should be placed on an equal rank with expenditures for military and social security.

Valuable time is frittered away on fruitless jurisdictional quarrels between the Federation, the *Laender,* and the municipalities. After twelve years of economic boom we still lack school rooms. Thousands of teaching positions are unfilled. Classes are still being given in double shifts. The overcrowding of the universities is intolerable.

Education and training are indeed the foundation of our existence. The modern industrial society requires, more and more, men with specialized training. Of course, the Elementary and Secondary Schools must offer a terminal education and make better arrangements for entry into the vocations. We need more and more generously endowed technical and professional schools. Education for the development of the individual personality and training for spiritual independence

must have a front-rank position. That is especially true for the more advanced schools. In their different branches they must take account of the many-sidedness of modern life.

We recommend the establishment of new universities, colleges, and technical academies. The rational basis for financing compels education to emphasize research. We need a center for intellectual information and documentation. The introduction of aid to science should be undertaken as a basic principle of a liberal cultural policy.

But an expansion of our educational plant is not enough. We must also have a reform in the spirit of our educational system. Advanced courses must be guided deliberately toward independent intellectual work. The concrete experiences of the College system should be taken into consideration in this regard. Admission to the colleges must be open to qualified persons from all social levels and must not be thwarted for financial reasons. For this purpose, special preparatory courses in the form of a second curriculum should be created.

The recommendations for school reform made by the German Commission on the Training and Education System should be tried out. We do not need additional new plans, but reform of the school administration, carried out rapidly and without bias. A long experimental period will not be useful to the schools. Nor does it correspond to the desire of the teaching staff. Bearing the burden of the educational problem are the teachers. Their education and their social position must correspond to this importance.

The efforts of the churches in the Evangelical (Lutheran) and Catholic parochial schools and in the Church Conventions to hold a permanent conference on the problems of our times are a necessary counterpoise to the progressive and massive indifference in the Federal Republic. We regard with great regret the placement of our official life on a denominational basis. A liberal climate for our spiritual life is a good part of the German tradition. Only in a liberal society can a settlement of denominational conflicts be achieved in a spirit of tolerance. Therefore, we support Christian municipal schools with separate religious instruction under the supervision of the churches as the best way for training with mutual respect.

Our people have not yet developed a full consciousness of citizenship. Only a politically mature people can be a modern people. Therefore, the work of political education should have top priority.

D. Christian Democratic Parties

18. Policy Declaration, Parliamentary Group of the French Popular Republican Movement*

Although the Christian democratic movement in France can trace its origins back to the middle of the nineteenth century and although a small Christian democratic party existed during the latter decades of the Third Republic, it was not until after World War II that it acquired significant political influence.

During the first three postwar years, the Popular Republican Movement (M.R.P.) participated with the Socialists and the Communists in the governing coalition. After the Communists returned to the opposition in 1947, the government majority extended further to the right to include the Radical-Socialists and some conservatives. It was not until the Mendès-France government of 1954-1955 that the M.R.P. went, briefly, into opposition.

In the first years of the Fourth Republic, the M.R.P. vied with the Communists as the largest party, electorally and in Parliament. But as the more conservative parties recovered from the taint of having been identified with the Vichy regime, they drew support away from the right wing of the M.R.P., and it declined greatly in strength.

The party has given lukewarm and qualified support to the de Gaulle government and has retained virtually intact the electoral following and parliamentary strength it had at the close of the Fourth Republic.

In order to assure to all Frenchmen and all Frenchwomen, and especially to the young generations, a future of progress in conformity with our tradition and our destiny, the group of Popular Republicans and of the Democratic Center sets the following as the essential objectives which will guide the task of its members:

* *Journal officiel, lois et décrets,* January 23, 1959, p. 1224.

To assure authority to the Republican State with respect for all liberties and for the human being.

The restoration of peace with justice in Algeria.

The erection of a fraternal community of peoples freely associated.

Action for social progress with economic expansion and monetary stability.

The pursuit of a policy of investments and of development of regional economies.

The attainment of the construction of a united Europe, gauge of peace and of human progress.

In this spirit the group will endeavor to unite and to conciliate, in a renovated Republic, all the true democrats for whom the defense of spiritual values cannot be separated from the welfare of the people.

19. General Policy Resolution of the French Popular Republican Movement, 1960*

The Popular Republican Movement believes, in the face of the resumption of the cold war, that France cannot safeguard her independence and her freedom by a policy that would lead to her isolation.

On the contrary, the construction of a politically and economically united Europe must be advanced.

It opposes any project which would tend to subordinate in a manner contrary to the letter and the spirit of the Treaties of Paris and of Rome the existing European Communities to the authority and control of a conference of Chiefs of State.

It refuses to subscribe to any condemnation of the principle of the integration of the military forces of the free nations in the Atlantic Community or of the integration of consenting States in the European Community.

It opposes the plan to create a purely national striking force accompanied by the weakening of the unity of the free peoples.

It urges the parliamentarians of the Movement to make their votes conform to these directives.

Conscious that the future of Algeria, as that of France, imperatively demands the return of peace, it urges that every initiative be taken to resume the talks on a ceasefire with the adversary and to undertake, at the same time, an examination of guarantees for self-determination with all the representatives of the Algerian people.

It believes that the stabilization of the financial situation of the State and the progress of the economy permit, above all, a rise in the standards of living of the least favored, especially through an increase in family subsidies.

In the face of the fragility of institutions which rest essentially on one man, it believes that it is indispensable to begin immediately to set the Republic in operation in order that freedom may be protected in the future.

* Adopted at the National Committee meeting, October 10, 1960. *Le Monde,* October 11, 1960.

20. The Philosophy and Program of the German Christian Democratic Union*

BY KONRAD ADENAUER

One of the parties forming the government coalition during most of the Weimar Republic was the Christian democratic Center Party. It always ranked second or third in electoral strength among parties, yet never polled as many as 20 per cent of the vote.

When free political life resumed in West Germany after World War II, the newly formed Christian Democratic Union, effectively the successor to the Center Party, emerged as the largest party. At first its margin was narrow. In 1949 it edged out the Social Democrats by 31 per cent of the vote to 29.2 per cent and 139 Bundestag seats to 131. In 1953, however, it obtained an absolute majority of the Bundestag seats and in 1957 an absolute majority of popular votes and Bundestag seats. In 1961 it lost its majority, winning 48 per cent of the seats with 45.3 per cent of the votes.

The party's leader, Konrad Adenauer, has headed a coalition government since the founding of the Bonn Republic, but while his party had an absolute majority in parliament, the coalition was little more than a formality with the Christian Democrats having virtually complete control.

So much has been said in recent years about the so-called German "miracle" that the subject has become somewhat tedious. Let me be frank and confess that I never had much liking for this term—which, incidentally, did not originate in Germany. For the fact is that there has never been such a thing as a German "miracle," merely the successful initiative, the self-effacing devotion and energy of millions of individual Germans from all walks of life. To attribute exclusive merits for the rehabilitation of Germany to any particular sector, class or political organization would be grossly unfair: all political parties have shared in it, the worker as much as the employer,

* From Edgar Alexander, *Adenauer and the New Germany* (translated by Thomas E. Goldstein), Farrar, Straus & Cudahy, 1957, pp. 287-300. Copyright 1957 by Farrar, Straus & Cudahy, Inc. Reprinted by permission.

the farmer and craftsman as well as the civil servant, or the member of the creative and intellectual professions. And yet, one fact ought to be noted with equal certainty: the major responsibility for the rehabilitation of Germany during all these years, the successes as well as the risks, has been borne, before God and history, by the German government coalition, in particular the Christian Democratic Union (CDU-CSU).

To bear such a responsibility involves more than the mere exercise of governmental power; it means also the persistent awareness of the duties and obligations which this responsibility implies. Only he who never, not even for a moment, loses sight of this essential interrelationship, who continuously weighs these two components of true statesmanship, in sincere scrutiny before God and conscience, forever attempting to strike the proper balance between them, can hope to resist power's thousandfold temptations.

During the last eight years the CDU-CSU has borne the major share of the day-by-day business of government in the German Federal Republic, and during the past four years * has even commanded an absolute parliamentary majority. For the first time in German history, a democratic party has succeeded in establishing itself in such a position by unquestionable democratic means, as an impressive testimony to the basic soundness of its political principles. Yet the CDU-CSU has not once taken advantage of its majority position in parliament for selfish party-political ends.

Already at the time of its founding in 1946 the Christian Democratic Union gave programmatic expression to its basic political principles by stating: "For the first time in the history of Germany we have rallied for a union of all Christian and democratic elements, firmly rejecting the political division of our nation. Many have been led back, by the voice of freedom, to those values of Christian civilization whose vitality has survived the centuries, guiding and inspiring the course of mankind with an ever new vigor. In returning to these imperishable values we shall once more find the strength to release the hidden wellsprings and to make our full and significant contribution towards human happiness and progress on a par with every other nation."

The Christian Democratic Union proposes to build a new, a different Germany. Let there be an end to that period in which German intellectual life was based on a materialistic spirit pervading civilization and government. The roots of National Socialism reach deep into this philosophy; in fact, National Socialism represents the most consistent application of this philosophy. We have seen the results of this development, which started before the turn of the century, with our own eyes: the total disregard for the law, the adulation of power, the denial of the dignity of the human individual and its freedom, the deification of the state, and the unbridled expansion of its control. The end is the disintegration and destruction of government, the collapse of the economy, the utter spiritual and material impoverishment of the nation.

To be able to bear the tremendous burdens which have been imposed upon every individual German and to balance the resulting tensions we need a moral regeneration. In place of materialism, we must return to the Christian view of life, the views and principles which grow out of the materialistic philosophy must be replaced with the principles of Christian ethics. These must be our guiding criteria in the reconstruction of government, in delimiting its powers and the rights and duties of the individual, our standards for the economic and social life, for the conduct of our own civilization, as well as the relations of the nations among themselves. The

* That is, since 1953 (*Ed. note*).

Christian view of life is the sole guarantor for law, order and self-restraint, the dignity and freedom of the individual, and therewith a true and genuine democracy not limited to the outward manifestations of government but apt to guide and permeate the life of the individual, as well as that of the nation and the nations of the world. We consider Christianity's profound view of human dignity, of the value of the individual, as the basis and guiding criterion in our efforts for the political, economic and cultural rehabilitation of our nation.

In the process of reconstruction we have taken stock of these commitments, always reminding ourselves of the Christian principles upon which our party was founded at that time. Again and again, we have asked ourselves—as we are still asking ourselves each day—whether we have kept faith with these basic tenets. But, in a mood of serious reappraisal, we ask ourselves yet another question: whether we still, at this point, have the spiritual power and the strength of mind required to continue our work.

It would be pharisaical conceit to answer such a question with an unflinching "yes." And yet, these principles are no doubt as firmly rooted in our minds today as they were then, just as it is certain that we are trying everything humanly possible, again and again, to translate them into reality. For this is what essentially distinguishes our party from all other political organizations. We are committed to a genuine universal concept, independent of all the passing whims of the rapidly changing *"Weltanschauungen,"* a concept which is deliberately based on the immortal values—and here we may find one of the reasons why the CDU, together with its sister party, the CSU, is as vigorous and as aware of its responsibilities today as it was when it first started.

However, in sketching the achievements of the German rehabilitation effort, I may be permitted to focus the attention, flash-like, once more on the situation as it existed at the very start.

In 1947—i.e., ten years ago, two years after the end of the war—the official food consumption in Germany was 1,000 calories per capita per day. In the long run, that was just about too much to die and too little to live on. Nor was the supply situation for other vital commodities any better; according to the production rate of the German economy in those days, every German would have been lucky to get a new suit every forty years, a new shirt every ten years, and a pair of socks every four years. One has to recall this absurd situation in order to grasp the extent of the change that has taken place in the German Federal Republic within a period of less than ten years. At that time, we undertook the job of reconstruction against a background of total destruction of our productive facilities, isolated from all our links with the international economy, and without a genuine currency. In this situation, we received precious help from nations, some of which had faced Germany only a few years before as enemies at war; most important among these the United States, thanks in particular to the Marshall Plan. This "primary ignition," together with the currency reform of 1948, gave us the opportunity to restart our economy; and when we made a bold break with the cumbersome restrictions of the planned economy, reasserting the power of free initiative in a socially conscious market economy, we had finally managed to pave the way for those achievements of which only a few examples shall be cited here: more than three million apartments built since 1949; steel production—amounting to a mere 6 million tons in 1949—raised to 22 million tons by 1956. Within a short time it was possible to restore a normal labor market situation, integrating into the economy even those millions of Germans who had been driven from the

territories in the German East, the area beyond the Oder-Neisse line, and from Southern and Eastern Europe. We have long reached a state of full employment.

We all know that, notwithstanding this economic recovery, there are still great tasks confronting us especially in the field of social reform, representing a challenge particularly in view of the ethical foundations of our party. Much has already been accomplished in this field—for the war victims, the recipients of pensions, the expellees—but a great many problems are still waiting to be solved. In this field it is important to realize that no successful social policy is possible without a vigorous, sound and lucrative economic life. And both are impossible without a sound, solid currency—and I suppose I am entitled to say that the German currency now is solid and will stay solid, as long as nobody is going to subject it to risky experiments. We shall most certainly not indulge in such experiments.

Important tasks are, moreover, awaiting us in promoting the creative intellectual endeavor in research as well as teaching. There can be no economic or social progress in the long run without a vigorous development in the sciences. This is true not only for the technological disciplines but is the same, perhaps in an even greater measure, for the humanities. The word that man does not live on bread alone has eternal validity. This is why we must and shall do more than hitherto for the humanities—we of the CDU above all, who build on humanistic foundations.

Only a few years ago, many people outside of Germany feared that the Federal Republic might turn into an element of unrest and concern in the world because its own indigenous forces did not seem to suffice for a lasting stabilization. I think it must be evident by now that such fears were unfounded, since the Federal Republic has become one of the most stable factors in the free world, in every area.

One day, future historians are going to single out the fifth of May, 1955, as one of the most crucial dates in German history, the day on which our national sovereignty has been restored, and with it our unhampered self-determination in every field, together with a heightened degree of responsibility of which we must never lose sight. On that day, we were also reaping the fruits of our efforts in the field of foreign relations, beginning with the Bonn Agreements and distinguished by clarity of purpose, firmness and self-restraint. Here are the pillars of our success: these must remain the foundations for our policy, in time to come. Let us beware of dangerous experiments in our foreign affairs as well, since they would drive the German people back into the abyss and into the policy of adventure. It is our determination to remain firmly committed to the policy of European integration and the North Atlantic Pact.

Let me say a few words at this point about our attitude toward the German Social Democratic Party and why, in the extremely critical situation through which Germany is going, it has not been possible to work out a common foreign policy approach between these two great parties. To me, this is a profoundly painful fact which has caused me very real suffering over all these many years. Even now, in the midst of an election year, I cannot cease hoping that the Social Democrats will one day realize that, if they would control a majority in the Federal Diet, they would have to follow precisely the same foreign policy course as the one we have steered.

From the very beginning, the fundamental tenet of our foreign policy has been to follow a course of firm solidarity with the West, and thereby to guard our own freedom. Guarding our freedom seems, after all, a worthy objective, without which all of Ger-

many would have to surrender to slavery. Yet the Social Democrats, denying that the solidarity with the West will lead to reunification, want the Federal Republic, as well as a future reunited Germany, to occupy a position by itself, in the middle of the two big power blocs. In point of fact, the notion that a reunited Germany would be able to hold her own in between the two big power constellations—prior to a universal relenting of tensions and a consequent over-all change in the international situation—is so thoroughly utopian that one is surprised to see anyone expound these ideas seriously before the German people and the world. Germany stands after all in the very focus of the European high-tension area between East and West—but some people talk as if we were situated in the stars.

The Federal Republic is a member of NATO, which has been established primarily—but by no means exclusively!—as a military instrument for the defense of freedom. It may be that the Soviets have deferred the threat of "hot war" for the time being: in the long run the danger remains nevertheless real! One can hardly deny that the Soviet Union is ruled by a dictatorship, whether the dictator is Stalin or somebody else. We Germans should be the first to realize the extent of stupid errors and hasty decisions of which a dictatorship is capable—stupid mistakes even in the face of its own selfish interests. If it is true that Soviet Russia remains under a dictatorial rule; that she continues to arm and to cause ever new upheavals throughout the world; that she remains obsessed—as I firmly believe she does—with the idea of world rule: would it not seem advisable to guard against possible attack from that quarter? Some people, both in and outside of Germany, like to call such cautious wisdom a "policy of strength." I do not happen to favor this term because it is subject to so many dangerous misinterpretations; nevertheless, I much prefer a policy of caution and "strength" to a policy of weakness!

In becoming NATO members we have assumed, as a matter of course, the obligation to share in the defense of the West; and, equally as a matter of course, we shall fulfill this obligation, and would not even dream of abandoning a basic defense concept which not only serves to strengthen NATO, but at the same time increases our own security. Now it so happens that the task which for us grows out of this obligation, i.e., the establishment of a modern defense force, coincides with a revolutionary change in the armament and defense thinking throughout the world, due to the breathtaking development in the field of nuclear weapons and missiles technology. What that means for us is that the need to rebuild our military establishment out of nothing, following the vacuum of these last years, amounts to the tremendous opportunity of a "zero hour," a new beginning; and even if that appears to spell certain delays in the establishment of a Federal defense force, we may look forward to the certain prospect of an up-to-date, highly effective Federal defense force which will measure up to its tasks.

Twice during the first half of the twentieth century, the German people has experienced the horrors of war; perhaps better than any other nation we know that a third world war would jeopardize the existence of Europe and of large portions of the world. It is this knowledge that compels us to make every possible contribution to the preservation of peace; this is why neither the Federal Republic, nor a reunited Germany, will ever again present a threat for any other nation in the world, because we shall always respect the honest security interest of all our neighbors, including our neighbors to the east.

In September 1955 I said in Moscow: "The highest good for all Germans to safeguard is peace. You will therefore find no one in Germany—neither among the responsible political leaders, nor among the population as a whole—who would even remotely play with the idea that any of the great political problems, now awaiting solution might be resolved by means of war." The view I expressed at that time continues to be the guiding principle of our policy.

Notwithstanding all our achievements in the Federal Republic, we cannot forget for a moment that 17 million people are living and suffering in the Soviet zone of occupation in a state where they are totally unfree and oppressed by a regime resting solely upon the support of a foreign power. The supreme objective of our policy therefore remains the preservation of our freedom and the restoration of German unity in freedom and peace. Its realization is predicated upon the holding of free elections throughout Germany and the establishment of a government, freely elected by an all-German parliament, able to determine Germany's future legal and political place in the world. This position has been recognized by the entire free world, together with the fact that already at this time the Federal Government, as the only freely elected German government, has the right to speak for all of Germany. This is an issue on which we are unable to compromise, lest we relinquish our goal of reunification in freedom.

Even in these matters, it is impossible to separate the German interest from that of the entire free world. The restoration of a free German commonwealth is conceivable only insofar as the free world seeks to restore freedom for all of Europe by means of a universal peace offensive. Only an all-European freedom policy, in which the German problem is duly recognized in accordance with its Central European position, can lead to freedom and peace for all. On the other hand, as long as the German problem is treated as an isolated issue, the 17 million oppressed Germans will not come any closer to achieving their freedom, and a dangerous source of unrest will continue to exist in the midst of Europe. It helps to recall the warning which Salvador de Madariaga, the great European liberal and friend of Germany, voiced in Munich in 1956: "Reunification is not a German problem because the Iron Curtain extends from the Baltic to the Adriatic Sea. If Germany should embrace nationalism, the future of Europe would look dark indeed. But if Germany should rise to the level of what she can attain, she will achieve the place, within a united Europe, to which she is entitled, thanks to her intellectual vigor. . . . The time demands great decisions of everyone, most of all the Germans."

Madariaga's words recall that the chief aim of our efforts, next to the reunification of Germany, is the unity of Europe—and that the two aims are mutually interdependent. When I was first elected to the Federal chancellorship, I said in September 1949: "European integration hinges on the relations between Germany and France. I have advocated this view as early as twenty-five years ago." The ratification of the Paris treaties, the acceptance of the Federal Republic in the Western European Union and in NATO have made us the allies of France, and any future war between these two nations has therewith become unthinkable. These facts indicate the extent to which Franco-German relations have changed since the Federal Republic has come into being. The settlement, in a spirit of friendship, of the Saar issue has eliminated the last of the differences which used to divide Germany and France; the end for which I had been hoping eight years ago, in the interest of both our nations, in

the European and world interest, and for which I have since striven as best I could, has at last been realized.

But let us view the European problem from a broader perspective: the idea of the nation state has been one of the primary causes for the division and the fraternal strife which have brought our European continent so close to the abyss. We will have to shake off this idea if Europe in the future is to develop as an organic whole, carrying the political weight it deserves due to its history and achievements. This is why we have done everything possible in order to expedite European unity: why the Federal Republic is now a member of the Council of Europe in Strasbourg, as well as of the European Coal and Steel Community. Still, these are no more than beginnings; the ultimate goal is the establishment of a genunine European political community—which should be flexible and lithe, rather than rigid, finding a form which permits each nation to make its own contribution. We therefore welcome the fact that Great Britain, too, has demonstrated her willingness to cooperate in the efforts toward a common European market—representing a substantial extension of the Coal and Steel Community in the mere range of the commodities to be included—and in the establishment of a European atomic community.

Yet, since the end of the war, certain political developments and changes have made us aware not only of the internal European aspects, but also of the world-wide implications of the European integration problem. The concept of a European political and economic hegemony in the world is probably a thing of the past. However, our concern for European civilization, with all that it has given to the world, and including its well-nigh inexhaustible sources of cultural inspiration, demands that we adjust to the changing international conditions, as it requires our active defense if it is to retain its place in the world.

Those days were a test also for our German policy, compelling us to subject the basic assumptions as well as the objectives of our political action to renewed scrutiny. Today, we may say that our German policy has stood the test, at a time when everything seemed to hang in the balance. None of the events of 1956 has forced us to change our course; on the contrary, some of these events have borne out our expectations and justified our fears with an almost tragic consistency.

In the first place, there was, inside the Soviet sphere, the so-called "destalinization" process with all its implications and results, the growing unrest throughout the Soviet orbit and the popular revolts in Poland and Hungary. In a most heartbreaking and shocking way I was confirmed in my contention that the disavowal of Stalin did not mean a true change of mind, and hence no change of direction, for the Communists. The blood bath, the terror regime, the deportations, the continuing show trials in Hungary revealed beyond a shadow of a doubt the true face of the Communist system, stripping all pretensions of "peaceful coexistence" of their inherent hypocrisy. I have always felt sure that the only aim of the strategy of the big smile and the diplomacy of reassurance was to sow confusion in the Western camp, to undermine the unity of the free world, and to gain control over the Federal Republic by means of a phony "neutralization" and a reunification in slavery. The Eastern European events amounted to a confirmation of this view, destroying a great many illusions of our political opponents in the process.

And, last but not least, the Near Eastern developments have shown that the Soviet Union persists in its attempts to subvert the free nations, not disdaining to inject the poison of nationalism into its philosophy of dia-

lectic materialism, so as to further its imperialistic ends more effectively. On the other hand, the events in the Eastern Mediterranean, especially in Egypt, have led to some important repercussions in the Western world. They revealed certain cracks and flaws in the structure—to which we cannot possibly shut our eyes. But the West has learned from these events, and we may say already today that the bitter lesson of these days in October and November 1956 has led to a realistic self-scrutiny. The unity of the free world remains unshaken at the core; in fact, it is firmer today than it ever has been.

The year 1956 has strongly corroborated our efforts to strengthen the community and cooperation among all the free nations. In this, we agree with President Eisenhower who said at the height of the Suez crisis last October: "We believe that integrity of purpose and action is the fact that must most surely identify and fortify the free world in its struggle against Communism. We cannot proclaim this integrity when the issue is easy—and stifle it when the issue is hard. To do this would be to do something much worse than merely making our great struggle in the world more difficult. For if we were ever to lose that integrity, there would be no way to win true victory in that struggle. That would be a surrender that we shall not make."

To preserve this integrity of purpose and action is the chief concern of the Christian Democratic Union, which has not adopted the adjective "Christian" as a mere slogan, but is committed to a literal interpretation of the implicit ethical obligation, feeling deeply serious about the realization of Christian principles in the world of politics. We in Germany have had the bitter experience of the Nazi system; other nations have experienced different dictatorships, or are still subject to them today. We all know that the removal of the ethical element from the political life leads to the deification of the state, until human freedom and dignity sink into the materialistic morass. After those bitter lessons who would deny that there is no genuine freedom in a true democracy, unless it is tied to the eternally valid principles of Christian ethics? It is the only possible foundation for any legislation and any attempt to influence creatively the life of the nations in its multiple aspects—whether in the political, economic, cultural or social sphere. Only he who feels this permanent link with the living wellspring of divine strength can hope to last in the fight against communism and materialism.

I am happy that I may recall another statement by President Eisenhower to which I subscribe wholeheartedly, a statement which highlights the meeting of Western philosophy with the idea of the leadership of the West: "It is our faith in the deathless dignity of Man, governed by eternal morals and natural law. This faith defines our full view of life. It establishes, beyond debate, those gifts of the Creator that are Man's inalienable rights and that make all men equal in His sight."

I have said above that the Federal Republic represents today one of the most stable factors in the free world. The ultimate reason for this is in the profound commitment of my party, the Christian Democratic Union, to these basic tenets of Christian ethics. I myself, as well as all those who share with me the leadership of this party or who are going to succeed me, shall remain loyal to this commitment.

21. The Cologne Manifesto of the German Christian Democatic Union, 1961*

GERMANY, despised and isolated after the Second World War, has gained the respect and the friendship of the free world and won security from Soviet imperialism under the leadership of the [*Christian Democratic*] Union in the Federal Republic.

But still seventeen million Germans live in the Zone under a foreign dominated regime with greater oppression daily. In all our political endeavors we remain fervently bound to them.

Under the leadership of the Union the German people in the Federal Republic have resolved the clerical quarrel and ended class warfare and have worked their way up out of poverty and need to thriving prosperity.

The Union presents itself confidently to the judgment of the German people at the Bundestag elections of September 17, 1961. With responsibility before God and Man, our political decisions will continue to be guided by the rightful claims of all, but bound by no biased interest.

The Christian Democratic Union wants:

The freedom of all Germans,
Peace in the world,
Unity of the Fatherland,
The unification of Europe,
The Atlantic community.
Therefore, it demands:

1. The security of our State and its inhabitants from all dangers, foreign and domestic.

2. The right of self-determination for all Germans, the liberation of the capital Berlin, the reunification of Germany in peace and freedom.

3. The unification of Europe and the strengthening of the Atlantic alliance.

4. Universal, controlled disarmament, including all atomic weapons.

5. Cooperative assistance to the developing countries by the free world.

The Christian Democratic Union wants:

Liberty for all citizens,
Encouragement for families,
The free development of society,
Property and prosperity for all,
Social order in town and country.
Therefore it demands:

1. The continuance of the social market economy, the elimination of all trade-restraining concentrations, the strengthening of the middle class and of agriculture, the broader organization of the expellees and refugees, stable currency and sound money, secure savings and widely-distributed property, the continuance of social reform, social housing construction, "premium" savings, and "people's shares."

2. Solid education of our youth from elementary schools through the universities, expansion of the teaching and research facilities, aid in a way suitable to families for all qualified students from the technical schools to the scientific colleges through scholarships and loans in order that all may have equal opportunities based on ability and inclination.

* German text supplied by the party organization.

3. Strengthening of the family, expansion of family subsidies, relief for mothers, care for the aged, aid for home ownership, kindergartens and playgrounds near families.

4. The construction of sports arenas, gymnasiums, and swimming pools according to the "Goldenen Plan," and of recreation and hiking facilities.

5. Extensive rehabilitation and renewal of our cities and towns, relief of congested areas, reduction of housing density, more green space in our cities, improvement of the traffic and street systems, noise control, purification of air and water.

The successes of our nation under the leadership of the Union are obvious to everyone. Whoever does not want to risk these achievements, whoever wants to insure our future, and whoever wants to continue the climb upward will vote for the Christian Democratic Union of Germany.

E. Socialist Parties

22. British Labour Party Election Manifesto, 1959*

THE British Labour Party emerged as one of the two major parties in the 1920's, driving out the Liberals. It formed a minority government in 1923 and again after becoming the largest party in the House of Commons in 1929.

Party leaders participated in the wartime Churchill government and formed, for the first time, a majority Labour government after the 1945 electoral victory. Since then, in four successive elections, Labour representation in parliament has declined, the party losing control of the House of Commons in 1951.

Labour remains one of Britain's two major parties, but it is beset by leadership and ideological struggles and by continuing evidence of declining popular support.

WE welcome this Election; it gives us, at last, the chance to end eight years of Tory rule.

In a television chat with President Eisenhower, Mr. Macmillan told us that the old division of Britain into the two nations, the Haves and the Have Nots, has disappeared. Tory prosperity, he suggested, is shared by all. In fact, the contrast between the extremes of wealth and poverty is sharper today than eight years ago. The business man with a tax-free expense account, the speculator with tax-free capital gains, and the retiring company director with a tax-free redundancy payment due to a take-over bid—these people have indeed 'never had it so good.'

It is not so good for the widowed mother with children, the chronic sick, the 400,000 unemployed, and the millions of old age pensioners who have no adequate superannuation. While many of those at work have been able to maintain and even improve their standard of living by collective bargaining, the sick, the disabled and the old have continually seen the value of state benefits and small savings whittled away by rising prices. Instead of recognizing this problem as the great-

* Courtesy of British Information Service.

est social challenge of our time, the Prime Minister blandly denies that it exists.

The Danger of Complacency. One of the dangers we face as a nation is the mood of complacency and self-deception engendered by the vast Tory propaganda machine. The Tory Manifesto claims that the Government has 'now stabilized the cost of living while maintaining full employment' and that it is 'succeeding in creating one nation at home.'

These claims are *largely without foundation.* The cost of living has *not* been maintained. There are many millions of 'have nots' in Britain. The best way to ensure you do not reach your goal is to pretend that you are there already. This is what the Tories have been doing.

We do not say that the task of combining an expanding economy with full employment and steady prices is an easy one. Indeed it will remain impossible until we have a Government which is prepared to use all measures, including the Budget, in order to expand production and simultaneously to ensure that welfare is developed and prosperity fairly shared. Labour's five-year program of action has been carefully worked out to achieve these aims.

The Truth about Production. Rising living standards depend upon a steady expansion of production. The Tory record, whether measured against that of the Labour Government or of other countries, is deplorable. Far from leading in the race for higher productivity, Britain in these last years has been outpaced by almost every other industrial nation.

After the Thorneycroft crisis of 1957, the Government deliberately created unemployment in an attempt to halt inflation. Unemployment is still heavy in some areas. Throughout the country it has led to broken apprenticeships; and many school-leavers this autumn are having difficulty in finding jobs.

Ending Poverty in Old Age. The living standards of more than half our old-age pensioners are a national disgrace. About a million are driven by poverty to seek National Assistance and another 500,000 would be entitled to receive it but are too proud to do so. True, the small minority who draw a really good superannuation pension are comfortably off, but they are the exception.

Our *emergency* plan for tackling this problem is to raise the basic pension and other social security benefits at once from £2 10s. to £3 a week; and their purchasing power will be maintained by an automatic increase to cover any rise in prices that may have taken place in the previous year.

The Government have turned down both the basic £3 pension and the guarantee of its value. All they have done is to improve slightly the scales of National Assistance, from which no one can benefit without a means test.

The contrast between our *long-term* scheme and that of the Tories is equally striking. Our plan for National Superannuation will not affect those already covered by good superannuation schemes. But every other employed and self-employed person will be brought into National Superannuation and enjoy all the advantages of the best kind of private scheme. The scheme will be financed by graded contributions, 5 per cent from employer and 3 per cent from employee, and an Exchequer grant equivalent to 2 per cent of average national earnings. In five years it will be providing a useful addition to the basic pension. When it is in full operation, it will provide half-pay on retirement for the average wage-earner, and up to two-thirds for the lower paid workers, both men and women.

The Tories have put on the Statute Book a bogus imitation of National Superannuation, due to come into force in 1961. This does *not* give an immediate increase to existing pensioners; it does *not* raise pensions if prices rise;

it does *not* cover those earning less than £9 a week; and, though the contributions are heavy, it does *not* provide anything approaching half-pay on retirement. Indeed, only a third of the graded contribution comes back in graded benefit to the contributor. The rest is taken by the Chancellor for other purposes.

The Tory scheme is really a financial device for shifting most of the burden of paying for pensions from the better-off taxpayers to workers earning between £9 and £15 a week.

Widows. Among widows—especially widowed mothers with growing children—there is a great deal of hardship and want. We shall review all widows' pensions, paying particular attention to the earnings rule, and increase to £1 the Basic pension of the '10s. widow.'

Education. Money spent on education is an investment for the future. We propose, therefore, a great drive to abolish slum schools, to reduce the size of classes to 30 in primary and secondary schools, and to expand facilities for technical and other higher education.

One of the greatest barriers to equality of opportunity in our schools is the segregation of our children into grammar and other types of school at the age of 11. This is why we shall get rid of the 11-plus examination. The Tories say this means abolishing the grammar schools. On the contrary, it means that grammar-school education will be open to all who can benefit by it. In our system of comprehensive education we do not intend to impose one uniform pattern of school. Local authorities will have the right to decide how best to apply the comprehensive principle.

At present, children whose parents cannot pay fees often suffer from an unfair disadvantage in secondary education. By improving the system of maintenance grants, we shall make sure that no child is deprived of secondary schooling by the parents' lack of money. In the same way we shall ensure that any student accepted by a university will receive a really adequate State scholarship.

Housing. Labour's policy has two aims: to help people buy their own homes and to ensure an adequate supply of decent houses to let at a fair rent.

As a first step we shall repeal the Rent Act, restore security of tenure to decontrolled houses, stop further decontrol, and ensure fair rents by giving a right of appeal to rent tribunals.

The return of a Tory Government would mean further rent increases and the decontrol of many more houses. We say this despite the official Tory assurance that there will be no decontrol during the life of the next Parliament—for we remember what happened last time.

During the 1955 Election Mr. Bevan prophesied that rents of controlled houses would be increased if the Conservatives came back to power. Two days later the Conservative Central Office denied this, and said there was no truth in his statement. In 1957 the Conservative Government introduced the Rent Act.

Under the Tories, home purchasers have been subject to unpredictable and burdensome increases of interest rates. Labour will bring interest rates down. We shall also reform leasehold law to enable leaseholders with long leases to buy their own homes.

Council building of rented houses has been slashed under the Tories chiefly as a result of higher interest rates and the abolition of the general housing subsidy. We shall reverse this policy by restoring the subsidy and providing cheaper money for housing purposes. We shall encourage councils to press on with slum clearance.

At the last count there were seven million households in Britain with no bath, and over three million sharing or entirely without a w.c. The Tories have tried to induce private landlords

to improve their property by means of public grants, with very small success. Labour's plan is that, with reasonable exceptions, local councils shall take over houses which were rent-controlled before 1 January 1956, and are still tenanted. They will repair and modernize these houses and let them at fair rents. This is a big job which will take time and its speed will vary according to local conditions.

Every tenant, however, will have a chance first to buy from the Council the house he lives in; and all Council tenants in future will enjoy the same security of tenure as rent-restricted tenants.

Health. The creation of the National Health Service was opposed by the Tories. Since they took office they have starved the Service of money.

Although the period of post-war scarcity is long since over, the Tories have completed only one new hospital. As a minimum we shall spend £50 million a year on hospital development, and we shall also restore the free Health Service by abolishing all charges, starting with the prescription charge.

One gap in the Service is that at present no provision is made for health care at work. We shall close that gap by creating an occupational health service.

The family doctor will, however, remain the basis of health care. We shall help him by reducing the permitted maximum number of patients, without loss of income, and encourage group practice by a substantial increase in the group practice loans fund. We shall safeguard the health, welfare and safety of people employed in shops and offices by carrying out the recommendations of the Gowers Committee.

We shall also establish a free chiropody service for old people.

Leisure. As our plan for expansion develops, people will be increasingly able to choose between more money and more leisure. How the balance is struck is largely a matter for the unions in negotiation with the employers. How leisure is spent is a matter for the individual. Governments should not interfere in either. The individual, however, can only have real freedom to use his leisure as he wants to if proper facilities are available to all and not merely to a privileged few; and this is where both the Government and the local authorities can help.

We shall make much better provision for the enjoyment of sport, the arts and the countryside. A Sports Council will be set up with a grant of £5 million. The Arts Council grant will be increased by £4 million annually. The National Theatre will be established. In order to ensure that the countryside is open for the enjoyment of all, the powers of the National Parks Commission will be increased.

We shall get rid of out-of-date restrictions on personal liberty. Anomalies in the betting laws will be removed; an inquiry will be held into the Sunday observance laws; and a Royal Commission will be set up to review and recommend changes in the licensing laws. But, as these are all matters of conscience, there will be free votes on them for Labour M.P.s.

We do not propose to end commercial television, but evasions of the Television Act must stop. When it is technically possible we shall welcome a third television program. There is a strong case for granting this neither to the B.B.C. nor to the I.T.A.* but to a new public corporation But decision will be deferred until the views of an independent committee have been obtained.

Labour will end the Cinema Entertainments Duty.

Youth. The Youth Service which should provide recreation for boys and girls leaving school, has, year after year, been starved of funds. Many youth club premises are dingy and un-

* The commercial television network (*Ed. note*).

attractive, trained leaders are too few, and facilities for sports and games are quite inadequate.

Over the next five years we have got to cater for a million more teenagers leaving school. Our new Sports Council will go some way to meet their needs. But we shall also require (1) a sustained drive to re-equip the whole youth service, (2) a rapid increase of apprenticeships and other forms of training, and (3) economic expansion sufficient to provide a million new jobs.

We are also convinced that the affairs of the community will benefit from more active participation by young people. Among the many proposals which Labour will consider is the lowering of the voting age. As this would be a major change in our electoral law and social practice, we shall in the next Parliament initiate discussions on it with the other parties.

Taxation—and Planned Expansion. Tory propagandists allege that a Labour Government would have to put up taxes in order to pay for these improved social services. This is quite untrue. The finance required would be raised in two ways. The chief way of raising it would be through planned expansion. For four years under the Tories industrial production scarcely rose. In 1958 alone this cost the country £1,700 million, of which the Exchequer would have received £450 million. With this increased revenue we could have paid for great improvements in the welfare services, and we could have reduced taxation and extended the repayment of postwar credits. So, too, the steadily expanding national income will enable us to pay for our five-year program without increasing the present rates of taxation.

Secondly, we shall change the tax system to deal with the tax-dodgers and limit tax-free benefits. These benefits are now so extensive and lavish that the ordinary wage or salary earner who has no access to them pays more than his fair share of taxation.

In particular:

1. We shall deal with the business man's expense account racket and the tax-free compensation paid to directors on loss of office;

2. We shall tax the huge capital gains made on the Stock Exchange and elsewhere;

3. We shall block other loopholes in the tax law including those which lead to the avoidance of death duties and surtax.

Public Ownership. The nationalised industries have played a great part in Britain's postwar development. Pits have been modernized, atomic power stations built, a massive modernisation of the railways started. But one crying need is to clear up the present muddle by an overall national fuel policy.

The work of our nationalised industries has been made much more difficult by the Tories. Big business and the Tory Party itself have invested huge sums in propaganda campaigns, designed to discredit the idea of public ownership. Many of the Government's policies have, indeed, been activated by prejudice—for example, their transference of work from publicly owned railway workshops to private firms and the favoritism they have shown to private airlines. Under a Labour Government, the nationalised industries will be given an opportunity once again to forge ahead.

As part of our planned expansion, it will be necessary to extend the area of public ownership. The private steel monopoly will be restored to public ownership, in order to ensure its expansion and give the taxpayer value for the large sums of public money still invested in it. Commercial long-distance road haulage will be renationalised and built into an integrated transport system.

With half a million new cars coming on the roads each year, the Government's road programme is entirely inadequate. But, to solve the problem, road-building must be related to a national plan which covers *all* the trans-

port needs of an expanding economy. It must also deal with the appalling problem of road casualties.

We have no other plans for further nationalisation. But where an industry is shown, after thorough inquiry, to be failing the nation we reserve the right to take all or any part of it into public ownership if this is necessary. We shall also ensure that the community enjoys some of the profits and capital gains now going to private industry by arranging for the purchase of shares by public investment agencies such as the Super-annuation Fund Trustees.

The Cost of Living. To achieve planned economic expansion and full employment without raising prices requires a buoyant demand to stimulate British industry; a high rate of investment as the basis of raising productivity; an energetic application of science in all phases of our economic life; a favorable balance of payments including the development of Commonwealth trade; and a strong pound.

Under the Tories the cost of living has risen by a third. Eventually the Government were forced to take action and apply the traditional Tory remedy: they cut production and deliberately created unemployment.

This use of unemployment to halt rising prices is as obsolete as it is cruel. But it is unavoidable under a Government with a doctrinaire prejudice against controls—a Government moreover, which antagonizes the unions. Every wage-earner realizes the futility of wages chasing prices and wants to see a stable cost of living combined with full employment. But the unions can only co-operate if the Government, too, plays its part. If we want lasting prosperity it must be prosperity which is fairly shared.

Only a Labour Government is ready to use the necessary controls and able to win full co-operation from the unions by such measures as a fair-shares Budget policy and the extension of the Welfare State.

Consumer Protection. We shall begin a vigorous campaign of consumer protection. Buyers will be protected against hire-purchase ramps and shoddy goods. A tough antimonopoly policy will lower prices and we shall make it compulsory to show clearly the net weight or quantity of packaged goods. Existing consumer protection organizations will be encouraged and we shall examine the need for further consumer protection—a task in which the Co-operative Movement will obviously have a great part to play.

Private Industry. Our policy for planned expansion without inflation requires the full co-operation of the private sector of industry. Our tax policy will be directed towards helping industry to mechanise, modernise and expand and make a maximum contribution to exports. As for the industrial giants which dominate our economic life, we shall ensure that these firms plan their operations in accordance with our national objectives of full employment and maximum efficiency.

With employers and trade unions we shall work out a Code of Conduct. This will include a Workers' Charter, designed to raise the status of the wage-earner and extend privileges, such as sickness pay, already provided for most salaried employees.

Local Unemployment. One of our first tasks will be to help industries at present suffering depression and contraction. Despite the Government's 'scrap and shut down' policy, we shall at once put into effect our own Plan for Cotton and guarantee to what survives of the industry a much more hopeful future. Shipbuilding and ship-repairing is another hard-hit industry, where vigorous action must be taken if full employment is to be restored.

Wherever there is a danger of local unemployment arising, we shall use the full powers of the Distribution of Industry Act. The activities of the industrial estate companies will be greatly expanded. The Government will build 'advance' factories to encourage firms

to move to places where they are needed. Additional areas with high unemployment will be scheduled for development purposes. From 1945 to 1951 it was Labour's policy to bring the work to the workers. We pledge ourselves to do this again!

Unemployment pay will be raised to £3 a week. By discontinuing Section 62 of the National Insurance Act, the Tories have ended long-term unemployment benefit. We shall restore it.

The Countryside. The Labour Government gave the farmer reasonable security for the first time in this century; but since 1951 this security has been whittled away. It must be restored. Protection will be given against unfair foreign competition. The tenant farmer will obtain real security of tenure and an effective rent arbitration system such as existed until the Tories' recent wrecking measure. A special credit organisation will be set up to provide loans at reasonable and stable rates of interest. Agricultural co-operation will be encouraged. We shall introduce measures to improve agricultural and horticultural marketing.

The farm worker is leaving the land. If he is to stay there he needs a better life. We shall:

1. enable the Wages Board to introduce a 'payment during sickness' scheme;

2. end the evils of the tied cottage; and

3. through National Superannuation provide security in old age for workers in an industry in which there are virtually no private occupational schemes.

Labour will also improve rural amenities. Slum schools will be abolished, education in the countryside brought up to the town level. The publicly-owned industries have already done much: thanks to nationalisation, 110,000 more farms than in 1948 now have electricity.

We shall carry out the long overdue reorganisation of water supplies under public ownership. This will not only help the countryside, but industry as well.

Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. Each of the various nations that make up the United Kingdom has its special problems. Labour has recognised this by issuing the policy statements *Let Scotland Prosper* and *Forward with Labour—Labour's Policy for Wales.* The Northern Ireland Labour Party has issued its own policy statement on the problems of Ulster, to which Labour's National Executive has given general approval.

Labour's plans for expansion, restoring full employment and increasing welfare will benefit all these areas. In particular we will take vigorous measures to increase and diversify industry and to stimulate agriculture. Improvements in communications will include such major enterprises as the building of road bridges over the Severn and the Tay.

The time has now come for the special identity of Wales to be recognised by the appointment of a Secretary of State.

Who Goes to the Summit?—All our hopes of building a decent, happy society at home are vain without peace abroad. Our very existence depends on ending the nuclear arms race.

This summer a new opportunity has come for breaking the East-West deadlock. There is now every chance of the Summit Conference for which Labour has pressed for two long years.

It seems to us that there are three tests to which anyone who claims to represent Britain at the Summit should be prepared to submit himself.

1. Has he proved beyond doubt that he believes in promoting the rule of law in international relations, and that he rejects as obsolete the resort to violence in order to achieve his ends?

2. Can he show by his past actions that he will make Britain the leader in securing a disarmament agreement?

3. Has he faced, in a way that will gain the confidence of Asia and Africa, the problem of a world divided be-

tween rich and poor nations, subject and free peoples.

The Rule of Law and the United Nations. The Tories pay lip-service to the rule of law but ignore it whenever it seems to conflict with their interests. That is the lesson of Suez. Ignoring an overwhelming vote by the United Nations Assembly, they put Britain into a hopeless military venture which split the Commonwealth and all but destroyed the Anglo-American alliance. The Suez gamble was not only a crime, it was also an act of folly, hopelessly misconceived, bungled in execution and covered with a tissue of lies told by the leading Ministers concerned, including the present Premier and Foreign Secretary. By refusing to express any compunction or regret about Suez, Mr. Macmillan and Mr. Selwyn Lloyd have shown the world how little respect they really feel for the rule of law.

The Labour Party, on the other hand, upheld the decision of the United Nations on Suez. Since then our proposals for disengagement in Central Europe, the Middle East and the China Sea have all been designed to substitute the rule of law and negotiated settlements for the power politics of conflicting blocs. We have also insisted that the West should not violate the spirit of the Charter by preventing the admission of Communist China to the United Nations.

We have always realised, however, that power is required to make the rule of law effective. That is why during the period of the East-West deadlock we have stood resolutely by our defensive alliances and contributed our share to Western defence through NATO. It is our view that any weakening of the alliance would contribute to a worsening of international relations.

For this reason we have repeatedly exposed the blunders in planning and expenditure committed by no fewer than seven Tory Defence Ministers in eight years. We have vigorously opposed the Government's dangerously one-sided reliance on nuclear weapons; and we urged that highly trained, well-paid regular forces should be substituted for conscripts.

The Arms Race. In the field of disarmament Labour has set the pace. We led the demand for an end to all nuclear tests; after years of delay the tests are now temporarily suspended, and we declare that, even if other countries break the truce, we would not start our tests again but would immediately convene a new conference. This year we have taken the lead on another urgent problem—the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries. We have put forward the only concrete proposals designed to stop this dangerous development and so to leave the way open to world-wide disarmament, which is our paramount objective. We have proposed a comprehensive disarmament treaty which would reduce arms, manpower and military expenditure, destroy all stocks of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, abolish all chemical and biological weapons, and provide new safeguards against surprise attack.

In contrast, the Tory record has been negative and, sometimes, obstructive. They opposed a disarmament agreement unless it was tied to the settlement of political problems. They opposed a nuclear test agreement unless it was part of a general disarmament agreement. They opposed the suspension of tests when Russia offered to stop her own. They opposed Labour's proposals for disengagement in Europe. They opposed a Summit Conference. Only with a change of American policy and in time for a General Election in Britain has Mr. Macmillan emerged as a sponsor of a Summit Conference.

Two Worlds. Two worlds, one white, well-fed and free, the other colored, hungry and struggling for equality, cannot live side by side in friendship. In their attitudes to the Colonial

and ex-Colonial peoples of Asia and Africa the Labour and Tory records stand in sharp contrast.

No action of the Attlee Government evoked greater enthusiasm than the freeing of nearly 500 million people in India, Pakistan, Burma and Ceylon. The transformation of the old British Empire into the first inter-racial Commonwealth of free nations was the supreme achievement of the Labour Government.

What of the Tory record? In Cyprus foolish words and a stubborn refusal to face facts led to disturbance and bloodshed—and, in the end, the Government had to agree to a settlement that could have been obtained years earlier. An opportunity to integrate Malta into the United Kingdom was thrown away. In Kenya eleven African prisoners were beaten to death. Above all, the Tories ignored Labour's solemn warnings that nine-tenths of the peoples of Nyasaland and Northern and Southern Rhodesia opposed the Federation which the Tories were forcing on them. The Government's own Devlin Commission exposed the tragic folly of Tory policy. Mr. Macmillan rejected its findings. After this, how can the peoples of Africa and Asia trust a Tory Government?

Today the future of Africa is poised as perilously as that of India in 1945. The only British Government which can regain the confidence of Africans is a Government wholeheartedly committed to three principles of the Labour Party's Colonial policy: first, that the peoples still under Colonial rule have as much right as we have to be governed by consent; secondly, that 'one man, one vote' applies in all parts of the world; thirdly, that racial discrimination must be abolished.

War Against Want. Labour has always recognized that even if the East-West differences were ended the West is still presented with an immense challenge—the poverty of two-thirds of the world's people. This is a challenge the Tories have never really faced. We believe in extending the Socialist concept of the Welfare State to all the peoples of the world. This is why we have solemnly pledged ourselves to devote an average of 1 per cent of our national income each year to helping the underdeveloped areas.

Our Socialist Ethic. Like our other social and economic policies, this pledge is based on the Socialist belief in the equal value of every human being. This is the belief which inspired the pioneers of Socialism, and still inspires the Labour Party, in the struggle for social justice and human rights.

In Britain, despite the bitter resistance of those who saw their profits and privileges threatened, great gains were won in the first half of the twentieth century. We still have to consolidate and extend these gains: none of us, however lucky or well-off we may happen to be, ought to feel comfortable in a society in which the old and the sick are not decently cared for.

The same principle applies when we face this vast problem of the hungry two-thirds of the world. To solve this problem is the biggest task of the second half of the century. We know that it can be solved—if the fear of war is removed, and with it the crippling burden of arms expenditure.

At this historic moment a British Government with a clear policy based on the ethical principles of Socialism can exercise a decisive influence for peace. Hundreds of millions of people throughout the world still look to Britain for moral leadership and eagerly await the result of this General Election. We are confident that their hopes will be fulfilled, and that Britain will be represented at the Summit by a Labour Prime Minister.

23. Declaration of Principles of the French Socialist Party (S.F.I.O.), 1946*

THE S.F.I.O. (French Section of the Workers' International), although founded in 1905, did not participate in a ministry until the Popular Front governments that were headed by its leader, Léon Blum in the mid-1930's.

After World War II, however, the party emerged as a key group in the National Assembly. During most of the Fourth Republic, no government could remain in office without Socialist support or neutrality. It was the largest non-Communist party in the Chamber during the greater part of that time and supplied four premiers, including Guy Mollet who headed the longest-lived cabinet of the Fourth Republic.

As with most of the traditional parties in France, the importance of the Socialist party was sharply reduced with the establishment of the Fifth Republic. Although its electoral support increased slightly in the 1958 elections over the 1956 and 1951 polls, its number of deputies fell from 99 to 40. Soon thereafter it passed from support of de Gaulle into the opposition.

THE aim of the Socialist Party (S.F.I.O.) is to liberate the human person from all the bonds which oppress him and, consequently, to assure to men, women, and children, in a society founded on equality and fraternity, the free exercise of their rights and their natural faculties.

The distinctive characteristic of the Socialist Party is its assumption that human liberation depends on the abolition of the system of capitalist property which has divided society into necessarily antagonistic classes and enables one of them to enjoy property without work, and obliges the other to sell its labor and to abandon part of its product to the owners of the capital.

Firmly attached to freedom of conscience and to the secular State and schools, the Socialist Party has as its proper activity the assembly without distinction of philosophic or religious belief the mass of laborers of all types —intellectual or manual—on the po-

* Adopted February 24, 1946, at Paris by the National Assembly of the party.

litical, economic, and doctrinal terrain, with a view toward the conquest of the public powers * a condition that is necessary but not sufficient for the social transformation.

The Socialist Party is an essentially revolutionary party: its aim is to substitute for the system of capitalist property a system in which the natural resources as well as the means of production and distribution will become the property of the collectivity and in which, consequently, classes will be abolished. This transformation, accomplished in the interests of all men can be the work only of the laborers themselves. No matter what means are used for its accomplishment, it will constitute in itself the social revolution. It is in this sense that the Socialist Party has always been and continues to be a party of class warfare, founded on the organization of the labor world.

It is an essentially democratic party, because all the rights of the human person and all the forms of freedom are indissoluble one from another. There is no free citizen if labor is not liberated. There is no emancipation of labor if the realm [*cité*] is not free. The democratic freedoms extended and developed are both a necessary element of any socialist regime and the means of assuring to the proletariat, in the very bosom of the capitalist system, the progressive reforms which ameliorate its condition and increase its revolutionary capacity.

It is a party both national and international at the same time.

Essentially national because there is no free labor in a subject or enslaved nation, because the workers, whom the abuses of capitalism tended to cast out of the Fatherland, have reintegrated themselves by a century and a half of efforts and sacrifices, because the Fatherland is today their own and in large part their work, and because they are determined to defend it.

Essentially international because the laws of economics have acquired a universal character, because the interests of all workers are interdependent as are the rights and duties of all men, because the first of these interests, peace, cannot be assured without their organization and their international action.

* In French constitutional terminology, this refers to the legislative and political executive branches of government (*Ed. note*).

24. Statement of Policy of the Parliamentary Group, French Socialist Party (S.F.I.O.), 1959*

At the moment when the new institutions of the Fifth Republic, defined by the constitutional text that was submitted to the referendum of September 28 and adopted by a very large majority by the people, are set in place and when popular sovereignty has been expressed by free, direct, and secret vote to designate deputies to the National Assembly, the Socialist Party S.F.I.O. reviews its nature and its aims.

The Socialist Party is distinguished from other political formations or groupings by the extent to which it is a democratically organized force at the service of the world of labor and of a human ideal. Socialism is, in effect, both a doctrine and a morality, which seeks to liberate man from all his bonds and to permit him, out of respect for his personality, to fulfill himself and to accede to the concrete liberties which assure happiness and dignity in life.

Respectful of all religious beliefs, which are matters of conscience for each individual and which can be made harmonious only through secular State institutions, the Socialist party aims at uniting all the laborers in the country in order to abolish class barriers born of heredity or fortune, in order to suppress social injustices and to afford to each person from the outset the equal rights and duties that will permit him to make the most of his opportunities in life.

The Socialist Party thus pursues the effort and prolongs the education of the most illustrious as well as the most obscure of its members who, over a century, have changed and transformed the social conditions of production and the distribution of wealth. If this is compared to the early struggles by workers in the Nineteenth century in order that labor might be honored, protected, and respected; in order that the slavery of the worker might end; that women and children might no longer be the victims of selfish and unscrupulous profit; that education might become universal, secular, and free, the Socialists can say with pride to those who fear the future that no devotion, no sacrifice was vain. The passage of time convinces us of this.

* *Journal officiel, lois et décrets,* January 23, 1959, p. 1221.

25. Basic Program of the Social Democratic Party of Germany* (Adopted November 13-15, 1959)

The German Socialists emerged as the largest party in the last decades of the Empire, even though their influence was diminished by the nature of the regime. They presided over the early years of the Weimar Republic but declined later and were ruthlessly suppressed by Hitler.

In the postwar years they have grown slightly in electoral support, but their growth has been at the expense of the minor parties. Their chief rivals, the Christian Democrats, have grown even more. The gap between the two has become so wide that commentators now refer to Germany as having a "one-and-a-half-party" system.

Although it had only eight seats fewer than the C.D.U. in 1949, by 1957 it had only 169 seats to 270 for Adenauer's party. The margin narrowed in the 1961 elections as the Socialists won 190 seats to 241 for the C.D.U. It has been the chief opposition party throughout the Bonn Republic.

FUNDAMENTAL VALUES OF SOCIALISM

Socialists aim to establish a society in which every individual can develop his personality and, as a responsible member of the community, take part in the political, economic and cultural life of mankind.

Freedom and justice are interdependent, since the dignity of man rests on his claim to individual responsibility just as much as on his acknowledgement of the right of others to develop their personality and, as equal partners, help shape society.

Freedom, justice and solidarity, which are everyone's obligation toward his neighbors and spring from our common humanity, are the fundamental values of Socialism.

Democratic Socialism, which in Europe is rooted in Christian ethics, humanism and classical philosophy, does not proclaim ultimate truths—not because of any lack of understanding for or indifference to philosophical or religious truths, but out of respect for

* English translation supplied by the party organization.

the individual's choice in these matters of conscience in which neither the state nor any political party should be allowed to interfere.

The Social Democratic Party is the party of freedom of thought. It is a community of men holding different beliefs and ideas. Their agreement is based on the moral principles and political aims they have in common. The Social Democratic Party strives for a way of life in accordance with these principles. Socialism is a constant task —to fight for freedom and justice, to preserve them and to live up to them.

BASIC DEMANDS FOR A SOCIETY WORTHY OF MAN

From the acceptance of Democratic Socialism follow certain basic demands which must be fulfilled in a society worthy of man.

All peoples must submit to the rule of international law backed by adequate executive power. War must be ruled out as a means of policy.

All peoples must have equal opportunities to share in the world's wealth. Developing countries have a claim to the help of other peoples.

We are fighting for democracy. Democracy must become the universal form of state organization and way of life because it is founded on respect for the dignity of man and his individual responsibility.

We resist every dictatorship, every form of totalitarian or authoritarian rule because they violate human dignity, destroy man's freedom and the rule of law. Socialism can be realized only through democracy and democracy can only be fulfilled through Socialism.

Communists have no right to invoke Socialist traditions. In fact, they have falsified Socialist ideas. Socialists are struggling for the realization of freedom and justice while Communists exploit the conflicts in society to establish the dictatorship of their party.

In the democratic state, every form of power must be subject to public control. The interest of the individual must be subordinated to the interest of the community. Democracy, social security and individual freedom are endangered by an economic and social system in which striving for profit and power are the distinguishing features. Democratic Socialism therefore aspires after a new economic and social order.

All privileged access to educational institutions must be abolished. Talent and achievement should be the sole criteria of advancement.

Freedom and justice cannot be guaranteed by institutions alone. Technology and organization are exerting a growing influence on all areas of life. This creates new dependencies which threaten freedom. Only diversity in economic, social and cultural life can stimulate the creative powers of the individual without which man's mind is paralyzed.

Freedom and democracy are only thinkable in an industrial society if a constantly growing number of people develop a social consciousness and are ready to help shoulder responsibility. A decisive means to this end is political education in its widest sense. It is an essential objective of all educational efforts in our time.

THE ORDER OF THE STATE

The Social Democratic Party of Germany lives and works in the whole of Germany. It stands by the Basic Law of the German Federal Republic. In accordance with the Basic Law it strives for German unity in freedom.

The division of Germany is a threat to peace. To end this division is a vital interest of the German people.

Not until Germany is reunited, will the whole people be able freely to determine the content and form of the state and society.

Man's life, his dignity and his conscience take precedence over the state. Every citizen must respect the convictions of his fellow men. It is the duty

of the state to protect freedom of faith and freedom of conscience.

The state should create the conditions in which the individual may freely develop his personality, responsible to himself but conscious of his obligations to society. Established fundamental rights do not only protect the freedom of the individual in relation to the state; they should also be regarded as social rights which constitute the basis of the state.

The social function of the state is to provide social security for its citizens to enable everyone to be responsible for shaping his own life freely and to further the development of a free society.

The state becomes a truly civilized state (*Kulturstaat*) through the fusion of the democratic idea with the ideas of social security and the rule of law. It depends for its content on the forces prevalent in society, and its task is to serve the creative spirit of man.

The Social Democratic Party affirms its adherence to democracy. In a democracy the power of the state is derived from the people and the government is always responsible to Parliament whose confidence it must possess. In a democracy the rights of the minority as well as the rights of the majority must be respected; government and opposition have different tasks of equal importance; both share in the responsibility for the state.

The Social Democratic Party aims to win the support of the majority of the people by competing under equal conditions with other democratic parties in order to build a society and a state that accord with the essential demands of democratic Socialism.

Legislature, executive and judiciary should operate separately and it is the duty of each to serve the public interest. The existence of three levels of authority—Federal, State, and Local—ensures the distribution of power, strengthens freedom and through co-determination and co-responsibility gives the citizen manifold access to democratic institutions. Free local communities are vital to a living democracy. The Social Democratic Party therefore supports the principles of local self-government which must be extended and given adequate financial support.

Associations in which people of different groups and sections of the population unite for common ends are necessary institutions of modern society. They must be democratically organized. The more powerful they are, the greater is the responsibility they carry, but the greater also is the danger of their abusing their power. Parliaments, administration and courts must not be allowed to come under the one-sided influence of vested interests.

Press, radio, television and cinema fulfill public tasks. They must be independent and free to gather information wherever they wish, to comment on it and to distribute it, and to form and express their own opinions. Radio and television should remain under the control of public corporations, and be directed by free and democratic boards. They must be safeguarded against pressure from interest groups.

Judges must have outer and inner independence if they are to serve justice in the name of the people. Lay judges should play an equally important part in jurisdiction. Only independent judges can pass judgment on criminal offenses. Neither wealth nor poverty should have an influence on people's access to courts or on jurisdiction. Legislation must keep pace with the development of society if justice is to be done and if the people's sense of justice is not to be violated.

National Defense. The Social Democratic Party affirms the need to defend the free democratic society. It is in favor of national defense.

National defense must be adapted to the political and geographical position of Germany and therefore stay within the limits imposed by the necessity of creating the conditions for an easing of international tensions, for effectively

controlled disarmament and for the reunification of Germany. Protection of the civilian population is an essential part of a country's defense.

The Social Democratic Party demands that the means of mass destruction be banned by international law in the whole world.

The Federal Republic of Germany must neither produce nor use atomic or other means of mass destruction.

The Social Democratic Party is striving for the inclusion of the whole of Germany in a European zone of reduced tensions and of a controlled limitation of arms, a zone to be cleared of foreign troops in the process of German reunification in freedom and in which atomic weapons and other means of mass destruction are neither produced nor stored nor used.

The armed forces must be under the political direction of the government and under the control of Parliament. A relationship of trust should exist between soldiers and the democratic forces in the country. The soldier must retain his civic rights and duties.

The armed forces must only be used for national defense.

The Social Democratic Party pledges itself to protect every citizen who for reasons of conscience refuses to do military service or operate means of mass destruction.

The Social Democratic Party stands for general and controlled disarmament and an international authority equipped with the means of coercion to safeguard the rule of international law. These would supersede national defense forces.

THE ECONOMY

The goal of Social Democratic economic policy is the constant growth of prosperity and a just share for all in the national product, a life in freedom without undignified dependence and without exploitation.

Constant Economic Expansion. The Second Industrial Revolution makes possible a rise in the general standard of living greater than ever before and the elimination of poverty and misery still suffered by large numbers of people.

Economic policy must secure full employment whilst maintaining a stable currency, increase productivity and raise general prosperity.

To enable all people to take part in the country's growing prosperity there must be planning to adjust the economy to the constant structural changes in order to achieve a balanced economic development.

Such a policy demands national accounting and a national budget. The national budget must be approved by Parliament. It is binding on government policy, provides an important basis for the policies of the autonomous central bank, and establishes guiding lines for the economy which keeps its right to make independent decisions.

The modern state exerts a constant influence on the economy through its policies on taxation, finance, currency and credits, customs, trade, social services, prices and public contracts as well as agriculture and housing. More than a third of the national income passes through the hands of the government. The question is therefore not whether measures of economic planning and control serve a purpose, but rather who should apply these measures and for whose benefit. The state cannot shirk its responsibility for the course the economy takes. It is responsible for securing a forward-looking policy with regard to business cycles and should restrict itself to influencing the economy mainly by indirect means.

Free choice of consumer goods and services, free choice of working place, freedom for employers to exercise their initiative as well as free competition are essential conditions of a Social Democratic economic policy. The autonomy of trade unions and employers' associations in collective bargaining is an important feature of a free society.

Totalitarian control of the economy destroys freedom. The Social Democratic Party therefore favors a free market wherever free competition really exists. Where a market is dominated by individuals or groups, however, all manner of steps must be taken to protect freedom in the economic sphere. As much competition as possible—as much planning as necessary.

Ownership and Power. A significant feature of the modern economy is the constantly increasing tendency toward concentration Large-scale enterprises exert a decisive influence not only on the development of the economy and the standard of living but also on the structure of the economy and of society.

Those who control large industrial concerns, huge financial resources and tens of thousands of employees do not merely perform an economic function but wield decisive power over men; wage and salary earners are kept in a position of dependence, and not only in purely economic and material matters.

Wherever large-scale enterprises predominate, free competition is eliminated. Those who have less power have fewer opportunities for development, and remain more or less fettered. The consumer occupies the most vulnerable position of all in the economy.

Increased power through cartels and associations gives the leaders of big business an influence on politics and the state which is irreconcilable with democratic principles. They usurp the authority of the state, Economic power becomes political power.

This development is a challenge to all who consider freedom, justice, human dignity and social security the foundations of human society.

The key task of an economic policy concerned with freedom is therefore to contain the power of big business. State and society must not be allowed to become the prey of powerful sectional groups.

Private ownership of the means of production can claim protection by society as long as it does not hinder the establishment of social justice.

Efficient small and medium sized enterprises are to be strengthened to enable them to prevail in competition with large-scale enterprises.

Competition by public enterprise is an important means of preventing private enterprise from dominating the market. Public enterprise should safeguard the interests of the community as a whole. It becomes a necessity where, for natural or technical reasons, economic functions vital to the community cannot be carried out in a rational way except by excluding competition.

Enterprises which are built up on a voluntary collective basis and whose purpose it is to satisfy demand rather than earn private profits help to regulate prices and serve the interests of the consumer. They perform a valuable function in a democratic society and should be supported.

Large-scale publicity should give the people an insight into the power structure of the economy and into business practices in order that public opinion may be mobilized against abuses of power.

Effective public control must prevent the abuse of economic power. The most important means to this end are investment control and control over the forces dominating the market.

Public ownership is a legitimate form of public control which no modern state can do without. It serves to protect freedom against domination by large economic concerns. In these concerns power is held today by managers who are themselves the servants of anonymous forces. Private ownership of the means of production is therefore no longer identical with the control of power. Economic power, rather than ownership, is the central problem today. Where sound economic power relations cannot be guaranteed by other means, public ownership is appropriate and necessary.

Every concentration of economic

power, even in the hands of the state, harbors dangers. This is why the principles of self-government and decentralization must be applied to the public sector. The interests of wage and salary earners as well as the public interest and the interests of the consumer must be represented on the management boards of public enterprises. Not centralized bureaucracy but responsible co-operation between all concerned serves the interests of the community best.

Distribution of Income and Wealth. The competition economy does not guarantee by itself just distribution of income and wealth. This can only be achieved through measures of economic policy.

Income and wealth are distributed unjustly. This is not only the result of mass destruction of property through crises, war and inflation but is largely due to an economic and fiscal policy which has favored large incomes and the accumulation of capital in the hands of a few, and which has made it difficult for those without capital to acquire it.

The Social Democratic Party aims to create conditions in which everybody is able to save part of his rising income and acquire property. This presupposes a constant increase in production and a fair distribution of the national income.

Wage and salary policies are adequate and necessary means of distributing incomes and wealth more justly.

Appropriate measures must ensure that an adequate part of the steadily growing capital of big business is widely distributed or made to serve public purposes. It is a deplorable symptom of our times that privileged groups in society indulge in luxury while important public tasks, especially in the fields of science, research and education, are neglected in a way unworthy of a civilized nation.

Agriculture. The principles of Social Democratic economic policy apply also to agriculture. The structure of agriculture, however, and its dependence on uncontrollable forces of nature call for special measures.

The farmer is entitled to own his land. Efficient family holdings should be protected by modern laws on land tenure and leases.

Support of the existing system of co-operatives is the best way of increasing the efficiency of small and medium sized holdings while maintaining their independence.

Agriculture must adjust itself to the changing economic structure in order to make its proper contribution to economic development and to assure an adequate standard of living to the people working in it. These changes are determined not only by technical and scientific progress, but also by the changes in the location of the market within the framework of European co-operation and by the fact that the German economy is increasingly linked with that of the rest of the world.

The modernization of agriculture and its efficiency are a public responsibility.

The interests of the farming population are best served by the integration of agriculture into an economy with high productivity and an ever more widely distributed mass purchasing power. Price and market policies necessary to protect agricultural incomes should take into account the interests of the consumers and of the economy as a whole.

The cultural, economic, and social condition of the entire farming population must be improved. The lag in social legislation must be overcome.

Trade Unions in the Economy. All wage and salary earners and civil servants have the right to free association in trade unions. They would be helplessly exposed to those in positions of command in enterprises and concerns unless they were able to confront the latter with the united force of their free and democratically organized trade unions and freely to agree on working conditions.

Trade unions fight to secure wage and salary earners a fair share of the country's wealth and the right to a voice in decisions affecting economic and social life.

They fight for greater freedom and act as representatives of all working people. This makes them an important element in the constant process of democratization. It is the unions' great task to enable every employee to shoulder responsibility and to see to it that he can make use of his abilities.

Wage and salary earners whose contribution to production is decisive have so far been deprived of an effective say in economic life. Democracy, however, demands that workers should be given a voice and that co-determination be extended to all branches of the economy. From being a servant the worker must become a citizen of the economy.

Co-determination in the iron and steel industry and in coal mining marks the beginning of a new economic structure. The next step should be the establishment of a democratic organizational structure in all large enterprises. Co-determination by employees in the independent administrative bodies set up in the economy must be secured.

SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY

Social policy must create the essential conditions which allow the individual to unfold himself freely in society and which determine his life according to his own responsibility. Social conditions that lead to individual and social hardship cannot be accepted as inevitable and unchangeable. The system of social security must correspond to the dignity of responsible individuals.

Every citizen has the right to a minimum state pension in case of old age or inability to earn a living, or at the death of the family's provider. This pension is supplemented by other personally acquired pension claims. In this way the individual standard of living will be sustained. Social allowances of all kinds, including pensions for war-disabled and their dependents, must be regularly adjusted to the rise in earned incomes.

Technology and modern civilization expose people to many dangers to their health. They threaten not only the living generation but future generations as well. The individual is unable to protect himself against these hazards. The Social Democratic Party therefore demands comprehensive health protection. Health policy must be perfected, and the conditions and ways of living must be shaped in a way conducive to making life in sound health possible. Public health protection, especially protection at work and effective methods of preventing damage to health in individuals, must be developed. A sense of personal responsibility in respect of one's health must be aroused and the doctor of one's choice must be given full facilities for the preservation of health and prevention of illness. The professional freedom of decision of doctors must be ensured. The provision of adequately equipped hospitals is a public task.

Since all people should have an equal chance to live, all must have access to the treatment made available through modern technical research when they are in need of it, regardless of their financial position. Such medical treatment must be supplemented by adequate economic assistance in the case of illness.

Working hours should be progressively shortened without prejudice to income levels and in step with the development of the economy. In order to cope with particularly difficult situations in life and in special cases of need, the general social allowances must be supplemented by individual care and social aid. Social aid should be given in co-operation with independent voluntary welfare organizations and institutions for mutual aid and self-help. The independence of

voluntary welfare organizations must be protected.

All labor and social legislation should be ordered and compiled in a surveyable code on labor legislation and a code on social legislation.

Everyone has a right to a decent place in which to live. It is the home of the family. It must therefore continue to receive social protection and must not be the mere object of private gain.

The housing shortage must speedily be eliminated through effective building programs. Public housing must be encouraged and social considerations must be taken into account when determining rents. Speculation in real estate should be prohibited and excessive gains from the sale of real estate taxed away.

Woman—Family—Youth. Equality of rights for women should be realized in the legal, economic and social spheres. Women must be given equal opportunities in education and occupational training, in the choice and practice of professions and in earnings. The special psychological and biological characteristics of women should not be disregarded because they have equal rights. The work of the housewife should be recognized as an occupation. The housewife and mother is in need of social assistance. Mothers of children of pre-school age and school-age should not be compelled by economic need to seek gainful employment.

State and society must protect, support and strengthen the family. By supporting the material security of the family, society recognizes its moral value. Effective help should be given to the family by generous tax allowances for parents, and by maternity benefits and family allowances.

Young people must be enabled to manage their own lives and grow up ready to assume their responsibilities toward society. It is therefore the task of state and society to strengthen the educational function of the family, to supplement it where it does not suffice, and, if need be, to provide an alternative. A system of grants and scholarships must ensure that special abilities and aptitudes of young people are fully developed in their vocational and professional training.

The protection of the young workers must be adjusted to present-day social conditions and educational experience. If the young people are entrusted at an early stage with a share in the work and responsibilities of adults, they will become well-informed and determined democrats. Progressive youth legislation should guarantee the young people's right to education and development of their personality. In all areas of life which concern education or the encouragement and protection of youth, the welfare of youth must have priority over all other considerations.

CULTURAL LIFE

The creative powers of the individual must be given a chance to unfold freely in a full and diverse cultural life. The state should encourage and support all forces willing to make a contribution to cultural progress. The state must protect the citizen against all attempts by power groups or sectional interests at making the people's spiritual and cultural life subservient to their own purposes.

Religion and Church. Only mutual tolerance which respects the dignity of all men regardless of differences in belief and conviction, offers a sound basis for political and human co-operation in society.

Socialism is no substitute for religion. The Social Democratic Party respects churches and religious societies. It affirms their public and legal status, their special mission and their autonomy.

It is always ready to co-operate with the churches on the basis of a free partnership. It welcomes the fact that men are moved by their religious faith to acknowledge their social obligation

and their responsibilities toward society.

Freedom of thought, of religion and of conscience, and freedom to preach the gospel must be protected. Any abuse of this freedom for partisan or anti-democratic ends cannot be tolerated.

Education. Education must give an opportunity to all to develop freely their abilities and capacities. It must strengthen the will to resist the conformist tendencies of our time. Knowledge and the acquisition of traditional cultural values, and a thorough understanding of the formative forces in society, are essential to the development of independent thinking and free judgment.

School and university should bring up youth in a spirit of mutual respect. Youth should be taught to appreciate the values of freedom, independence and social responsibility as well as the ideals of democracy and international understanding. The aim should be to encourage tolerance, mutual understanding and solidarity in our society in which so many philosophical viewpoints and systems of value exist side by side. The curricula of schools should therefore pay proper attention to education for citizenship.

The arts and crafts should have an important place in education. It is the task of state and society to enable everyone to become familiar with the arts and artistic work through schools and adult educational institutions.

Sport and physical training deserve the support of state and society. They help to keep the people in good health and are important elements in the formation of a spirit of solidarity.

Parents should have a voice in the education of their children at school and forms of self-government by pupils should be developed everywhere. School systems and curricula must give full scope to the development of talent and ability at all stages. Every gifted pupil should have access to advanced education and training. Attendance at all state supported schools and universities should be free. Books and other study material should be available to students free of charge.

The period of compulsory school attendance should be increased to ten years. Trade and technical schools should not only provide occupational training but also general education.

New paths to university education must be opened. Since not all talented young people can reach university via the usual elementary and higher school training, other opportunities to do so must be made available via vocational work, occupational schools and special educational institutions.

All teachers should be trained at universities. A good school system demands educators able to judge independently the problems of their time.

Science. Scientific research and teaching must be unfettered. The results of scientific research must be made known to the public. Adequate public means must be spent on research and teaching.

The state must see to it that the results of scientific research are not misused to the detriment of mankind.

An independent council of scientists should be formed which would regard itself responsible for making proposals for urgent research projects and for undertaking some itself. Research and teaching should be furthered in every field of science without exception.

Generous grants should secure for all students the full benefits of academic education. All students should be taught the basic elements of political and social science.

Mastering the political, human, and social problems of the developing industrial society and maintaining human freedom in it call for a perfection and intensification of the science of man and society. Efforts in this field must be made to correspond to those exerted to develop natural science and technology.

The freedom and independence of universities must remain untouched.

But the university must not remain isolated from other spheres of life and should therefore work together with other institutions of a democratic society, especially in adult education.

A modern system of adult education should provide opportunities for everyone to acquire knowledge, power of judgment and other abilities after the completion of formal education. Responsible participation in the democratic state depends on these qualities.

The Arts. The freedom of artistic work must be guaranteed. State and municipality should make public means available to support the creative elements in the community. No regimentation, especially no censorship, must restrict free artistic creation.

THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

The greatest and most urgent task is to preserve peace and protect freedom.

Democratic Socialism has always stood for international cooperation and solidarity. At a time when all interests and relationships are internationally linked, no nation can any longer solve its political, economic, social and cultural problems by itself. The Social Democratic Party is guided by the realization that the cultural, economic, legal and military tasks of German politics must be solved in close cooperation with other peoples.

Normal diplomatic and trade relations with all nations are indispensable in spite of differences in system of government and social structure.

International courts of justice and treaties, the acknowledgement of the right to national self-determination and of the equality of all nations, the inviolability of sovereign territory and non-interference in the affairs of other peoples—all these are necessary to secure peace which must be guaranteed by a world authority.

The United Nations Organisation must become the universal body which it was meant to be. Its principles must be universally binding. The right of national minorities must be recognized in accordance with the human rights proclaimed by the Charter of the United Nations. The Social Democratic Party of Germany proclaims the right of all people to a homeland, a national tradition, a language and culture.

Regional security systems within the United Nations framework should be established as a step toward general disarmament and the easing of international tension. The reunified Germany should become a member of a European security system with full rights and obligations. Economic developments make co-operation between the states of Europe necessary. The Social Democratic Party recognizes the need for such co-operation which, in the first place, should serve economic and social progress. Regionally limited supra-national association must not be allowed to result in "closed-door-policies" with regard to the rest of the world. The prerequisites of peaceful co-existence are co-operation between equal partners and a system of world trade open to all nations.

Democratic states must express their solidarity especially with the developing countries. Half of the world's population still lives in extreme poverty and ignorance. So long as the wealth of the world is not redistributed and the productivity of developing countries raised considerably, democratic development is in jeopardy and peace continues to be threatened. All peoples are obliged to fight starvation, misery and disease by a common effort. Their economic, social and cultural development must be inspired by the ideas of democratic Socialism if they are not to become the victims of new forms of oppression.

OUR WAY

The Socialist movement has an historic task. It began as a spontaneous

moral protest of wage earners against the capitalist system. The tremendous development of the productive forces with the help of science and technology brought wealth and power to a small group of people, but only destitution and misery to the workers. To abolish the privileges of the ruling classes and to secure freedom, justice and prosperity for all was and remains the essence of the Socialist aim.

The working class had to rely on its own resources in its struggle. It acquired self-confidence by becoming conscious of its own position and by its determination to change this position by united action and the experience of success in its struggle.

Despite heavy setbacks and some errors the Labor movement succeeded in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries in winning recognition for many of its demands. The proletarian who was once without protection and rights, who had to work sixteen hours a day for a starvation wage, achieved the eight-hour day, protection at work, insurance against unemployment, sickness, disability and destitution in old age. He achieved the prohibition of child labor and night work for women, the legal protection of youth and mothers, and holidays with pay. He successfully fought for the right to assemble and to form trade unions, the right to collective bargaining and to strike. He is about to obtain the right to co-determination. Once a mere object of exploitation, the worker now occupies the position of a citizen in the state with equal rights and obligations.

In several countries of Europe the foundations of a new society have been laid under Social Democratic governments. Social security and the democratization of the economy are being realized to an increasing extent.

These sucesses represent milestones on the march forward of the Labor movement which has demanded so many sacrifices. The emancipation of the workers helped to enlarge the freedom of all men. From a party of the working class the Social Democratic Party has become a party of the people. It is determined to put the forces unleashed by the industrial revolution and the advance of technology in all spheres of life to the service of freedom and justice for all. The social forces which built the capitalist world cannot tackle this task. Their historical record is one of impressive technical and economic advance, but also of destructive wars, mass unemployment, inflation which robbed people of their savings, and economic insecurity. The old forces are unable to oppose the brutal Communist challenge with a better program for a new society, in which individual and political freedom is enhanced, and economic security and social justice guaranteed. This is why they cannot satisfy the claims for assistance and solidarity from the young states which are about to throw off the yoke of colonial exploitation, to shape their destinies in freedom and to insist on participation in the world's wealth. These states are resisting the lure of Communism which is trying to draw them into its sphere of influence.

Communists are radical suppressors of freedom and violators of human rights and of the self-determination of individuals and peoples. The people in the countries under Communist domination are increasingly opposing the Communist regime. Even in those countries changes are taking place. Even there, the longing for freedom is growing which no system can wholly suppress in the long run. But the Communist rulers are fighting for their own survival. They are building up military and economic power for which their peoples have to pay the price and which represents an increasing threat to freedom.

Only the prospect of a society based on the fundamental values of democratic Socialism can offer the world new hope, a society resting on respect for human dignity, on freedom from want and fear, from war and oppres-

sion, which is built in co-operation with all men of good will.

This message is addressed to all men and women in this country as well as in other parts of the world.

In Germany Socialists are united in the Social Democratic Party which welcomes to its ranks all who accept the fundamental values and demands of Democratic Socialism.

F. Communist Parties

26. Election Appeal of the French Communist Party, 1958*

The French Communist Party was formed as a result of the scission of the Socialist Party in 1920 over the question of the acceptance by the party of discipline by the Comintern. It participated in the Popular Front in the 1930's and was associated with the Socialists and Christian Democratic M.R.P. in the "tri-partite" governments immediately after World War II. Since the expulsion of the Communists from the government in 1947, the party has been in systematic and sterile opposition almost continuously.

In terms of electoral support, the Communist Party was the largest in four of the five elections during the Fourth Republic. It had the largest parliamentary delegation in three of the five legislatures. The apparent decimation of the party's voting strength under the Fifth Republic is largely an illusion produced by manipulation of the electoral law and the interposition of de Gaulle's personality. The Communist share of the vote declined from the 25 per cent it ordinarily obtained during the Fourth Republic to 18.9 per cent in 1958, but its representation in the Assembly fell from 150 to 10 deputies. Communist candidates drew more votes on the first ballot than those of any other party including the Gaullists, except the conservative Independents.

Frenchwomen! Frenchmen!

Tomorrow you are being called upon to elect your representatives to the next National Assembly. Although the Assembly's powers are limited by the new Constitution, your vote has great importance for the future of France and her people.

After six months of existence, the present government, which has complete power, has resolved none of the grave problems which are at the center of our concern.

* *L'Humanité* (official organ of the party), November 22, 1958.

The war on the Algerian people, who are fighting for their independence, still continues, more murderous and ruinous than war. It swallows up two billion francs each day.

The phony elections organized in Algeria will have as their only result the sending to the National Assembly of 71 enemies of peace, freedom, and the Republic.

Prices have not stopped rising although wages and pensions remain frozen. Economic crises and unemployment have appeared; the living conditions of the workers have worsened. Working peasants are forced to sell their products at reduced prices to the benefit of the large-scale middlemen who always impose higher prices on the city dwellers.

The artisans and the merchants suffer the consequences of the reduction of the buying power of the working people.

The new budget increases appropriations for war at the expense, more than ever, of housing construction, schools, laboratories, veterans benefits, the civil service, the aspirations of youth, and the needs of the older workers.

The secular school is dangerously menaced; republican liberties flouted. Our country remains chained to the aggressive Atlantic bloc and on January 1 must enter the Common Market, which will ensure the predominance in Europe of a vengeful West Germany.

The Communist Party believes that the way to get rid of the evils that accompany the capitalist regime is to install a socialist society. However, it intends for the present to fight together with all the democratic and republican forces which are united in working for the profound changes to which you aspire, for a true national renovation.

Frenchwomen! Frenchmen!

You will vote Communist because you cannot give your confidence to the men and the parties that have repudiated their promises and their programs. Before the voters they pretend to dispute among themselves, although for years and still today they agree perfectly to work together in the government against the people.

It was to impose this bankrupt policy that the Communist ministers were excluded from the government eleven years ago. Of all the parties that present themselves for your votes, only the French Communist Party bears no responsibility for the misfortunes that beset France. It alone has remained faithful to its program. Its action has always conformed to its commitments.

You will vote for the candidates of the French Communist Party in order that there may be in the National Assembly an opposition resolved to defend the interests and express the will of the workers, the little people.

Only the French Communist Party proposes solutions to put an end to the policies that have caused so much harm to France and her people. It works to achieve the union of the laboring and democratic forces which is the means to bring about these solutions.

—For peace in Algeria by negotiation.
—For increases in wages, salaries, and pensions; for unemployment insurance at the expense of the employers, for a return to the 40-hour week with no reduction in wages.
—For a democratic reform of taxes tending to make the great capitalists pay more.
—For the construction of houses, schools, and laboratories.
—For the restoration of republican liberties and of [*the principle of*] secularity [*in the schools.*]
—For national independence and peace.
—For the Republic and the grandeur of France.

ALL TOGETHER, THE 23RD OF NOVEMBER, VOTE COMMUNIST!

THE FRENCH COMMUNIST PARTY

27. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union*

BY JOSEF V. STALIN

In a sense it is anomalous to deal with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in the same way as with Western democratic parties. True, the CPSU performs such standard party functions as providing personnel for the machinery of government and organizing discussion of the government's performance. But the superficial appearance of similarity is deceptive. The prevention of opposition by other parties and the assignment exclusively to it of the task of supervising and controlling the work of the government makes of it absolute master of the latter.

Stalin's lecture on the role and organization of the party was part of a series entitled "The Foundations of Leninism," that was delivered at the Sverdlov University and published in *Pravda* in April and May, 1924. This was very shortly after the death of Lenin and long before Stalin had established the tyrannical control over the party that is described so graphically by Comrade Khrushchev in the following secret speech to the 20th Party Congress on the night of February 24-25, 1956.

Stalin from 1924 until his death in 1953 and then, almost without a break, Khrushchev since then have dominated the party for more than 90 per cent of the time since the Bolsheviks established effective control over Russia.

In the pre-revolutionary period, the period of more or less peaceful development, when the parties of the Second International were the predominant force in the working-class movement and parliamentary forms of struggle were regarded as the principal forms—under these conditions the Party neither had nor could have had the great and decisive importance which it acquired afterwards, under conditions of open revolutionary clashes. Defending the Second International against attacks made upon it, Kautskv says that the parties of the Second International are an instrument of peace and not of war, and that for

* *Works,* Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1953, vol. 6, pp. 175-193.

this very reason they were powerless to take any important steps during the war, during the period of revolutionary action by the proletariat. That is quite true. But what does it mean? It means that the parties of the Second International are unfit for the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat, that they are not militant parties of the proletariat, leading the workers to power, but election machines adapted for parliamentary elections and parliamentary struggle. This, in fact, explains why, in the days when the opportunists of the Second International were in the ascendancy, it was not the party but its parliamentary group that was the chief political organization of the proletariat. It is well known that the party at that time was really an appendage and subsidiary of the parliamentary group. It scarcely needs proof that under such circumstances and with such a party at the helm there could be no question of preparing the proletariat for revolution.

But matters have changed radically with the dawn of the new period. The new period is one of open class collisions, of revolutionary action by the proletariat, of proletarian revolution, a period when forces are being directly mustered for the overthrow of imperialism and the seizure of power by the proletariat. In this period the proletariat is confronted with new tasks, the tasks of reorganising all party work on new, revolutionary lines; of educating the workers in the spirit of revolutionary struggle for power; of preparing and moving up reserves; of establishing an alliance with the proletarians of neighbouring countries; of establishing firm ties with the liberation movement in the colonies and dependent countries, etc., etc. To think that these new tasks can be performed by the old Social-Democratic parties, brought up as they were in the peaceful conditions of parliamentarism, is to doom oneself to hopeless despair, to inevitable defeat. If, with such tasks to shoulder, the proletariat remained under the leadership of the old parties, it would be completely unarmed. It scarcely needs proof that the proletariat could not consent to such a state of affairs.

Hence the necessity for a new party, a militant party, a revolutionary party, one bold enough to lead the proletarians in the struggle for power, sufficiently experienced to find its bearings amidst the complex conditions of a revolutionary situation, and sufficiently flexible to steer clear of all submerged rocks in the path of its goal.

Without such a party, it is useless even to think of overthrowing imperialism, of achieving the dictatorship of the proletariat.

This new party is the party of Leninism.

What are the specific features of this new party?

1. *The Party as the advanced detachment of the working class.* The Party must be, first of all, the *advanced* detachment of the working class. The Party must absorb all the best elements of the working class, their experience, their revolutionary spirit, their selfless devotion to the cause of the proletariat. But in order that it may really be the advanced detachment, the Party must be armed with revolutionary theory, with a knowledge of the laws of revolution. Without this it will be incapable of directing the struggle of the proletariat, of leading the proletariat. The Party cannot be a real party if it limits itself to registering what the masses of the working class feel and think, if it drags at the tail of the spontaneous movement, if it is unable to overcome the inertia and the political indifference of the spontaneous movement, if it is unable to rise above the momentary interests of the proletariat, if it is unable to raise the masses to the level of understanding the class interests of the proletariat. The Party must stand at the head of the working class; it must see farther than the working class; it must

lead the proletariat, and not drag at the tail of the spontaneous movement. The parties of the Second International, which preach *"khvostism,"* are vehicles of bourgeois policy, which condemns the proletariat to the role of a tool in the hands of the bourgeoisie. Only a party which adopts the standpoint of advanced detachment of the proletariat and is able to raise the masses to the level of understanding the class interests of the proletariat—only such a party can divert the working class from the path of trade unionism and convert it into an independent political force.

The Party is the political leader of the working class. . . .

The difficulties of the struggle of the working class, of the complicated conditions of the struggle, of strategy and tactics, of reserves and manoeuvering, of attack and retreat . . . are no less complicated, if not more so, than the conditions of war. Who can see clearly in these conditions, who can give correct guidance to the proletarian millions? No army at war can dispense with an experienced General Staff if it does not want to be doomed to defeat. Is it not clear that the proletariat can still less dispense with such a General Staff if it does not want to allow itself to be devoured by its mortal enemies? But where is this General Staff? Only the revolutionary party of the proletariat can serve as this General Staff. The working class without a revolutionary party is an army without a General Staff.

The Party is the General Staff of the proletariat.

But the Party cannot be only an *advanced* detachment. It must at the same time be a detachment of the *class,* part of the class, closely bound up with it by all the fibres of its being. The distinction between the advanced detachment and the rest of the working class, between Party members and non-Party people, cannot disappear until classes disappear; it will exist as long as the ranks of the proletariat continue to be replenished with former members of other classes, as long as the working class as a whole is not in a position to rise to the level of the advanced detachment. But the Party would cease to be a party if this distinction developed into a gap, if the Party turned in on itself and became divorced from the non-Party masses. The Party cannot lead the class if it is not connected with the non-Party masses, if there is no bond between the Party and the non-Party masses, if these masses do not accept its leadership, if the Party enjoys no moral and political credit among the masses.

Recently two hundred thousand new members from the ranks of the workers were admitted into our Party. The remarkable thing about this is the fact that these people did not merely join the Party themselves, but were rather sent there by all the rest of the non-Party workers, who took an active part in the admission of the new members, and without whose approval no new member was accepted. This fact shows that the broad masses of non-Party workers regard our Party as *their* Party, as a Party *near* and *dear* to them, in whose expansion and consolidation they are vitally interested and to whose leadership they voluntarily entrust their destiny. It scarcely needs proof that without these intangible moral threads which connect the Party with the non-Party masses, the Party could not have become the decisive force of its class.

The Party is an inseparable part of the working class.

> "We," says Lenin, "are the Party of a class, and therefore *almost the whole class* (and in times of war, in the period of civil war, the whole class) should act under the leadership of our Party, should adhere to our Party as closely as possible. But it would be Manilovism and *'khvostism'* to think that at any time under capitalism almost the whole class, or the whole class,

would be able to rise to the level of consciousness and activity of its advanced detachment, of its Social-Democratic Party. No sensible Social-Democrat has ever yet doubted that under capitalism even the trade union organisations (which are more primitive and more comprehensible to the undeveloped strata) are unable to embrace almost the whole, or the whole, working class. To forget the distinction between the advanced detachment and the whole of the masses which gravitate towards it, to forget the constant duty of the advanced detachment to *raise* ever wider strata to this most advanced level, means merely to deceive oneself, to shut one's eyes to the immensity of our tasks, and to narrow down these tasks" (see vol. VI, pp. 205-06).

2. *The Party as the organised detachment of the working class.* The Party is not only the *advanced* detachment of the working class. If it desires really to direct the struggle of the class it must at the same time be the *organised* detachment of its class. The Party's tasks under the conditions of capitalism are immense and extremely varied. The Party must direct the struggle of the proletariat under the exceptionally difficult conditions of internal and external development; it must lead the proletariat in the offensive when the situation calls for an offensive; it must lead the proletariat so as to escape the blow of a powerful enemy when the situation calls for retreat; it must imbue the millions of unorganised non-Party workers with the spirit of discipline and system in the struggle, with the spirit of organisation and endurance. But the Party can fulfil these tasks only if it is itself the embodiment of discipline and organisation, if it is itself the *organised* detachment of the proletariat. Without these conditions there can be no question of the Party really leading the vast masses of the proletariat.

The Party is the organised detachment of the working class.

The conception of the Party as an organised whole is embodied in Lenin's well-known formulation of the first paragraph of our Party Rules, in which the Party is regarded as the *sum total* of its organisations, and the Party member as a member of one of the organisations of the Party. The Mensheviks, who objected to this formulation as early as 1903, proposed to substitute for it a "system" of self-enrolment in the Party, a "system" of conferring the "title" of Party member upon every "professor" and "high-school student," upon every "sympathiser" and "striker" who supported the Party in one way or another, but who did not join and did not want to join any one of the Party organisations. It scarcely needs proof that had this singular "system" become entrenched in our Party it would inevitably have led to our Party becoming inundated with professors and high-school students and to its degeneration into a loose, amorphous, disorganised "formation," lost in a sea of "sympathisers," that would have obliterated the dividing line between the Party and the class and would have upset the Party's task of raising the unorganised masses to the level of the advanced detachment. Needless to say, under such an opportunist "system" our Party would have been unable to fulfil the role of the organising core of the working class in the course of our revolution.

"From the point of view of Comrade Martov," says Lenin, "the border-line of the Party remains quite indefinite, for 'every striker' may 'proclaim himself a Party member.' What is the use of this vagueness? A wide extension of the 'title.' Its harm is that it introduces a *disorganising* idea, the confusing of class and Party" (see vol. VI, p. 211).

But the Party is not merely the *sum total* of Party organisations. The Party

is at the same time a single *system* of these organisations, their formal union into a single whole, with higher and lower leading bodies, with subordination of the minority to the majority, with practical decisions binding on all members of the Party. Without these conditions the Party cannot be a single organised whole capable of exercising systematic and organised leadership in the struggle of the working class.

> *"Formerly,"* says Lenin, "our Party was not a formally organised whole, but only the sum of separate groups, and therefore no other relations except those of ideological influence were possible between these groups. *Now* we have become an organised Party, and this implies the establishment of authority, the transformation of the power of ideas into the power of authority, the subordination of lower Party bodies to higher Party bodies" (see vol. VI, p. 291).

The principle of the minority submitting to the majority, the principle of directing Party work from a centre, not infrequently gives rise to attacks on the part of wavering elements, to accusations of "bureaucracy," "formalism," etc. It scarcely needs proof that systematic work by the Party as one whole, and the directing of the struggle of the working class, would be impossible without putting these principles into effect. Leninism in questions of organisation is the unswerving application of these principles. Lenin terms the fight against these principles "Russian nihilism" and "aristocratic anarchism," which deserves to be ridiculed and swept aside.

Here is what Lenin says about these wavering elements in his book *One Step Forward:*

> "This aristocratic anarchism is particularly characteristic of the Russian nihilist. He thinks of the Party organisation as a monstrous 'factory'; he regards the subordination of the part to the whole and of the minority to the majority as 'serfdom' . . . , division of labour under the direction of a centre evokes from him a tragicomical outcry against people being transformed into 'wheels and cogs' . . . , mention of the organisational rules of the Party calls forth a contemptuous grimace and the disdainful . . . remark that one could very well dispense with rules altogether"
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> "It is clear, I think, that the cries about this celebrated bureaucracy are just a screen for dissatisfaction with the personal composition of the central bodies, a fig leaf. . . . You are a bureaucrat because you were appointed by the congress not by my will, but against it; you are a formalist because you rely on the formal decisions of the congress, and not on my consent; you are acting in a grossly mechanical way because you plead the 'mechanical' majority at the Party Congress and pay no heed to my wish to be co-opted; you are an autocrat because you refuse to hand over the power to the old gang" * (see vol. VI, pp. 310, 287).

3. *The Party as the highest form of class organisation of the proletariat.* The Party is the organised detachment of the working class. But the Party is not the only organisation of the working class. The proletariat has also a number of other organisations, without which it cannot wage a successful struggle against capital: trade unions, co-operatives, factory organisations, parliamentary groups, non-Party women's associations, the press, cultural and educational organisations, youth leagues, revolutionary fighting organisations (in times of open revolutionary action), Soviets of deputies as the form of state organisation (if the

* The "gang" here referred to is that of Axelrod, Martov, Potresov and others, who would not submit to the decisions of the Second Congress and who accused Lenin of being a "bureaucrat."—J. Stalin.

proletariat is in power), etc. The overwhelming majority of these organisations are non-Party, and only some of them adhere directly to the Party, or constitute offshoots from it. All these organisations, under certain conditions, are absolutely necessary for the working class, for without them it would be impossible to consolidate the class positions of the proletariat in the diverse spheres of struggle; for without them it would be impossible to steel the proletariat as the force whose mission it is to replace the bourgeois order by the socialist order. But how can single leadership be exercised with such an abundance of organisations? What guarantee is there that this multiplicity of organisations will not lead to divergency in leadership? It may be said that each of these organisations carries on its work in its own special field, and that therefore those organisations cannot hinder one another. That, of course, is true. But it is also true that all these organisations should work in one direction for they serve *one* class, the class of the proletarians. The question then arises: who is to determine the line, the general direction, along which the work of all these organisations is to be conducted? Where is the central organisation which is not only able, because it has the necessary experience, to work out such a general line, but, in addition, is in a position, because it has sufficient prestige, to induce all these organisations to carry out this line, so as to attain unity of leadership and to make hitches impossible?

That organisation is the Party of the proletariat.

The Party possesses all the necessary qualifications for this because, in the first place, it is the rallying centre of the finest elements in the working class, who have direct connections with the non-Party organisations of the proletariat and very frequently lead them; because, secondly, the Party, as the rallying centre of the finest members of the working class, is the best school for training leaders of the working class, capable of directing every form of organisation of their class; because, thirdly, the Party, as the best school for training leaders of the working class, is, by reason of its experience and prestige, the only organisation capable of centralising the leadership of the struggle of the proletariat, thus transforming each and every non-Party organisation of the working class into an auxiliary body and transmission belt linking the Party with the class.

The Party is the highest form of class organisation of the proletariat.

This does not mean, of course, that non-Party organisations, trade unions, co-operatives, etc., should be officially subordinated to the Party leadership. It only means that the members of the Party who belong to these organisations and are doubtlessly influential in them should do all they can to persuade these non-Party organisations to draw nearer to the Party of the proletariat in their work and voluntarily accept its political leadership.

That is why Lenin says that the Party is "the *highest* form of proletarian class association," whose political leadership must extend to every other form of organisation of the proletariat (see Vol. XXV, p. 194).

That is why the opportunist theory of the "independence" and "neutrality" of the non-Party organisations, which breeds *independent* members of parliament and journalists *isolated* from the Party, *narrow-minded* trade union leaders and *philistine* co-operative officials, is wholly incompatible with the theory and practice of Leninism.

4. *The Party as an instrument of the dictatorship of the proletariat.* The Party is the highest form of organisation of the proletariat. The Party is the principal guiding force within the class of the proletarians and among the organisations of that class. But it does not by any means follow from this that the Party can be regarded as an end in itself, as a self-sufficient

force. The Party is not only the highest form of class association of the proletarians: it is at the same time an *instrument* in the hands of the proletariat *for* achieving the dictatorship when that has not yet been achieved and *for* consolidating and expanding the dictatorship when it has already been achieved. The Party could not have risen so high in importance and could not have exerted its influence over all other forms of organisation of the proletariat, if the latter had not been confronted with the question of power, if the conditions of imperialism, the inevitabilty of wars, and the existence of a crisis had not demanded the concentration of all the forces of the proletariat at one point, the gathering of all the threads of the revolutionary movement in one spot in order to overthrow the bourgeoisie and to achieve the dictatorship of the proletariat. The proletariat needs the Party first of all as its General Staff, which it must have for the successful seizure of power. It scarcely needs proof that without a party capable of rallying around itself the mass organisations of the proletariat, and of centralising the leadership of the entire movement during the progress of the struggle, the proletariat in Russia could not have established its revolutionary dictatorship.

But the proletariat needs the Party not only to achieve the dictatorship; it needs it still more to maintain the dictatorship, to consolidate and expand it in order to achieve the complete victory of socialism.

> "Certainly, almost everyone now realises," says Lenin, "that the Bolsheviks could not have maintained themselves in power for two-and-a-half months, let alone two-and-a-half years, without the strictest, truly iron discipline in our Party, and without the fullest and unreserved support of the latter by the whole mass of the working class, that is, by all its thinking, honest, self-sacrificing and influential elements, capable of leading or of carrying with them the backward strata" (see vol. XXV, p. 173).

Now, what does to "maintain" and "expand" the dictatorship mean? It means imbuing the millions of proletarians with the spirit of discipline and organisation; it means creating among the proletarian masses a cementing force and a bulwark against the corrosive influences of the petty-bourgeois elemental forces and petty-bourgeois habits; it means enhancing the organising work of the proletarians in re-educating and remoulding the petty-bourgeois strata; it means helping the masses of the proletarians to educate themselves as a force capable of abolishing classes and of preparing the conditions for the organisation of socialist production. But it is impossible to accomplish all this without a party which is strong by reason of its solidarity and discipline.

> "The dictatorship of the proletariat," says Lenin, "is a stubborn struggle—bloody and bloodless, violent and peaceful, military and economic, educational and administrative—against the forces and traditions of the old society. The force of habit of millions and tens of millions is a most terrible force. Without an iron party tempered in the struggle, without a party enjoying the confidence of all that is honest in the given class, without a party capable of watching and influencing the mood of the masses, it is impossible to conduct such a struggle successfully" (see vol. XXV, p. 190).

The proletariat needs the Party *for* the purpose of achieving and maintaining the dictatorship. The Party is an instrument of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

But from this it follows that when classes disappear and the dictatorship of the proletariat withers away, the Party also will wither away.

5. *The Party as the embodiment of unity of will, unity incompatible with the existence of factions.* The achievement and maintenance of the dictatorship of the proletariat is impossible without a party which is strong by reason of its solidarity and iron discipline. But iron discipline in the Party is inconceivable without unity of will, without complete and absolute unity of action on the part of all members of the Party. This does not mean, of course, that the possibility of conflicts of opinion within the Party is thereby precluded. On the contrary, iron discipline does not preclude but presupposes criticism and conflict of opinion within the Party. Least of all does it mean that discipline must be "blind." On the contrary, iron discipline does not preclude but presupposes conscious and voluntary submission, for only conscious discipline can be truly iron discipline. But after a conflict of opinion has been closed, after criticism has been exhausted and a decision has been arrived at, unity of will and unity of action of all Party members are the necessary conditions without which neither Party unity nor iron discipline in the Party is conceivable.

> "In the present epoch of acute civil war," says Lenin, "the Communist Party will be able to perform its duty only if it is organised in the most centralised manner, if iron discipline bordering on military discipline prevails in it, and if its Party centre is a powerful and authoritative organ, wielding wide powers and enjoying the universal confidence of the members of the Party" (see vol. XXV, pp. 282-83).

This is the position in regard to discipline in the Party in the period of struggle preceding the achievement of the dictatorship.

The same, but to an even greater degree, must be said about discipline in the Party after the dictatorship has been achieved.

> "Whoever," says Lenin, "weakens in the least the iron discipline of the Party of the proletariat (especially during the time of its dictatorship) actually aids the bourgeoisie against the proletariat" (see vol. XXV, p. 190).

But from this it follows that the existence of factions is compatible neither with the Party's unity nor with its iron disciplne. It scarcely needs proof that the existence of factions leads to the existence of a number of centres, and the existence of a number of centres means the absence of one common centre in the Party, the breaking up of unity of will, the weakening and disintegration of discipline, the weakening and disintegration of the dictatorship. Of course, the parties of the Second International, which are fighting against the dictatorship of the proletariat and have no desire to lead the proletarians to power, can afford such liberalism as freedom of factions, for they have no need at all for iron discipline. But the parties of the Communist International, whose activities are conditioned by the task of achieving and consolidating the dictatorship of the proletariat, cannot afford to be "liberal" or to permit freedom of factions.

The Party represents unity of will, which precludes all factionalism and division of authority in the Party.

Hence Lenin's warning about the "danger of factionalism from the point of view of Party unity and of effecting the unity of will of the vanguard of the proletariat as the fundamental condition for the success of the dictatorship of the proletariat," which is embodied in the special resolution of the Tenth Congress of our Party "On Party Unity."

Hence Lenin's demand for the "complete elimination of all factionalism" and the "immediate dissolution of all groups, without exception, that have been formed on the basis of various platforms," on pain of "unconditional

and immediate expulsion from the Party" (see the resolution "On Party Unity").

6. *The Party becomes strong by purging itself of opportunist elements.* The source of factionalism in the Party is its opportunist elements. The proletariat is not an isolated class. It is constantly replenished by the influx of peasants, petty bourgeois and intellectuals proletarianised by the development of capitalism. At the same time the upper stratum of the proletariat, principally trade union leaders and members of parliament who are fed by the bourgeoisie out of the superprofits extracted from the colonies, is undergoing a process of decay. "This stratum is bourgeoisified workers of the 'labour aristocracy,'" says Lenin, "who are quite philistine in their mode of life, in the size of their earnings and in their entire outlook, is the principal prop of the Second International, and, in our days, the principal *social* (not military) *prop of the bourgeoisie*. For they are real *agents of the bourgeoisie in the working-class* movement, the labour lieutenants of the capitalist class . . . , real channels of reformism and chauvinism" (see vol. XIX, p. 77).

In one way or another, all these petty-bourgeois groups penetrate into the Party and introduce into it the spirit of hesitancy and opportunism, the spirit of demoralisation and uncertainty. It is they, principally, that constitute the source of factionalism and disintegration, the source of disorganisation and disruption of the Party from within. To fight imperialism with such "allies" in one's rear means to put oneself in the position of being caught between two fires, from the front and from the rear. Therefore, ruthless struggle against such elements, their expulsion from the Party, is a pre-requisite for the successful struggle against imperialism.

The theory of "defeating" opportunist elements by ideological struggle within the Party, the theory of "overcoming" these elements within the confines of a single party, is a rotten and dangerous theory, which threatens to condemn the Party to paralysis and chronic infirmity, threatens to make the Party a prey to opportunism, threatens to leave the proletariat without a revolutionary party, threatens to deprive the proletariat of its main weapon in the fight against imperialism. Our Party could not have emerged on to the broad highway, it could not have seized power and organised the dictatorship of the proletariat, it could not have emerged victorious from the civil war, if it had had within its ranks people like Martov and Dan, Potresov and Axelrod. Our Party succeeded in achieving internal unity and unexampled cohesion of its ranks primarily because it was able in good time to purge itself of the opportunist pollution, because it was able to rid its ranks of the Liquidators and Mensheviks. Proletarian parties develop and become strong by purging themselves of opportunists and reformists, social-imperialists and social-chauvinists, social-patriots and social-pacifists.

The Party becomes strong by purging itself of opportunist elements.

> "With reformists, Mensheviks, in our ranks," says Lenin, "it is *impossible* to be victorious in the proletarian revolution, it is *impossible* to defend it. That is obvious in principle, and it has been strikingly confirmed by the experience of both Russia and Hungary. . . . In Russia, difficult situations have arisen *many times,* when the Soviet regime would *most certainly* have been overthrown had Mensheviks, reformists and petty-bourgeois democrats remained in our Party . . . in Italy, where, as is generally admitted, decisive battles between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie for the possession of state power are imminent. At such a moment it is not only absolutely necessary to remove the Mensheviks,

reformists, the Turatists from the Party, but it may even be useful to remove excellent Communists who are liable to waver, and who reveal a tendency to waver towards 'unity' with the reformists, to remove them from all responsible posts. . . . On the eve of a revolution, and at a moment when a most fierce struggle is being waged for its victory, the slightest wavering in the ranks of the Party may *wreck everything,* frustrate the revolution, wrest the power from the hands of the proletariat; for this power is not yet consolidated, the attack upon it is still very strong. The desertion of wavering leaders at such a time does not weaken but strengthens the Party, the working-class movement and the revolution" (see vol. XXV, pp. 462, 463, 464).

28. A Critique of Stalin's Party Leadership*

BY NIKITA S. KHRUSHCHEV

Comrades! In the report of the Central Committee of the party at the 20th Congress, in a number of speeches by delegates to the Congress, as also formerly during the plenary CC/-CPSU [*Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union*] sessions, quite a lot has been said about the cult of the individual and about its harmful consequences.

After Stalin's death the Central Committee of the party began to implement a policy of explaining concisely and consistently that it is impermissible and foreign to the spirit of Marxism-Leninism to elevate one person, to transform him into a superman possessing supernatural characteristics, akin to those of a god. Such a man supposedly knows everything, sees everything, thinks for everyone, can do anything, is infallible in his behavior.

Such a belief about a man, and specifically about Stalin, was cultivated among us for many years.

The objective of the present report is not a thorough evaluation of Stalin's life and activity. . . . At present, we are concerned with a question which has immense importance for the party now and for the future—with how the cult of the person of Stalin has been gradually growing, the cult which became at a certain specific stage the source of a whole series of exceedingly serious and grave perversions of party principles, of party democracy, of revolutionary legality.

Because of the fact that not all as yet realize fully the practical consequences resulting from the cult of the individual, the great harm caused by the violation of the principle of collective direction of the party and because of the accumulation of immense and limitless power in the hands of one person, the Central Committee of the party considers it absolutely

* Reproduced from *The New Leader's* pamphlet edition, *The Crimes of the Stalin Era.*

necessary to make the material pertaining to this matter available to the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

Allow me first of all to remind you how severely the classics of Marxism-Leninism denounced every manifestation of the cult of the individual. . . . Marx stated: "From my antipathy to any cult of the individual, I never made public during the existence of the International the numerous addresses from various countries which recognized my merits and which annoyed me. I did not even reply to them, except sometimes to rebuke their authors. Engels and I first joined the secret society of Communists on the condition that everything making for superstitious worship of authority would be deleted from its statute. . . .

Sometime later Engels wrote: "Both Marx and I have always been against any public manifestation with regard to individuals, with the exception of cases when it had an important purpose; and we most strongly opposed such manifestations which during our lifetime concerned us personally."

The great modesty of the genius of the Revolution, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, is known. Lenin has always stressed the role of the people as the creator of history, the directing and organizational role of the party as a living and creative organism, and also the role of the Central Committee.

Marxism does not negate the role of the leaders of the working class in directing the revolutionary liberation movement.

While ascribing great importance to the role of the leaders and organizers of the masses, Lenin at the same time mercilessly stigmatized every manifestation of the cult of the individual, inexorably combated the foreign-to-Marxism views about a "hero" and a "crowd," and countered all efforts to oppose a "hero" to the masses and to the people.

Lenin taught that the party's strength depends on its indissoluble unity with the masses, on the fact that behind the party follows the people—workers, peasants and intelligentsia. "Only he will win and retain the power," said Lenin, "who believes in the people, who submerges himself in the fountain of the living creativeness of the people."

Lenin spoke with pride about the Bolshevik Communist party as the leader and teacher of the people; he called for the presentation of all the most important questions before the opinion of knowledgeable workers, before the opinion of their party; he said: "We believe in it, we see in it the wisdom, the honor, and the conscience of our epoch."

Lenin resolutely stood against every attempt aimed at belittling or weakening the directing role of the party in the structure of the Soviet state. He worked out Bolshevik principles of party direction and norms of party life, stressing that the guiding principle of party leadership is its collegiality. Already during the pre-Revolutionary years, Lenin called the Central Committee of the party a collective of leaders and the guardian and interpreter of party principles. "During the period between congresses," pointed out Lenin, "the Central Committee guards and interprets the principles of the party."

Underlining the role of the Central Committee of the party and its authority, Vladimir Ilyich pointed out: "Our Central Committee constituted itself as a closely centralized and highly authoritative group."

During Lenin's life the Central Committee of the party was a real expression of collective leadership of the party and of the nation. Being a militant Marxist-revolutionist, always unyielding in matters of principle, Lenin never imposed by force his views upon his co-workers. He tried to convince; he patiently explained his opinions to others. Lenin always dili-

gently observed that the norms of party life were realized, that the party statute was enforced, that the party congresses and the plenary sessions of the Central Committee took place at the proper intervals. . . .

The delegates to the Party Congress should familiarize themselves with an unpublished note by V. I. Lenin directed to the Central Committee's Political Bureau in October 1920. Outlining the duties of the Control Commission, Lenin wrote that the commission should be transformed into a real "organ of party and proletarian conscience."

"As a special duty of the Control Commission there is recommended a deep, individualized relationship with, and sometimes even a type of therapy for, the representatives of the so-called opposition—those who have experienced a psychological crisis because of failure in their Soviet or party career. An effort should be made to quiet them, to explain the matter to them in a way used among comrades, to find for them (avoiding the method of issuing orders) a task for which they are psychologically fitted. Advice and rules relating to this matter are to be formulated by the Central Committee's Organizational Bureau, etc."

Everyone knows how irreconcilable Lenin was with the ideological enemies of Marxism, with those who deviated from the correct party line. At the same time, however, Lenin, as is evident from the given document, in his practice of directing the party demanded the most intimate party contact with people who had shown indecision or temporary non-conformity with the party line, but whom it was possible to return to the party path. Lenin advised that such people should be patiently educated without the application of extreme methods.

Lenin's wisdom in dealing with people was evident in his work with cadres.

An entirely different relationship with people characterized Stalin. Lenin's traits—patient work with people, stubborn and painstaking education of them, the ability to induce people to follow him without using compulsion, but rather through the ideological influence on them of the whole collective —were entirely foreign to Stalin. He discarded the Leninist method of convincing and educating, he abandoned the method of ideological struggle for that of administrative violence, mass repressions and terror. He acted on an increasingly larger scale and more stubbornly through punitive organs, at the same time often violating all existing norms of morality and of Soviet laws.

Arbitrary behavior by one person encouraged and permitted arbitrariness in others. Mass arrests and deportations of many thousands of people, execution without trial and without normal investigation created conditions of insecurity, fear and even desperation.

This, of course, did not contribute toward unity of the party ranks and of all strata of working people, but, on the contrary, brought about annihilation and the expulsion from the party of workers who were loyal but inconvenient to Stalin.

Our party fought for the implementation of Lenin's plans for the construction of socialism. This was an ideological fight. Had Leninist principles been observed during the course of this fight, had the party's devotion to principles been skillfully combined with a keen and solicitous concern for people, had they not been repelled and wasted but rather drawn to our side, we certainly would not have had such a brutal violation of revolutionary legality and many thousands of people would not have fallen victim to the method of terror . . .

Lately, especially after the unmasking of the Beria gang, the Central Committee looked into a series of matters fabricated by this gang. This re-

vealed a very ugly picture of brutal willfulness connected with the incorrect behavior of Stalin. As facts prove, Stalin, using his unlimited power, allowed himself many abuses, acting in the name of the Central Committee, not asking for the opinion of the Committee members nor even of the members of the Central Committee's Political Bureau; often he did not inform them about his personal decisions concerning very important party and government matters.

Considering the question of the cult of an individual, we must first of all show everyone what harm this caused to the interests of our party.

Vladimir Ilyich Lenin had always stressed the party's role and significance in the direction of the socialist government of workers and peasants; he saw in this the chief precondition for a successful building of socialism in our country. Pointing to the great responsibility of the Bolshevik party, as ruling party of the Soviet state, Lenin called for the most meticulous observance of all norms of party life; he called for the realization of the principles of collegiality in the direction of the party and the state.

Collegiality of leadership flows from the very nature of our party, a party built on the principles of democratic centralism. "This means," said Lenin, "that all party matters are accomplished by all party members—directly or through representatives—who, without any exceptions, are subject to the same rules; in addition, all administrative members, all directing collegia, all holders of party positions are elective, they must account for their activities and are recallable."

It is known that Lenin himself offered an example of the most careful observance of these principles. There was no matter so important that Lenin himself decided it without asking for advice and approval of the majority of the Central Committee members or of the members of the Central Committee's Political Bureau. In the most difficult period for our party and our country, Lenin considered it necessary regularly to convoke congresses, party conferences and plenary sessions of the Central Committee at which all the most important questions were discussed and where resolutions carefully worked out by the collective of leaders, were approved.

We can recall, for an example, the year 1918 when the country was threatened by the attack of the imperialistic interventionists. In this situation the 7th Party Congress was convened in order to discuss a vitally important matter which could not be postponed—the matter of peace. In 1919, while the civil war was raging, the 8th Party Congress convened which adopted a new party program, decided such important matters as the relationship with the peasant masses, the organization of the Red Army, the leading role of the party in the work of the soviets, the correction of the social composition of the party, and other matters. In 1920 the 9th Party Congress was convened which laid down guiding principles pertaining to the party's work in the sphere of economic construction. In 1921 the 10th Party Congress accepted Lenin's New Economic Policy and the historical resolution called "On Party Unity."

During Lenin's life, party congresses were convened regularly; always, when a radical turn in the development of the party and the country took place, Lenin considered it absolutely necessary that the party discuss at length all the basic matters pertaining to internal and foreign policy and to questions bearing on the development of party and government.

It is very characteristic that Lenin addressed to the Party Congress as the highest party organ his last articles, letters and remarks. During the period between congresses, the Central Committee of the party, acting as the most

authoritative leading collective, meticulously observed the principles of the party and carried out its policy.

So it was during Lenin's life. Were our party's holy Leninist principles observed after the death of Vladimir Ilyich?

Whereas, during the first few years after Lenin's death, party congresses and Central Committee plenums took place more or less regularly, later, when Stalin began increasingly to abuse his power, these principles were brutally violated. This was especially evident during the last 15 years of his life. Was it a normal situation when over 13 years elapsed between the 18th and 19th Party Congresses, years during which our party and our country had experienced so many important events? These events demanded categorically that the party should have passed resolutions pertaining to the country's defense during the Patriotic War [World War II] and to peacetime construction after the war. Even after the end of the war a Congress was not convened for over seven years. Central Committee plenums were hardly ever called. It should be sufficient to mention that during all the years of the Patriotic War not a single Central Committee plenum took place. It is true that there was an attempt to call a Central Committee plenum in October 1941, when Central Committee members from the whole country were called to Moscow. They waited two days for the opening of the plenum, but in vain. Stalin did not even want to meet and talk to the Central Committee members. This fact shows how demoralized Stalin was in the first months of the war and how haughtily and disdainfully he treated the Central Committee members.

In practice, Stalin ignored the norms of party life and trampled on the Leninist principle of collective party leadership. . . .

What is the reason that mass repressions against activists increased more and more after the 17th Party Congress? It was because at that time Stalin had so elevated himself above the party and above the nation that he ceased to consider either the Central Committee or the party.

While he still reckoned with the opinion of the collective before the 17th Congress, after the complete political liquidation of the Trotskyites, Zinovievites and Bukharinites, when as a result of that fight and socialist victories the party achieved unity, Stalin ceased to an ever greater degree to consider the members of the party's Central Committee and even the members of the Political Bureau. Stalin thought that now he could decide all things alone and all he needed were statisticians; he treated all others in such a way that they could only listen to and praise him. . . .

Stalin's report at the February-March Central Committee plenum in 1937, "Deficiencies of party work and methods for the liquidation of the Trotskyites and of other two-facers," contained an attempt at theoretical justification of the mass terror policy under the pretext that as we march forward socialism class war must allegedly sharpen. Stalin asserted that both history and Lenin taught him this.

Actually Lenin taught that the application of revolutionary violence is necessitated by the resistance of the exploiting classes, and this referred to the era when the exploiting classes existed and were powerful. As soon as the nation's political situation had improved . . . Lenin instructed [Cheka chief Felix] Dzerzhinsky to stop mass terror and to abolish the death penalty. . . .

Stalin deviated from these clear and plain precepts of Lenin. Stalin put the party and the NKVD up to the use of mass terror when the exploiting classes had been liquidated in our country and when there were no serious reasons for the use of extraordinary mass terror.

This terror was actually directed not at the remnants of the defeated ex-

ploiting classes but against the honest workers of the party and of the Soviet state; against them were made lying, slanderous and absurd accusations concerning "two-facedness," "espionage," "sabotage," preparation of fictitious "plots," etc. . . .

It is known that brutal willfulness was practiced against leading party workers. The party statute, approved at the 17th Party Congress, was based on Leninist principles expressed at the 10th Party Congress. It stated that, in order to apply an extreme method such as exclusion from the party against a Central Committee member, against a Central Committee candidate and against a member of the Party Control Commission, "it is necessary to call a Central Committee plenum and to invite to the plenum all Central Committee candidate members and all members of the Party Control Commission"; only if two-thirds of the members of such a general assembly of responsible party leaders find it necessary, only then can a Central Committee member or candidate be expelled.

The majority of the Central Committee members and candidates elected at the 17th Congress and arrested in 1937-1938 were expelled from the party illegally through the brutal abuse of the party statute, because the question of their expulsion was never studied at the Central Committee plenum.

Now, when the cases of some of these so-called "spies" and "saboteurs" were examined, it was found that all their cases were fabricated. Confessions of guilt of many arrested and charged with enemy activity were gained with the help of cruel and inhuman tortures. . . .

Mass arrests of party, Soviet, economic and military workers caused tremendous harm to our country and to the cause of socialist advancement.

Mass repressions had a negative influence on the moral-political condition of the party, created a situation of uncertainty, contributed to the spreading of unhealthy suspicion, and sowed distrust among Communists. All sorts of slanderers and careerists were active.

Resolutions of the January plenum of the Central Committee, All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), in 1938 had brought some measure of improvement to the party organizations. However, widespread repression also existed in 1938.

Only because our party has at its disposal such great moral-political strength was it possible for it to survive the difficult events in 1937-1938 and to educate new cadres. There is, however, no doubt that our march forward toward socialism and toward the preparation of the country's defense would have been much more successful were it not for the tremendous loss in the cadres suffered as a result of the baseless and false mass repressions in 1937-1938. . . .

The main role and the main credit for the victorious ending of the Second World War belongs to our Communist party, to the armed forces of the Soviet Union, and to the tens of millions of Soviet people raised by the party. [*Thunderous and prolonged applause.*] . . .

After the conclusion of the Patriotic War, the Soviet nation stressed with pride the magnificent victories gained through great sacrifices and tremendous efforts The country experienced a period of political enthusiasm. The party came out of the war even more united; in the fire of the war, party cadres were tempered and hardened. Under such conditions nobody could have even thought of the possibility of some plot in the party.

And it was precisely at this time that the so-called "Leningrad affair" was born. As we have now proven, this case was fabricated. Those who innocently lost their lives included Comrades Voznesensky, Kuznetsov, Rodionov, Popkov, and others.

As is known, Voznesensky and Kuznetsov were talented and eminent leaders. Once they stood very close to Stalin. It is sufficient to mention that

Stalin made Voznesensky first deputy to the chairman of the Council of Ministers and Kuznetsov was elected Secretary of the Central Committee. The very fact that Stalin entrusted Kuznetsov with the supervision of the state-security organs shows the trust which he enjoyed.

How did it happen that these persons were branded as enemies of the people and liquidated?

Facts prove that the "Leningrad affair" is also the result of willfulness which Stalin exercised against party cadres. Had a normal situation existed in the party's Central Committee and in the Central Committee Political Bureau, affairs of this nature would have been examined there in accordance with party practice, and all pertinent facts assessed; as a result, such an affair as well as others would not have happened. . . .

Comrades! The cult of the individual has caused the employment of faulty principles in party work and in economic activity; it brought about rude violation of internal party and Soviet democracy, sterile administration, deviations of all sorts, covering up the shortcomings and varnishing of reality. Our nation gave birth to many flatterers and specialists in false optimism and deceit.

We should also not forget that, due to the numerous arrests of party, Soviet and economic leaders, many workers began to work uncertainly, showed overcautiousness, feared all which was new, feared their own shadows and began to show less initiative in their work.

Take, for instance, party and Soviet resolutions. They were prepared in a routine manner, often without considering the concrete situation. This went so far that party workers, even during the smallest sessions, read their speeches. All this produced the danger of formalizing the party and Soviet work and of bureaucratizing the whole apparatus. . . .

Comrades! If we sharply criticize today the cult of the individual which was so widespread during Stalin's life and if we speak about the many negative phenomena generated by this cult which is so alien to the spirit of Marxism-Leninism, various persons may ask: How could it be? Stalin headed the party and the country for 30 years and many victories were gained during his lifetime. Can we deny this? In my opinion, the question can be asked in this manner only by those who are blinded and hopelessly hypnotized by the cult of the individual, only by those who do not understand the essence of the revolution and of the Soviet state, only by those who do not understand, in a Leninist manner, the role of the party and of the nation in the development of the Soviet society.

The Socialist Revolution was attained by the working class and by the poor peasantry with the partial support of middle-class peasants. It was attained by the people under the leadership of the Bolshevik Party. Lenin's great service consisted of the fact that he created a militant party of the working class, but he was armed with Marxist understanding of the laws of social development and with the science of proletarian victory in the fight with capitalism, and he steeled this party in the crucible of revolutionary struggle of the masses of the people.

During this fight the party consistently defended the interests of the people, became its experienced leader, and led the working masses to power, to the creation of the first socialist state. You remember well the wise words of Lenin that the Soviet state is strong because of the awareness of the masses that history is created by the millions and tens of millions of people.

Our historical victories were attained thanks to the organizational work of the party, to the many provincial organizations and to the self-

sacrificing work of our great nation. These victories are the result of the great drive and activity of the nation and of the party as a whole; they are not at all the fruit of the leadership of Stalin, as the situation was pictured during the period of the cult of the individual. . . .

As we have already shown, many decisions were taken either by one person or in a roundabout way, without collective discussion. The sad fate of Political Bureau member Comrade Voznesensky, who fell victim to Stalin's repressions, is known to all. It is a characteristic thing that the decision to remove him from the Political Bureau was never discussed but was reached in a devious fashion. In the same way came the decision concerning the removal of Kuznetsov and Rodionov from their posts.

The importance of the Central Committee's Political Bureau was reduced and its work was disorganized by the creation within the Political Bureau of various commissions—the so-called "quintets," "sextets," "septets" and "novenaries." Here is, for instance, a resolution of the Political Bureau of October 3, 1946:

"Stalin's Proposal:

"1. The Political Bureau Commission for Foreign Affairs ('Sextet') is to concern itself in the future, in addition to foreign affairs, also with matters of internal construction and domestic policy.

"2. The Sextet is to add to its roster the Chairman of the State Commission of Economic Planning of the USSR, Comrade Voznesensky, and is to be known as a Septet.

"Signed: Secretary of the Central Committee, J. Stalin."

What a terminology of a card player! [*Laughter in the hall.*] It is clear that the creation within the Political Bureau of this type of commissions—"quintets," "sextets," "septets" and "novenaries"—was against the principle of collective leadership. The result of this was that some members of the Political Bureau were in this way kept away from participation in reaching the most important state matters.

One of the oldest members of our party, Klimenti Yefremovich Voroshilov, found himself in an almost impossible situation. For several years he was actually deprived of the right of participation in Political Bureau sessions. Stalin forbade him to attend the Political Bureau sessions and to receive documents. When the Political Bureau was in session and Comrade Voroshilov heard about it, he telephoned each time and asked whether he would be allowed to attend. Sometimes Stalin permitted it, but always showed his dissatisfaction. . . .

Comrades! In order not to repeat errors of the past, the Central Committee has declared itself resolutely against the cult of the individual. We consider that Stalin was excessively extolled. However, in the past Stalin doubtless performed great services to the party, to the working class and to the international workers' movement.

This question is complicated by the fact that all this which we have just discussed was done during Stalin's life under his leadership and with his concurrence; here Stalin was convinced that this was necessary for the defense of the interests of the working classes against the plotting of enemies and against the attack of the imperialist camp.

He saw this from the position of the interest of the working class, of the interest of the laboring people, of the interest of the victory of socialism and communism. We cannot say that these were the deeds of a giddy despot. He considered that this should be done in the interest of the party, of the working masses, in the name of the defense of the revolution's gains. In this lies the whole tragedy!

Comrades! We must abolish the cult of the individual decisively, once and for all; we must draw the proper con-

clusions concerning both ideological-theoretical and practical work. It is necessary for this purpose:

First, in a Bolshevik manner to condemn and to eradicate the cult of the individual as alien to Marxism-Leninism and not consonant with the principles of party leadership and the norms of party life, and to fight inexorably all attempts at bringing back this practice in one form or another.

To return to and actually practice in all our ideological work the most important theses of Marxist-Leninist science about the people as the creator of history and as the creator of all material and spiritual good of humanity, about the decisive role of the Marxist party in the revolutionary fight for the transformation of society, about the victory of communism.

In this connection we will be forced to do much work in order to examine critically from the Marxist-Leninist viewpoint and to correct the widely spread erroneous views connected with the cult of the individual in the sphere of history, philosophy, economy and of other sciences, as well as in literature and the fine arts. It is especially necessary that in the immediate future we compile a serious textbook of the history of our party which will be edited in accordance with scientific Marxist objectivism, a textbook of the history of Soviet society, a book pertaining to the events of the Civil War and the Great Patriotic War.

Secondly, to continue systematically and consistently the work done by the party's Central Committee during the last years, a work characterized by minute observation in all party organizations, from the bottom to the top, of the Leninist principles of party leadership, characterized, above all, by the main principle of collective leadership, characterized by the observance of the norms of party life described in the statutes of our party, and, finally, characterized by the wide practice of criticism and self-criticism.

Thirdly, to restore completely the Leninist principles of Soviet socialist democracy, expressed in the Constitution of the Soviet Union, to fight willfulness of individuals abusing their power. The evil caused by acts violating revolutionary socialist legality which have accumulated during a long time as a result of the negative influence of the cult of the individual has to be completely corrected.

Comrades! The 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union has manifested with a new strength the unshakable unity of our party, its cohesiveness around the Central Committee, its resolute will to accomplish the great task of building communism. [*Tumultuous applause.*]

We are absolutely certain that our party, armed with the historical resolutions of the 20th Congress, will lead the Soviet people along the Leninist path to new successes, to new victories. [*Tumultuous, prolonged applause.*]

Long live the victorious banner of our party—Leninism!

[*Tumultuous, prolonged applause ending in ovation. All rise.*]

29. The C.P.S.U. and Ukrainian Agriculture: A "Debate" Between Comrades Khrushchev and Podgorny*

THE following excerpts from the transcript of the plenary session on agriculture of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, January, 1961, illustrate the nature and extent of the control of all aspects of Soviet life by the party. It also suggests something of the manner and subject matter of publicly reported meetings of high party organs. Finally, it shows the type of authority wielded by the party's First Secretary, Nikita S. Khrushchev, and illuminates his personality.

Comrade N. V. Podgorny, First Secretary of the Ukraine Communist Party Central Committee: . . . The prestige of the glorious Communist Party of the Soviet Union is higher than ever before. The people of the Ukraine, together with all the peoples of our homeland, gratefully take note of the inspiring and organizing role and the wise leadership of the Leninist Central Committee headed by Comrade N. S. Khrushchev. [*Stormy applause.*]

All progressive mankind speaks with deep appreciation of the untiring fight of our party and government, and of Comrade N. S. Khrushchev personally, for the triumph of the immortal ideas of Marxism-Leninism and for peace and friendship among peoples. . . .

The reports at the plenary session, and the conferences in the Party Central Committee and the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers that preceded it, testify to the Party Central Committee's very high demands upon and at the same time enormous assistance to the cadres that have been charged with organizing the accomplishment of these paramount tasks.

A large part in the preparations for the Central Committee plenary session was played by Comrade N. S. Khrushchev's memorandum to the Presidium of the Party Central Committee. The fundamental, vitally important problems in the further development of agriculture that it raised, the sharp criticism of shortcomings in the management of agriculture and the thoroughly developed specific proposals are of exceptional significance for the

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whole Party. This document has been widely discussed in the Party organizations and has met with the unanimous approval of the Communists of the Ukraine. In the theses of the address at the present plenary session, as in the letter, the inexhaustible potentialities of socialist agricultural production are disclosed with thorough knowledge of the subject and great force of argument. The exploitation of these potentialities depends entirely on the organizational work of Party organizations. . . .

1. Results of Fulfillment of State Plans and Pledges in 1960.—Comrades! As a result of the tremendous political and labor enthusiasm that has seized the working people of the Ukraine, as of all the fraternal republics, substantial successes have been scored during the first two years of the seven-year plan. The gross output of industry has risen more than 20% in this time, instead of the 17% called for by the seven-year plan control figures. . . .

Production capacity has grown substantially in the republic. . . .

Socialist competition for preschedule completion of the seven-year plan has developed widely in the Ukraine in agriculture too. The Ukraine Communist Party, in carrying out the decisions of the 21st Party Congress and the December plenary session of the Party Central Committee, has attached great importance to increasing the production of grain and creating a stable fodder base for animal husbandry. As a result, the average annual output of grain, meat and milk in the first two years of the seven-year plan exceeded the output of these products in the years of the preceding five-year period. . . .

In view of the late spring last year and the resultant protracted wintering, many collective and state farms were left with an extremely limited amount of fodder, and as a result of the loss of the winter crops the stock ended up with no green fodder. Some managers of farms that for one reason or another have harvested a poor crop, and therefore laid in an inadequate amount of fodder, usually seek a way out of such a situation by holding on only to the brood stock. The remaining animals, for which there is no fodder, are as a rule written off.

This incorrect attitude to the preservation of livestock was unfortunately displayed last year in a number of provinces in our republic too. The Ukraine Communist Party Central Committee and the government of the republic drew attention to this in time and looked into the reasons for cases of this kind. Having extended aid to local organizations, we set the task of preventing a decrease in the number of livestock, of preserving as many animals as possible. We knew that this would be sure to entail some losses in the productivity of animal husbandry, but we did it deliberately. Now, summing up the 1960 results, we feel we acted properly. In our republic we succeeded not only in preserving but in increasing the number of cattle, cows and pigs. . . .

We have every reason to conclude that last year the republic had a sufficient number of cattle and pigs to achieve the meat and milk production we had set. Therefore the big pledges we reported a year ago at the plenary session of the Party Central Committee also had a solid foundation beneath them.

There are many instances that confirm the feasibility of the estimates and pledges for increased output of livestock products. These are instances where Party and Soviet leaders rose to the occasion and were able, leaning on the front-rankers and the *aktiv,* to mobilize all collective farmers and state farm workers for selfless labor. Chernovtsy Province as a whole, for example, produced an average of 123 centners of meat and 562 centners of milk per 100 hectares of farmland. [*Prolonged applause.*]

Khrushchev: It is Chernovtsy Province the comrades are applauding. [*Applause.*]

Podgorny: I understand that, Nikita Sergeyevich . . .

Hundreds of new raisers of big harvests have taken their place beside corn growers as well known to the whole country as Comrades Ye. A. Dolinyuk, S. D. Vishtak, A. M. Ladani, Ye. V. Blazhevsky, Yu. Yu. Pitra, A. G. Yeremenko, F. Ya. Kosyanchuk and many others. [*Applause.*]

Khrushchev: Once again, the applause is for the front-rankers in agriculture. They are applauding innovators like Comrade Dolinyuk, who is here at the plenary session.

Podgorny: I understand that too, Nikita Sergeyevich. . . .

It was only thanks to corn that the collective and state farms were able last summer to maintain the stock, to put away more than 54,000,000 tons of silage for winter and to enlarge the forage reserves substantially. Even so, we were unable to overcome the shortage of winter crops entirely, above all because our corn yield was low.

Khrushchev: I'm sure, Comrade Podgorny, that the figures for corn yield that you have given here represent only half the crop. The other half of the corn that was raised was pilfered, plundered on the stalk.

Podgorny: You are right, Nikita Sergeyevich.

Khrushchev: Then what has the weather to do with it? The crop was pilfered, plundered, and then you say the weather kept you from growing a big crop. Can this conclusion be drawn?

Podgorny: It can.

Khrushchev: Then why don't you talk about this?

Podgorny: Unfortunately, there are still more than a few officials on collective and state farms and in province and republic organizations who, without going to the heart of the matter, try to explain the poor corn crop obtained in the Ukraine last year by the fact that, in view of the large amount of replanting, there was not enough equipment, seeds or fertilizer.

Khrushchev: That explanation for the poor corn crop is wrong. Why do I say this so confidently? In the first place, I know the practical side of things, and in the second place, corn cannot yield a mere 16 to 17 centners a hectare in the Ukraine. Figure it out yourself. If corn is sown 70 by 70 centimeters by the square-cluster method, that means 20,000 clusters per hectare. You can count on one and a half to two plants in each cluster, and each plant will have one or two ears. This means there are sure to be 35 to 40 centners of grain to the hectare; under your conditions it is biologically impossible for corn to yield less. And if they say that a smaller crop was obtained, this means the corn was either stolen or they're cheating. For instance, they sow 20 hectares and write down 25 hectares in the report. All this is later figured into some kind of statistical "average," and thus the crop obtained is not what was actually raised. And again they put the blame on the Lord God, because you can't make Him accountable.

Podgorny: Of course, all this had a definite effect and to some degree complicated and hampered our work. Nevertheless, even under these circumstances a big crop could have been grown if the use of available equipment had been better organized and the experience acquired in corn cultivation had been more widely introduced. But in many provinces and regions this was not done. . . .

Comrade N. S. Khrushchev was profoundly right when in hailing Stepanida Demidovna Vishtak, team leader on the Soviet Ukraine Collective Farm in Kiev Province, he pointed out: "If everyone engaged in growing corn had applied know-how and proper effort, the collective and state farms would have raised a big corn crop and the

gross grain harvest would not have gone down in the Ukraine. Then we would have found ourselves talking not about a shortage but about a surplus of fodder."

There is still another serious reason for the drop in gross grain harvests. On considerable areas in a number of districts, corn that had been sown for grain failed to develop ears, owing to the drought, and was therefore used for green forage or silage.

Khrushchev: You say, Comrade Podgorny, that as a result of the drought ears failed to form on the corn, and since it would not yield grain you decided to cut it for green forage?! But in life it doesn't happen that way. Because by the time it is evident that there won't be any ears on the corn, the corn is no longer any good for green forage either—it's already all withered.

Podgorny: Yes, this obviously was used merely as an excuse to cut the corn.

Khrushchev: That's what you should have said.

Podgorny: I want to substantiate this with examples. In many provinces and on many farms, particularly in Zaporozhye, Dnepropetrovsk and Stalino Provinces, even well-developed corn, which might have yielded good grain, was cut green.

Khrushchev: But that's inadmissible! That's an out-and-out crime.

Podgorny: This harmful practice has taken root with some leaders as a result of a wrong, *mistaken attitude to corn* as a fodder crop, and of failure to take sufficient advantage of its latent potentialities for obtaining a large quantity of grain.

The job of raising corn and other grains was especially neglected in Poltava Province. Despite the availability of excellent land, poor crops have been gathered year in and year out, and the gross grain harvest and the sale of grain to the state have been going down. . . .

Another shortcoming in the development of animal husbandry has been the fact, to which the Party Central Committee has quite rightly drawn our attention, that in a number of provinces the herd of cows has been very poorly replenished through its own reproduction This is largely the consequence of unsatisfactory work in the raising of heifers and of the high incidence of barrenness in the breed stock. . . .

The collective and state farms are still taking too little advantage of such a great reserve for increasing meat production as the raising of fowl, especially waterfowl. As a result, the production of poultry meat showed a negligible increase last year.

Khrushchev: Excuse me, but I want to offer another rejoinder, lest the wrong impression be left. You said that 10,500,000 hectares of corn was sown in the republic, including 2,500,000 hectares for green fodder [*i.e., fodder to be eaten in the fields*]. But that's not true. Why not? Because the most unrewarding crop to sow for green fodder is corn. Everyone knows that corn should be sown by the square-cluster method, 70 by 70 centimeters, with spaces between the rows, and that only one or two plants should be left in a cluster. With that number of plants, corn will yield very little fodder for green feeding. If you sow more thickly, the crop for green fodder, it is well. When it comes to choosing a crop for green fodder, it is a vetch-oats mixture that should be sown. It will yield more green mass than corn. I think the Ukrainians sowed all their corn for grain, and that they were right to do so. But after they had neglected the corn, failed to cultivate it or done a poor job of sowing, they said that 2,500,000 hectares had been sown for green fodder in order to improve the indices for average yield.

So don't delude yourselves, and don't mislead the collective-farmers and state farm workers, because later you'll have

to pay for your mismanagement. This is very important to bear in mind for the future too. . . .

Podgorny: Nikita Sergeyevich, you are absolutely right. I didn't just make this up; this is the way we thought. But I think Nikita Sergeyevich is giving us the right lead here in saying that corn should not be planted for green fodder. If it is to be sown, it should be sown for grain.

Khrushchev: Muscovites sow winter rye and even wheat for these purposes. And this is correct. I know collective farms that last year and the year before planted rye, fed it to the livestock and after this planted potatoes or corn. In Moscow Province, after harvesting winter crops for green fodder, it is possible to obtain 400 to 500 centners of corn for silage per hectare. This is a correct, efficient use of sown area. But what you are talking about—using corn on the stalk for feeding—is incorrect.

Podgorny: One of the fundamental reasons for shortcomings in the organization of production and consequently of the sale of livestock products to the state is the unsatisfactory condition of organizational work in fulfilling pledges in a number of provinces. . . . Not only were pledges for the output and sale of livestock products not fulfilled, but milk yields even declined in comparison with 1959. . . .

Comrade N. S. Khrushchev, displaying as always a tireless concern for advancing the country's agriculture, has given us valuable advice in a talk with us and in the theses of his address to this plenary session He recommended that 3,000,000 hectares be set aside for sowing corn for grain, and that 50 centners of grain per hectare be obtained from this area in 1961.

We have given serious thought to this, consulted with specialists and people who know agriculture well, and consider this advice to be correct. Accomplishment of such a task is fully feasible for the Ukraine. . . .

It is planned to double the area planted to leguminous crops in the republic, increasing it to 900,000 hectares, and even if we obtain the harvest achieved in 1960, this will yield 90,000,000 poods.

Khrushchev: Sowings of leguminous crops must be increased in every way, if the possibilities exist. In general, it is necessary to follow a course of expanding the area under leguminous crops.

Podgorny: The gross harvest of such crops as groat crops, barley, fodder lupine and vetch is being set at approximately 270,000,000 poods, or 13.8 centners per hectare. This is a fully realistic undertaking.

Even if the harvest of grain corn comes to somewhat under 50 centners per hectare—40 centners, say (this possibility is also allowed by Comrade N. S. Khrushchev in the theses of his address to the plenary session)—the republic will still fulfill its pledges to the state, create the necessary reserves and supply animal husbandry with concentrated fodder better than in past years.

Khrushchev: Even if you obtain 25 centners per hectare, you will have more than enough grain both for fulfilling your pledges to the state and for laying in the necessary reserves of seed and forage.

Podgorny: Furthermore, aside from the corn yield, we will be planting not 3,000,000 hectares but a little more.

Khrushchev: I have in mind sowings of corn only for dry grain.

Podgorny: Even in that case we will gain.

Khrushchev: When we speak of setting aside 3,000,000 hectares for raising grain corn, we have in mind the moister regions of the Ukraine. But after all, you can't fail to plant corn for grain even in the south of the Ukraine. Apparently you would be sowing 1,500,000 hectares for sure, even if the leadership hadn't suggested it. Here is a reserve for you.

Podgorny: The deficiency in concentrated fodder will be made up by expanding the area under sugar beets for fodder purposes and laying in mash silage from corn ears at lacticwaxen maturity. . . .

Special commissions have been established under the Central Committee of the Ukraine Communist Party and the province Party committees to check on the progress of the measures for integrated mechanization of work in animal husbandry.

However, the amount of machinery on the collective and state farms of the Ukraine is disproportionately low for the tasks of fulfilling the seven-year plan. Much manual labor is still employed, particularly in harvesting corn, beets and other crops. Nevertheless, the need for tractors and other machines is far from fully met year after year. For example, the number of tractors allocated is only half what is needed, and is barely enough to make up for the number scrapped. Few trucks, tractor-drawn carts, silage- and corn-harvesting machines and many other farm machines are supplied, as well as tires and spare parts.

Khrushchev: Comrade Podgorny, think about the initiative of Odessa Province tractor drivers in employing tractors at higher speeds. This is a progressive trend, for it makes it possible to double the work performed by the tractor pool without enlarging the latter. Have you read about this?

Podgorny: I have read about it. They are working on this in our Odessa and Kherson Provinces.

Khrushchev: Tell about it; you say you ought to be given more tractors, but you don't tell about what is being done with the ones that exist.

Podgorny: I said in my speech that we are working on increasing the speeds, but we ought to be given what should be given us.

Khrushchev: In this case you're pronouncing the word "give" louder. [*Stir in the hall.*]

Podgorny: Nikita Sergeyevich, I consider that in speaking of the shortage of machinery I am merely confirming what you said about the abnormal situation that has arisen in respect to the production of a number of agricultural machines, and that increasing the output of machinery in short supply is a task that is being placed on the agenda.

Khrushchev: Look, comrades, he is trying to make me a partner. [*Laughter in the hall.*]

Podgorny: Thanks to the care of the Party and the government, the communal economy of the collective farms is steadily being strengthened. . . . At the same time it is necessary to bear in mind that the cash expenditures of the collective farms for production needs have increased since 1957. Payments into the indivisible and other communal funds and also various other payments have also increased, and as a result the collective farms found themselves in financial difficulty.

Of tremendous importance in this connection is the decree recently adopted by the Party Central Committee and the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers on measures for strengthening the financial condition of the collective farms, a decree referred to in Comrade N. S. Khrushchev's theses. Undoubtedly these measures will be greeted with great satisfaction by the toilers of agriculture, and their implementation will help a further advance in the communal economy of the collective farms and a rise in the prosperity of the collective farmers. . . .

Part IV

ELECTIONS

A. The United Kingdom

30. Elections in Britain*

BY WINSTON S. CHURCHILL

Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill overcame his usual reluctance to discuss constitutional questions in general or theoretical terms long enough to make the brief comment printed below. As usual with Mr. Churchill, the theoretical statement was evoked by a very practical problem, the question of when new elections should be held. In this case, he argued successfully for postponement of new elections until hostilities in World War II ceased. In fact, the elections were held shortly after the German surrender of May 8, 1945.

The foundation of all democracy is that the people have the right to vote. To deprive them of that right is to make a mockery of all the high-sounding phrases which are so often used. At the bottom of all the tributes paid to democracy, is the little man, walking into the little booth, with a little pencil, making a little cross on a little bit of paper—no amount of rhetoric or voluminous discussion can possibly palliate the overwhelming importance of that point. The people have the right to choose representatives in accordance with their wishes and feelings, and I cannot think of anything more odious than for a Prime Minister to attempt to carry on with a Parliament so aged,† and to try to grapple with the perplexing and tremendous problems of war and peace, and of the transition from war to peace, without being refreshed by contact with the people or without being relieved of any special burdens in that respect.

* *H. C. Debates,* October 31, 1944, col. 667.

† The House of Commons being addressed had been elected nine years earlier, making it the second longest parliament in British history (*Ed. note*).

31. On the Theory of Electoral Mandates in Britain*

BY WINSTON S. CHURCHILL

It is argued by some specialists on the British constitution that a prime minister and his cabinet have the right and duty to enact into statute or implement administratively all policies advocated by their party platform in the previous election. It is said that the majority of the voters has expressed its will in favor of those policies by supporting the candidates of that party.

The university representatives to which Mr. Churchill refers were elected by the faculty and alumni of the great British universities before the seats were abolished by the Representation of the People Act of 1948. They had almost always been held by Conservatives or independents with Conservative leanings.

In the 1945 and 1950 elections the Labor Party expressed in its election manifestoes an intention to bring the iron and steel industry under public ownerships. The party won both elections. In 1951 the Labour government determined to implement this policy. Mr. Churchill, leader at the time of the opposition Conservative party, criticized this plan in a speech from which the following selection is taken.

We are told, "We have a mandate from the nation for the nationalisation of iron and steel now. We put it in our 1945 manifesto. We carried it with our majority through the House of Commons in that same Parliament. It could have been delayed by the House of Lords, but we have dealt with that; and now after the second election"—I hope I am stating the case fairly—"we have not only placed our Bill upon the Statute Book, but we have had majorities of never less than six in favour of its immediate enforcement. Who then should challenge our right?"

Let us look into this mandate argument. The 1945 election was not fought on steel. If what I have heard is to be believed—and I am pretty sure of its truth—steel was only added as an after-

* *H. C. Debates,* February 7, 1951, cols. 1747-1749.

thought to the already extensive programme which was proposed by the Socialist Party. Mines, railways, some aspects of transport, and services like electricity and gas opened up a very large field for the activities of a single Parliament already burdened with all the perplexities of the aftermath of a terrible struggle and the transition from war conditions to what we all then hoped would be an era of unchallenged peace and freedom.

I do not admit as democratic constitutional doctrine that anything that is stuck into a party manifesto thereupon becomes a mandated right if the electors vote for the party who draw up the manifesto. [*Interruption.*] We are all allowed to have our opinions about constitutional matters. If that principle is accepted, why not shove a dozen more items in? One can always leave them out if there is not time, or circumstances change. But is it not for our convenience to have a lot to play with, and surely it costs nothing to a party seeking a change or a new deal? Why not add the word "etc."? I ask the Lord President and the Chief Whip, why not add the word "etc." in the list of planks in the party platform? We could then be told, "Do you not see these letters 'etc.' written at that point in our party manifesto? Does that not give us the right and impose upon us the obligation to do anything we please?"

At the last election steel played no prominent part in the manifestoes and propaganda of the Socialist Party. The Conservative and Liberal Parties, on the other hand, declared their vehement opposition to it. [*Interruption.*] I do not want to interrupt the right hon. Gentleman the Minister of Labour.

The Minister of Labour (Mr. Aneurin Bevan): The right hon. Gentleman babbles quite a lot.

Mr. Churchill: The repeal of the Act was thus one of the main issues in the domestic sphere of the Opposition parties together, and they had a majority —I am sorry to rub this in—of one and three-quarter million votes over those who voted, consciously or unconsciously, for the nationalisation of steel.

But we are told, "The numerical vote of the people at a General Election is not a relevant fact. Who cares for the numerical vote?" The test, we are told, is: What is the vote of the House of Commons in the new Parliament resulting from the polls? Perhaps hon. Members opposite will please cheer. They had better learn the doctrine, or they may fall into the errors of diversionism or even distortionism. On this matter of the test in the House, the Government majority has fallen as low as six. How vain to call this a mandate which leaves the Government of the day no choice but to go ahead with this unwise and untimely doctrinal Measure. If the Lord President of the Council had not had the happy thought to abolish university representation in breach of the agreement to which he was a party, at the Speaker's Conference in 1944, even this paltry majority would have been lacking. So where is the mandate?

The Prime Minister (Mr. Atlee): Were the university seats all pocket boroughs of the Conservative Party then?

Mr. Churchill: They certainly were not, but it was because the right hon. Gentleman and his hon. Friends thought they were that they abolished them. We all recall the remarks of the Secretary of State for Scotland on the subject at that time.

So I say, where is the mandate?—not in the 1945 programme, not in the vote of the people in 1950, nor in the House of Commons votes here in our present distressed assembly. It certainly does not, I think, await the Socialist Party when they are forced, as they will soon be, to appeal to the electorate. There is no mandate which is not an abuse of the term, and no obligation whatever on the Prime Min-

ister and the Government to proceed with what I believe in their hearts they know to be an unwise and unfortunate Measure. Events have cast upon the Government fearful responsibilities which they seem to have willingly accepted. No one who has the welfare and even the safety of the country at heart would do other than respect them if they laid aside every impediment and strove only for national survival against perils which no man can measure, and which grow ever nearer and ever more grave.

32. The 1959 British Election Campaign*

BY D. E. BUTLER AND RICHARD ROSE

THE following description and analysis of a British election campaign is included to convey an understanding of the manner and tone in which political issues and personalities are presented to the British electorate. For presentation of the substance of the issues see the election manifestoes of the three parties (above, pp. 96-106, 109-113, 135-143).

AN election campaign is always difficult to describe. It is a formless struggle for the electors' votes fought in confusion on many fronts and in many ways. Yet each election does have its own feel and rhythm, however differently it may be perceived by different observers. The 1959 contest was one in which, to an unusual extent, there was a sense of ebb and flow. At the outset almost every forecast assumed a Conservative victory; it was only the size of the majority that was debated. Oddly enough, although the opinion polls showed the Labour party behind by from 4% to 7%, no one was moved to predict a landslide result. There were reiterated Conservative warnings against over-confidence, but few on the government side seemed to think that, at the best, they would do more than keep what they had. The Labour party, too, started the campaign in surprisingly good heart considering that only a few of its leaders or agents thought victory likely.

In retrospect the campaign can be seen to have had three phases, each lasting about ten days. Before the dissolution, there was first the relatively quiet period of preparation, during which events favoured the Labour party. Then there was a period in which the Labour party attacked vigorously and appeared to make headway. The final phase was one of Conservative counterattack.

* From D. E. Butler and Richard Rose, *The British General Election of 1959*, Macmillan, London, 1960, pp. 46-67. Footnotes have been omitted. Reprinted by permission.

In the days after the election was announced the Labour party was much in the news. The fact that Mr. Gaitskell and Mr. Bevan were in Moscow at the time proved an asset rather than a handicap. The *Daily Express* even produced the headline 'HUGH AND NYE DEFEND THE EMPIRE.' Their travels were already news, and their hasty flight home on September 9th secured banner headlines. In a press conference at the airport, on television that night, at the Trades Union Congress the next day, and in a special television report the following Monday, Mr. Gaitskell had admirable opportunities to present himself and, indirectly, his party in a favourable light. Eschewing party politics, he reported on his impressions of Russia and his blunt conversations with Mr. Khrushchev. This was the first step in the growth in his public stature, which was so marked a feature of the election. Moreover, the fact that Mr. Gaitskell and Mr. Bevan were travelling together in such apparent harmony was a convenient demonstration of the unity of the Labour party's leadership.

This picture of unity did not remain altogether untarnished. On September 10th the monthly *Socialist Commentary* published a well-informed pseudonymous article which attacked the organisation of Transport House and in particular criticised Mr. Morgan Phillips. Over the next ten days Mr. Phillips' unsuccessful bid for a safe seat was to attract unwelcome publicity, and his final rejection by the North-East Derbyshire Labour Party on September 19th (in favour of a local miner) was to serve as the text for some rather confused homilies on the condition and structure of the party.

The announcement of the election was made while the Trades Union Congress was in session at Blackpool, and it helped to distract attention from the debate there on the hydrogen bomb. Mr. Frank Cousins' demand for unilateral British renunciation of the bomb was defeated by a two-to-one majority; however, a protest against American missile bases being sited in Britain was just carried. These struggles which, but for the coming of the election, might have been the precursors of a bitter fight at the Labour Party Conference due a month later, were hardly referred to again.

In other ways the gathering of the Trades Union Congress served the Labour party well. Mrs. Castle, as the party's fraternal delegate, opened the campaign with a lively broadside; she accused Mr. Macmillan of rushing to the country 'in a sun-tan election . . . designed to catch the heatwave vote.' Mr. Gaitskell flew up to Blackpool the morning after his return from Moscow and delivered a speech which the *Guardian* described as 'a virtuoso performance': he dealt optimistically and at length with the world scene and spoke of the bleak prospects that faced the trade unions under a Conservative government. The passage in his speech which drew most attention was a blunt warning that the unions would have to co-operate in any planned expansion of output.

Mr. Gaitskell's appearance on his return from Moscow did much to stimulate enthusiasm within the Labour party. When the National Executive met on Monday, September 14th, a special campaign committee was set up under the chairmanship of Mr. R.H.S. Crossman and it speedily got down to work repairing some omissions in the party's pre-election planning. It met daily, and through the press and broadcasting, as well as through circulars to candidates, endeavoured to guide the tempo and tactics of the battle. The first aim was to make the electorate aware of the party's policy, which, although long published, was little known.

The Labour party launched one early salvo, a slickly produced pamphlet entitled *The Tory Swindle*. This vehement and class-conscious attack on the government was well designed

to put heart into the party's rank and file, even if it offended a few moderates. At the last moment Mr. Randolph Churchill unsuccessfully sought an injunction against its issue on copyright grounds—his indictments of the Suez venture in his biography of Sir Anthony Eden were quoted without permission. *The Tory Swindle* was also made the theme of the Labour party's television broadcast on September 9th; in this Mr. Anthony Greenwood painted such a gloomy and bitter picture of contemporary hardship that he was accused of adhering to 'the Chamber of Horrors school of politics' and of rivalling Dr. Charles Hill's anti-Labour broadcast a week earlier (which had evoked shocked protests in *The Times*).

The field was largely left to Labour in the first days of the campaign. The Conservatives provided little news. Their only publicised activity was the issue of their manifesto, *The Next Five Years,** on September 11th. In this the main issue of the election was found to be simple: 'Do you want to go ahead on the lines which have brought prosperity at home? Do you want your present leaders to represent you abroad?' The manifesto was a clearly written but slightly ponderous document, which, amid a recital of the government's achievements and some modest promises, made only two pledges that attracted special notice—one was to establish a Ministry of Science and the other to introduce immediate measures to deal with local unemployment. However, as *The Times* justly observed, for a party which had been in power for eight years to fight an election on a new policy and programme would be to admit that the old one had failed. The manifesto was launched at a well-reported press conference given by Mr. Macmillan, Mr. Butler, and Lord Hailsham.

The Labour party's manifesto, *Britain Belongs to You,* did not appear for another week.* Unlike the Conservative document, the drafting of which had been under way for more than a year, it was prepared at the last moment. Speculation about what it would contain was fanned on September 13th by the report of a Labour Youth Commission which suggested votes at 18, a demand vigorously taken up by the *Daily Mirror*. In fact, the manifesto contained no major proposals new to anyone who had followed the numerous policy statements which the Labour party had issued over the previous three years. It was, moreover, although similar in format to the Conservative manifesto, more spiritedly written—Mr. Crossman and Mr. Driberg were its principal draughtsmen. The manifesto painted a contrast between the business men and speculators who had 'never had it so good' and the plight of the old, the sick, and the unemployed, and it attacked 'the mood of complacency and self-deception engendered by the vast Tory propaganda machine.' It matched denunciation of Conservative failings with promises of action: the abolition of the 11-plus examination, the municipalisation of rented houses, the expansion of hospital building, of subsidies for recreation and the arts, and of aid for depressed areas, and, most important, the establishment of a full national superannuation scheme together with an immediate increase of 10s. a week in the old-age pension. These proposals were to be paid for out of the extra revenue which planned increases in production would bring, as well as by a capital-gains tax and a check on tax-dodging.

The Labour manifesto, like the Conservatives', was launched on a Friday, a bad day for securing attention in the press because of the week-end. Although Mr. Khrushchev's disarmament speech at the UN deprived it of first place in the newspapers, it received

* See pp. 96-106 (*Ed. note*).

* See pp. 135-143 (*Ed. note*).

good coverage, with the 10s. a week pension drawing most headlines. *The Times* commented:

> 'The general impression the manifesto gives is of a party with some misgivings about the few doctrinaire experiments to which it is committed and with a coherent programme of minor social reform well grounded on Labour's traditional preoccupation with equality.'

The Liberal manifesto, *People Count,** which did not appear until September 21st, had the most ingenious format. It proposed improvements in the welfare services and alone among the manifestoes it mentioned the problem of controlling trade unions; it also said that Britain should stop manufacturing nuclear bombs. However, the main emphasis was not on specific policy promises (which, after all, it would have no hope of implementing) but on a message from Mr. Grimond stressing the need to break away from machine politics. It closed with a statement: 'The vote does not belong to the Conservative and Labour Parties. It belongs to you.'

Mr. Grimond had started the Liberals' campaign by addressing a poorly attended rally in London on September 15th at which he appealed for a good Liberal vote to curb any Labour or Conservative government. He then retreated to campaign among the forty islands of Orkney and Shetland and was hardly heard from for the next fortnight. The Liberals had no other well-known leaders available to tour the country or make news. Virtually all their best speakers were tied down in contesting single constituencies. Despite the valiant efforts at headquarters of Mr. Byers, the Campaign Chairman, and Mr. Harris, the party's General Director, the Liberals could not mount anything like a full-scale national campaign or join effectively in the exchanges between the major rivals. They appeared in the election as the largest of the minor parties, a federation of independently operating candidates, rather than as a broad national movement.

Fortune seemed to be favouring the Labour party when a major City scandal broke out in connection with the Jasper group of property companies. On September 16th there was a dramatic slump in the value of their shares and their take-over bid for a brewery met with trouble. For the next few days the affair was front-page news: the managing director of some of the companies, Mr. Grunwald, disappeared and was traced to Israel, where he made cryptic statements, while the State Building Society, which had invested heavily in some of the property involved, ran into difficulties. Ostensibly the matter never became a party issue, but many Labour speakers followed Mr. Harold Wilson in his pointed allusions to the 'casino mentality of the City of London.'

The most publicised party exchanges at this period came after a self-righteous repudiation of 'mud-slinging' by Lord Hailsham. In an attack on *The Tory Swindle* on September 16th he said:

> 'Everybody in this country knows perfectly well that, with few exceptions, every leading figure in public life on both sides of the political fence is a person of integrity and honour and has his country's good sincerely at heart. . . . I want an end to the old mud-slinging tactics of "Eatanswill" electioneering.'

Mr. Gaitskell welcomed this declaration by 'a repentant sinner,' and the Labour party throughout the rest of the campaign gleefully pinned the mud-slinging label on any Conservative lapse from good taste.

The first phase of the election ended with the dissolution of Parliament on Friday, September 18th. Nothing had occurred to disturb seriously the ex-

* See pp. 109-113 (*Ed. note*).

pectation of a quiet election with a comfortable Conservative victory, although the Labour party had shown surprising vitality, both at the centre and in the constituencies.

In the course of the ten days after the dissolution, 1,536 candidates handed in nomination papers. The pattern first set in 1955 of a contest for every seat was repeated. The Labour party fought everywhere except in nine Northern Ireland seats. The Conservatives left the field to the Liberals in four seats, and in Caithness and Sutherland they did not oppose the former member, Sir David Robertson, who had renounced the party whip over Highland issues. The Liberals put up 216 candidates, twice as many as in 1951 and 1955, but there were notably fewer Conservative plaints about Liberal 'intervention.' The Communists fought eighteen constituencies, one more than in 1955. The Nationalist parties were more active. Sinn Fein again contested all twelve Ulster seats, mostly with candidates who were in prison or detention. The Scottish Nationalists extended their challenge from two to five seats, while Plaid Cymru fought twenty of the thirty-six Welsh seats, nine more than in 1955. The only other candidature to be regarded at all seriously was that of Sir Oswald Mosley, who, taking advantage of the racial tensions that had flared into the Notting Hill riots, entered the fray in North Kensington. But there were also the usual crop of a dozen or so independents, some of them with agreeable labels, such as Alert Party, Lancastrian Party, and Fellowship Party; their policies ranged from that of a gentleman who wanted to sink exactly half the world's fleets with an atom bomb to the one who only sought to ventilate a grievance—in which the Anti-Christ was involved—about a clause in the Landlord and Tenant Act.

The week-end of September 19th-20th showed the Labour attack well under way. Both party headquarters were receiving reports that the 10s. a week pension promise was stimulating interest in the constituencies and no other issues were looming large. The efforts of Mr. Crossman's campaign committee were beginning to bear fruit. On Monday, September 21st, Mr. Morgan Phillips appeared before the first of his daily press conferences, which secured much publicity for Labour and helped to set the tone of the struggle. The campaign committee sensed that editors would appreciate the convenience of a daily story attached to a familiar name, even though it came from the opposition. The stories were carefully selected and prepared by the committee, and Mr. Phillips was adroit at making the most of them with the journalists. In the first week the Labour press conference secured about 200 inches of space in the columns of the nine national dailies, more than ten times as much was given to the conventional Conservative briefings. The Conservatives were getting compensating press coverage, through reports of the very quotable speeches which Lord Hailsham was making as he toured the country. But the Labour aim was not so much to get more press coverage than the Conservatives as to get its case across and to do so in a way that showed the party had a fighting chance to win.

There was also a sharp contrast between the opening shots in the television battle. The first Conservative performance on September 19th, a dated film of a country-house discussion between five leading Cabinet ministers, was ill-received by the press. Two days later the Labour party launched their 'Britain Belongs to You' series of election reports, which, whatever was thought of their political content, were certainly very good television. Like the daily press conferences, they were keyed in to the general campaign strategy. With a variety of clever visual devices, the first programme emphasised Labour's interest in pensioners, since it was believed

that Labour's pensions promises were the party's best vote-getters.

The *Daily Mail* poll on September 21st was the first to show a drop in the Conservative lead, and this was confirmed in the next three days by polls in the *Daily Telegraph* and the *News Chronicle*. The contrast in vitality and technical smoothness between the parties' television shows contributed still further to the sense that Labour prospects were improving and that the election might be a close run thing, after all. At the centre if not in the constituencies the Conservatives began to be a little anxious. But throughout this week the Conservatives stuck to their policy of trying to keep the election temperature low. On September 23rd Mr. Phillips complained of his opponent's silence:

> 'This refusal to answer challenges is a new feature of Lord Hailsham. I have never known him to be so shy before and it has spread to the entire Tory organisation.'

Mr. Macmillan, in the opening speech of his national tour at Manchester on September 23rd, maintained a deliberately low key throughout a general survey of the political scene in which, with the motto 'Let's Stick to the Facts' he stressed Conservative achievements. He argued that a Labour victory would destroy everything that the government had built up. Nonetheless he ended on a friendly note.

> 'Let us remember we are not enemies. We have suffered a lot together in my lifetime. I was rather struck by the title of the Labour Party manifesto, *Britain Belongs to You*. So it does. There is no cleavage between the rich and the poor. All that has changed and a new world is coming. Let us keep the spirit of it.'

Mr. Macmillan was to become more aggressive later in his sixteen-day tour which took him 2,500 miles about the country and included seventy-four speeches (almost twice as many as Sir Anthony Eden had made in 1955).

Mr. Gaitskell hit out vigorously from the start of his tour, which lasted thirteen days and included fifty-three major speeches, sixteen more than Mr. Attlee had made in the previous campaign. The *Daily Mail* commented that Mr. Gaitskell won hearts, 'not with emotional gestures and cries, but with economics and figures.' He ran into intermittent heckling as he set off through East Anglia, stressing the plight of the aged and the unemployed, the evils of the Rent Act, and the errors of the Conservatives in colonial policy. His opening radio broadcast on September 19th had summed up the two-pronged line of attack found in most of his speeches.

> 'Our main criticism is that Britain can be and should be much better off and that a lot of people in Britain, several millions in fact, are suffering quite unnecessary hardship.'

Mr. Bevan's speeches on tour received considerable coverage (although many of his reported remarks lay to some extent outside the dominant themes of the campaign). He raked over the embers of Suez.

> 'In the eyes of the world the guilt was the guilt of Macmillan and his friends. But if, on October 8, you vote for the Tories once more, then the guilt will be yours.'

He also attacked the fitness of the Conservatives to go to summit:

> 'I think Mr. Macmillan and Mr. Selwyn Lloyd will be regarded by the rest of the world as men with blood on their hands and guilt in their hearts, because I know there are hundreds of millions of people all over the world who say that we ought not to make them the ambassadors in the Conferences that are to come.'

He also suggested that if the Conservative government were returned they would 'almost completely destroy the Health Service.'

Sir Winston Churchill's few incursions into the fray produced some echoes of a former thunder.

> 'Let no one suppose that our prosperity is certain and assured. It is not. It is the result of prudent policies. Change to foolish policies and it could vanish like the snow before the sunshine.'

He ridiculed Mr. Grimond's idea that a Liberal vote would enforce good behaviour on the other parties:

> 'How absurd. The Socialists, I have no doubt, will pursue their destructive trend blandly indifferent to any mild and ameliorating Liberal wind. For ourselves, I do not feel that a Liberal vote will deter us from the course of continued progress which Conservative rule will again make possible.'

The pensions promise appeared to be the leading issue throughout the first week of active campaigning. Mr. Gaitskell said on September 23rd:

> 'The real challenge to us is whether we're going once and for all to abolish poverty in old age. The Labour Party is the only party that can do that.'

The 10s. increase was stressed in almost every speech, and Conservatives were worried by it. Mr. Macmillan said on September 22nd:

> 'We have seen all this in the past. The Socialists are now talking of adding ten shillings to the pension. When they were in office they reduced its purchasing power by nearly half a crown. You may say that was not their fault. But that was what inflation did, and what inflation will inevitably do again.'

and on September 23rd:

> 'I want our party to win this election. Of course I do. But there is a price I am not prepared to pay for victory. I will not enter into any kind of auction with the parties trying to outbid each other in this and every other sphere. For I know that a government which won an election on that basis would either have to duck out of its promises, or if they tried to carry them out would plunge us back into the inflationary mess from which we have rescued ourselves so painfully.'

But other speakers, including Mr. Boyd-Carpenter, the Minister of Pensions, hinted that even in the first year of the next government the expansion of the economy might justify an increase in pensions. There were also arguments about the rival contributory super-annuation schemes of the two parties, but here the exchanges between Mr. Crossman and Mr. Boyd-Carpenter quickly became lost in actuarial technicalities.

Other themes came up. In his visit to Scotland Mr. Gaitskell dwelt at length on the Nyasaland issue, over which the Presbyterian Church had strongly criticised the government. The 'big barons of industry' were attacked by Mr. Phillips for 'throwing their treasure into the fight to get a Conservative government returned' through their advertising campaigns. The Labour party's advocacy of comprehensive schools was described by Lord Hailsham as 'the death knell of the grammar schools.' Conservatives also brought up nationalisation and Labour's alleged schemes to take over the 600 largest companies. Labour candidates replied with firm denials that anything beyond the renationalisation of road transport and iron and steel was contemplated. But these were not issues that provoked sustained exchanges or big headlines.

New developments in the Jasper case continued to provide exciting copy for the newspapers and to give point to

the protests of Mr. Wilson and others about the 'spivs' paradise' of the stock exchange. On September 22nd the Chief Registrar of Friendly Societies intervened officially in the management of the State Building Society. On September 24th Mr. Grunwald met the press in Tel Aviv. The next day a Q.C. was appointed to investigate the affairs of H. Jasper and Co., and the Prime Minister gave an assurance that the committee on company law promised in the Conservative manifesto would look into the question of take-over bids. Mr. Amory ridiculed the Labour party's new pose as the champion of the small investor. The *Daily Herald* of September 26th drew attention under the banner caption 'THE JASPER ELECTION' to a speech in which Lord Hailsham described Labour's policy as a take-over bid for Britain:

> 'When the time comes I fear that Mr. Harold Wilson will be like some other prominent financial experts who cannot find the cash they promised.
>
> 'Take-over bids may be all right and may be all wrong. I don't profess to know myself. But they are probably all right when the day of reckoning comes and you have got the money to pay.
>
> 'But when the day of reckoning comes and you have not got the money to pay, and if you have made a take-over bid, you had far better take an air ticket to Tel Aviv or Haifa and issue a statement to the press that you are tired.
>
> 'You had far better not try to be Prime Minister of Great Britain or Chancellor of the Exchequer.'

Mr. Morgan Phillips was quick to protest at this 'mud-slinging' analogy between the Labour leaders and Mr. Grunwald, and had several exchanges with Lord Hailsham, who truculently refused to apologise. In the newspaper reports of the Jasper affair there were some distasteful efforts to demonstrate connections between particular Labour candidates and the companies involved. Some observers noted that comment on it in casual conversations was as often anti-semitic as anti-capitalist.

As the week-end of September 27th-28th approached, there were further signs that the trends in the opinion polls, as well as Labour successes on television and in the press, were having an effect. Mr. Gaitskell could actually say, 'The only thing that worries me is over-confidence. I am getting to that stage.' The Conservatives at Central Office showed signs of worry. The strategy of keeping down the election temperature was not succeeding. On September 25th the *Daily Sketch* cried out:

> 'The Tories must wake up, get off their dignified perches and make their voices heard. . . . The Tory don't-panic-old-boy attitude is giving us—and many of their friends—grave misgivings. . . . Remember: there are only THIRTEEN days to go.'

'The Labour Party have undoubtedly had the best of the battle so far' was the *Daily Mail* comment on September 27th. On September 28th *The Times* observed:

> 'Mr. Phillips and his campaign committee have needed only one week to teach Conservative Central Office that this time Transport House are fighting the campaign at a much harder pace.'

On Sunday, September 27th, at short notice, Lord Hailsham and Lord Poole began appearing at the daily Conservative press conference to make it as news-worthy an affair as that of Labour, and thereafter Cabinet ministers appeared almost daily. Even so, in the following week the Labour press conference still secured 50% more space in the national press than the Conservative one (100% more in *The Times*), and Conservative spokesmen were often forced to reply to Labour's

latest broadside before they could present their own case. The first press conference began with Mr. Geoffrey Lloyd, the Minister of Education, making a reply to Labour's television programme on education the night before.

On September 28th Lord Hailsham urged party workers to take off their coats:

> 'and wade into the fight. . . . Let there be plenty of hard hitting above the belt. Just because we fight honourably there is no reason why we should be dull. By all means be pure but for goodness sake do not let us be driven on to the defensive.'

This marked the start of the third phase of the election. The Conservatives' counter-attack was just under way when Mr. Gaitskell, speaking at Newcastle on September 28th, played into his opponents' hands with this pledge:

> 'There will be no increase in the standard or other rates of income tax so long as normal peacetime conditions continue.'

Mr. Gaitskell's motive was to counter a possible last-minute scare that the Labour programme would add half a crown to the income tax. In making the pledge he was moving for the first time from the offensive; he was, moreover, acting on his own without informing the campaign committee in London. The Conservatives were quick to react. At Glasgow the next night Mr. Macmillan commented that such a pledge was 'a very queer one for a professional economist and an ex-Chancellor of the Exchequer,' and a day later at Bradford he described it as a gross piece of electioneering that would deceive no one.

> 'Let me ask Mr. Gaitskell a few direct questions. I hope he will answer them next time he speaks. Is it only income tax that he pledges himself not to raise? Will he sign the same pledge for beer and other drinks? Will he promise us not to put up the petrol duty, the entertainment duty or the purchase tax? If not, why not?'

Before Mr. Gaitskell could reply to these questions (which he did only obliquely) a further tactical blunder compounded the impact of the income-tax pledge. At the Transport House news conference on October 1st journalists were given a press hand-out which stated that a Labour government would remove purchase tax from essential goods. The exact history of this hand-out is obscure: its release did not originate with the campaign committee and, as *The Times* noted the next day, it was not issued with the rest of the day's material; the fact that Mr. Phillips made no reference to it suggests that it was not intended as a major pronouncement. Mr. Gaitskell was reported as saying that there was 'no significance in the timing of this statement.' It was certainly not put out as the result of Mr. Macmillan's speech. But Mr. Harold Wilson described it as 'our considered answer to the challenge put out by the Tories. Mr. Gaitskell talked it over with me before the announcement was made.' Later on, Labour spokesmen protested that there was nothing new in what Mr. Macmillan had described as 'the biggest budget leak in history,' since Mr. Wilson had several times argued in parliament that purchase tax should be concentrated on luxuries, not essentials, and since he had repeated the point in his broadcast on September 22nd.

No such explanations could repair the damage. Journalistic enterprise and Conservative eloquence consolidated the picture of the Labour leaders bidding for votes with succession of wild fiscal promises. Lord Hailsham said that they 'were trying to bribe the electorate with their own money,' while Mr. Butler suggested that their motto was 'a bribe a day keeps the Tories away.' Mr. Macmillan accused

them of trying to turn the election into 'a mock auction.'

> 'By putting forward these specious and unworthy pleas Mr. Gaitskell is not only insulting the intelligence of the British public but fatally undermining his own ability to act responsibly should he find himself again in high office.'

Mr. Gaitskell countered:

> 'The Tories are hopping mad because we say what we want to do in precise language. They think this unfair because they never do this themselves. . . . Today Mr. Macmillan keeps mum. Will he tell us what their plans will cost? Not on your life. Under the guise of sham statesmanship he asks for a blank cheque.'

In retrospect the two tax pledges appear as the turning point of the campaign itself. All the opinion polls indicate that about ten days before the vote the tide which had been flowing so strongly to Labour was checked and then reversed.

From the start of the campaign the Conservatives had been asking Labour speakers to explain how they would finance their proposals. As one Labour agent put it: 'The issues in this election are Labour's programme and "how are you going to pay for it?"' The Conservatives contrasted the prosperity of 1959 with the economic difficulties when Labour was in office and, as the campaign advanced, concentrated their fire on the 'financial irresponsibility' of their opponents. Mr. Macleod ended the Conservative television broadcast on September 29th with a direct challenge to Mr. Gaitskell, 'Mr. Rising Price himself': 'You say our estimate of the cost of your programme is too high. But why not give us your own estimate?' Mr. Macmillan was more personal in his attack, telling a Nottingham meeting on October 1st:

> 'It was this addiction to figures, on which he (Mr. Gaitskell) built what seems now a false reputation, that led Mr. Bevan to describe him as a desiccated calculating machine. That is now only a half-truth. I think he is still rather desiccated but his reputation as a calculator has gone with the wind.
>
> 'Elections are very severe tests and Mr. Gaitskell has managed to destroy in a week a reputation he had built up over a number of years. Mr. Gaitskell has brought himself down to the level of Mr. Harold Wilson.'

Labour could claim that their answer to the Conservative challenge was in their manifesto: a Labour government would stimulate greater production through economic planning.

> 'For four years under the Tories industrial production scarcely rose. In 1958 alone this cost the country £1,700 million of which the Exchequer would have received £450 million. With this increased revenue we could have paid for great improvements in the welfare services . . . without increasing the present rates of taxation.'

But the acceptance of this argument demanded economic sophistication as well as faith in economic planning. Life-long Labour supporters were heard to express doubts about how Labour could pay for its programme: 'After all, the money isn't there.' In so far as the income-tax and purchase-tax pledges lost votes, it was because they tended to bring to the surface latent doubts about the party's financial capabilities. Further, Labour appeared less responsible because the timing of these pledges made them look like 'electioneering.' In fact, the purchase-tax pledge (like the 10s. pension increase) had been clearly stated in parliamentary debate, while the determination not to increase taxes was explicit in the manifesto. But a policy stated is not the same thing as a policy heard or understood. It was the failure to publicise the Labour programme be-

fore the campaign that enabled the Conservatives to picture Labour's main appeals as reckless last-minute schemes to catch votes.

Another Labour answer to the 'how are you going to pay for it?' question was a promise to stop tax dodging and to look into business expense accounts. Labour spokesmen made play with the scale of entertainment in some quarters, painting picture of business men being driven in their tax-free Rolls-Royces to luxury dinners at the Ritz and the Savoy. Mr. Amory replied by boasting that the British were honest and 'the best tax-payers in the world' and Mr. Maudling, more tellingly, pointed out that tax avoidance was not confined to business men alone.

> 'How much casual decorating work, for example, is done at the week-ends and paid for in cash that never reaches the ears of the Inland Revenue? Will Mr. Gaitskell set his blood hounds after all these people too?'

The *Daily Sketch* took this up with a polling day scare—'ODD JOB GESTAPO IF LABOUR WINS'—which suggested that under a Labour government an army of snoopers would soon be checking on the unreported earnings of millions of ordinary people.

The Conservative theme of prosperity received three late boosts from official statistics. On September 28th it was announced that unemployment had fallen by 22,000 during the previous month, and now stood at 1.9%, 0.3% less than a year before. On September 30th it was announced that production was rising and that the August output had been 8% above that of August 1958. On October 2nd it was announced that the gold and dollar reserves had risen by £13 million in September—normally an unfavorable month—and were now at the highest level since August 1951. Each of these statistics was advertised by Conservative spokesmen, while the opposition explained why the figures were misleading and why they should, with wise policy, have been better.

Fortune, which had presented the Labour party with the Jasper affair, redressed the balance in the last ten days of the campaign when an unofficial strike among oxygen workers caused lay-offs in large sections of the motor and kindred industries. The strike provided headline news from September 29th until its settlement on October 5th. Neither side made much explicit party capital out of it, although Lord Poole did remark on September 30th:

> 'I do not think a strike is an advantage to anybody, but it certainly cannot be of any political advantage to the Labour party. I think it shows how very false are its claims that if it gets in it will be able to conduct these affairs and control the unions and unofficial strikes.'

Despite the fact that the strike was condemned by trade-union leaders (who pointed to the significant fact that the same men had struck during the 1955 election), the incident could not help injuring Labour prospects, partly by causing a number of voters to draw a light wage packet on polling day, but still more by conjuring up a picture of industrial irresponsibility.

The last part of the campaign was marked by an especial interest in the 'don't knows' among the voters. The pollsters had found the waverers more numerous than in previous elections, and party workers were marking down more 'doubtfuls' on their canvass cards. On Friday, October 2nd, Lord Poole complained:

> 'The Labour propaganda machine has been successful in confusing people about the right issues. That is the only reason I can give for the increase rather than the decrease which normally takes place at this time in the number of "don't knows."'

In a press conference the following day, specially called for him to clarify the issues 'blurred by Labour,' an optimistic Mr. Macmillan added further confusion by saying that in constituency canvassing it was wise to allocate 'doubtfuls' to the other side. The press made much of the 'don't knows,' but Mr. Morgan Phillips refused to see any special significance in the situation, even when in the last few days the opinion polls began to show the 'don't knows' coming off the fence on the Conservative side.

Although the Prime Minister and Mr. Gaitskell had begun the election by talking about the summit, it was not prominent in the campaign. Mr. Gaitskell several times criticised the government's reluctance to take up the disarmament challenge which Mr. Khrushchev had made at the United Nations. Mr. Selwyn Lloyd concentrated in his speeches on a defence of British foreign policy, coupled with references to the hazards of entrusting it to a party that was deeply divided over the hydrogen bomb. Despite its special 'week' from September 13th to 19th, the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament drew very little attention in the election. One of its leading members, a Labour candidate, remarked sadly that he got no reaction at his meetings, so that he had had to switch his fire to the Rent-Act.

In the last week of the campaign Mr. Macmillan restored the summit to prominence. The announcement by President Eisenhower and Mr. Khrushchev on September 28th after their Washington talks that the way was open for a full summit meeting had been hailed by the *Daily Express* as 'MACMILLAN'S TRIUMPH' (because he had started them on this path by his visit to Moscow in March). On September 30th the Prime Minister declared that the dates of the summit meeting would be announced 'within a few days.' This brought a denial from the White House, and in the last few days of the campaign Mr. Gaitskell taunted Mr. Macmillan for playing politics on so vital a matter.

Mr. Grimond came back into the fray on October 3rd to deliver an appealing solo performance on television. As in his other speeches, he stood amicably outside the main battle and stressed the need of 'building up a new progressive radical party and at the same time getting politics back from the party machines into the hands of the people themselves.' However, he never made fully clear what the Liberals would do if they were to hold the balance of power in the next Parliament.

On October 5th, employing one of the most practical gimmicks of the election, Mr. Grimond made a one-day helicopter tour of the most hopeful Liberal seats from North Cornwall to Rochdale. He showed himself the only party leader willing to talk critically about the trade unions and methods of wage negotiation; he accused the Conservatives of lacking any constructive policy ('their campaign can be summed up as smugness to begin with and scares afterwards'), and he argued that, if there was a Labour government, the Liberals could do a lot to rescue it from its lunatic fringes. He also amplified his earlier forecasts of winning twelve to eighteen seats into predictions of 'a sweeping tide of Liberalism' and 'a landslide to Liberalism in certain places.'

Lord Montgomery added to the liveliness of the last days of the election by declaring on October 5th that anyone who voted Labour 'must be completely barmy, absolutely off his rocker. . . . and should be locked up in a lunatic asylum as a danger to the country.' Mr. Morgan Phillips commented that if Labour voters had been locked up during the war Lord Montgomery would have been left with half an army. Lord Hailsham observed that Lord Montgomery seemed 'to have come by a different route to the same conclusion as me. I think these fighting men have a colorful means of

expressing themselves.' Indignation about the Field-Marshal's remarks—sometimes mock, sometimes genuine—echoed through many Labour eve-of-poll speeches.

In the last stages of the election the Conservatives made a recovery in the field of television. They scrapped previous arrangements and brought in expert aid to salvage their last two programmes; at the same time the lively formula to which the Labour party adhered began to lose its shock impact. As electioneering there may not have been much to choose between the final television appeals of Mr. Gaitskell and Mr. Macmillan on October 5th and 6th, each of which was watched by a fifth of the electorate.

Mr. Gaitskell said that the Labour policy was 'a good neighbour policy,' towards the children, the unfortunate, the badly housed at home, and towards the outside world. "We would never, never, never have committed the fiasco of Suez.' Labour's programme was a

> 'fine, modern, new, realistic programme: exciting too. I don't pretend it's easy.
>
> 'It certainly needs confidence in our own future and in Britain's. But it is within our capacity to carry it out.
>
> 'It seems to me to be in tune with the special qualities for which British people are admired all over the world: for kindliness, tolerance, decency, a sense of fair play. I hope you are going to give us the chance to carry it out.'

The next night Mr. Macmillan claimed that the Conservatives had brought prosperity to Britain not by nationalisation or controls but 'by letting people free, under the general guidance of the government, to do their own job without the government interfering in everything.' In the best phrase of the television contest he cited Sir Winston Churchill's warning: 'To build is the laborious task of years. To destroy can be the foolish act of a single day.' He asked the electorate 'to think over the trust you hold for yourselves, your children and your grandchildren'—and to vote Conservative.

In the last days each side gave indications of confidence. Opinion polls were showing the Conservatives drawing away from Labour, and stock-exchange prices were beginning to bound upwards. However, Mr. Phillips could say on October 6th:

> 'If there is no swing at all, our canvass returns show that we can not only wipe out the Tory majority but get our nose in front—if we get our people to the poll.
>
> 'Any swing in our favour will give us the working majority that we consider to be essential, but it will be up to our party supporters and workers everywhere to make certain that the maximum poll is yielded . . . All we want to get a working majority is a high poll.'

It is certain that when Mr. Gaitskell said on October 4th 'the spirit of victory is in the air' he firmly believed that he was going to win. Lord Poole claimed that the Conservatives were holding their own, although the 'don't knows' were sufficient to bring in a variety of results. Two members of the Cabinet, Mr. Butler and Mr. Watkinson, made statements which indicated that they expected a close finish, but the Prime Minister seems to have been more optimistic, even if he did not join Mr. Macleod in anticipatng an increased Conservative majority.

[*The Conservative Party increased its representation in the House of Commons from the 344 seats it won in 1955 to 365. Labour slipped from 277 to 258 and the Liberals retained their 6 seats. The Conservative share of the popular vote declined from 49.7 per cent to 49.4 per cent, but Labour lost still more, from 46.4 to 43.8 per cent. The Liberals gained from 2.7 per cent to 5.9 per cent, principally because they entered about twice as many candidate as in 1955.—Ed. note.*]

B. France

33. The 1958 French Parliamentary Election Campaign*

BY PHILIP M. WILLIAMS AND MARTIN HARRISON

This description and analysis of the first parliamentary election campaign of the Fifth French Republic illustrates the manner and tone in which policies and candidates have been submitted for the expression of voter judgment in the Gaullist regime. The extent to which campaigns were directed locally and the personality of one man dominated the campaign may be contrasted with the British election campaign discussed above. For the programs and statements of principles of some of the parties, see pp. 93-95, 106-108, 114-116, 123-124, 144-146, 159-160 above.

The election of 1958 was not a battle between well-drilled armies fighting a nation-wide campaign. It was a series of hundreds of local skirmishes, fought from village to village by candidates and relatively small groups of supporters—often with little concern for what might be happening a dozen miles away. National campaigning through the mass media, with party leaders stumping the country, has never been known in France. This time there was less attempt than ever. General de Gaulle had asked his ministers not to speak outside their own constituencies. With a storm brewing against the retiring deputies, even the most comfortably entrenched party leaders felt ensuring their re-election to be their first duty. There were no speaking tours, though occasional candidates went to a neighbouring constituency to help out a friend. The absence of a national press also explained why there was no national debate on the principal issues of the election.

Only one medium could reach the whole country simultaneously: broadcasting. Some left-wing critics saw the RTF as one of the instruments of the UNR victory. The radio, they alleged, invariably said 'Gaullists' in the same breath as 'UNR,' thereby bringing the electorate to accept the UNR as *the*

* From "France 1958" in D. E. Butler, Philip M. Williams, Martin Harrison, Zbigniew Pelczynski, Basil Chubb, and R. R. Farquharson, *Elections Abroad,* Macmillan, London, 1959, pp. 55-72. Reprinted by permission. Non-bibliographical footnotes omitted.

Gaullist Party. But such complaints were few compared with the referendum—the various political groups in the cabinet were now in competition. The twelve parties with seventy-five or more candidates were allotted one five-minute broadcast on television, on the national radio network, and on the regional stations. (The latter gave seventy candidates a chance to speak.)

No party made the most of the opportunity. Speakers were still script-bound and unrehearsed. Since little could profitably be said in five minutes the candidates stuck chiefly to rolling generalities. Considering the importance of local interests the regional broadcasts were treated with surprising casualness. In the Radical South-West M. Félix Gaillard, the party's national President, made the regional broadcast instead of a local candidate. At the opposite extreme, M. Vincent Badie, ostensibly speaking for the CR (right-wing Radical) candidates, used his entire five minutes to campaign for his own election in Montpellier, and M. Paul Reynaud spent all his efforts on attacking the MRP (Christian democrats), who were dangerous opponents in his own constituency—but were his party's allies elsewhere. Only two of the twelve speakers from Toulouse even mentioned the word 'wine,' while economic arguments were illustrated by Parisian statistics. At heart, neither the candidates nor the parties thought such fleeting appearances could help their cause. They were probably right. *Renouveau et Fidélité,* doomed to utter defeat, gave first-rate broadcasts; the CNI (Independents) and the UNR were among the worst.

Even the parties did not count for much once the election got under way. By British standards many national party headquarters might almost as well not exist—apart from the UNR (discussed later) and the Communists, who are an exception to most generalisations. The Socialists, who have a name for organisation, are about as well-staffed as the British Liberal Party. Most, even of the well-established parties, are scattered round Paris, in old, dingy, and unsuitable premises, with tiny staffs—three to five responsible officials, four to ten typists at most. Often the former disappear from Paris to stand as candidates when election time comes around, leaving the office to their juniors—who sometimes do not even know the party's policy. So small a headquarters cannot exercise control over the party in the country. One ex-premier, it was admitted, would 'of course' accept Communist votes on the second ballot in defiance of party policy, and 'of course' nothing would happen to him. (He never got the chance—he had to retire after the first ballot.) Indeed, the centre may know very little of the goings-on it is supposed to control—a request for a list of Radical candidates was answered apologetically, 'I'm awfully sorry, but I don't even have one myself.' As for the newer parties the DCF (dissident Christian democrats) replied to a similar request, 'I'm afraid the only list is in M. Bidault's pocket, and he's out.'

Candidates could look to their party for propaganda—though the UFD, (left anti-Gaullist alliance) remembering its inability to distribute its posters during the referendum, left these entirely to the constituencies. Candidates were often hesitant to accept 'Parisian' propaganda, fearing that the bright, attractive, professional posters would shock their more conservative supporters. Often 'the party' meant merely a useful label, a force to be reckoned with when withdrawals had to be negotiated, and perhaps a share-out from the election fund.

The UNR was the single striking exception to this shoe-string organisation. Spacious headquarters in the fashionable Avenue Georges V had been put at its disposal by business interests; with soft carpets, strip lighting, television sets, a chattering teleprinter, and a large staff working behind glass

partitions it was the picture of metallic efficiency. Several senior officials were public-relations experts, fresh from the referendum campaign, impressed by American ideas, technicians rather than 'enthusiasts.' They had drawn up the UNR's national posters and leaflets, and even written many candidates' election addresses. Throughout the campaign they gave advice and kept an eye on electoral law. A press relations officer was charged with replying immediately to any article that merited it. Out in the provinces many UNR candidates seem to have carried on with the traditional campaign quite unimpressed, but the UNR's careful cultivation of the press may have helped create the feeling that it was a force to be reckoned with. UNR headquarters' activities were unremarkable by British standards—in France they were a startling innovation.

It was, in fact, a candidates' campaign. For many the official opening of the campaign on November 3 marked the final lap, more than a beginning. For years they had been working up through minor local offices to the small-town *mairie:* now came their bid for Paris. The *sortants* had been cossetting their constituency against this very day. But others had had no thought of standing until a week or so before.

The campaigning fell heavily on the candidates themselves. Only the Socialists and Communists and, more rarely, the Gaullists and MRP, boasted significant local organisations—though even they could call on only small numbers for help. Many right-wing candidates had the help of a few friends and acquaintances—apart from what they paid for. Independents were often even worse placed. 'Of course I'm late,' one of them snapped on arriving at a meeting; 'I've got to stick all my own posters.'

Help from party members was not as vital as in Britain. They organised meetings, went out bill-posting, and heckled at opposition meetings. But the distribution of election addresses was carried out by the *mairies,* and canvassing of electors by party workers was generally held an unthinkable intrusion except in a few Communist strongholds. Polling is on a Sunday, and cars and knockers-up are not used. Outside the Left, few candidates had permanent party headquarters. Some set up makeshift committee rooms in empty shops, but many campaigned from their homes.

In Paris the candidates' *permanences* were almost always deserted. The Paris Socialists operated from three large rooms, to which entrance was almost blocked on the eve of poll by tons of undistributed literature. The single room occupied by the PSA (leftwing Socialists) would have raised eyebrows even in the Gorbals. But the worst was one of *Renouveau et Fidélité's* Paris offices. It lay at the top of six flights of rickety, unlit stairs off one of the seedier *quais.* The room itself ten feet by five, looked out on to a crumbling courtyard. A young girl clerk, sitting at a battered typewriter on a littered table, welcomed her visitors as if she had spoken to no one else for hours. She was bursting with helpfulness; she produced a poster, but beyond that, she did not as much as know the address of her party headquarters. Then, looking round at the squalor in which she worked she added, 'You see, we haven't any money.'

Even the well-established parties were not very wealthy. One spent about ten million francs (£7,000) on the national campaign, others seven to ten times that sum. All candidates of one party received the same subsidy; those of another were rationed according to their chances; in a third there was plenty of help in propaganda material but none in cash. It was not difficult for any candidate of an established party, or well-to-do independent, to raise the million francs (£700) needed for a full-scale constituency campaign. If he won 5% of the vote, his deposit and the cost of his election

addresses and posters (perhaps half-a-million francs in all) were returned to him; at a pinch he could manage on half as much again. At the other extreme a notorious spender in Paris was said to have invested (unsuccessfully) ten million francs. Under the new electoral system, one party official complained that campaigning cost more, since the same ideas and programme would no longer serve for identical propaganda throughout a department. But another party with more money and local influence, and less ideological baggage, rejoiced that it cost less; a candidate could now do far more for himself, and no longer needed to pay agents to look after a district or an important group of opinion leaders on his behalf.

Whatever the help he received from his party and from friends and militants, the candidate had to shoulder the main burden, especially since the return to *scrutin d'arrondissement* * had made candidates' personalities more important than ever. They usually saw to their own election propaganda. This was often as cautious as tradition decreed. The officially prescribed election address—a single sheet of low-grade newsprint, ten inches by eight inches—admittedly gave little scope for imagination. Candidates developed the favourite points in their platform, headed them with a photograph, and recalled their 'qualifications.' It was thought useful to mention not only political experience but wartime decorations, resistance activity, being a 'father of six,' and work in farmers' or ex-servicemen's organisations. In country districts the occupation was thought to carry weight. No matter how big a landowner a candidate might be, invariably he termed himself 'farmer.' In the Midi lawyers with a back-garden vineyard preferred to be known as 'winegrower.' One candidate, a cess-pool emptier, chose to campaign as a plumber.

Nor did the posters afford much evidence that the referendum campaign had been a lesson in political publicity. Many candidates simply printed their election address as a poster and stuck it on the official panels. With their hundreds of words of fine print and hodge-podge of type faces, scarcely any addresses showed any imagination. Almost every poster and election address presupposed that Frenchmen are political animals of unlimited stamina to be reached through material which is wholly unreadable.

Most candidates chose to fight a 'traditional' campaign in every way. This meant that they had to see and be seen at every function in the constituency. On November 11 they turned out practically to a man, in uniform and decorations. In the Midi they enthusiastically played *boules* or *pétanque* and vied in their knowledge of *patois*. In Ariège (where there was no MRP candidate) a Socialist pointedly attended a mass for the repose of the late Pope; it was said that M. Jailon, who beat Mr. Edgar Faure in Jura, never missed a funeral, and that M. Lainé (a CNI *sortant*) attended every baptism as well, and even knew the name of all the cows in the constituency.

Many candidates felt they had to keep almost continuously on the move. Day after day they travelled from farm to farm, asking for votes, talking about drainage, hopes of a new bridge, or the price of wheat. Though such personal campaigning was less common in the cities, M. Gaston Defferre was reported to turn out every morning to shake as many hands as possible. Door-to-door visiting was particularly favoured in Marseilles—though it was alleged to be more 'bar to bar' in practice. But it was never clear how far voters really expected to be personally courted. While M. Ducos, who survived triumphantly the

* Single-member electoral constituencies (*Ed. note*).

Radical debacle in Haute-Garonne, toured the farms zealously, his pockets stuffed with sweets for the children, a former minister, M. Martinaud-Déplat, who worked just as assiduously, came bottom of the poll. Some candidates obviously disapproved of personal campaigning. M. Moatti said of his CNI opponent in central Paris. 'She has no programme, and her only merit is to have worn out four pairs of shoes during the campaign, climbing stairs to go and bother the electors.'

Many rural candidates preferred to travel from *mairie* to *mairie*. In Basses-Alpes all the candidates toiled in this way from nine in the morning to eleven at night, covering one canton a day with fifteen minutes at the *Mairie* of every commune. Voters could go to the *mairie* to tell the candidate their wishes; delegations from farmers' associations went to hear his views and demand assurances. If sufficient villagers turned out he would say a few words impartially on the beauties of the village, the inspiring leadership of General de Gaulle, the place of agriculture in a renovated France, and his own election.

If few voters could spare the time to see them during working hours, candidates did not worry. They had made the gesture: it would be remembered. Their visits were often made chiefly with an eye to the mayor and his councillors (which even the tiniest commune can boast). They hoped to reach the electors at second hand through the dozen or so *notables*. During the campaign many of the hundred or two villagers, living clustered around the mairie, would ask the members of this influential group, 'Well, what do you think?' They could report the candidates' views and pledges and, most important, show which candidate had their own goodwill. Tradition attributed an immense importance to the favour of this tiny group. So important were they that at eighty M. Paul Reynaud visited every one of the sixty-seven communes in his constituency, while M. Gaillard claimed to have held 140 'meetings' of this type during the campaign. M. Edgar Faure held lunches for the *notables* of Jura, while M. Mendès-France invited sixty local mayors to a reception at Louviers. M. Bidault conducted his entire campaign by visits to the communes—while Mr. Pinay's consisted of a banquet for all the leading *notables* in his constituency. However, in the towns and cities, though candidates cultivated the shop-keepers' organisations, there was no such compact group in such close daily contact with the electors.

The evenings were devoted to meetings—again more popular in the country than in towns. Few city candidates spoke more than once in a day, while in the country they might speak at three meetings. No candidate in Paris held more than thirteen meetings; the average was between five and six. But in the cities there were more often special meetings for young voters, workers, or small tradesmen and self-employed craftsmen—for which hotels and cafés had to be hired. In central Paris meetings for shopkeepers were the rule—even for the Communists. The traditional election meeting was little changed. This account of one of M. Mitterrand's was true of hundreds of others during any night of the campaign:

> 'The mist has fallen, with the night, on the woods of Morvan. The municipal council's tiny meeting room is well warmed. In the corner a barrack-stove is roaring away. On the walls a coloured print of Sadi Carnot (President of the Republic, 1887-1894), and a chilly marble bust of Marianne, inscribed "Liberty, Equality, Fraternity," and draped in a tricolour.
>
> 'The room fills quickly. There are only men. Real peasant types, short, thick-set and swarthy. All genera-

tions are represented. The young men in muddy gumboots and leather jackets, the not-so-young in wooden sabots and old-fashioned hunting coats, with ornamental buttons. Twenty-five persons in all.

'The mayor, fresh from the fields in his working clothes, explains:

' "He always gets a big audience. He's always late, but they all know that. He likes a man-to-man chat."

' "You're one of his supporters?"

' "Oh no, I'm Communist. But he certainly knows how to put things across."

'Here is M. Mitterrand at last, sober and elegant, as at the National Assembly. He shakes hands with all those present, takes his place behind the simple table.

'The mayor presents him; he begins his speech. First, local matters. He has long been deputy for this region. How much he cares for it. Formerly he loved the whole department. Now he loves above all his constituency, from Château-Chinon to Clamecy. So much so that those friends he still keeps in Nevers and Cosne reproach him. So much the worse for them. Mind you, he thinks highly of Cosne and Nevers, but not as much as this land round Clamecy. He *adores* Pousseaux, Grenois, Trucy, Villiers, Oisy, and Dornecy. He wants every village in the Morvan to live better, to have water, electricity. He will see to it . . . This is a family chat, a word whispered in your ear by the fire-side . . . He recalls the hardships of these neglected Morvan-ites, the meetings he had held in the glow of an acetylene lamp, when he could scarcely see his questioners' faces . . . And so to national questions. To the rise of Black Africa, to the crisis of May, and finally to his NON, and the new constitution.

'And then the questions. A stocky farmer rises to air his bitter complaint. In the past month the price of meat has dropped 100 francs a kilo. "Think of it, Monsieur le Ministre, we lose 30,000 francs a carcass. This constitution's all very well—but we've got veal to sell." He sympathises. It is the government's fault, of course. Another questioner insists—for no apparent reason—that General Leclerc died in Paris. "No, no," says Mitterrand, "in an aeroplane accident at Colomb-Béchar." Unconvinced, his questioner grumbles quietly in the corner, while the final point is raised. "How many votes did Pflimlin get in the National Assembly?" "Four hundred and four." Mitterrand replies, but adding courteously, "though I could be wrong."

'The meeting is over. M. Mitterrand shakes hands yet again, and climbs wearily in his car. Clamecy is eight kilometres away, and his tenth meeting of the day is waiting. He is already late.' *

The formula was little different in the towns. Meetings must *never* start less than half an hour late; audiences come and go as they please—an essential, for otherwise they might have to sit for as much as three hours on the comfortless benches of a school hall, listening to up to six speakers. Meetings are rarely disrupted by hecklers. But once the orators have had their say time must be left for question and *contradiction*—a chance for members of the audience to challenge the candidate's views.

Sometimes these *contradicteurs* are ordinary members of the audience who have been stirred to reply to something they have heard during the evening. Sometimes they are spokesmen of interest groups who hope to extract pledges from the candidate, while occasionally they are members of other groups like the European Federalists, who cash in on the presence of a

* *Le Figaro*, November 15-16, 1958.

ready-made audience. But usually they are supporters of an opposing candidate—or the opponent himself. Instead of candidates preaching to tiny groups of the converted, and completely ignoring each other, *contradiction* can introduce a real dialogue between the parties. The resulting clash of personalities and policies can enliven even the prosiest evening.

The final meeting of the conservative parties' campaign, at the Salle de la Mutualité in Paris, was attended by about 700 people—including a band of extreme right-wing troublemakers who entered the gallery after M. Lafay's speech. They howled down M. Duchet when he attacked 'les colonels de division,' and when M. Bidault was introduced as former President of the National Council of the Resistance their cries of *'Tant pis!'* mingled with the polite applause. Launching into an attack on Soviet aggression, he was suddenly interrupted by a very fat listener shouting, 'And what about the pact you signed in Moscow in 1944? You've forgotten, haven't you?' The fat man was promised a chance to have his say later, and at the end of the speech cries of 'A la tribune!' accompanied him to the microphone. 'This eloquent M. Bidault,' he began his rapid vehement *contradiction*. 'How many times has he been a Minister? And M. Lafay, he's been a Radical candidate, he served under a Communist Minister of Health, and he's been a Minister himself—I forget how often. Perhaps he didn't make anything out of it—I make no charges because I don't know. But these men, they founded the System, they lived on it, supported it, filled up its governments, and now they are clamouring "Down with the System!" Well, if it was so rotten, what stopped them saying so sooner?' He stepped down, to a good deal of applause, and was followed by an elderly gentleman of military bearing who explained that he had served from 1914 to 1918 with a Moroccan regiment. Briefly, courteously, but with unmistakable bitterness he made his point.

> 'M. Duchet told you some shocking stories about our Moroccan friends, who today are paying for their friendship for France by forced labour on the roads. They are true stories. He said there are 180,000 Frenchmen from Morocco and 100,000 from Tunisia who have been driven from their homes and forced to emigrate to France. That is true too. But why didn't he add that none of this would have happened if M. Duchet and his party had not deserted these people in 1955?'

The third *contradicteur,* a young man who would not speak into the microphone, was almost inaudible and his voice was soon drowned by jeers; apparently he was attacking the purges of 1944-1946. After a brief and unconvincing reply from M. Lafay, and a longer and far more skilful one from M. Bidault, the meeting closed.

Sometimes *contradicteurs* systematically harried their opponents: 'M. Frédéric-Dupont: why do you say you have no party label, when we know quite well you are backed by the CNI?' The explanation followed. 'Well, M. Frédéric-Dupont, that's very interesting—but you explained it quite differently at Avenue Duquesne last night, didn't you?' 'Contradictory' meetings were often specially arranged in Paris, and such challenges were far more frequently accepted than in Britain. In north-west Paris five candidates met to argue against one another.

There were the usual gloomy reports of badly attended meetings. M. Poujade once spoke to nine electors at Saumur, M. Mendès-France sometimes had no more than two or three (and sometimes as many as 300), while M. Goudoux, a Communist deputy in Corrèze, once found only the mayor waiting for him. Yet there were also reports that M. Edgar Faure spoke to

audiences of 100 to 150 despite both fog and snow in a 'bad' area, and that in a village of fifty houses he had an audience of forty. Often 10% of the population turned out in country districts, while the Chaban-Delmas-Chassin duel filled a hall for 6,000 with 3,000 left standing outside. General Chassin alone once attracted 400 to a meeting in a schoolroom without chairs.

Elsewhere meetings seemed to be losing their appeal. In Nord they were said to be out of date, although the Socialists and MRP held a few. In Paris and Marseilles many candidates preferred to advertise that they would be in a local bar during the evening. In Calvados M. Bisson, who beat the former premier Joseph Laniel, held no meetings; and several other candidates won similarly effortless victories. M. Reynaud was one of the few candidates who was felt to have gained strength through his meetings. Many other candidates—particularly in the towns—held them only because they feared adverse criticism if they were dropped.

Some candidates tried to break away from the older-style campaign—though there was a scornful note in opponents' references to M. Filliol, 'whose publicity car, covered in slogans, ploughs our cantons.' In Nord film shows were the vogue; MRP, Socialists, and Communists all used them. Fernandel and Tarzan were featured on the Socialist programme at Lille; the latter drew a large audience, but only twelve persons in it were of voting age. A CNI candidate in Côte d'Or tape-recorded his speeches to save his voice, while a candidate in Paris distributed records of his speech to friendly juke-box owners. M. Charles Hernu arranged for his election address to be available by telephone. Thousands of calls poured in, and three other candidates followed his lead—but M. Hernu was well beaten. (The telephone authorities in Paris also arranged for the different party programmes to be heard by dialling SVP, each party being allotted six hours for this service.)

That was the limit of the legal campaign. Apart from their quota of one election address, two small posters, and two medium-size ones (on the official panels), candidates could distribute no propaganda on pain of losing their seat if elected. Had the electoral law been observed to the letter it would have been a drab campaign. But candidates showed as much ingenuity as ever in getting around the law, while many openly flouted it. The line between ingenuity and illegality was never clear. The expensive posters on commercial hoardings, which said 'Union for the New Republic—Make your OUI respected,' were probably legal, as they mentioned neither 'Vote' nor the name of a candidate. But almost all the posters which sprouted night by night on building sites, trees, and telegraph poles, and the tracts distributed at the exits of the Metro, were clearly illegal.

Literary politicians were the most favourably placed for campaigning extensively within the law. M. Jean-Pierre Giraudoux took newspaper space and plastered the walls of the Latin Quarter with posters reminding voters how highly the critics praised his play, *Un Roi*. A small section of northern Paris, not known for its literary appetite, was plastered overnight with advertisements for Dr. André Soubiran's *Les Hommes en Blanc*. Dr. Soubiran was the CR candidate. M. Habib-Deloncle advertised his lecture on 'The French Renewal' only in one half of the XVIth arrondissement. M. Cayeux, a retiring MRP deputy, suddenly decided to hold a public meeting on the reconversion of Montparnasse. Two Communist councillors—one a candidate in north-east Paris—felt the need to remind voters, on posters bearing the official tricolour flash, that they 'received' on certain days. MRP candidates almost everywhere took to attending well-adver-

tised meetings of parent-teacher associations, where they could show their support for church schools.

Newspapers were a favourite campaign weapon. Many local dailies and weeklies were controlled or influenced by political figures. In Seine-Maritime M. Bettencourt, a CNI *sortant,* had a paper in each canton of the constituency. In Eure, M. Rémy Montagne distributed free four issues of his local paper to every elector in the constituency in his campaign to unseat M. Mendès-France. In Nord, M. Reynaud distributed 20,000 copies of his paper, and M. Eugène Thomas, Socialist, 45,000.

Candidates backed by local or party periodicals could have them run off supplements. The most sought-after journals were those of ex-service, agricultural, business, or taxpayers' organisations. Their format and editorial services could be used for special editions, apparently coming from less-prejudiced sources than the MRP's *Forces Nouvelles* or the Communist *L'Humanité Dimanche. L'Express* produced the neatest journalistic stunt of the election, a special edition for the Xth arrondissement of Paris. On the cover, the face of Group Captain Peter Townsend was replaced by that of Mme. Brigitte Gros, the UFD candidate (and sister of the editor). A eulogy of Mme. Gros appeared instead of an article on General Massu. Otherwise the editions were identical.

Candidates who lacked such helpful friends sometimes invented a periodical for the occasion. They carefully gave it a bogus serial number and fictitious subscription and advertising rates. M. Lafay circulated a campaign newspaper purporting to be published before the campaign opened, but blithely referring to events later than its 'publication date.' Yet without such subterfuges, candidates without the support of a local newspaper would suffer an unfair advantage.

Other candidates treated the electoral law even more cavalierly. M. Héon, the RGR (moderate Radical) candidate in Eure, flew over Bernay on market day with 'Vote Héon' painted on his aircraft's wings. (He was promptly fined for low flying.) Mme. Brigitte Gros distributed comb-and-mirror sets to concièrges. Later she promised a complete layette to any constituent who gave birth to a child on polling day—surely a promise made for publicity rather than corruption. All this was small beer compared with Oise, long notorious for its costly campaigning, politically dominated by the 'proprietor of the department,' M. Dassault, and by M. Robert Hersant (technically a Radical). Both were millionaires; they fought impressively lavish campaigns in separate constituencies. In 1956 M. Hersant was the wonder and scandal of the country. There were the Laurel and Hardy film shows for the children, the Hersant circus, the children's holiday camp at Nice, the neon signs over the skylines of Beauvais and Compiègne, and the aeroplane writing his initials in the sky. M. Hersant had been elected, invalidated, then elected again. Now his campaign was relatively subdued. His newspaper, *Oise-Matin,* ran the Robert Hersant Club, membership of which was free, offering help to the needy and free legal advice. Thanks to his paper M. Hersant again ran his circus to packed houses, swelled by free transport, and distributed gift parcels to the poor. In the neighbouring constituency there was 'not a telegraph post that did not flash "Dassault, Dassault, Dassault" in fluorescent letters.' Long before the election *L'Oise Libérée* reached thousands of electors free, while during the campaign M. Dassault also distributed free his national illustrated weekly *Jours de France* in such quantities that it was said he had to compensate the postmen to avoid a strike. His generosity became a by-word in the constituency. There were tales of his paying for re-

pairs to church steeples, of gifts of scooters to the local sports club's tombola. Never, it was said, had so many food parcels been distributed to the poor, to the parents of young children. Both M. Dassault and M. Hersant were triumphantly returned. However, MM. Lafay, Moscovitch, and Pierre Taittinger, who had all fought conspicuously expensive campaigns, were just as decisively defeated; and M. Hersant's neighbour and protégé M. Strauss, who shared in his campaign, was frustrated by the local Socialists' decision to vote UNR in order to keep him out.

Illegal campaigning, on the grand scale or the petty, was widespread. After the election the Constitutional Council was called on to unseat several deputies for irregularities. Many appeals were rejected solely because they could not have altered the result. It invalidated only four deputies, but recognised that they had done no more than many others elsewhere. In fact, the electoral law had fallen into such disrespect that it would have been imprudent to enforce it. The CNI, protesting against its two invalidations, claimed that 'the reasons advanced could justify the invalidation of almost every one of the deputies of the National Assembly, for in many constituencies the widest tolerance was accorded, both to bill-posting and to the distribution of circulars.' It might be doubted how far a committee of lawyers could judge the point at which illegal campaigning might have changed the result.

Although the law might be trifled with, the campaign was the most orderly for years. Of course a few constituencies had rowdy meetings. In Haute-Garonne M. Bourgès-Maunoury was barracked by Socialists, and M. Alfred Coste-Floret could not get a hearing—though at the same meeting M. Bidault did. M. Lecanuet's meetings in Seine-Maritime were sometimes broken up by noisy opponents; supporters of General de Bénouville harried M. Teitgen in Ille-et-Vilaine, and the huge Chaban-Delmas-Chassin joint meeting was very heated. But in Lot M. Juskiewenski was heard in 'religious silence.' Neither M. Baylet in Tarn-et-Garonne nor M. Caillavet in Lot-et-Garonne had any questions, contradictions—or applause. Even in 'red' Corrèze the campaign was always 'courteous, correct, and even moderate.' In Paris a UNR candidate and his substitute advertised: 'François Missoffe and Jean de Préaumont invite all who wish, including their opponents, to come and outline their point of view at their meetings, freely and with every courtesy.'

The campaign in Yonne was so friendly that four candidates toured the villages holding their meetings in common (even the Communist agreed to join them, until headquarters made him withdraw) and the winner stood the others a dinner.

Serious exceptions were rare. Socialist and Communist bill-stickers clashed at Toulon, and M. Mendès-France's eve-of-poll meeting was broken up by fascists of the banned *Jeune Nation* group, who also attacked other UFD meetings, sometimes with cudgels and acid bottles. The Poujadists, who systematically harried *sortants* in 1956, made only two major incidents. In Charente-Maritime M. Faraud, a Socialist *sortant,* was beaten up, and in Jura a gang of Poujadists from Saône-et-Loire broke up a meeting held by their old enemy M. Edgar Faure. But most incidents arose from the anger of the moment, such as the brawl at M. de Gracia's meeting in Gironde over a questioner who was said to have sold fish to the Germans. A UNR supporter at a meeting in Var was debagged when he imprudently attacked Corsicans. He finished his speech in egg-shell blue underpants and 'rose bon-bon' socks. The quietness of the election mainly reflected the lethargy of the Communists, the effacement of the Poujadists, and the generally low emotional temperature

—but the parties realised that a brawling campaign had lost votes in 1956 and would win none this time.

Nowhere was lethargy more marked than in the largest and most organised party—the Communists. They had never fought a more dispirited campaign. Though they were deeply shaken by their defeat at the referendum, and aware that the new electoral system was sure to cost them many seats, their malaise was of longer standing. Despite criticism of its 'soft' line on Algeria by opponents of the war, the Party knew that the terrorism of the National Liberation Front was rousing racism among its working-class supporters—and even in its own ranks. During the campaign the Somme and Marseilles Communists were reported particularly exasperated by sabotage of oil refineries. Some members were still wondering nervously whether the Party was going to be outlawed.

The leadership was negative and defeatist from the beginning. It fought under the slogan 'To assure the presence in the National Assembly of a working class Republican opposition.' *L'Humanité,* reporting from the constituencies, dared not prophecy the success even of sitting Communists. The traditional reports of 'little Popular Fronts' among left-wingers, still evident at the referendum, had all but vanished. The Communists claimed that 'we are the only Party which has no responsibility for the failure of the Fourth Republic,' but for all M. Thorez' claim that they were a 'new' party, his broadcast went wearily back to the iniquities of the Marshall Plan and the war in Korea. They were indeed embarrassed for issues; they dared not fight de Gaulle and the constitution, and though they repeatedly attacked the cost of the Algerian war, they ventured only oblique statements of their own solutions, and chose to fight chiefly on the economic situation.

In some areas fears about farm prices, unemployment, or the Common Market were real enough. *L'Humanité* was filled with gloomy reports of closing factories and workers' hardships. Elsewhere the Communists turned municipal administration to advantage. M. René Cance, Communist mayor of Le Havre, campaigned on 'housing, costly new schools, the municipal stadium and sports centre, the medical-social centre, the central market, abattoirs which will doubtless be the largest in France, not to mention the extraordinary Museum of the Fine Arts, an immense glass cage of revolutionary conception, seen by every ship on arrival in France.' Control of the local council could sometimes be turned to more dubious uses. At Montreuil the municipality removed the official panels to prevent M. Frenay from informing voters of his withdrawal in favour of the UNR.

Conscious of their weakness and isolation, the Communists campaigned unenthusiastically. Though hitherto their posters were always the first up, their bill-sticking this time was patchy. In several constituencies they held no meetings (or failed to advertise them). In others they made only token appearances, at which subdued groups of the faithful sat in lifeless silence. At Boulogne, where the Party had held five meetings a day in 1956, it had all but disappeared; at Aix-en-Provence the Communists 'surprised by their timidity'; in Var they 'wavered' and 'lacked vigour.' Their old enemies, MM. Mollet and Moch, were left unharried by contradictors. But where they had a chance the Communists campaigned energetically and expensively. Their attempts to save the Party's leader, Maurice Thorez, were repeated in many other *sortants'* constituencies. In Marseilles, where the Party was generally 'discreet and lacking bite,' it threw all its efforts into the rescue of François Billoux. Yet, even in these constituencies, Communist enthusiasm fell below previous elections, even the referendum. While

the poverty of their campaign partly explains the Communist defeat, it was also a clear indication before polling day of the debacle to come.

This lethargy of the Communists was particularly striking because of their traditional militancy. But the whole campaign was unusually drab. 'No banners, no big posters, no brawls—why, you can't call *this* an election', snorted a Marseilles taxi-driver, spitting with contempt. Reading their daily papers, listening to the radio bulletins, the voters must have known an election was in progress. Yet they had little direct contact with it. Over the whole country nine voters in ten had never been to a meeting, while it is doubtful how much they read of the uninviting propaganda. There was nothing approaching the elaborate publicity of the referendum campaign. In the rural areas it could still be argued that the candidates' views had percolated down through the network of *notables* and acquaintances. In the bigger, impersonal towns, with no such recognised opinion leaders, even this did not happen. To all appearances most of the candidates had been engaging in an ineffective ritual. Yet, despite the confusion of Gaullist labels, the conformism of all the major parties, and an average of six candidates to a constituency, on November 23 four Frenchmen in five went to the polls and made their choice.

[Election results:

Parties (and associates)	*1st Ballot Percentage*	*2nd Ballot Percentage*	*Deputies Elected*
Communists	18.9	20.7	10
Socialists	15.5	13.8	40
Radicals	12.9	7.7	37
M.R.P.	11.6	7.5	57
N.RU.	17.6	26.4	189
Independents	19.9	23.6	132
Extreme Right	3.3	—	1

—*Ed. note*]

C. Germany

34. A Parliamentary Election in a German City*

BY KLAUS SCHUETZ

In contrast to the descriptions above of British and French elections, the following selection treats the campaign in a single German city, Cologne. Nevertheless, because all three significant national political parties were active, it is a fair microcosm of the national campaign. The extent to which issues and candidates had a national orientation is readily apparent. For the national party policy statements and election manifestoes for the 1961 election, see pp. 116-122, 125-134, 147-158 above.

The results in Cologne were awaited with particular interest. The city is the seat of Cardinal Frings, a prince of the Church extremely active in politics. Cologne had seen the beginnings of Konrad Adenauer's career: he had been the city's mayor from 1917 until 1933. Three-quarters of the city's population is Roman Catholic, and basing itself on the tradition of the Centre Party the CDU (Christian Democratic Union) had until 1956 emerged as the strongest party in every election. It held all three city seats in both the first and the second Bundestag, polling 52 per cent of votes in 1953. Nevertheless the Social Democrats entered the campaign with confidence: in the municipal elections of October 1956 they had scored a remarkable success, polling 46 per cent as against the CDU's 42 per cent. The City Statistical Office called this 'a clear victory' unequalled even in 1919, and in a cautious commentary gave the SPD (Social Democratic Party) a chance of winning at least one of the seats.

The city is divided into three constituencies, Cologne I and II on the left and Cologne III on the right bank of the Rhine. No separate statistics of the social structure of the individual constituencies are available, but in the city as a whole 73 percent of inhabitants were Catholic, 21 percent Protestant; just 17 percent of the total population consisted of post-war im-

* "The 1957 election in Cologne," from U. W. Kitzinger, *German Electoral Politics,* Oxford University Press, London, 1960, pp. 341-349. Reprinted by permission.

migrants, 10 percent being expellees from the territories east of the Oder-Neisse line. In 1950 over 40 percent of the inhabitants were workers, nearly 30 percent employees and civil servants, and nearly 20 percent were described as 'independent without employment' —largely no doubt pensioners of one kind or another.

The Candidates. The parties began their preparations early in the summer and the big parties had already put up their candidates before the summer holidays began. The Federalist Union, the Centre Party, the League of Germans, and the Union of the Middle Class (who would all have needed to collect signatures to put up constituency candidates) only competed for list votes: the nomination papers of two prospective FU candidates on the left bank were rejected since some of the signatures were too illegible to be checked in the electoral register.

The CDU candidate in Cologne I was Aenne Bruksiepe, a housewife aged forty-five. She did not live in Cologne, but had represented the constituency in the second Bundestag and the neighbouring constituency, Cologne II, in the first. Vice-chairman of the German Catholic Women's League and a member of the Federal Executive of the CDU, she took a particular interest in housing, had been a member of the relevant committees in past parliaments, and promised to do everything in her power to prevent Cologne 'losing its character as a result of soulless dwelling-machines.'

In Cologne II the CDU put up the head of the Institute of German Industry, Dr. Fritz Hellwig. A native of the Saar, now aged forty-five, he had represented the constituency of Remscheid-Solingen in the second Bundestag. He had been chairman of the Bundestag Economic Committee, a member of the Federal Executive of the CDU, and was regarded as one of the economic experts of the party. He was the first Protestant to be put up as Bundestag candidate by the Cologne CDU. He succeeded the constituency member Dr. Herman Puender, who declared in letters to the press that he was standing down voluntarily on the grounds of his age.

On the right bank, in Cologne III, the CDU candidate was the federal manager of the Christian Democratic Employees' Association, Hans Katzer. He was thirty-eight years old, born in Cologne, and a member of the Public Services Trade Union. Since 1950 he had been a member of the City Council. He now stood for the Bundestag for the first time, thus taking over the constituency of another CDU trade unionist who had represented it since 1949 and gave no reason for not standing again.

For the city as a whole the CDU had thus obtained a well-balanced team: one woman and one representative each of employers and employees; two Catholics and one Protestant.

In Aenne Bruksiepe's constituency the Social Democrats put up a native of Cologne, Heinrich Hamacher. Aged fifty-eight, he was the party secretary in the Middle Rhine region, had sustained severe wounds in the first world war, and had spent many years after 1933 in prisons and concentration camps. He had been a city councillor since 1946. The SPD's 1953 candidate in the constituency had entered the second Bundestag via the Land list but did not stand again in 1957: this decision seems to have been demanded by the Trade Union Federation, of whose executive he had in the meantime become a member.

The SPD candidate in Cologne II was Hans-Juergen Wischnewski, aged thirty-five, secretary of the Metal Workers' Union in Cologne. He was born in East Prussia, twice wounded in the war, had worked in the metal industry in South Germany, joined the trade union in Cologne in 1952, and was the chairman of the Cologne SPD.

The SPD's candidate in the third

constituency was Heinz Kuehn, a journalist born in the city forty-five years earlier, who had worked in the socialist youth organization before 1933. Forced to emigrate soon after Hitler's advent to power, he became editor-in-chief of the *Rheinische Zeitung* in Cologne after the war and was elected to the Landtag of North Rhine-Westphalia in 1948: there he was the party's whip until 1953, when he entered the Bundestag via the Land list. He was vice-chairman of the Press, Radio, and Film Committee of the Bundestag, and later served on the Foreign Affairs Committee. He was the only candidate of any party who was fighting his constituency for the third time.

Thus one of the SPD candidates was a journalist, the other trade union or party secretaries. Obviously the SPD was not guided by the sociological structure of the electorate in the choice of its candidates.

None of the other candidates could have any reasonable hope of election in a constituency, and they may thus be described more briefly. The nominal nature of their candidatures is borne out, for example, by the FDP's (Free Democratic Party) selection of the veteran chairman of the city party, a business consultant aged seventy, and the BHE's (Refugee and Expellee's League) nomination of a corn-merchant aged seventy-two. The FDP's two other candidates were a lawyer and a woman expellee from Danzig who was a member of the Landtag; the BHE's other two candidates were the local secretary of a non-party society for the promotion of German reunification and a native of Posen (Poznan); the German Party put up its federal Secretary-General, a refugee, and a civil servant in the Federal Press Office, while the DRP (German Reich Party) nominated another refugee, another civil servant, and a thirty-year-old builder's labourer. Two of the FDP candidates were given places on the Land list, while the other smaller parties gave their constituency candidates in Cologne no such second nomination.

The Campaign. There are three main papers in Cologne. The *Koelner Stadt-Anzeiger* is the biggest, with a circulation of 131,000. It tried with some success to be neutral and to give information about the main meetings of all parties. The *Koelnische Rundschau* (90,000) and the *Neue Rhein-Zeitung* (30,000), on the other hand, made no bones about working for the CDU and for the SPD respectively. Both practically confined themselves to reporting meetings of their own party.

The Cologne campaign started with a vow from all parties to fight a fair campaign. The chairman of the Cologne SPD, Wischnewski, had suggested that the parties should meet and so the chairmen of the Cologne SPD, FDP, DP, and BHE signed a declaration that they would see to it that there was no personal or political defamation of character on posters, leaflets, or in speeches, and undertook to utter or admit no propaganda implying that one of the parties had a monopoly of national, Christian, or social conscience. The Christian Democrats refused to sign this agreement and issued a separate statement that their candidates would conduct the campaign fairly and objectively—but that while the CDU did not claim the monopoly of a national, Christian, or social conscience they felt obliged to stress that the CDU was the only party consciously subordinating its programme and its practical policy to Christian principles.

Candidates and speakers observed these undertakings fairly well and there were no serious incidents in the campaign. Only Kuehn had to appear in court for one of his pointed remarks against the Federal Chancellor. Adenauer maintained that Kuehn had told an audience that the Chancellor prayed for a CDU victory every eve-

ning, promising God a sacrifice of 15,000 soldiers—'we have already made a beginning at the Iller.' Kuehn obtained a court injunction forbidding the Chancellor to repeat this report, but the injunction was lifted on 23 August, the court deciding that the Chancellor had 'not acted frivolously or in bad faith.' Occasionally posters were defaced or destroyed, but there were no serious incidents in the campaign. Meetings were orderly with the exception of a few FDP meetings at the outset of the campaign which were disturbed by DRP rowdies. There were hardly any hecklers and few opposition speakers in discussions.

The candidates did not meet during the campaign, and most of them did not even know each other. There were no joint discussions and no personal canvassing. For their election meetings the smaller parties had hired rooms in public houses. These were small—and yet rarely full. The bigger parties, too, complained of bad attendance at their neighbourhood meetings. But they were pleased with the good attendance at party rallies, saying that popular interest and attendance had never been so high.

As elsewhere, the street scene in Cologne was dominated by the CDU's national posters. The CDU's loudspeaker and film vans appeared in fifty public squares in the city. 'Candidates talked to people at works gates,' said the CDU's campaign organizer, 'and they talked to pre-political assemblies which had invited them, even in the laundry of a housing estate.' Apart from these 'pre-political' meetings—which in Cologne meant largely meetings of Catholic organizations—the CDU was the most active of Cologne parties with more than 120 meetings, forty-five of them for women. Katzer made some eighty speeches in Cologne. The other two candidates, being more prominent in the party, had to travel all over the Federal Republic and made only fifty and thirty respectively. Most meetings were addressed by party leaders as well as by candidates, but none of the speakers did more than produce variations on the main themes of the Christian Democratic campaign. Foreign policy was in the foreground: local problems were rarely mentioned.

On 2 September the Middle-Class Committee of the Cologne CDU called a meeting at which a first-rate team, including five members of the Bundestag and three candidates, appeared and spoke of their faith in a liberal economy, personal responsibility, and a social policy of the middle road. Seventeen speakers declared that the middle class had found its political home in the CDU. They appealed specifically to retail traders, artisans, house-owners, doctors, people engaged in trade, farmers, civil servants, and East Germans. The meeting, though somewhat exhausting, was thought a great success.

'The greatest political rally of the CDU since 1945,' announced the loudspeaker van in front of the congress hall in the Trade Fair grounds on 7 September. Dr. Adenauer was to speak. The hall could hold 4,000; roughly 10,000 further attenders who had no tickets were accommodated in adjacent rooms or in tents. In the hall there was a brass band, a little loud for some tastes, but in keeping with the mood of expectancy and the Chancellor's later remark that electoral campaigns could not be conducted by academic discussions but needed simpler and harder weapons. The front rows were thronged with important people, guests of honour and clergy. The interior decoration was in good taste. There were flowers on the rostrum and federal, *Land,* and city crests and colours in the hall. There were no streamers, no posters, no badges, eagles or any of the other current electoral paraphernalia. Adenauer first greeted the visitors outside the hall. Inside he was received with loud applause. He spoke for two hours, occasionally letting himself go in Cologne dialect, and sharply attacked the

Social Democrats and the FDP. A few quotations may illustrate the tenor of the speech:

> My heart is in Cologne and beats for Cologne . . . [*Loud and long applause.*] Why do we consider a Christian party necessary? Firstly because . . . we are fanatical defenders of the freedom and dignity of the individual, secondly because we are accountable to God for all our political actions . . . [*Applause*]. We, and many others, really owe our existence to the United States . . . The United States are stronger than the Soviet Union and will remain so as long as the free world preserves its unity . . . [*Assent and applause*].

No dissenting voices were raised during the speech and the meeting ended with the whole audience rising to sing the national anthem.

The SPD opened its campaign with a large meeting on 26 June at which Erich Ollenhauer spoke. He described the home and foreign policy aims of his party and attacked the 'misuse of Christianity in the election campaign':

> One can think of every possible coalition without the CDU which would not endanger Christianity. The SPD has proved in its local and *Land* policy that it is ready and willing to render unto the churches what is their due, and not only to protect the basic rights of the churches.

He called on the Adenauer Government to resign and was tempestuously applauded for his statement that the SPD's chief aim was the abolition of CDU/CSU hegemony in the Bundestag.

The Cologne SPD only used federal posters. They were not as numerous as those of the CDU, but there was a sufficient spread of them. There were a few unorthodox publicity ventures such as three pretty girls who were sent through the town carrying parasols with the slogans 'Vote for the SPD' and 'Youth votes SPD.'

One of the SPD candidates sent postcards to all householders in his constituency asking them to put their questions on them and to post them to him. Four hundred of these postcards were used and showed a multiplicity of problems: pension reform, housing, tax reform, European unity, older employees, the difficulties of owners of old houses, shop closing hours, capital punishment, the taxation of married couples, equal rights for women, rents, the civil service, support for the retail trade, conscription, and so on. In most cases the candidate himself called on those who had asked to see him, and wrote to the rest.

The SPD did more than other parties to advertise its meetings in the press. It also conducted meetings for special groups of the population such as women and the middle classes. Heinz Kuehn held a joint meeting with a Protestant Professor of Theology on 'The atom bomb and Christian responsibility,' and the Young Socialists of Cologne held a protest meeting against atomic armament.

Prominent SPD speakers, apart from Erich Ollenhauer, included the Minister-President of North Rhine-Westphalia, Fritz Steinhoff, and Carlo Schmid, who addressed an audience of a few thousand in the square in front of the town hall on 9 September. This meeting was the climax and, in a sense, the end of the SPD campaign in Cologne. Schmid put the alternatives facing the electorate as follows:

> The voter must now decide whether to endorse further rearmament, the continuation of a cold war policy, the atom bomb, and increased tension in the world. Whoever is against these dangers will have to give his vote to the SPD on 15th September even if he disagrees with that party in many other respects.

By contrast, the methods of the FDP's campaign showed more local initiative. The Cologne party supplemented the federal poster programme with a poster of their own which symbolized the FDP as a third force between the black and red party blocks. There were also match containers with the party insignia and the inscription: 'And they saw the light—and voted FDP' and cakes of soap bearing the slogan 'For cleanliness in politics—FDP.' A week before the poll the party sent a cavalcade of cars decorated with posters through the city, for the last fortnight a dinghy with the admonition to vote FDP cruised on the Rhine, and on the eve of the election three aircraft trailed party streamers across the sky. In the city centre the party erected a small tower representing the *Fuliusturm*.* 'Away with the tax screw' and 'Down with the *Fuliusturm*' were the slogans, and the party's eve-of-poll meeting was held beside this tower. The finance required for these stunts was raised locally.

The FDP held a number of small meetings, all of them badly attended, and six big ones at which attendance was regarded as very satisfactory. At one of these the "dean" of the Bundestag, Dr. Marie-Elisabeth Lueders, appealed to the women of Cologne to throw aside their political apathy, fulfil their civic duty, and make their numerical preponderance felt also in politics. Speaking before about a thousand people at another such meeting, Reinhold Maier declared, 'The train of state is about to enter a dark tunnel, and the Federal Chancellor's election train is its vanguard.'

The other parties attracted no attention either by their propaganda or by their meetings, and voluntary associations and the Churches do not seem to have played any very noticeable part in the campaign. The Catholic organizations put their meetings at the disposal of candidates and speakers of the CDU, and all parties tried to address a number of special meetings arranged by other organizations. The chairman of the Diocesan Committee of Catholic Organizations in Cologne wrote in the paper of the archdiocese that the Church did not identify itself with any party and was not infusing religion with party politics. It was rather the other way round: the parties could not help 'being subordinated and judged by God's order.' As particular criteria of voting decision he enumerated the salient points of the appeal of the Central Committee of German Catholics: 'Scrutinise works, not words!' He asked all Catholics to exercise the virtues of justice and prudence in the election. Thus a quiet campaign was followed by a quiet election.

The Results. At no election since 1919 had there been such a high turnout as 84 percent—an achievement for a city which earlier commentaries had described as electorally lazy. The CDU scored its greatest victory since its foundation, nearly doubling its vote since 1949 and winning an absolute majority even on the right bank of the river. Its voters had risen by 50,000 compared with 1953 and by 100,000 compared with the city elections of 1956. The SPD had admittedly gained 16,000 votes since 1953, but it had lost 19,000 compared with the city elections, and as a result of the higher turnout its percentage of the poll dropped from 46 to 32 percent—an obvious defeat. The Free Democrats' vote had remained more or less constant, but its share of the poll was the lowest ever, and the other parties only accounted for 4 percent of votes between them.

There were more valid constituency than valid list votes, and this fact partly explains why all the CDU and SPD candidates received more votes than their respective parties. But in addition

* The *Fuliusturm* in Berlin, in which the Prussian State had hoarded its war reserve of gold, had come to symbolize the surplus of tax and other receipts over expenditure hoarded by Fritz Schaeffer as Federal Minister of Finance.

the voters of the Centre, the League of Germans, and the Union of the Middle Class had no candidate of their own to vote for, and a number of adherents of other smaller parties did not wish to waste their constituency vote on a hopeless candidature: they gave it to the candidate of a party not too far removed from their own—a choice of the lesser evil. Thus in the constituency where the CDU had put up its economic expert Hellwig, 23 percent of those who cast their list vote for the German Party did not vote for the German Party's candidate, while in the constituency where the CDU had nominated a trade unionist, the difference between the German Party's list and constituency votes was only 13 percent. It is worth noting that the voters of some parties showed rather greater 'discipline' in this respect: the difference between the BHE's list and constituency votes amounted only to between 6 and 8 percent, and in the case of the DRP to between less than 1 and 4 percent. But then these minor parties—BHE, German Party, and DRP put together—only polled 3 percent of list votes.

Election Results in the City of Cologne

Election	Electors '000	Turnout %	Valid votes '000	CDU		SPD		FDP		Others	
				Votes '000	%	Votes '000	%	Votes '000	%	Votes '000	%
Bundestag 1949	412	72	293	127	31	98	33	34	12	34	12
Bundestag 1953	477	80	372	194	52	121	33	32	9	22	6
Landtag 1954	*489*	*60*	*288*	*134*	*46*	*98*	*34*	*35*	*12*	*21*	*8*
Municipal 1956	*522*	*65*	*338*	*142*	*42*	*155*	*46*	*25*	*7*	*16*	*5*
Bundestag 1957	537	84	431	249	58	137	32	28	7	17	4

Although the election had gone clearly in favour of the CDU in each of the three constituencies, the three defeated SPD candidates also entered the Bundestag: all three were elected via the Land list. Nor were these six the only representatives of Cologne in its 'southern suburb' Bonn: though none of the FDP candidates were so fortunate, two further members of the Cologne SPD and six additional Cologne Christian Democrats were elected on the North Rhine-Westphalian Land list. Cologne can thus boast of the respectable contingent of fourteen members of the third Bundestag all closely associated with the city.

[The 1957 election results for the entire Republic were:

Parties	*Percentage of Valid Votes*	*Candidates Elected*
CDU/CSU	50.2	270
SPD	31.8	169
FDP	7.7	41
BHE	4.6	—
German Party	3.4	17
DRP	1.0	—
Others	1.3	—

—*Ed. note*]

D. The Soviet Union

35. Soviet Election Campaign Speech, 1958*

BY NIKITA S. KHRUSHCHEV

Election campaigns in the Soviet Union do not perform the same political function as they do in the three governmental systems treated above. Nevertheless, they are not without importance in the Soviet political process. They do not permit authentic choices to the Soviet people, but they do afford the Soviet leaders an opportunity to organize an intensive propaganda campaign praising the achievements and demontsrating the popularity of the regime and congratulating the Russian people on their good fortune to live under such a benevolent system. In Premier Khrushchev's speech below, he also explains the advantages that he believes exist in Soviet elections.

Comrades,

Allow me first of all to thank you, all the electors of the Kalinin constituency in Moscow, for the great trust you have shown me by nominating me your candidate for the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet. [*Applause.*]

The confidence of the people is a great and high honour which must be justified by work for the good of the country. I regard the fact that you have again nominated me your candidate as a high estimate of my work and I promise to devote all my energies in future to justifying the confidence of the electors, the confidence of the people. [*Prolonged applause.*]

Elections to the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet have become a gala day for the entire Soviet people. In these days Soviet men and women are summing up our country's successes and achievements during the term of office of the Supreme Soviet of the last convocation and are planning what we should do in the next few years.

The results of the work for the past four years are well described in the message addressed by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to all electors and in other well known documents.

We have a right to be proud of the achievements of our socialist home-

* Excerpts from "Speech at Meeting of Electors of Kalinin Constituency, Moscow, March 14, 1958," in N. S. Khrushchev, *For Victory in the Peaceful Competition with Capitalism,* Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1959, pp. 155-192.

land. Gross output of Soviet industry has increased by 55 per cent as compared with 1953, including a 61 per cent increase in the output of means of production and a 45 per cent increase in the output of consumer goods.

It should be stressed that the development of industry in the Soviet Union is proceeding at a rapid pace all the time. The recent reorganization of the management of industry and building, bringing the management of industrial establishments and building sites directly to the places where material wealth is produced, has played a tremendous constructive part in improving the work of our country's industry. . . . Today, Russia, the Ukraine, Byelorussia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, every republic in Transcaucasia, Central Asia and the Baltic area —all the fraternal republics—have become advanced, industrially developed socialist republics. Every one of them can vie with many capitalist states as regards the level of their economic development. [*Applause.*]

How can we not rejoice, comrades, at the gigantic achievements of our industry—that firm foundation of the economic might and the defence capacity of the Soviet state, the foundation for the constant improvement of the well-being of the Soviet people. These achievements are vivid evidence of the viability and invincibility of the new social system—Socialism. [*Applause.*]

The working people of Moscow, including those of the Kalinin constituency, one of the biggest districts of our capital, are contributing greatly to the strengthening of the might of our Soviet country. It is gratifying to note that the working people of Kalinin district fulfilled their 1957 state plan ahead of schedule—as early as December 14—and produced 300 million rubles' worth of goods above target. [*Applause.*] . . .

The output of consumer goods will be sharply increased in the next few years. It is also necessary to improve the quality of these goods in every way and to manufacture high-quality goods and attractive clothing and footwear.

Our people want to have not only all the essential articles for domestic use and clothing; they also want to dress well and attractively. And is our industry doing everything possible in this field? No, not by a long way.

The measures that are being taken by the Party and the Government will enable us to secure notable changes in this sphere of economic activity too, not only to bring about a still more rapid advance in light industry production and in the output of consumer goods, but also to bring about a radical improvement in the quality of the goods designed to give colour to the life of the people.

Comrades, all the successes of our country have become possible because we are living under socialism, when the people are the complete masters of their country and take a most active part in all spheres of political, economic and cultural life.

The working people of our country are deeply interested in electing as deputies the best and worthiest representatives of the people. It is precisely for this reason that our people regard the elections to the Supreme Soviet as their own vital concern. Almost the entire electorate takes part in the voting.

There is nothing like that in capitalist countries. For instance, during the last congressional elections in the United States only 57.3 per cent of the people who had reached voting age went to the polls, and in the previous elections, in 1954, there were even fewer—42.5 per cent. Or take the elections to the House of Commons in Britain. At the last elections only 26,760,000 of the 34,852,000 electors voted. Don't these figures speak for themselves? The voters in those countries see that no matter what representative of the ruling classes they elect to Congress or Parliament there will be no change in the state of affairs. It makes

no difference whether representatives of the Republican or the Democratic Party sit in the United States Congress, they will defend the interests of the ruling classes—the capitalists, bankers, big landowners and big businessmen.

Take the present composition of the United States Congress. Of the 531 congressmen, more than half are lawyers and one quarter are employers and bankers. All of them are representatives of Big Business. How many workers are members of the United States Congress? There are no real workers in the American Congress. Or let us see how many ordinary farmers are members of the American Congress. There are no farmers either. Seventeen and a half million Negroes, or 10.4 per cent of the country's entire population, are citizens of the United States. How many Negroes have been elected to Congress? According to American sources, there are three Negroes in the United States Congress, or 0.56 per cent of the total number of congressmen. Or let us see how many women are members of the United States Congress. In all, 17 women have been elected to Congress, or only three per cent. Consequently, the American Congress is actually inaccessible to workers and farmers, to women and to national minorities, who are placed in a position of inequality.

Here you have the so-called "free world," in which the workers, all the working people, are given the right to vote for this or that representative of the ruling classes, but have no right to take part in the activities of the legislative bodies.

In this connection I would like to quote figures which have been provided at my request by comrades in the Central Electoral Commission. In our country, 1,378 people have been registered as candidates for the Soviet of the Union and the Soviet of Nationalities. Among them 614 are workers and collective farmers directly engaged in production which makes up 44.6 per cent of all the candidates. [*Prolonged applause.*] In all, more than 60 per cent of the candidates are workers and peasants by social status. The others are representatives of the working intelligentsia. All the candidates are representatives of the bloc of Communists and non-Party people. Of the candidates nominated for the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet 26.4 per cent are women. [*Applause.*] It is not difficult to see in these figures an expression of genuine Soviet democracy.

The strength and merit of our socialist democracy consists not only in the fact that the people themselves take a direct part in determining the composition of the legislative bodies, but also in the fact that all the activities of our state bodies serve the interests of the people. Workers, collective farmers, intellectuals—all the working people of our country—are working to build communist society under the banner of Marxism-Leninism, under the leadership of the Communist Party, founded by the great Lenin. All the activities of the Communist Party prove that it has always served, and continues to serve, its people, confidently leading them to the cherished goal—communism. [*Prolonged applause.*]

It is socialist democracy which has liberated the Soviet people from such "freedoms" as the right to elect their exploiter and be unemployed, the right to die of starvation or to be a wage slave of capital. That is not what our people understand by freedom. In freedom we see the right of the people to a life worthy of man, without exploiters or exploitation; the right to genuine political equality; the right to enjoy all the achievements of science and culture. We understand freedom as the liberation of the people from the horrors of unemployment and poverty, from racial, national and social oppression. [*Prolonged applause.*] . . .

Comrades, our elections are taking place in an atmosphere of tremendous patriotic enthusiasm, of the further strengthening of the alliance between

the workers and the peasants. The Soviet people firmly believe that under the leadership of their Communist Party they will achieve further successes in attaining their cherished goal—the building of communism. [*Stormy applause.*] . . .

In these elections to the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet, as in previous election campaigns, our Party is in close alliance with non-Party people. This means that the Communists will cast their votes both for Party and non-Party candidates, while the non-Party people will vote both for non-Party and Communist candidates. [*Prolonged applause.*] There is no doubt that the entire electorate will cast their votes unanimously for the candidates of the bloc of Communists and non-Party people and thereby again demonstrate their unbreakable unity and solidarity with the Communist Party and the Soviet Government. [*Stormy applause.*]

Long live our mighty socialist homeland! [*Prolonged, stormy applause.*]

Long live the Communist Party of the Soviet Union—the inspirer and organizer of all the victories of the Soviet people! [*Prolonged, stormy applause.*]

Glory to the Soviet people—the great builder of communism! [*Prolonged, stormy applause. All rise.*]

[*Official election results showed that 99.97 of the eligible voters took part in the 1958 Soviet elections. Of the ballots cast, 99.57 supported candidates of the "Communist and Non-Party Bloc" for the Soviet of the Union and 99.73 supported candidates of that list for the Soviet of Nationalities.—Ed. note.*]

Part V

LEGISLATURES

A. The United Kingdom

36. The Spirit of the House of Commons*

BY WINSTON S. CHURCHILL

PRIME Minister Churchill's remark in the speech below that "Logic is a poor guide compared with custom" may almost be regarded as the governing maxim of British politics. It also helps explain why Sir Winston's only extensive discussion of the role and nature of the House of Commons occurred during this debate on the very practical problem of the reconstruction of the chamber at the end of World War II.

The Prime Minister (Mr. Churchill): I beg to move, "That a Select Committee be appointed to consider and report upon plans for the rebuilding of the House of Commons and upon such alterations as may be considered desirable while preserving all its essential features."

On the night of 10th May, 1941, with one of the last bombs of the last serious raid, our House of Commons was destroyed by the violence of the enemy, and we have now to consider whether we should build it up again, and how, and when. We shape our buildings and afterwards our buildings shape us. Having dwelt and served for more than 40 years in the late Chamber, and having derived very great pleasure and advantage therefrom, I, naturally, would like to see it restored in all essentials to its old form, convenience and dignity. I believe that will be the opinion of the great majorty of its Members. It is certainly the opinion of His Majesty's Government and we propose to support this resolution to the best of our ability.

There are two main characteristics of the House of Commons which will command the approval and the support of reflective and experienced Members. They will, I have no doubt, sound odd to foreign ears. The first is that its shape should be oblong and not semi-circular. Here is a very potent factor in our political life. The semi-circular assembly, which appeals to

* *H.C. Debates,* October 28, 1943, cols. 403-409.

political theorists, enables every individual or every group to move round the centre, adopting various shades of pink according as the weather changes. I am a convinced supporter of the party system in preference to the group system. I have seen many earnest and ardent Parliaments destroyed by the group system. The party system is much favoured by the oblong form of Chamber. It is easy for an individual to move through those insensible gradations from Left to Right but the act of crossing the Floor is one which requires serious consideration. I am well informed on this matter, for I have accomplshed that difficult process, not only once but twice. Logic is a poor guide compared with custom. Logic which has created in so many countries semi-circular assemblies which have buildings which give to every Member, not only a seat to sit in but often a desk to write at, with a lid to bang, has proved fatal to Parliamentary Government as we know it here in its home and in the land of its birth.

The second characteristic of a Chamber formed on the lines of the House of Commons is that it should not be big enough to contain all its Members at once without over-crowding and that there should be no question of every Member having a separate seat reserved for him. The reason for this has long been a puzzle to uninstructed outsiders and has frequently excited the curiosity and even the criticism of new Members. Yet it is not so difficult to understand if you look at it from a practical point of view. If the House is big enough to contain all its Members, nine-tenths of its Debates will be conducted in the depressing atmosphere of an almost empty or half-empty Chamber. The essence of good House of Commons speaking is the conversational style, the facility for quick, informal interruptions and interchanges. Harangues from a rostrum would be a bad substitute for the conversational style in which so much of our business is done. But the conversational style requires a fairly small space, and there should be on great occasions a sense of crowd and urgency. There should be a sense of the importance of much that is said and a sense that great matters are being decided, there and then, by the House.

We attach immense importance to the survival of Parliamentary democracy. In this country this is one of our war aims. We wish to see our Parliament a strong, easy, flexible instru ment of free Debate. For this purpose a small Chamber and a sense of intimacy are indispensable. It is notable that the Parliaments of the British Commonwealth have to a very large extent reproduced our Parliamentary institutions in their form as well as in their spirit, even to the Chair in which the Speakers of the different Assemblies sit. We do not seek to impose our ideas on others; we make no invidious criticisms of other nations. All the same we hold, none the less, tenaciously to them ourselves. The vitality and the authority of the House of Commons and its hold upon an electorate, based upon universal suffrage, depends to no small extent upon its episodes and great moments, even upon its scenes and rows, which, as everyone will agree, are better conducted at close quarters. Destroy that hold which Parliament has upon the public mind and has preserved through all these changing, turbulent times and the living organism of the House of Commons would be greatly impaired. You may have a machine, but the House of Commons is much more than a machine; it has earned and captured and held through long generations the imagination and respect of the British nation. It is not free from shortcomings; they mark all human institutions. Nevertheless, I submit to what is probably not an unfriendly audience on that subject that our House has proved itself capable of adapting itself to every change which the swift pace of modern life has brought upon us.

It has a collective personality which enjoys the regard of the public and which imposes itself upon the conduct not only of individual Members but of parties. It has a code of its own which everyone knows, and it has means of its own of enforcing those manners and habits which have grown up and have been found to be an essential part of our Parliamentary life.

The House of Commons has lifted our affairs above the mechanical sphere into the human sphere. It thrives on criticism, it is perfectly impervious to newspaper abuse or taunts from any quarter, and it is capable of digesting almost anything or almost any body of gentlemen, whatever be the views with which they arrive. There is no situation to which it cannot address itself with vigour and ingenuity. It is the citadel of British liberty; it is the foundation of our laws; its traditions and its privileges are as lively to-day as when it broke the arbitrary power of the Crown and substituted that Constitutional Monarchy under which we have enjoyed so many blessings. In this war the House of Commons has proved itself to be a rock upon which an Administration, without losing the confidence of the House, has been able to confront the most terrible emergencies. The House has shown itself able to face the possibility of national destruction with classical composure. It can change Governments, and has changed them by heat of passion. It can sustain Governments in long, adverse, disappointing struggles through many dark, grey months and even years until the sun comes out again. I do not know how else this country can be governed other than by the House of Commons playing its part in all its broad freedom in British public life. We have learned—with these so recently confirmed facts around us and before us—not to alter improvidently the physical structures which have enabled so remarkable an organism to carry on its work of banning dictatorships within this island and pursuing and beating into ruin all dictators who have molested us from outside. . . .

His Majesty's Government are most anxious and are indeed resolved to ask the House to adhere firmly in principle to the structure and characteristics of the House of Commons we have known, and I do not doubt that that is the wish of the great majority of the Members in this the second longest Parliament of our history. If challenged, we must take issue upon that by the customary Parliamentary method of Debate followed by a Division. The question of Divisions again relates very directly to the structure of the House of Commons. We must look forward to periods when Divisions will be much more frequent than they are now. Many of us have seen 20 or 30 in a single Parliamentary Sitting, and in the Lobbies of the Chamber which Hitler shattered we had facilities and conveniences far exceeding those which we are able to enjoy in this lordly abode. I am, therefore, proposing in the name of His Majesty's Government that we decide to rebuild the House of Commons on its old foundations, which are intact, and in principle within its old dimensions, and that we utilise so far as possible its shattered walls. That is also the most cheap and expeditious method we could pursue to provide ourselves with a habitation. . . .

I must tell you, Mr. Speaker, that it would be a real danger if at the end of the war we find ourselves separated by a long period from the possibility of obtaining a restored and suitable House of Commons Chamber. We are building warships that will not be finished for many years ahead, and various works of construction are going forward for war purposes. But I am bound to say that I rank the House of Commons—the most powerful Assembly in the whole world—at least as important as a fortification or a battleship, even in time of war. Politics may be very fierce and violent

in the after-war days. We may have all the changes in personnel following upon a General Election. We shall certainly have an immense press of business and, very likely, of stormy controversy. We must have a good, well-tried and convenient place in which to do our work. The House owes it to itself, it owes it to the nation, to make sure that there is no gap, no awkward, injurious hiatus in the continuity of our Parliamentary life. . . .

We owe a great debt to the House of Lords for having placed at our disposal this spacious, splendid hall. We have already expressed in formal Resolution our thanks to them. We do not wish to outstay our welcome. We have been greatly convenienced by our sojourn on these red benches and under this gilded, ornamented, statue-bedecked roof. I express my gratitude and appreciation of what we have received and enjoyed, but

> "Mid pleasures and palaces though we may roam,
> Be it ever so humble, there's no place like home."

37. House of Commons Question Period: The Case of the "Cheeky" Scottish Boy*

THE House of Commons has two principal political activities: question periods and debates. Question periods, in general, are more influential than debates in controlling the current action of the cabinet. Questions concerning alleged abuses of governmental authority or administrative inefficiency or omissions usually have more discernible effect than questions concerning govermental policies on more general matters. The effectiveness of the question period is illustrated by the John Waters Case below.

ORAL ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS
JULY 8, 1958

Sir D. Robertson asked the Lord Advocate why the charge against Police Constables Gunn and Harper for assaulting and injuring John Waters, aged 15 years, was not proceeded with after the Procurator Fiscal, Wick, reported the case to the Lord Advocate for instruction of Crown counsel; if he has considered the seventeen written statements made by witnesses and forwarded to him by the hon. Mem-

* *H.C. Debates,* 1958, vol. 591, col. 191, vol. 596, cols. 205-206; 1959, vol. 599, cols. 349-358, 982-983, vol. 600, cols. 225-228, vol. 605, col. 204.

ber for Caithness and Sutherland together with the statement made by Dr. Fell who treated the boy on the night of the assault and on two subsequent occasions; and if he will now give immediate instructions to have the case put down for trial.

The Lord Advocate (Mr. W. R. Milligan): Crown Counsel did not order proceedings in the case to which my hon. Friend refers because in their view the evidence did not justify proceedings being taken. I have carefully considered the written statements submitted by my hon. Friend and have made further inquiry into the case.

I regret, however, that owing to the illness of one of the witnesses whom it is necessary to see in the light of my hon. Friend's representations I have not yet been able to complete these inquiries.

Sir D. Robertson: Why should this trial be still further delayed? The offence is alleged to have been committed seven months ago and this witness can throw no light on the actual assault, whereas the seventeen witnesses were with the boy either immediately before or immediately after he came out of the alley after being beaten up by the police.

The Lord Advocate: I disagree entirely with my hon. Friend that the witness, who is unfortunately ill, can throw no light on the situation which admittedly occurred some time ago. I think it would be inappropriate at this stage to say anything further.

NOVEMBER 25, 1958

Sir D. Robertson asked the Lord Advocate why the charge against Police Constables Gunn and Harper for assaulting and injuring John Waters, aged 15 years, was not proceeded with after the Procurator Fiscal, Wick, reported the case to him for instruction of Crown counsel; if he has yet considered the seventeen written statements made by witnesses and forwarded to him by the hon. Member for Caithness and Sutherland, together with the statement made by Dr. Fell who treated the boy on the night of the assault and on two subsequent occasions; and if he will now give immediate instructions to have the case put down for trial.

The Solicitor-General for Scotland (Mr. William Grant): As my right hon. and learned Friend stated in reply to a Question by my hon. Friend on 8th July, Crown Counsel did not order proceedings in this case because in their view the evidence did not justify proceedings being taken. On receiving the statements referred to, my right hon. and learned Friend carefully considered them and caused further investigation to be made. Having done so he decided that on the evidence before him he would not be justified in instituting criminal proceedings against the constables concerned, and he so informed my hon. Friend by letter dated 28th July. My right hon. and learned Friend is still of the same opinion.

Sir D. Robertson: Does not my right hon. and learned Friend know that, during the whole of the seven months I have been pressing the case, none of the statements contained in this Question has been challenged? Does he also know that many of the people of Caithness know that this assault took place and they will be gravely and grievously disappointed at the reply given today denying a trial? Why should there be all this covering up and lack of informing this House why a trial has not taken place?

The Solicitor-General for Scotland: The mere fact that there is local feeling that something has happened is no ground for taking proceedings in a case where the evidence does not justify it.

Sir D. Robertson: In view of the unsatisfactory nature of the answer, Sir, I beg to give notice that I will raise this matter again at the first opportunity.

DEBATE
FEBRUARY 3, 1959

Motion made and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—[Mr. E. Wakefield.]

Sir David Robertson (Caithness and Sutherland): I desire to raise the case of John Waters, a boy of 15, who was brutally assaulted by two police constables in Thurso, a town in my constituency, on 7th December 1957. I learned of this case when I was in Thurso on 1st May last when the father, a working chap, was brought to me by my constituency association.

I was rather reluctant to take up the case. Some time had elapsed since the assault had taken place. I was impressed by his earnestness and asked him to put the facts in writing and to send me a list of the witnesses. I did not promise to take up the case; I promised to investigate it. When I received his letter, his story of the events was something like this. The boy had been to a cinema which he left about 11 o'clock at night and went to the Cardosi's, a well-conducted cafe in Thurso, where there were a number of other fellows with whom he was friendly.

Two police constables, without being called into the cafe, entered it, presumably on duty. P. C. Gunn and P. C. Harper. There was some talk between the boys and the constables and one of the constables went up and took young John Waters under his control. The other policeman joined him and they took Waters outside. I understand they warned him to watch his behaviour or he would get into trouble. His behaviour, as far as I know, was impeccable: there was nothing wrong with it at all.

When he got back into the cafe his companions said, "Your coat is torn." The boy ran after the policemen and protested, presumably, but they just took him into their control again and marched him along Traill Street, the principal street and, when they got to an alleyway, took him down the alleyway. What happened there was not seen by anybody except John Waters, the boy. He stated that he remembers nothing after the first savage blow, which knocked him on his back.

Seventeen witnesses have testified in writing to me that most of them saw the boy when he was taken under the control of the constables and that they saw him being led along the main street and disappearing into the alley. They saw the two constables come out, and then some of the other boys ran in and found this boy in the care of a Mrs. McPhee, who had heard the racket, had come out and had found him lying in the alleyway. She took him into her home and had him washed and bathed, and he was taken to the doctor. . . .

I took the precaution of obtaining references for the boy. . . . I have never seen better references as to the conduct and behaviour of a boy. . . .

At that stage I received the letter from the boy's father and I raised the case with the Secretary of State for Scotland. I wanted to find out why a trial had not taken place. . . .

He did not reply to me, but about four weeks later I received a letter from my right hon. and learned Friend the Lord Advocate stating that he had gone into the matter and was of the same opinion as Crown Counsel. There was to be no trial, which seemed to me extraordinary. . . .

I was dissatisfied with the Lord Advocate's answer, and I put down a Question to him. After I had done that, I was asked by the Solicitor-General for Scotland if I would postpone it until they had made further investigations about the evidence I had submitted. I at once agreed to a postponement of fourteen days in order to give them time, but when the Lord Advocate answered I got a most unsatisfactory reply . . .

[After the Summer Recess] I again put down a Question, and again got the same unsatisfactory reply—no trial.

The Lord Advocate (Mr. W. R. Milligan): . . . My hon. Friend has referred to certain evidence. I, also, am in possession of certain evidence. . . .

After considering the evidence, Crown Counsel decided that criminal proceedings would not be justified. . . .

The House will appreciate that if I could give specific reasons for the decision which I have taken in this matter, I could only do so by referring to the statements that were in the possession of the Crown authorities, and it would be a most unsatisfactory operation that these witnesses' statements should be referred to without any opportunity of cross-examination of the witnesses. . . .

A decision in regard to criminal proceedings has been, and I think must always be, a pure matter of discretion . . . Criminal proceedings are not automatic merely because there may be adequate, although perhaps narrow, evidence. In these circumstances, I regret to have to inform the hon. Member not only that I adhere to my previous decision, but that I cannot give him any further information than I have already given.

Question put and agreed to.

Adjourned accordingly at seven minutes past Eleven o'clock.

ORAL ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS
FEBRUARY 10, 1959

Sir D. Robertson asked the Secretary of State for Scotland, in view of continuing public concern because proceedings have not been brought, if he will move for an inquiry into all the circumstances of the case of John Waters, in order, in the general public interest, to restore public confidence in the local police force.

Mr. D. Howell asked the Secretary of State for Scotland if he will move for an inquiry into the case of John Waters, details of which have been supplied to him by the hon. Member for Caithness and Sutherland (Sir D. Robertson).

Mr. N. Macpherson: This is a matter for the criminal authorities, who decided not to prosecute. The complaints against the police have been fully investigated by my right hon. and learned Friend the Lord Advocate. My right hon. Friend has no power to order an inquiry; nor would he consider it appropriate to proceed under the Tribunals of Inquiry (Evidence) Act, 1921.

Sir D. Robertson: Does the Secretary of State for Scotland deny that one or both of the police constables assaulted by this boy?

Mr. Macpherson: The Secretary of State for Scotland has not had access to the evidence in question. It is for the Lord Advocate, for the criminal authorities, to deal with these matters. . . .

[*Additional supplementary questions were posed by eight other M.P.s, both Government and Opposition, most receiving answers either to the effect that "the Secretary of State has no power to appoint a judicial inquiry" or that "my right hon. and learned Friend the Lord Advocate has investigated the matter" and "decided that the evidence was insufficient to warrant an inquiry." Finally the Speaker closed the exchange with the comment that "Hon. Members have complained to me about not getting far with Questions. I think that enough time has been spent on these Questions."*

The debate on the motion of adjournment and the subsequent question period received wide publicity in the British and foreign press. The motion below, sponsored by 150 M.P.s of all parties, was submitted for debate:

"That this House calls upon Her Majesty's Government to set up a Select Committee of this House to inquire into the case of John Waters and to advise this House whether the said John Waters was assaulted by certain police officers as alleged, and in what circumstances it was decided that no prosecution should be instituted."]

STATEMENT
FEBRUARY 16, 1959

The Prime Minister (Mr. Harold Macmillan): With permission, Mr. Speaker, I will make a statement about the case of John Waters.

I have given careful consideration to the terms of the Motion standing in the name of the hon. Member for Caithness and Sutherland (Sir D. Robertson) and other hon. Members.

It is an established principle of Government in this country, and a tradition long supported by all political parties, that the decision as to whether any citizen should be prosecuted, or whether any prosecution should be discontinued, should be a matter where a public as opposed to a private prosecution is concerned, for the prosecuting authorities to decide on the merits of the case without political or other pressure.

It would be a most dangerous deviation from this sound principle if a prosecution were to be instituted or abandoned as a result of political pressure or popular clamour. In this case, my right hon. and learned Friend the Lord Advocate decided, after considering the evidence before him, that criminal proceedings would not be justified. . . .

Nevertheless, although this principle must stand, there is a second which cannot be ignored. Considerable disquiet has been expressed both inside and outside the House over this affair and public confidence has been correspondingly disturbed. The Government have therefore, felt it right that there should be some form of inquiry.

The most convenient method is clearly to act under the Tribunals of Inquiry (Evidence) Act, 1921. The purpose would be to inquire into the allegation that John Waters was assaulted at Thurso on 7th December, 1957, and into the action taken by the Caithness police. . . .

Mr. Gaitskell: I am sure that the whole House will welcome the decision announced by the Prime Minister and the fact that the Government, taking into account the feeling in the House and in the country, have decided to institute this inquiry after all. . . .

Sir D. Robertson: May I associate myself with the words used by the Leader of the Opposition, and ask the Prime Minister to accept my grateful thanks and those of my constituents and, I believe, of all the people and of our free Press for the prompt and efficient action that he has taken on this case? . . .

The Prime Minister: All these are matters, like so much of our constitution, of balance and good sense. I think that it would be the general view of the House that it would be a very bad thing if the House or the Cabinet of the day tried to influence the semi-judicial functions of the Law Officers in the institution or the dropping of prosecutions. . . . At the same time, these are matters of balance. I think that the decision we have taken will commend itself as a reasonable settlement.

DEBATE
FEBRUARY 17, 1959

The Prime Minister (Mr. Harold Macmillan): I beg to move,

> That it is expedient that a Tribunal be established for inquiring into a definite matter of urgent public importance, that is to say, the allegation that John Waters was assaulted on the 7th December, 1957, at Thurso, and the action taken by the Caithness Police in connection therewith.

In the statement which I made to the House yesterday, I announced the Government's decision to set up this Tribunal under the Tribunals of Inquiry (Evidence) Act, 1921. I think that there was general approval of this decision.

My statement made it clear, and this,

too, seemed to be generally accepted, that in accordance with our traditions, long supported by Members of all political parties, the decision of the Lord Advocate not to prosecute in this case was one for him alone, and that it will not be for the Tribunal to review this decision.

The Tribunal will, however, be able to make the fullest inquiries into the allegations that the boy was assaulted, and into the steps which were taken by the police to investigate and report on the case. . . .

[*There followed a debate of more than an hour concerned principally with the extent to which the tribunal would protect the policemen from having guilt imputed on the basis of evidence that would be insufficient in a court of law. Note that the House, which was first concerned with punishing the police for brutality, is now concerned with protecting the police from unjust accusations. It was also alleged that the frame of reference stated in the motion prevented inquiry into the possibility that the Government had "covered up" for mistakes made by local officials. The Prime Minister closed the debate, saying in part:*]

The Prime Minister: I think that the House will feel that the debate we have had on the Motion has been of very considerable value. It is encouraging to us all to feel, at a moment when our minds are filled with great problems between nations and with the vast political issues that we have to think about, that the House turns, and properly turns, and tried to do justice to, individuals.

I see many of the difficulties that have been raised. . . .

Mr. Paget: Does the Prime Minister say that he is not launching a proceeding that will have all the results of a prosecution?

The Prime Minister: Prosecution, in the wider and not technical sense of the word, has been carried out by the T.V., the newspaper and by the whole machinery which has brought this matter and these two men before the bar of public opinion. The only method is to ask this tribunal to find out what happened. When it has made its report, the House and the country will be informed of the facts which took place.

The Tribunal is rightly, properly and constitutionally instructed to find out what took place, what the facts were and what the police did about it. I do not think that it is the proper judge of whether or not the officers formed a right decision. That is not the duty of such a Tribunal and we should not ask it to do it. I am not saying that the Law Officers of the Crown stand different from any other Ministers, in the sense that they are ultimately responsible to the Crown and to Parliament. Parliament is the proper place, if their conduct is to be arraigned. If the Tribunal told us what happened that night and subsequently, and what the police did about it, that would be the best method we can now adopt.

It is a difficulty and a dilemma, but this is the only way out. The alternative is to do nothing and to let the agitation go on. I do not think that that would be better for the administration of justice in Scotland, or for the lives and careers of the policemen who are involved. I hope, therefore, that the House will feel that, while we are not unconscious of certain weaknesses of the position, this is the best method to adopt.

[*The tribunal, composed of the senior judge of the Court of Session in Edinburgh, the rector of Aberdeen Grammar School, and the president of the Law Society of Scotland, heard 36 witnesses in six meetings from March 17 to March 22, and submitted a report on April 16. It concluded that John Waters "is an extremely cheeky boy and on the occasion in question his*

behavior and language can only be described as shocking," but that Constable Robert Gunn, "sorely tried by the provocative behavior and language of this excited boy," had struck him. "What he did was, for a policeman, unquestionably wrong, and we must unquestionably condemn it." The tribunal exonerated the other constable and the local public prosecutors, finding that "the Crown evidence would not have sufficed for a conviction" in a *court. On May 15 the case was closed on a typically Scottish note with the following exchange during Question Period in the House of Commons.*]

Sir D. Robertson asked the Secretary of State for Scotland what charge has been made against Caithness County Council for recovery of part of the costs of the Waters Inquiry; . . . and what sum this represents expressed in terms of the existing rate product of the country.

Mr. Maclay: I have written to my hon. Friend explaining the position.

38. House of Commons Question Period: The Case of the Missing "Frogman"*

Questions rarely have a direct influence on governmental policy decisions or when the Government adamantly refuses to reply to questions. The "Frogman" case illustrates this type of situation.

Commander Lionel Crabb, a retired British naval officer trained to work under water, disappeared from Plymouth, England, while the Soviet warships that had brought Soviet leaders Nikita Khrushchev and Nicolai Bulganin to England on a good-will visit were anchored in the harbor. It was widely alleged that Commander Crabb had been on an intelligence mission to learn details of Soviet underwater detection devices for the United States Central Intelligence Agency.

Mr. Dugdale asked the Parliamentary Secretary to the Admiralty whether he will state the evidence on which his Department officially presumed the death of Commander Lionel Crabb; the circumstances of Commander Crabb's disappearance; whether efforts are still being made to locate the body; and whether he will make a statement.

Mr. Ward: My right hon. Friend the Prime Minister will make a statement

* *H.C. Debates,* 1956, cols. 1188-1189, 1219-1223.

in reply at the end of Questions. . . .

The Prime Minister (Sir Anthony Eden): With your permission, Mr. Speaker, and that of the House, I will make a statement on the subject raised by Question No. 9.

It would not be in the public interest to disclose the circumstances in which Commander Crabb is presumed to have met his death.

While it is the practice for Ministers to accept responsibility I think it necessary, in the special circumstances of this case, to make it clear that what was done was done without the authority or the knowledge of Her Majesty's Ministers. Appropriate disciplinary steps are being taken.

Mr. Dugdale: Is the Prime Minister aware that that is one of the most extraordinary statements made by a Prime Minister in the House of Commons and that, whatever he may say to the contrary, it is a complete evasion of Ministerial responsibility? May I ask him one or two questions? Whether he will answer them or not appears doubtful. First, why was Commander Crabb diving in the close vicinity of the Soviet cruiser which was here on a friendly visit? Secondly, why, and under whose authority, was a police officer sent to the hotel at which Commander Crabb was staying, and why did he order the leaves to be torn from the register showing the names both of Commander Crabb and of the man with whom he stayed? Further, what was the name of that other man and why did the police officer threaten the hotel keeper with action under the Official Secrets Act if he did not allow that to be done?

The Prime Minister: I thought it right to make the statement which I have made to the House, and I have nothing to add to it.

Mr. Gaitskell: Is the Prime Minister aware that a great deal of information has already been published in the Press about this matter? Does he not think, on reflection, in view of the amount of speculation which undoubtedly will continue in the absence of any information from the Govermnent —[*An Hon. Member: "It will increase."*]—and, as my right hon. Friend has said, will increase, that it really would be wiser, and in the general interest, if a full explanation were given?

The Prime Minister: I can assure the right hon. Gentleman that I have given the fullest consideration to this matter. I can also assure him that there are certain issues which are the responsibility of the Prime Minister himself. Having given this all reflection and having given all the information at our disposal, I thought it my duty, as I have said, to give the House the Answer that I have given; and I must tell the House that I cannot vary the Answer I have given.

Mr. Gaitskell: Is the Prime Minister aware that that answer is totally unsatisfactory? Is he further aware that, while all of us would wish to protect public security, the suspicion must inevitably arise that his refusal to make a statement on this subject is not so much in the interest of public security as to hide a very grave blunder which has occurred?

The Prime Minister: The House and the country must draw their conclusions from what I have said—[*Hon. Members: "They will."*]—of course—and also from what I have declined to say. Naturally, any right hon. Gentleman will understand that I have weighed all these considerations; and they weighed heavily in the Answer I have given. But I repeat—and as right hon. Gentlemen, with their experience, know—there are some decisions which only a Prime Minister can take, and I am convinced, after the most careful reflection, that the decision I have taken was the right and the only one.

Mr. Gaitskell: Are we really to take it that in the absence of any further statement from the Prime Minister, and in the light of what he has just said about the public drawing their own conclusions, officers were engaged,

or an officer of Her Majesty's forces was engaged, on the business of espionage during the Russian visit?

The Prime Minister: The right hon. Gentleman, if I may say so with respect, is perfectly entitled to put any wording he likes upon what I have said. My words stand as they were, without any gloss that anyone could put on them.

Mr. Shinwell: The right hon. Gentleman has just told the House that he proposes to take disciplinary action. Those were his words. Will he be good enough to say against whom he is taking disciplinary action, and for what reason he is taking this disciplinary action?

The Prime Minister: No, Sir. What I have said in my statement was that disciplinary steps are being taken. That is so.

Mr. Shinwell: Would the right hon. Gentleman be good enough to enlighten hon. Members on this matter? Against whom is he taking disciplinary steps? Is it against an individual or individuals, who gave instructions to Commander Crabb? Against whom is the action being taken and for what reason is he taking action? Is it because they defied authority, or is it because they acted without consulting Her Majesty's Ministers? What is the reason for the action?

The Prime Minister: I have nothing to add to the Answer I have given.

Mr. Dugdale: In view of the Government's most unsatisfactory Answer, I beg to ask leave to move the Adjournment of the House under Standing Order No. 9 to call attention to a definite matter of urgent public importance, namely, the failure of Her Majesty's Government to give a satisfactory explanation to the country about the events connected with the disappearance of Commander Crabb.

Mr. Speaker: The right hon. Member asks leave to move the Adjournment of the House under Standing Order No. 9 to call attention to a definite matter of urgent public importance, namely, the failure of Her Majesty's government to give a satisfactory explanation to the country about the events connected with the disappearance of Commander Crabb.

This application is covered by authority. When a Minister refuses to answer a Question on the grounds of public interest, it has been ruled in the past—and I adhere to it myself—that that is a matter which cannot be raised under the Standing Order. Therefore, I must decline to admit the right hon. Member's application.

Mr. Wigg: With respect, Sir, the Question was tabled for answer by the First Lord of the Admiralty. It really was a matter for him because a naval establishment had been used. The Prime Minister's reply makes that quite clear. It would, therefore, appear to be an abuse of the rules of the House that the Minister who, clearly has a responsibility in this matter passes it to the Prime Minister, not, Mr. Speaker, in the interests of the country, but of the political interests of the Government.

Mr. Speaker: Order. There is no point in that at all. The Prime Minister is quite entitled to answer the Question.

39. House of Commons Debate: The Suez Case*

Since World War II few issues have divided British political opinion as sharply as the Suez crisis of 1956. Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser nationalized the British-controlled Universal Suez Canal Co. in July, 1956, after having been rebuffed in his efforts to obtain a loan from the United States to construct the Aswan High Dam.

Great Britain and other countries with interests in the Suez Canal negotiated with Egypt for several months in an effort to agree on a satisfactory structure for control of canal operations. Late in October the Israeli army attacked Egypt and within hours the British and French governments announced that they would intervene militarily unless both combatants "withdrew" ten miles from either side of the canal (although the nearest Israeli troops had not yet penetrated closer than sixty miles to the east of the canal). It is widely believed, though not definitely established, that the attack on Egypt was a planned joint operation by the three powers.

The debate from which excerpts are reprinted below took place immediately after the announcement of the Franco-British ultimatum. It illustrates the manner in which parliamentary debates are conducted in the House of Commons and also highlights its weakness in the face of a determined Government. The influence of the House, and especially of the opposition, on the Government is exerted indirectly via the news media and subsequent elections more than it is directly.

Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—

The Prime Minister (Sir Anthony Eden): With your permission, Mr. Speaker, and that of the House, I will make a statement.

As the House will know, for some time past the tension on the frontiers of Israel has been increasing. The growing military strength of Egypt has given rise to renewed apprehension, which the statements and actions of the Egyptian Government have further aggravated. . . . Five days ago news was received that the Israel Government were taking certain measures of mobilisation. . . . News was

* *H.C. Debates,* 1955-1956, vol. 558, cols. 1273-1743.

received last night that Israel forces had crossed the frontier and had penetrated deep into Egyptian territory. . . . It appears that the Israel spearhead was not far from the banks of the Suez Canal. . . .

My right hon. and learned Friend the Foreign Secretary discussed the situation with the United States Ambassador early this morning. The French Prime Minister and Foreign Minister have come over to London at short notice at the invitation of Her Majesty's Government to deliberate with us on these events.

I must tell the House that very grave issues are at stake, and that unless hostilities can quickly be stopped free passage through the Canal will be jeopardised. . . .

Her Majesty's Government and the French Government have accordingly agreed . . . to join the United States . . . in seeking an immediate meeting of the Security Council [*of the United Nations*]. This began at 4 p.m. In the meantime, . . . the United Kingdom and French Governments have now addressed urgent communications to the Governments of Egypt and Israel. In these we have called upon both sides to stop all warlike action by land, sea and air forthwith and to withdraw their military forces to a distance of 10 miles from the Canal. Further, in order to separate the belligerents and to guarantee freedom of transit through the Canal by the ships of all nations, we have asked the Egyptian Government to agree that Anglo-French forces should move temporarily—I repeat, temporarily—into key positions at Port Saïd, Ismaïlia and Suez.

The Governments of Egypt and Israel have been asked to answer this communication within 12 hours. It has been made clear to them that, if at the expiration of that time one or both have not undertaken to comply with these requirements, British and French forces will intervene in whatever strength may be necessary to secure compliance.

I will continue to keep the House informed of the situation. . . .

Mr. Bellenger: I should like to put a question to the Prime Minister which, I hope, he will recognise as a very important one. The Prime Minister told us in his remarks that what, in other days, would have been called an ultimatum had been given to Egypt and Israel. . . . Does it then follow that if no reply, or an unsatisfactory reply, has been given . . . automatically British troops will go into the Canal Zone?

Lastly, Mr. Speaker, the House is due to rise the day after tomorrow and the Prime Minister has promised to give the House further information. It seems to me in those circumstances that the House may be denied the opportunity, which obviously we cannot take today, of expressing our views on an issue which may very well be war at the end of twelve hours.

Mr. Gaitskell [*Leader of the opposition Labor Party*]. I venture to say to the House . . . that I do not believe any very useful purpose will be served by continuing the debate now. I believe it is the desire of the House that we should have a little time to reflect before we say anything further. I would therefore ask the Prime Minister and the Leader of the House if they will give an undertaking that we will debate this matter tomorrow. . . . I also ask the Prime Minister . . . whether he can possibly give us an assurance that until either the Security Council has reached a decision on this matter, or the House has had an opportunity of discussing it further, no further physical action will be taken by Her Majesty's Government.

The Prime Minister: As regards the question about the debate, of course I gladly conform to what the right hon. Gentleman has suggested. As regards what I said about the time, I have asked for an answer to these communications within twelve hours and it would not therefore be possible for me to give the undertaking about

action for which the right hon. Gentleman has asked. The communications were conveyed to the Governments about the same moment as I rose in the House. . . .

Mr. S. Silverman: Everyone has listened with sympathy to the speeches made on both sides of the House to the effect that it would be a great mistake to attempt on short notice, or indeed without notice, and without full information as to the facts to enter into a general debate today . . . , but there would be not the slightest use in refraining from debating today on a promise that we can debate it tomorrow if in the meantime the Government took action which made tomorrow's debate virtually useless, or took action in the meantime which would embarrass . . . this House in coming to a decision. . . .

Mr. R. A. Butler [*Conservative Leader of the House*]*:* I think it evident that the spirit of the House is that there should, if possible, be a short suspension so that people may think over these issues. . . . Therefore, . . . I beg to ask leave to withdraw the Motion.

Motion, by leave, withdrawn.

[*The debate on the Suez crisis was suspended; the House turned to other business and three hours later resumed the Suez debate. The Prime Minister opened the discussion with a ten-minute speech, justifying his government's action as a measure to restore peace in the Suez area. Mr. Gaitskell, Leader of the Opposition, spoke next. After reviewing the background of the situation, he criticized the government for acting before the Security Council had reached a decision in violation of the Tripartite Declaration and without the concurrence of the Commonwealth countries or the United States. As he developed this last point the following exchange occurred.*]

Mr. Gaitskell: . . . I put this seriously because we all know what the reaction of India was in the earlier stages. [*Interruption.*] Hon. Members who at one time, used to be rather proud, or appeared to be proud of the Commonwealth, had better be careful when they start laughing. If they go on in that way, they will go faster towards breaking it up than anything else they could do.

Viscount Hinchingbrooke (Dorset, South): You broke it up. You threw it away.

Mr. Gaitskell: We all know the noble Lord the Member for Dorset, South (Viscount Hinchingbrooke), and we do not take him terribly seriously. . . .

I must refer to the proposal put forward that each side should withdraw ten miles from the Canal Zone. . . . I am bound to say that a proposal which . . . involves the withdrawal of the Egyptians ten miles further within their own frontier and a withdrawal of the Israelis ten miles from the Canal Zone—which still leaves them at some points 160 miles inside Egypt—is hardly one which, I should have thought, would commend itself on equitable grounds.

The only other excuse which has been put forward—and I press the Prime Minister on this—[*Hon. Members: What would the right hon. Gentleman do?"*] What would I do? I have already said that. I would first of all—[*Hon. Members: "Answer."*] If we go on like this, we shall need a force to separate the two sides in this House.

Mr. Speaker: Order. I would call the attention of the House to the fact that we have a very short time for this debate and disorderly interruptions merely prolong speeches.

Mr. Gaitskell: The first thing I would do—and this is what I am going to ask the Prime Minister to do—would be to refrain from using armed force until the Security Council has finished its deliberations . . . and until we have had a further opportunity of discussing the matter in the House of Commons.

Mr. Cyril Osborne (Louth): Would the right hon. Gentleman do that?

Mr. Gaitskell: I must tell the Prime Minister that if he is unable to give that undertaking, . . . I regret to say that we shall have to divide the House.

Mr. Patrick Maitland: We have just heard a dissertation which is neither more nor less than a plea for delay. We have heard the Leader of the Opposition make one case and one case only. It was that nothing should be done until the Security Council had reached a decision.

This proposition is put forward within a matter of days of another resort to the Security Council which produced no decision at all. It is put forward after years of resort to the Security Council in many other matters that have produced no decision either. It is put forward in the light of the fact that on the one occasion when the Security Council did reach a decision nobody did anything about it.

This plea for procrastination is put forward when, on the Government's case, there might be some danger to British lives and property. It is put forward alongside the admission, which the Leader of the Opposition himself conceded, that under international law it may well be legitimate to intervene upon the territory of another State to protect one's own nationals. The proposition, in other words, is a series of arguments that do not argue—it is a succession of *non sequiturs*. . . . The whole object of the arguments by some hon. Gentlemen opposite is that, somehow, we best facilitate peace by doing nothing.

That was certainly not the intention of the United Nations Charter, and there are phrases in the Charter which may well be cited in support of the Government's approach. [*Hon. Members: "Cite one."*] I have not a copy in my pocket, or I would quote textually; but there is, for example, the provision that nothing in the Charter interferes with the inherent right of nations to defend themselves. Under international law, as already admitted by the right hon. Gentleman, that is bound to extend to the protection of the lives and property of one's own citizens.

Mr. R. J. Mellish (Bermondsey): What are the Americans doing? They have nationals, too.

Mr. Maitland: . . . I believe that we shall find in the days to come . . . that the public is wholeheartedly relieved that at last there are Governments in Europe . . . who are prepared to take some action to defend an international interest. . . .

[*The debate resumed the following day with an opening statement by the Prime Minister describing some aspects of the military situation and defending both the actions of his government and the decision to proceed without American concurrence. There followed an exchange between the Prime Minister and members of the Opposition in which the latter attempted without success to extract from Eden an admission that the United States had not been informed of the Anglo-French intentions to intervene militarily. At the conclusion of Eden's speech, the following exchange took place.*]

Mr. Gaitskell (Leeds, South): There was at least one extraordinary omission from the Prime Minister's statement. Last night, we begged the Government to give us an undertaking that they would refrain from using armed force until the Security Council had completed its deliberations or we had had another chance of discussing the matter here. I must say for myself that I had hoped, even after the Government's refusal to give us that undertaking, that wiser counsels might still have prevailed.

We are this afternoon still left to some extent in the dark about what Her Majesty's Government have done. I must ask the Prime Minister now to repair the omission from his speech and to tell us, "Yes" or "No," whether, on the expiry of his ultimatum, in-

structions were given to the British and French forces to occupy the Canal Zone.

Hon. Members: Answer.

The Prime Minister: If the right hon. Gentleman will be good enough to read the statement which the French and our Government issued at the conclusion of our meeting yesterday—[*Hon. Members: "Tell us."*]; I have not the words with me here—he will see perfectly clearly that we made it apparent that if agreement was not reached we should consider ourselves free to take whatever action—

Hon. Members: Answer.

Mr. Gaitskell: Of course, we all know that that is true, but what the Prime Minister did not say in that statement was whether such action would be taken immediately upon the expiry of the ultimatum.

The Prime Minister: I now have the words here.

Mr. James Callaghan (Cardiff, South-East): But what has happened?

The Prime Minister: The hon. Gentleman is a master at sitting and shouting. He seldom stands.

Mr. Callaghan: I am very grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for giving way. I should like to ask him a question to which 50 million people in this country will want to know the answer. Are British troops engaged in Egypt at this moment? Have they landed, or where are they?

The Prime Minister: As I said yesterday—

Hon. Members: Answer.

Mr. Speaker: Order. The debate cannot really proceed profitably if hon. Members do not listen. If hon. Members think that they can demand an answer to a question by shouting, it is not true. It is not really right. I do counsel the House to treat these grave matters with decorum.

Mr. R. T. Paget (Northampton): On a point of order. How can we debate a war when the Government will not tell us whether it has started?

Mr. Speaker: The hon. and learned Member must do the best he can with the material at his disposal.

The Prime Minister: I am not in any way prepared to give the House any details—[*Hon. Members: "Resign."*]—of the action which will follow the statement which I clearly made yesterday, that British and French forces will intervene in whatever strength may be necessary to secure compliance.

Mr. Gaitskell: This really is a fantastic situation. . . . I ask the Prime Minister once again . . . simply to tell the House . . . whether the decision has been finally taken that British and French troops shall invade the Canal Zone of Egypt. . . . I can only assume . . . that this decision has been taken. . . .

Sir, this action involves not only the abandonment but a positive assault upon the principles which have governed British foreign policy for . . . the last ten years—solidarity with the Commonwealth, the Anglo-American Alliance and adherence to the Charter of the United Nations. I cannot but feel that some hon. Gentlemen opposite may have some concern for these consequences. . . .

Viscount Hinchingbrooke (Dorset, South): . . . The right hon. Gentleman, the Leader of the Opposition . . . has been Chancellor of the Exchequer, but after the speech that he has delivered today I cannot believe that he will ever be Prime Minister. He should know something of the details of our Constitution.

It is true that, as Leader of the Opposition, he receives a salary of £2,000, and that Members of the Opposition receive their Parliamentary salaries as do we all, but the Leader of the Opposition and Members of Parliament have no place at all in executive Government. The function of the Executive is to make treaties, make war and make peace. Those are absolutely reserved functions, handed to the Executive by our Constitution.

There is no place for any claim, either by back bench Members or Leaders of the Opposition, to be consulted before action is taken. . . .

Mr. Wilfred Fienburgh (Islington, North): . . . The Labour Party cannot stop this war today because we are in opposition. . . . But about 20 Members on the other side of the House, answering the real dictates of their hearts, minds and consciences, instead of a three-line Whip, could stop the course which this Government are pursuing. . . . I am not asking them to vote for the Motion which will be put upon the Order Paper tomorrow. Let them abstain if they like. That in itself, from 20 men who really believe that the action of the Government is wrong—and there are 20 who do—would be bound to stop this Government in their tracks. It was done before by Members of the Conservative party back benches, when Neville Chamberlain had led this country, militarily and strategically, into an untenable and impossible position. It was not the votes of hon. Members on this side of the House which rectified the position, because we were in a grotesque minority. It was the abstention of hon. Members opposite which really mattered.

There are many hon. Members opposite who are really worried today. This fact reflected itself earlier in the dramatic change of policy on the part of the Prime Minister at one stage during the Suez debate. Although pressure came from hon. Members on this side of the House, and although the carpet was whipped away from under his feet by Mr. Dulles during the course of that debate, the real reason why he decided to take the Suez issue to the Security Council was that some Conservative back benchers said, "We will not risk war over this issue unless it is within the Charter of the United Nations."

The issue is infinitely graver today, and for that reason I am asking those men to have the courage and the guts to do again what they did then, because neither we in opposition, nor any industrial action—which I should deplore—can put a halt to this matter. Only if men on the benches opposite are true to their hearts can this precipitous course be stayed, and I implore them to be true to their hearts tonight.

Captain Richard Pilkington (Poole): The hon. Member for Islington, North (Mr. Fienburgh) has made a very eloquent speech. I very much regret that that is the last word of praise I can give it. He has got his facts mixed up so far as his reference to the 20 Members is concerned. Those 20 Members who may not vote with their own leaders, or do not in their hearts agree with them, are to be found not upon these benches but upon the benches opposite. I believe that that has been shown in recent debates and also, to some extent, in this one. . . .

[*The House adjourned after debating the matter for more than six hours. It resumed the following afternoon with a report from the Minister of Defense on the military situation in Egypt. When he concluded, the following question was posed.*]

Mr. S. Silverman: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. I would respectfully ask for your assistance and guidance to the House in what appears to be a completely unprecedented situation. The Minister of Defence has just made an announcement about the use of bombers and ships, the sinking of ships, the dropping of bombs, the destruction of property—[*An Hon. Member: "And life."*]—and the destruction of life in a country with whom apparently we are in friendly relations.

There has been no declaration of war, there has been no breaking off of diplomatic relations. It looks as though the Minister has been telling the House of Commons that he has been using his authority to compel British subjects to commit illegal acts resulting in the loss of life. Is there anything that the House of Commons

can do at this moment to make certain that those who have taken an oath of allegiance to Her Majesty are not required by that oath to commit murder all over the world?

Mr. Speaker: The hon. Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. S. Silverman), has addressed his question to me, but it is really a question for the House to decide. There stands on the Order Paper a Motion of censure against the Government because of their conduct of these affairs. My answer to the hon. Member for Nelson and Colne is that the House should get on with that Motion of censure as quickly as possible. . . .

Mr. Benn: On a point of order . . . Sir, may I appeal to you, as Speaker of this House, to clarify the constitutional position? As I understand, the matter of peace and war is a matter of the Royal Prerogative, and in that respect Her Majesty's Ministers are responsible for advising Her Majesty and they are also responsible to this House.

Now, Mr. Speaker, traditionally in the past you have been the spokesman for the Members of the House of Commons in order to ascertain the intention of the Executive and even of the Crown, and to see that the Crown is responsible to this House. On one famous occasion your predecessor rebuked the Sovereign who came to this House. Therefore, Sir, I ask you now . . . to ascertain the legal position so that we may be informed about it.

Mr. Speaker: I am willing, so far as my limited powers and abilities extend, to discharge any duty which the House lays upon me. It is my duty to do so. If the House were to pass a resolution, I would act upon it if I could, but . . . these wider matters are surely for . . . the House as a whole, and not for me. . . .

Mr. Gaitskell: Further to that point of order, Mr. Speaker, as I understand, you feel yourself unable to answer my hon. Friend's question. Therefore, with your permission, I would like to ask the Government whether a declaration of war on Egypt has been made?

Hon. Members: Answer.

Mr. Speaker: Order, order.

Hon. Members: Answer.

Mrs. L. Jeger rose—

Mr. Speaker: Order, order . . .

Hon. Members: Let the Government answer . . .

Mr. Bevan: . . . Under the orders of the Government, British airmen, soldiers and sailors have been sent into action. If they are captured and no declaration of war has been made, what protection have they under international law?

Hon. Members: Answer.

The Prime Minister: The action which has been taken has been, as I explained yesterday, in accordance with the statement we made. [*Interruption*]. No further declaration has been made going beyond that. . . .

Captain Pilkington rose—

Mr. Bevan: I am on a point of order.

Mr. Speaker: Order, order. I cannot have two hon. Members on their feet at the same time. Would it not be possible for all these matters to be brought out in the course of the debate?

Hon. Members: No.

Mr. Bevan: They do not come within the Motion at all.

Mr. Speaker: I think that the Motion—

Hon. Members: No.

Mr. Gaitskell rose—

Mr. Speaker: Order. The Motion is a general one.

Hon. Members: No.

Mr. Speaker: If the House will not listen to me—

Hon. Members: No.

Mr. Speaker: —I will suspend the Sitting. [*Interruption.*]

I have to inform the House that if it will not listen to me, I shall suspend the Sitting. [*Hon. Members: "Hear, hear."*] That appears to some hon. Members to be a desirable course . . . The Sitting is suspended for half an hour. . . .

Mr. James Griffiths (Llanelly): I beg to move,

> That this House deplores the action of her Majesty's Government in resorting to armed force against Egypt in clear violation of the United Nations Charter, thereby affronting the convictions of a large section of the British people, dividing the Commonwealth, straining the Atlantic Alliance, and gravely damaging the foundations of international order.

[*In concluding his half-hour speech defending the motion, Mr. Griffiths said:*]

. . . I say to the Prime Minister that he has forfeited the trust of millions of our people. . . . I say to the Prime Minister . . . that, not for the first time in the history of this House, it has been left for the Leader of the Opposition to speak for Britain. [*Hon. Members: "Oh."*] I am proud of the lead which my right hon. Friend has given today. . . .

In voting for this Motion this evening we are speaking for the best in Britain. We say to the Government, "Get out, and make way for others."

The Prime Minister (Sir Anthony Eden): I beg to move, to leave out from "House" to the end of the Question and to add instead thereof:

> "approves of the prompt action taken by Her Majesty's Government designed to bring hostilities between Israel and Egypt to an end and to safeguard vital international and national interests, and pledges its full support for all steps necessary to secure these ends."

[*After being debated for more than four hours longer, the amended motion was passed, 320 to 253.*]

B. France

40. The National Assembly of the Fourth Republic: The EDC Debate*

No postwar political issue has divided France as deeply and aroused as much bitterness as the proposal to create a supranational defense system, the European Defense Community. This dispute laid open the bare flesh of French nationalism and Germanophobia.

The key role of the National Assembly in the Fourth Republic is vividly illustrated by the parliamentary debates on EDC. They clearly show that, insofar as policy decisions were made in the political branches of government, they were made, above all, in the National Assembly and its committees.

Although the EDC treaty, the Treaty of Paris, was signed in 1952, successive governments deferred requesting its ratification for more than two years. Apparently they feared it would not be approved. When Pierre Mendès-France was invested as Premier in June, 1954, one of his pledges was that he would settle the EDC question before the summer legislative recess. After failing to work out a compromise plan acceptable to France's allies, his government brought the treaty to debate without taking a stand on either side of the question.

The debate opened on Saturday, August 28, 1954. Six parliamentary committees presented reports on the treaty on August 28 and 29. All six recommended its rejection. After the spokesmen for the committees had completed their presentations, the Prime Minister, who was also Minister of Foreign Affairs, gave an account of the efforts of his government to produce a compromise protocol acceptable both to the European allies of France and to the National Assembly.

* *Journal officiel*, August 29, 30, 1954.

M. Pierre Mendès-France (President of the Council, Minister of Foreign Affairs): Mesdames, Messieurs, the Government believes that it can most usefully contribute to this debate, which is crucial for all of us but most of all for its own members, by making an accurate and objective report on the events that have occurred since its formation and especially on the Brussels conference [*at which the government's compromise proposals were rejected by France's European allies*].

But I will not conceal the deep embarrassment and uneasiness with which I make this report. It would be dishonest on my part not to admit this to the National Assembly and to the country.

In fact, the government is committed to the position it has taken.... Personally, I am bound, not only by the investiture declaration which constituted our contract, but also by the investiture declaration . . . that I presented to this Assembly in June 1953.

At that time, I said that it was difficult to imagine that, in a debate of this gravity, a government would not bring to bear all its authority and even stake its existence. . . .

I said in June 1953 and I repeated it in June 1954 . . . that the Government would attempt to effect a *rapprochement* between patriots who are divided today . . . , that we would seek with all our strength, with all the vigor of our patriotism, a basis for *rapprochement* and conciliation and that on that basis . . . the Government would fight with all its strength and would, of course, pose, without reservation, the question of confidence. . . .

I admit with pain that the government has not been able to effect this *rapprochement* . . . despite the efforts it has undertaken continuously, day after day, week after week. . . .

I will speak of what I have called the internal negotiations.

They began, as you know, under the aegis of two men within the government who approached this grave question . . . with the same good faith and the same good will, but with different preferences, opinions, and convictions.

M. Bourgès-Manoury [1] and General Koenig [2] worked patiently for several weeks. They did it silently, discreetly, in order to increase the chances of *rapprochement.*

On certain points, indeed, they have shown the possibility of finding conciliatory solutions, but, despite their will, they did not achieve this conciliation on the essential points. . . .

Therefore, in the face of the failure of our two colleagues, I elaborated a text myself with a view toward bringing together those who were unfortunately divided. . . . This text, also, . . . satisfied neither the partisans nor the adversaries of the EDC. . . . It has been severely and harshly criticized by both and thus this internal negotiation has not succeeded politically.

Nevertheless, I maintain with deepest sincerity . . . that our conciliation project was one of true *rapprochement.* . . . I say this because the Government, with only three exceptions [3] took the responsibility for it and thought that it constituted a basis . . . for concessions acceptable by both partisans and adversaries of the EDC.

[*Mendès-France then gave an account of the attempt to negotiate a compromise on EDC with the European allies of France, using the protocol he had elaborated and which had been accepted by the cabinet, closing with these words:*]

I conceal neither the problems, nor the obstacles which your government will face tomorrow no matter what your vote may be. The Government will surmount them, I do not doubt, as it has surmounted others already,

1. An EDC supporter (*Ed. note*).
2. An EDC opponent (*Ed. note*).
3. Three members resigned because of disagreement with it (*Ed. note*).

if, forgetting so many subjects of discord and division, the French can finally surmount the passions, the angers, the misunderstandings that divide them in order that, united, they can make the interest of the fatherland prevail. [*Lively applause on numerous benches on the left and the extreme right and on several benches on the right.*[4]]

Several voices: Montel! Montel![5]

[*Various movements.*]

M. Pierre Montel: Monsieur le président. . . .

M. le Président: M. Pierre Montel, I must now give the floor to M. Auméran,[6] who is registered for the debate.

M. Pierre Montel: Monsieur le Président, can it be by chance that in a debate like this in which there will be hours of discussion I do not have the right to say only three words before making my speech simply because I am not registered for the debate? [*Exclamations on numerous benches on the left and the extreme right.*]

M. le Président: Not now, M. Montel.

M. Pierre Montel: I simply wish to say dispassionately to *M. le Président* of the Council,[7] that I cannot believe . . . [*Lively interruptions on the extreme left and on numerous benches on the left and the extreme right.*]

M. le Président: No, M. Montel, you cannot have the floor now.

M. Pierre Montel: Then, *M. le Président,* I rise to a point of order.

M. le Président: M. Montel rises to a point of order.

I call to his attention the fact that if he really wishes to make a point of order, I will let him have the floor; but I cannot let him have it if it is only an artifice.

M. Pierre Montel: You shall see, *M. le Président,* that I indeed intend to make a point of order.

M. le Président: May I ask you what it concerns.

M. Pierre Montel: The first rule of this country, that is the Constitution.[8] [*Laughter and exclamations on the extreme left and on numerous benches on the left and on the extreme right. —Applause on the right and in the center.*]

For, according to the Constitution, the president of the Council is responsible for the national defense. [*Applause on the right.—Various movements.*]

M. le Président: By virtue of Article 46 of the rules, M. Auméran has posed the preliminary question.[9]

M. Auméran has the floor.

M. Adolphe Auméran: Mesdames, Messieurs, it is unheard of that the French parliament waste time discussing documents which have only historical interest any more.

This treaty was, in 1950, the codification of a conception of European defense which is badly outdated today. The world has continued its accelerated race since then.

Thanks to the discovery of the use in the H bomb of lithium, a common metal distributed throughout the entire world, . . . the thermo-nuclear

4. Extreme Left = Communists, Left = Socialists, Center = Radicals and Christian Democrats (MRP), Right = Conservatives, Extreme Right = Gaullists (*Ed. note*).

5. A partisan of EDC (*Ed. note*).

6. An adversary of EDC (*Ed. note*).

discussion.

7. The prime minister (*Ed. note*).

8. Montel has made a play on words. In French, a "point of order" is literally a "call to the rules" (*Ed. note*).

9. This was a parliamentary motion denying that the item on the agenda was of sufficient importance and interest to warrant the time of the Assembly for a debate. It had precedence over all other motions. After it had been posed only one speaker on either side of the question could be heard before a vote was taken on the motion. If the motion carried, the item was automatically defeated and the Assembly moved on to the next item on the agenda. If Auméran's motion carries, therefore, the Assembly is saying that it will not even discuss ratification of the EDC treaty (*Ed. note*).

weapons have become easy to fabricate in unlimited quantities. . . .

With atomic weapons, the aggressor can be struck without delay at the sources of his supplies of men and material and all hope for him to pursue the war can be wiped out in a few hours. The defense of the continent is no longer posed in the same manner. . . .

Protected by atomic weapons, what need have we to revive, against the will of a large part of the German people, a military spirit that inspired the sad exploits of which we have grim reminders every day?

M. Jules Moch, rapporteur:[10] Very good!

M. Adolphe Auméran: What need have we to cede to Anglo-American pressure when the defense of the Western world can and must be organized without rearming Germany, the participation of which, under no matter what military form, appears much more dangerous than useful. . . .

[*Auméran continued in the same vein for more than an hour, terminating in this manner:*]

In closing, I wish to declare that I believe it would be wise to stop there [with the presentation of the reports of the six parliamentary committees and of the Assembly of the French Union, all of which were hostile to the treaty] and not to accentuate our rancor by debate that can only be the cause of new divisions among Frenchmen.

It would also be well not to delay longer the reply that our allies and partners await from us.

M. Joseph de Monsabert: Very good!

M. Adolphe Auméran: In posing the preliminary question, I have wished to put an end to our quarrels and our vacillations. The vote that I ask you to cast will have the effect of rejecting the treaty, but this meaning only.

M. Fernand Bouxom: And without debate!

M. Adolphe Auméran: Agreement cannot be reached on modifications for a text that is already a compromise, but agreement can be found, and rapidly, on a valid organization of European defense in harmony with the profound changes that have occurred recently in all domains. . . . [*Applause on numerous benches on the right and the extreme right.*]

M. le Président: Under the rules, only one orator may speak against the preliminary question. . . .

M. Paul Reynaud has the floor.

M. Paul Reynaud:[11] Mesdames, Messieurs, I am one of the most senior parliamentarians in this Assembly. It was in this capacity and in this capacity alone that I was asked to speak in opposition to the preliminary question posed by M. Auméran.

If it is voted, . . . the treaty will be rejected without debate. . . .

Seven committees have presented important reports. . . . And does no one have the right to question them?

M. le Président of the Council has just made a very important speech. . . . And has no one the right to reply to him?

The general debate must open. . . .

In a debate this grave the government has just said to the Assembly: "The choice that you have to make does not merit, in my opinion, that I stake my existence."

But we, mesdames, messieurs, we are obliged to choose.[12] [*Prolonged applause in the center and on numerous benches on the right and the left.*]

And what sort of figure would our

10. Anti-EDC Socialist. A *rapporteur* in French parliamentary usage is a member of a committee charged by it to prepare for its consideration a report on a bill. Moch was *rapporteur* on the EDC treaty for the powerful Foreign Affairs committee, which had principal responsibility for its parliamentary consideration (*Ed. note*).

11. A Conservative supporter of EDC, prime minister of France at the time of the defeat in 1940 (*Ed. note*).

12. An ironical allusion to Pierre Mendès-France's political motto: to govern is to choose (*Ed. note*).

Assembly cut in the world if . . . all the deputies, following the example of the Government, abdicated before the Treaty of Paris? [*New and lively applause on the same benches.*] . . .

All the voices which have been raised so far have condemned the treaty. And now M. Auméran, after having condemned it himself, has just told us: "That's enough, silence to the rest!" [*Lively applause in the center and on numerous benches on the right and the left.*]

Mme. Germaine Peyroles: [13] We are not in Prague; we are in Paris! [*Various movements.*]

M. le Président: Please listen to the speaker.

M. Paul Reynaud: I would like to ask M. Auméran under what sort of regime he thinks he lives. [*Lively applause in the center and on numerous benches on the right and the left.*]

M. Adolphe Auméran: Let me answer you. [*Exclamations on various benches on the right, in the center and on the left.*]

M. Paul Reynaud: Is he aware that his action leads to the strangulation of freedom of speech? [*Movements on the extreme left.—Applause on numerous benches on the right, in the center and on the left.*]

We are still under a parliamentary regime!

M. Etienne Fajon: [14] It's not your fault! [15]

M. Paul Reynaud: At a moment when, throughout the world, all eyes are on France, how little this is like her! [*Applause on numerous benches on the right, in the center and on the left.*]

M. Adolphe Auméran: It is two years since the treaty was signed. Consequently, it is known by everyone.

M. Paul Reynaud: There are in this Assembly—thanks to God—a majority of republicans and of parliamentarians. [*Applause on numerous benches on the right, in the center, and on the left.*]

Eh bien! Everyone agrees, whether they are for or against EDC . . . to safeguard that which is the very soul of the parliamentary regime: absolute respect for the opinions of others.

A while ago, *M. le Président* of the Council, you were applauded warmly and for good reason, when you declared that our allies said to us. . . : "First of all, clarify your position on EDC."

Is it a way to clarify our position to forbid debate? [*Applause on numerous benches on the right, in the center, and on the left.*]

M. Jean Binot: It is a way of giving them an answer.

M. Paul Reynaud: . . . The value of the "yea" or the value of the "nay" that we cast will depend on the scope and the sincerity of the debate that must begin. [*Lively applause in the center and on numerous benches on the right and the left.—Exclamations on various benches.*]

M. le Président: The tribune is open, I remind all our colleagues.

M. Daniel Mayer (Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee): Mr. Speaker.

M. le Président: The committee chairman has the floor.

M. Daniel Mayer: In order that the Foreign Affairs Committee may give to what is simply, M. Paul Reynaud, the application of the rule of order of the national republican Assembly [*Applause on various benches on the left, the right, and the extreme right*] its exact significance both on the preliminary question posed by M. Auméran and on the various adjournment motions [16] which have followed it and have the same purpose of interrupting the debate. . . .

[*Applause on numerous benches on the left, on the extreme left, and on the*

13. MRP supporter of EDC (*Ed. note*).
14. A Communist (*Ed. note*).
15. An allusion to 1940 (*Ed. note*).
16. Motions submitted by EDC supporters to adjourn the debate until the treaty could be revised in a form acceptable to the majority of the Assembly (*Ed. note*).

extreme right, and on several benches on the right.—Lively interruptions in the center.—Noise.]

M. Robert Bichet: You do not express the opinion of the majority of the committee. We already know your position anyway.

M. Jules Moch: These interruptions are intolerable.

M. Daniel Mayer [*turned toward the center*]: You will see how your emotion—

Numerous voices in the center: No!

M. Daniel Mayer:—is unjustified when you find out the very innocuous conclusion up to which I am leading. I could, in the face of your emotion use the words of M. Paul Reynaud: Where do you think you are? [*Lively applause on the extreme left and on various benches on the left and the extreme right.—Diverse movement on a great number of benches in the center, on the left, and on the right.*]

M. Paul Reynaud: Will you permit me to interrupt you, my dear colleague?

Numerous voices on the extreme left and on various benches on the left: No!

On the right: That's what they call freedom!

M. Daniel Mayer: In order that the Foreign Affairs Committee may give . . . their true political significance both to the preliminary question posed by M. Auméran . . . and to the various motions of adjournment of which we are now seized—I do not speak about those of which we are not yet seized [*Laughter on several benches on the left*]—the committee . . . very simply, asks for a recess in order that it may meet . . . [The recess was granted.]

M. le Président: The debate will be resumed at the next sitting.

THIRD SITTING

M. Daniel Mayer: I wish only to make a brief report on the work of the Foreign Affairs Committee . . .

We considered both the preliminary question posed by M. Auméran and . . . prejudicial motions, one presented by M. Chupin and the other by M. Delbez. . . .

It was noted that a preliminary question terminates all debate by rejecting the item of business inscribed on the agenda but a prejudicial motion, on the contrary, only adjourns the debate, permitting the discussion to be resumed eventually. . . .

But . . . the preliminary question . . . was, in reality, a response to the prejudicial motion and was of such a nature as to prevent an adjournment of the debate much more than to prevent its continuance. . . .

M. le Président of the Council, who was holding a cabinet meeting, did us —I would say the honor if I were a formalist but will rather say—the kindness of leaving the meeting and coming into an office near that of the Foreign Affairs Committee and asking the chairman of the committee to join him there. He charged me with presenting a message, a Governmental proposal, to the Foreign Affairs Committee. . . .[17]

The message from *M. le President* of the Council . . . was essentially this: if the preliminary question and the prejudicial motions are withdrawn the debate may begin and everyone . . . may speak in turn. . . .

I returned to the committee, . . . which asked both the author of the preliminary question and the author of the prejudicial motion—there remained only one, M. Chupin having, in the meantime, withdrawn his—to withdraw provisionally their motions, although retaining . . . their rights . . . to reintroduce them at any moment in the debate. . . .

I received from M. Auméran an affirmative reply and from . . . M. Delbez a negative reply.

17. Note that the Premier implicitly recognized the importance of the committee by seeking out its chairman (*Ed. note*).

M. le Président: . . . I have no authority to ask the author of the preliminary question or of the prejudicial motion not to insist. . . . But I express the wish that the Assembly would be showing objectivity and a concern for clarity if it would permit the orators to debate the substance. . . .

M. Pierre Mendès-France: I wish to associate myself with what you have just said. . . . I believe that it is in the interests of all that the debate permit all deputies who so desire to make known their views on the matter which is now being debated. . . .

M. Jacques Isorni: [18] *M. le President* of the Council, will you permit me to ask you a question?

M. Pierre Mendès-France: Please.

M. Jacques Isorni: M. le président, you ask M. Delbez, M. Auméran, and M. Caillet to withdraw their motions. . . . But there is a problem which seems to me much more important, that is to know what will be the attitude of the Government if these motions are maintained. [*Applause in the center and on some benches at the left.*]

M. Pierre Mendès-France: I do not understand M. Isorni's remarks very well.

On each of the texts which will be submitted successively to discussion and which will be the object of successive votes, the Government will make its position known.

But at the present moment we are . . . engaged in a procedural debate. . . .

M. Adolphe Auméran: I would be crushed if anyone would one day, prevent me from speaking. For that reason I would be very happy to hear all my colleagues who wish to express themselves during this debate.

But I wish to note in passing that the texts we are to discuss . . . have been known to everyone for two years and have been the objects of such propaganda and distribution that no one can still be unaware of the position he will take on them.

So, we are called upon at this time, it seems to me, . . . to take a position.

I have decided to do all in my power to see that this position is taken during this debate, by a "yes" or by a "no."

Therefore, I am opposed to any dilatory motion.

I . . . am ready to withdraw the preliminary question . . . but on condition that there is no other dilatory motion. [*Applause on the extreme right, the left, the extreme left and on various benches on the right.*]

M. le Président: M. Delbez has the floor.

M. Louis Delbez: . . . I am convinced that a certain number of points [*about EDC*] remain unanswered.

It is because I want the Government to bring us a complete file and . . . resolve a certain number of existing difficulties that I have introduced my prejudicial motion. . . . In other words I did it in the higher interest of the country.

But, *M. le Président* of the Council, you are a better judge than I of the interest of the country and since you come yourself to ask me to withdraw my motion, I make the sacrifice for you very willingly. . . . [*Applause on the extreme right and on several benches on the right and left.*] . . .

M. Francis Caillet: M. le Président, I agree, in the same spirit, to withdraw my preliminary question in order that the debate may resume. . . . [*Applause on various benches on the left, the extreme right and the right.*]

M. François Quilici: [19] I propose then, in my own name, the preliminary question. [*Exclamations on numerous benches.*] . . .

I ask for the floor. Then I will withdraw my motion. [*Exclamations on the left, the center, and on various benches elsewhere.*]

18. A Rightist deputy, attorney for Marshal Pétain, opponent of EDC and of the Mendès-France government (*Ed. note*).

19. Rightist opponent of EDC and of the Mendès-France government (*Ed. note*).

M. le Président: M. Quilici has the floor. . . .

M. Francois Quilici: Mesdames, Messieurs, . . . if I have moved the preliminary question, it is because I am struck by the fact that . . . the Government finds the means to take no position, either on the substance or on the procedure.

M. Jean Binot: That's so! . . .

M. François Quilici: If I raise again the preliminary question, it is for the sake of clarity. I ask, consequently, *M. le Président* of the Council what position he will take if I maintain this preliminary question. [*Exclamations on the left and the center.*]

M. le Président: M. Quilici, the President of the Council has let me know that he has no reply.

Do you maintain your preliminary question?

M. François Quilici: I call your attention to the fact that for the third time *M. le Président* of the Council refuses to take a stand and it appears that the Assembly is disposed to accept this. There is proof that the Assembly is allowing itself to be maneuvered. I withdraw my preliminary question. [*Exclamations and laughter on the left and in the center.*]

[*The general debate was resumed for the remainder of that sitting. An opponent of EDC spoke for 20 minutes, a supporter spoke for about 50 minutes with numerous interruptions, and another supporter spoke for about 40 minutes.*]

SITTING OF MONDAY, AUGUST 30, 1954

M. le Président: . . . I have been advised by M. Chupin that he did not participate in the withdrawal of the prejudicial motion that he had signed with MM. Delbez and de Moustier and that he has reintroduced it in his own name.

M. Jacques Duclos:[20] The maneuvers of the *cédistes*[21] are beginning!

M. le Président: On the other hand, M. Auméran has let me know that, under these conditions, he has reintroduced the preliminary question. [*Applause on numerous benches on the extreme right.*]

M. Alfred Chupin: I rise to a point of order.

M. le Président: M. Chupin has the floor for a point of order.

M. Alfred Chupin: Monsieur le président, my dear colleagues, I apologize for the misunderstanding that arose last night.

First I introduced a prejudicial motion in my personal name. . . . I withdrew it upon the introduction of the motion by M. Delbez, which was much more conciliatory than mine. . . . M. Delbez asked me to join him in introducing his. . . .

When . . . he withdrew his motion . . . he forgot that I was co-signer. . . .

After some reflection . . . I have decided . . . to reintroduce the motion that was introduced [by M. Delbez] . . . [*Interruptions.*]

M. Jacques Duclos: That means that Schuman[22] does not wish to speak. He is afraid. [*Exclamations in the center.*]

M. Maurice Lucas: He is not embarrassed, you may be sure of that!

M. Jean Lecanuet: Cantal did not support you yesterday, M. Duclos![23]

M. Jacques Duclos: And you? You have some nerve!

M. le Président: M. the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs has the floor.

M. Daniel Mayer: I call on the Assembly [*Interruptions on several benches*], I call on all the members of the Assembly not to put on the same footing the organization of Europe and

20. Leader of the Communist parliamentary group (*Ed. note*).

21. Supporters of EDC (*Ed. note*).

22. Robert Schuman, initiator of the EDC project and leader of its supporters. A leader of the MRP (*Ed. note*).

23. A reference to a by-election in the Cantal *département* in which the anti-EDC forces were defeated (*Ed. note*).

a departmental election. [*Applause on numerous benches on the left, the extreme right, and the extreme left.—Protests in the center.*]

M. Fernand Bouxom: [24] That hits the problem and it hits you too!

M. Daniel Mayer: M. Bouxom, I am interceding to carry out a mandate requested by your friends, I may even say imposed by them. [*Interruptions and protests in the center.*]

M. Fernand Bouxom: You don't give that impression! Our friends have not asked you to comment on the election in Cantal!

M. Alfred Coste-Floret: We have given no mandate to speak on the election in Cantal!

M. André Pierrard: Adenauer is not happy!

M. le Président: Please, Messieurs, be silent. Only M. the chairman of the committee has the floor.

M. Jacques Vendroux: They [25] are in the last throes of the death agony. Do not be angry with them.

M. Daniel Mayer: I thought that in speaking as I just did I would have the concurrence of all the members of this Assembly—

On the extreme left—The members of good faith!

M. Daniel Mayer: —who believe with me . . . that it is not through procedural artifices that a problem as important as that of European organization can be settled [*Applause on the extreme left and on numerous benches on the left, in the center, and on the right*], that it is not worthy of Parliament for, through the normal disagreements of a democracy and its operation, we must have at least as a point in common the will to preserve the dignity and the grandeur of the solutions to the problems posed.

M. Joseph Defos du Rau: M. Paul Reynaud said that yesterday.

M. Daniel Mayer: Well, do you object to my repeating the words of M. Paul Reynaud from this tribune?

M. François de Menthon: [26] But don't talk about the Cantal election! [*Laughter and exclamations on the extreme left.—Applause in the center and on several other benches.*]

M. Daniel Mayer: . . . I have been instructed by the Foreign Affairs Committee to ask for a suspension of the sitting in the event that a preliminary question is introduced or reintroduced in order that the committee might consider this preliminary question and make its position known. . . .

But, first, I want to point out to those newspapers which may speak of a sort of parliamentary absenteeism that this morning absenteeism is justified by the unusual number and length of the sittings [*Movements in the center and on several benches on the right*], by the work of the committees, by the custom we have in the groups or the committees to proceed very often by a sort of friendly relay, so the press does not have the right to speak this morning of absenteeism. [*Interruptions on the same benches.—Diverse movements.*]

My dear colleagues, right now I am defending our common rights and those of the entire Parliament in the face of a public campaign! [*Applause on numerous benches on the left and the extreme left and on various benches on the right and the extreme right.*]

M. Alfred Coste-Floret: You are defending the right to be lazy.

M. Daniel Mayer: M. Coste-Floret, my words are good for your friends as well as the others.

M. Alfred Coste-Floret: My friends are here; it is the Right which is absent and almost the entire Extreme Right.

M. Marc Depuy: You make a lot of noise, but there aren't many of you.

M. André Pierrard: And M. Schuman, where is he? He is telephoning Konrad! [27]

M. le Président: Silence! Messieurs.

M. Daniel Mayer: The discussion

24. Rightist supporter of EDC (*Ed. note*).
25. The EDC supporters (*Ed. note*).
26. MRP supporter of EDC (*Ed. note*).
27. Adenauer (*Ed. note*).

which took place yesterday in the Foreign Affairs Committee and which had a sort of provisional epilogue in the Assembly had as its principal purpose to try to conciliate the desire expressed by a great many of our colleagues . . . that the maximum number of speakers might make themselves heard—

M. Charles Guthmuller: All.

M. Daniel Mayer: All, if that is possible.—and the wish that the substantive problem . . . may be voted on before any adjournment of the debate.

In the committee we discussed at lengthy—too lengthily—these two, apparently contradictory, aspects of the question.

It was in the search for a sort of a *modus vivendi* and to establish among us a sort of *fair play* [28] . . . that last night M. Auméran and M. Delbez accepted the appeal of the President of Council, of the President of this Assembly, and, in a more modest form, my own appeal. . . .

It was understood . . . that this reprieve would not end so soon.

Can this reprieve, which began last night, be ended already this morning despite the legitimate absence of so many of our colleagues? Surely no one believed that, after having heard only two speakers, we would begin again this type of scenario, unworthy of a great parliament [*Applause on the extreme left, on numerous benches on the left and the extreme right and on several benches on the right*], absolutely contrary to the *fair play* of which the House of Commons so often gives examples that we should follow [*Applause on several benches on the left*], a scenario which consists of substituting, now and probably for several hours, for a debate on substance—a debate of conscience, of grandeur, of dignity—a procedural debate that would not take place if we were animated by the spirit to which I just alluded. [*Applause on numerous benches on the left and on several benches on the extreme right.*]

28. Spoken in English (*Ed. note*).

I assure you that there is in my mind—

M. Maurice Lucas: No hidden motives!

M. Daniel Mayer: Exactly, and I hope indeed, my dear colleague, that there is no more within your group and among your friends than exist at this moment in my mind. [*Applause on the left, the extreme left, and the extreme right.—Protests in the center and on the right.*]

. . . There are men who have had greater responsibilities than others in the elaboration, signature, and presentation of the treaty. Are we going to prevent these colleagues from explaining the conditions in which they elaborated, signed, and requested ratification of such an important act? [*Applause on the extreme left and on the extreme right and on numerous benches on the left.*]

M. André Pierrard: Perhaps that is what the authors of the motions wish to avoid.

M. Paul Coste-Floret: Well, then, let the Assembly vote against the preliminary question!

M. Jean Lecanuet: If it is voted there will be no debate.

M. Daniel Mayer: M. Lecanuet, with the respect that I have for you, for your talent which is great and which you have demonstrated several times at this tribune, with the respect that I hold for the opinions of those who do not think as I do—respect that is sometimes even greater, as you know, than for the ideas of those who think like me—I ask you very frankly not to distort the question.

Everyone knew . . . that the reintroduction of a prejudicial motion would automatically lead to the reintroduction of the preliminary question. Consequently, despite appearances, the reintroduction of the preliminary question was made, not by M. Auméran, but by M. Chupin. . .

That is why I turn to M. Chupin and speak in these terms:

. . . I am among those who, torn with a sorrow that only the members

of my group[29] can understand, have believed that we are in the presence of a problem of individual conscience, one of such a nature that no type of pressure, not even the most affectionate, not even that to which we are most sensitive,[30] should be exercised on us to modify our position on the substance. But, on the form, I have the right to ask you in the name of the rights of parliament, in the name of its dignity, in the name of that *fair play* and of that grandeur which should typify our debates, not to impose a sort of obstruction to the general flow of the discussion. . . .

In the event, alas, that you do not reply favorably, I will be obliged to ask for a suspension of the sitting . . . in order that the Foreign Affairs Committee can discuss your prejudicial motion. . . . [*Applause on numerous benches on the left, on the extreme left and on the extreme right.*]

M. Christian Pineau:[31] I rise to a point of order. . . .

My dear colleagues. . . . The preliminary question has, in fact, as its purpose the total interruption of the debate and requires a decision on the substance before all the speakers have spoken.

The prejudicial motion, on the contrary, simply has the effect . . . of suspending the debate . . . of permitting it to be resumed later. . . . [*Applause in the center, on numerous benches on the left and the right.*]

. . . I believe that the authors of a prejudicial motion cannot be held responsible for the termination of the debate whereas the authors of the preliminary question can be. [*Applause on numerous benches on the left, in the center, and on the right.—Protests on the extreme left.*]

M. Jacques Duclos: It is M. Pleven,[32] who does not want to explain himself, who has instructed that man! M. Pleven is in the pay of America!

M. Fernand Bouxom: And you of Russia . . .

M. Alfred Chupin: I reply to M. the chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, who expressed himself with great courtesy in my regard, that aside from the letter of the rule, its spirit demands that preliminary motions be discussed at the beginning of a debate and not at the end.

M. Jacques Duclos: Not at all. Read the rules.

M. Pierre Mendès-France: [*After reviewing the efforts to open full debate*] I ask, then, very amicably, of M. Chupin . . . and I ask of the Assembly, as a whole, not to break . . . this pact of good faith which was formed yesterday and which, if I am not mistaken, received the unanimous support of the Assembly [*Applause on several benches on the left and the extreme right.*] . . .

M. Alfred Chupin: M. le Président of the Council has just invited me amicably—I thank him for it very profoundly—to withdraw my prejudicial motion.

But . . . I must say, amicably also, to *M. le Président* of the Council, that his statement would carry much more weight if he would announce now that the Government is opposed to any procedural motions and particularly to the preliminary question. [*Very good! Very good! from the center.*]

M. le Président: Monsieur Chupin, do you maintain your prejudicial motion?

M. Alfred Chupin: Oui, M. le Président.

[*At the request of M. Daniel Mayer, chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, the sitting was suspended to permit the committee to deliberate on the motions introduced. The rules of*

29. Socialist, which nearly burst asunder in the bitterness of the EDC controversy (*Ed. note*).

30. A reference to the decision of the Socialist party to apply sanctions against those deputies voting against EDC (*Ed. note*).

31. EDC Socialist (*Ed. note*).

32. EDC supporter, whose name the plan bore (*Ed. note*).

the Assembly give the appropriate committee the right to such a suspension if a question is to be decided without debate.]

M. le Président: The sitting is resumed . . .

M. Daniel Mayer: Mesdames, Messieurs, the Foreign Affairs Committee . . . met from 11:00 a.m. to 12:45 p.m. . . .

Before explaining the conclusions of its majority, I must summarize the essentials of its debate, which were earnest and praiseworthy. All the members without any exceptions penetrated to the depth of the national crisis which prevails in these impassioned hours and were determined to permit everyone to liberate their consciences by speaking during a debate that was as ample as one could hope, after the fashion of the previous debates in the committee. . . .

[*He then summarized the committee's discussions.*]

The majority of the committee . . . accepted the preliminary question. . . .

The principal argument was that it ends the vacillation. . . .

The Assembly must say "yes" or "no" at once. . . . [*Diverse movements in the center and on numerous benches on the right.*]

M. Guy Petit: The Government also. Ask it!

M. Daniel Mayer: Please, M. Petit.

M. Guy Petit: No. Don't say "Please." This is very important. . . .

[*Mayer then presented the arguments for an early decision on EDC and for the quarrel to be forgotten in the interests of national unity He was interrupted 22 times in the last 12 minutes. He was succeeded at the tribune by M. Roland de Moustier, who gave the report of the minority of the committee which opposed the Auméran motion. He was interrupted 21 times in 13 minutes. The speech was principally an appeal to the government to take a position in the debate.*]

M. Pierre Mendès-France: Mesdames, Messieurs, since the Government was formed its principal efforts, in the most diverse domains, has consisted of untying all those knots which everywhere paralyzed, ossified, if I dare say it, our national life.

The problem posed by the European Defense Community was one of those. I could have tried to dodge, to elude, to adjourn it . . .

But, the Government has told you from the first day: we . . . will resolve this terrible uncertainty before the parliamentary recess.

At the time the Government agreed on this debate with you it was not unaware of the embarrassment this would cause for it. It is a secret to no one that differences of opinion existed and still exist within it. To the very extent that this government represents the coming together of men of good will holding various points of view, it is not surprising that it may have within it divergences of opinion. This was one more reason for us to try to achieve a *rapprochement,* to try to effect a reconciliation. It has not been able to effect . . . this *rapprochement,* this reconciliation. . . .

It makes me sick that my government cannot take a more clear-cut position in this debate. . . . [*Applause on numerous benches on the left, the extreme right and on several benches on the right*].

M. Louis Jacquinot: M. le Président of the Council, you can always quit.

M. Pierre Mendès-France: Yes, my dear colleague, I can quit and I have a certain number of friends, . . . who . . . have said to me: Do like the others, submit your resignation because it's getting too difficult. [*Diverse movements.—Applause on numerous benches on the left and the extreme right.*]

. . . What keeps me here . . . is the thought that it is my duty to aid the National Assembly, to force it if need be, to lift the mortgage, to emerge from the uncertainty, from the hesitation

which has lasted so many years. . . .

The preliminary question of M. Auméran puts an end to the debate and constitutes a means by which the Assembly can decide the substantive question. . . .

The Government . . . has not been able to effect the reconciliation . . . that it desired in this matter of extreme national importance. . . . In these conditions, it will not commit itself to support the Treaty of Paris such as it is today after the rejection of the French protocol presented to the . . . Brussels conference. . . .

The Government refuses to participate in a vote which divides the Assembly and public opinion so deeply [*murmurs in the center and on the right*] on a question for which a compromise solution should have been found.

As far as the motion by M. Chupin is concerned, my response is the following:

The Government cannot, of course, oppose a motion which approves of the action it undertook at Brussels. . . . If the Assembly wishes to give it its confidence to pursue the effort undertaken, it will not refuse this mission. . . .

M. Alfred Chupin: M. le Président of the Council, it is not proper that the head of the French government leave for Brussels in accordance with a resolution calling on him to renew the negotiations with criticism for his past action. . . .

We intended to give him the means to pursue the negotiations without having been disavowed by the Assembly, even by those who were not in agreement on the exact text of the protocol and to give him, above all, sufficient strength to defend a broad national point of view in a new conference.

In any case, if there is in this debate some equivocation or some difficulty, it comes neither from the wording of this motion nor from procedural questions, but from the fact that the Government would not take a stand and that a debate on foreign affairs will be arbitrated for the first time in France by the Communist party. [*Applause on several benches on the left, in the center, and on the right.—Interruptions on the extreme left.*]. . . .

M. Pierre Mendès-France: The Assembly will not be surprised that the Government is not satisfied by the reply that M. Chupin has just given. [*Applause on numerous benches on the left.*]

M. le Président: . . . I have been informed that M. Auméran would like to request permission for another orator to defend his motion in his stead. I replied that, in accordance with article 46 of the rules this did not seem possible.

But since then I have received the following note: "I countersign the preliminary motion of M. Auméran. (Signed) Edouard Herriot." [*On the extreme left, on numerous benches on the extreme right and on the left, and on several benches on the right the deputies arise and applaud at length. —Exclamations in the center and on the right.—Prolonged noise.*] [33]

[*Herriot expressed regret that a full debate had been prevented and criticized EDC because it did not provide for close Anglo-French alliance and, most important, because it "leads to the diminution of the sovereignty and independence of our country." Some of his remarks show graphically the extent to which French nationalism played a role in the decision on EDC.*]

33. Herriot, then past 80, was the "grand old man" of the Assembly, three times premier under the Third Republic, President almost in perpetuity of the key Radical party, honorary President of the Assembly, past president of the Assembly, a member of the French Academy, leading literary figure, mayor of Lyons for more than 50 years. He was so weak and aged that he could not mount the tribune to deliver his speech, but spoke with a rasping, emotion-choked voice from his seat. The announcement that he was to defend the Auméran motion was the climax in the climactic EDC debate (*Ed. note*).

M. Edouard Herriot: . . . Art. 20 of the Treaty of Paris . . . provides:

> "In the accomplishment of their duties, the members of the Commissariat will neither solicit nor accept instructions from any government. They will abstain from any action incompatible with the supranational character of their functions."

So we have commissars completely cut off . . . from all relations with their country.

M. Fernand Bouxom: That is what Europe means.

M. Edouard Herriot: Eh bien! I say that it is a text both monstrous and ridiculous. [*Applause on the extreme left, the extreme right, on numerous benches on the left and on some benches on the right.*]

What man who is a Frenchman at heart would agree to represent his country thus? [*Applause on the same benches.*]

That is monstrous and ridiculous because it accords a premium to those who will not be loyal. . . .

Men cannot be found who will renounce their national origin—this seems so monstrous an idea to me that I cannot accept it— . . . abstract beings, superhuman beings or robots by whom we would be commanded, governed, managed. [*Diverse movements in the center.*]

M. Pierre-Henri Teitgen: Will you permit me, *M. le Président,*[34] to interrupt you?

M. Edouard Herriot: Willingly.

M. Pierre-Henri Teitgen: M. le Président, I took the liberty of consulting the *Journal officiel.* I told you this before the sitting began.

I noted that, when you were my age, you took the liberty, in order to clarify the debate, of interrupting your elders. It is by benefit of this precedent that I am taking the liberty of asking authorization from you to present my observation.

M. Edouard Herriot: Please do.

M. Pierre-Henri Teitgen: You have just criticized, *M. le Président,* the formula at which the Brussels conference arrived and you have shown that, in your opinion, it was insufficient.

M. Edouard Herriot: Oui.

M. Pierre-Henri Teitgen: . . . What must we conclude from that? Two things: either we return to Brussels to try—[*Laughter on the extreme right. —Applause in the center and on several benches on the right and the left.*]

M. Jean Binot: Haven't you had enough?

M. Pierre-Henri Teitgen: —either we return to Brussels to try a last time to improve the formula or we vote the preliminary question which will end any later possibility for negotiation. [*Exclamations on the extreme right.*]

M. Jean Binot: Never in your life!

M. Pierre-Henri Teitgen: That's the choice.

M. Daniel Mayer: Not at all! Another false dilemma!

M. Pierre-Henri Teitgen: Eh bien! . . . Permit me to read . . . an extract from a speech you made in March 1937. [*Exclamations and laughter on numerous benches on the left, the extreme right, and the extreme left.*]

Mme. Madeleine Laissac: Was the situation the same?

M. Jean Binot: We've had Hitler since.

M. Pierre-Henri Teitgen: I think, my dear colleagues, that I am saying nothing that exceeds the limits of perfect courtesy. [*Applause in the center and on several benches on the right and the left.*]

Here is what *M. le Président* Edouard Herriot said in 1937:

"For my part, having often sought accommodation with Germany, . . . I say: although I have not succeeded so far . . . , I do not wish to discourage efforts for *rapprochement* which can be undertaken some day . . . I would

34. Addressed to Herriot, not to the presiding officer. In France, once a president (even of a very inconsequential group), always a president (*Ed. note*).

make a last try." [*Applause in the center and on some benches on the right and the left.—Applause on numerous benches on the left, the extreme right, and the extreme left.*]

M. Pierre André: Germany replied in 1939! [*Interruptions in the center.*]

M. Pierre-Henri Teitgen: My dear colleagues, by trying one last time at Brussels, by asking still another time of our friends—I say indeed—our friends [*Applause in the center and on several benches on the right and the left*]—the Belgians—

On the extreme left: Adenauer!

M. Pierre-Henri Teitgen: . . . by asking of Italy, by asking of Chancellor Adenauer [*Exclamations on the extreme left*] to make a last effort, we would be only according to these friends and to Chancellor Adenauer that which *M. le Président* Herriot in 1937 rightly accorded to Chancellor Hitler. [*Applause in the center and on several benches on the right and the left. . . . Exclamations on the extreme left and the extreme right.*]

M. Jean Binot: Sophism!

M. Jean Pronteau: The partner of M. Schuman should not be able to say such things.[35]

M. Edouard Herriot: I thank M. Teitgen for having presented these observations in terms intended to be courteous [*Light laughter*], which were not, perhaps, to the very end, because I heard, at the end of the last sentence, the name of Hitler.

On several benches in the center: That was in 1937.

M. Edouard Herriot: . . . I reply to our colleague [Teitgen]: Because it is better to tell the truth. The conflict which divides us is not a conflict over form; it is not a conflict over details; it is a conflict over substance. [*Very good! very good! on the extreme right.*]

For us, the European Community, —let me tell you what I think in the evening of my life by rallying to this conviction all the strength I have—for me, for us, the European Community is the end of France. [*Applause on the extreme left, on numerous benches on the left and the extreme right and on several benches on the right.*] . . .

Yes, for us it is not a question of detail, it is not a question of detail, it is not a question of changing a comma, it is not a question of adding a sentence. For us, it is the question of the life or the death of France. [*Applause on the extreme left, on numerous benches on the left, on the extreme right and on several benches on the right.*] . . .

What is the army of a country? It is not the mathematical sum of its conscripts, it is the country rallied around its flag for the defense of its material and intellectual treasures, for the defense of its liberty, of its independence. And it is because these sentiments, developed by the French Revolution, . . . had so much depth that they gave to the men of the Marne[36] the courage to die in conditions that we must not forget. [*Applause on the extreme left, on the extreme right, and on several benches on the right.*]

The army is the soul of the fatherland and I would like to know where this army of the European Community will find its soul. . . .

[*Herriot was followed by Christian Pineau, a Socialist supporter of EDC, who argued that EDC was an attempt to avoid the mistakes that led to World War II. Pineau, a supporter of the Mendès-France government, replaced Louis Jacquinot, an opponent of the cabinet, as the speaker against the Auméran motion. He praised the efforts of the premier at Brussels and in-*

35. An allusion to Schuman's efforts to undermine Mendès-France's position at Brussels by writing a vicious attack of the French protocol in a large Paris daily during the conference and by sending emissaries to Brussels to urge France's allies not to accept the protocol (*Ed. note*).

36. One of the bloodiest battles in history, the battle that halted the German advance in World War I (*Ed. note*).

terpreted the Chupin motion as a vote of confidence in the government and a vote against the Auméran motion as a call for new talks at Brussels and of confidence in the government. Following the Pineau speech the vote on the Auméran motion to kill EDC was taken. It carried 319-264, thus defeating EDC. Here is the reaction of the Assembly when the result of the vote was announced:]

M. le Président: The motion is carried.

Consequently the bill is rejected. [*Lively applause on the extreme right, the extreme left and on various benches on the left and the right.—On these benches, the deputies arise and sing the* Marseillaise.—*MM. the members of the Government arise.*]

Numerous voices in the center: To Moscow! To Moscow!

[*In the center, numerous deputies leave the chamber.—Various movements.—Noise.*]

On the extreme left—Down with the *Wehrmacht!*

M. Jean-Louis Vigier: Today the Communist votes count.[37]

[*On the left, several deputies sing the Workers' International.—Exclamations on numerous other benches.—Diverse movements.—Noise.*]

M. Paul Reynaud: I ask for recognition. [*Exclamations on the extreme left.*]

M. le Président: For what purpose?

M. Paul Reynaud: M. le Président, just a word.

For the first time since there has been a Parliament in France—[*Lively interruptions on the extreme left and on various benches on the left.*]

M. André Pierrard: Is he rising to a point of order?

Numerous voices on the extreme left: The debate is over! Rules!

M. Robert Ballanger: There are rules. They must be enforced.

M. le President: Leave that to me.

M. Robert Ballanger: There is no more debate!

M. Paul Reynaud:—a treaty has been rejected—[*New interruptions on the extreme left.*]

M. Jean Pronteau: Coupez la route du fer! [38]

M. André Pierrard: The gravedigger [39] is being allowed to speak!

M. le Président: M. Pierrard, I call you to order. [*Protests on the extreme left.—Noise.*]

[*M. Paul Reynaud mounts the tribune.—Lively applause in the center and on various benches, on the right and the left.—Exclamations on the extreme left.*]

On the extreme left: The rules!

M. Paul Reynaud: For the first time—

M. Alphonse Dénis: Is he rising to a point of order?

M. le Président: M. Dénis, you do not have the floor.

M. Alphonse Dénis: I must watch to see that the rules are enforced.

M. le Président: M. Dénis, your usual attitude is correct and courteous. I regret seeing you interfere today in the control of the debate. I cannot tolerate it.

M. Alphonse Dénis: M. Paul Reynaud has no right to speak.

M. le Président: M. Dénis, if you persist, I will call you to order.

37. An allusion to Mendès-France's refusal to count Communist votes in his investiture majority. In other words, he had said he would not take office unless he had a majority after the Communist votes were subtracted from those of his supporters. If the Communists had not voted against EDC it would have passed (*Ed. note*).

38. Bar the way to the tanks! An allusion to a rallying cry by Reynaud when he was premier in 1940 immediately before the fall of France (*Ed. note*).

39. Another allusion to Reynaud's premiership in 1940 (*Ed. note*).

M. Paul Reynaud: For the first time since there has been a Parliament in France, a treaty will have been rejected—[*New interruptions on the extreme left.—Applause in the center and on various benches on the right and the left.*]—without the author of the treaty nor its signer having taken the floor in its defense. [*Lively applause in the center and on various benches on the right and the left.—On these benches, then on all the other benches, the deputies arise and sing the* Marseillaise.]

M. Fernand Bouxom: Long live liberty in spite of this!

M. Jacques Fonlupt-Esperaber: Long live the Republic!

On the extreme left: Long live France!

M. Jean Nocher: Now let's ask the supporters of the EDC to sing for us *Deutschland über alles!* [*Diverse movements.—Prolonged noise.*]

M. le Président: I call on the Assembly to recover its calm.

If the demonstrations and the noise continue I will call it to order.

I call on everyone for silence, calm, and above all dignity.

M. Fernand Bouxom: It is too late for dignity!

M. le Président: There remain on the agenda several debates on second reading. [*Exclamations and laughter.*]

The agenda calls for the discussion on second reading of the bill relative to the age requirements for voting and office-holding in the chambers of agriculture. [*New exclamations.*]

M. Fernand Bouxom: The question is now grave enough for the Government to give its advice! [*Laughter in the center.*]

M. le Président: If the Assembly does not wish to recover its calm and agree to proceed with the order of business [*Diverse movements*], I will suspend the sitting and postpone until tomorrow the rest of our work.

On numerous benches: Oui! Oui!

M. the Président: It is so decided.

41. The National Assembly of the Fifth Republic: Debate on the Power of the Assembly*

As M. Michel Debré explained in his speech defending the constitution of the new republic to the Council of State (see pp. 43-55 above), one of the principal aims of the framers of the document was to curb what they believed was irresponsible abuse of power by the National Assembly. Several key provisions in the constitution had that purpose.

* *Journal officiel, débats parlementaires, assemblée nationale,* May 27-June 4, 1959, Nos. 25-30, pp. 553-756.

The Gaullists also sought to achieve that end through revision of the rules for the conduct of business within the Assembly. The selection below is excerpted from the debate in the Assembly concerning the proposed revision. It points up the decline of the Assembly in comparison to its predecessor in which the EDC debate took place (see pp. 249-265 above).

M. le Président [*of the National Assembly*]*:* The agenda calls for discussion of the conclusions of the report of the Special Rules Committee charged with the preparation and submission to the National Assembly of a bill on permanent rules.

M. Michel Habib-Deloncle, *rapporteur* of the Special Rules Committee, has the floor. [*Applause.*]

M. Michel Habib-Deloncle, *rapporteur:* Mesdames, Messieurs, . . . In elaborating our rules, the committee adhered to three essential principles: first, strict observance of the Constitution . . . ; second, the need for the establishment of an authentic parliamentary regime; finally, the institution of a bill of rights and, at the same time, of duties of the deputies. . . .

We must . . . not forget that . . . if there is a mission that has indubitably been conferred upon us by the country it is to get rid permanently of the remains of the assembly regime. [*Applause on the left and in the center.*]

In an assembly regime Parliament is omnipotent and one of the assemblies composing Parliament is omnipotent and, in fact, governs.

In a parliamentary regime, powers are separated and there is between them a relationship that does not exist in a presidential regime. . . . Parliament has two essential missions, it legislates and it controls.

To legislate is, in our view, the first mission, the intrinsic mission of Parliament. A Parliament that does not vote laws and also approve expenditures is not conceivable. . . . This presupposes broad deliberation, a broad confrontation of the opinions of those who may initiate laws and those who may initiate amendments, that is, the members of Parliament and of the Government. . . .

As far as control is concerned . . . we must distinguish two elements: on one hand, the means of information and control and, on the other, the exercise by the Assembly of its right of control.

There are several means of information and control. They can be brought into operation either on the initiative of the Government in the form of communications with or without debate or on the initiative of Parliament. Some are provided for by law; this is the case with oral questions and with committees of inquiry; they may also derive from long parliamentary custom, such as written questions and petitions. That is, too, the case with the role of information and control that devolves on your permanent committees.

The justification for these means of control is their rapid operation, their efficiency, their flexibility. The dialogue between the Government and the Assembly should not be feared, but, on the contrary, encouraged as much as possible and the Government must be permitted to come to the Assembly to present the urgent business of the country almost without delay, provided it is known that a vote will be taken only when the Constitution requires and that the responsibility of the Government will not be called into ques-

tion, except in conditions provided for in the Constitution. . . .

The last task undertaken by your committee was to establish a bill of rights and duties of deputies. . . . This means, above all, the right of free expression with respect for the Constitution. At all times, in considering the procedure for the discussion of bills and resolutions . . . your committee has taken care to preserve the right of the members of the Assembly to express themselves freely with respect for order.

Free expression is obviously, above all, respect for the rights of the opposition. The rights of the opposition in a democracy are sacred. But we must examine, with regard to a system of ministerial stability, what is the role of the opposition.

We have the feeling, my dear colleagues, that too often in this chamber, because of the practice of previous regimes, the role of the opposition has been considered a role of harassment which must have as its end the putting to death of the government after a nice bullfight in which everyone takes part. Indeed, this was true when the Assembly could, at any moment, call into question the existence of the Government by instigating implicit or explicit questions of confidence. It is no longer true in a parliamentary system of ministerial stability. . . .

The role of the opposition in the Fifth Republic is to prosecute the Government before public opinion in order to try to reverse at the next elections the majority in the country, and the role of the majority is not to arrange sterile compromises with the opposition, but to do a good job in carrying out its program so it can win its case before the country. [*Applause on the left and in the center.*] . . .

The introduction into our customs of the use of the motion of censure as a means of expressing opposition, the use of oral questions as the normal exercise by Parliament of its right to information, utilizing the latter so flexibly that its sanction will not be political, there, I think, is the best guarantee of the rights of the opposition.

The counterpart of this is that the Government must never evade a question that is asked of it. The rules that we are proposing to you do not give the Government any power to interfere in the inscription on the agenda of oral questions. We believed that this was a good rule, for it is fitting that the Government reply when it is interrogated by the deputies on matters which seem to them to be fundamental to the life of the country. . . .

The rules of the Assembly . . . must permit the deputy . . . to participate effectively in committee meetings as in plenary sessions not only in voting but in the discussions, for it is important that the voting be enlightened: to vote with full knowledge of the issue, . . . sheltered from outside pressures . . . ; to represent the great political movements of the country in clarifying its political life by regrouping, by uniting, with the thought that diverse opinions do not inevitably find expression through the creation of a new group, but may find the means of free expression within the great political movements among which public opinion is already distributed.

Those are the foundations of the work of your committee; that is what you will find . . . in the rules that it proposes to you. . . . During our work we have tried to keep in mind the great words that *M. le Président* of the Republic [de Gaulle] addressed to the Assembly in his first message . . . :

> Deliberate with dignity, elaborate good laws, make political choices and express them clearly, most certainly that is what the country expects of its representatives, what they themselves intend to do, what they will do, I am sure.
>
> It is true that the Constitution gives them a remodeled career. The character of our times, the danger

facing the State because of its failure to have foreseen it, have led the French people to reform the parliamentary institution profoundly. This has been done in the documents. The great changes made in the operation of the Assemblies and in the relationships between the organs of government remain to be put into effect.

In doing that, the National Assembly will assure, as far as it is concerned, to the Republican State the efficiency, the stability, and the continuity that is indispensable for all great undertakings and is required for the recovery of France.

We feel, mesdames, messieurs, that in adopting the rules proposed to you, the Assembly will respond to the confidence expressed by the Chief of State and thus will demonstrate its will, without pretense and without equivocation, to take loyally and fully its place within the new institutions that the French people have freely given themselves. [*Applause on the left, in the center, on the right, and on the extreme right.*] . . .

M. le Président: The Prime Minister has the floor. [*Applause on the left, in the center, and on the right.*]

M. Michel Debré: Mesdames, Messieurs les députés, . . . As the *rapporteur* has said . . . the Constitution contemplates a parliamentary regime. . . . What characterizes a parliamentary regime? It is characterized, first, obviously, by the free character of the elections concerning the Assembly. It is characterized, next, by a very precise and very detailed distribution of powers between the government and Parliament. It is characterized, finally —but this trait is outside the scope of this debate—by the powers as national arbiter that are held by the President of the Republic.

The Government must ask for approval of its program; that is its sign of confidence. The Government can see its responsibility called into question; that is the motion of censure. The essential acts concerning national life take the form of laws; that is, they must receive the approval of Parliament. The budget, each year, must be voted by the representatives, of the nation. Finally, the Government is subject to control by Parliament. This parliamentary control results from the devices of confidence, censure, and budget bill already mentioned; but it also includes the possibility for the parliamentarians to ask the government for explanations of its policy.

That is the balance between government and Parliament. . . . That which must be avoided is disequilibrium, of which there are two types: arbitrary government, but also the crushing of the government by the omnipotence of assemblies. . . .

To prevent arbitrary government the whole Constitution is there. . . . I call your attention, on this subject, to the fact that the Constitution goes into details that were not found in the previous constitutions and which impose particularly precise obligations on the government. Henceforth, the Constitution requires the government to submit the budget by a set date. . . . If the government has priority in fixing the agenda, this creates for it the obligation, when it submits bills, to see to it that they are discussed. It cannot, therefore, engage in a game we all know which consists in a government submitting bills that it hopes will never be discussed.

In addition, the Constitution provides that in both assemblies one day a week the government is constitutionally required to reply to questions of parliamentarians. . . .

The Constitution also . . . seeks to prevent . . . the disequilibrium . . . which results from the effacement of governmental authority by the simple deformation of parliamentary mechanisms. [*Applause in the center.*] . . .

The Constitution . . . has been, on this point, deliberately precise, in the sense that it indicates in what cases and in what conditions the government asks approval for its program, in what cases and in what conditions censure may be invoked. It is precise on the procedures for initiating and passing laws, on the procedures for submitting and voting on bills initiated by parliament. It is precise on the means for continuous control by the parliamentarians over governmental action. . . .

French theory and practice have . . . not yet become sufficiently conscious of the constitutional importance of the right to vote and the right of initiative of parliamentarians. . . .

The fundamental trait which characterizes our Constitution is that it states precisely in what cases a parliamentarian votes and in what conditions his right of initiative may be exercised. Approval of the [*government's*] program, censure, laws and amendments, budget, election of the president and the steering committee [*of the Assembly*], election of the committees, etc. In each case the Constitution stipulates how the parliamentarian may vote. In addition, it has also established this fundamental rule, necessary for the well-being of the Republic, that, in principle, the vote is a personal vote.

To these voting rights is added the right of initiative in matters of legislation, in matters of public finance, in matters of political responsibility. . . .

Proposals for resolutions are not provided for by the Constitution. They would have the effect of establishing a parallel procedure, a right of initiative. . . . The Constitution has set the rights and the limits of parliamentary initiative. It is not possible to create a new legislative, financial, or political domain. . . .

As far as the internal discipline of the Assembly is concerned, obviously, proposals for resolutions are available to the parliamentarians. But, . . . the proposal for resolution must be excluded from the domain of laws, . . . from measures of public finance, and . . . can not have political consequences. . . .

Questions by parliamentarians to the government are . . . a fundamental weapon of parliamentary control. . . . This important innovation has a double motivation.

In the first place, it is the logical consequence of the right . . . of the government to control the agendas of the assemblies. . . . Hypothetically speaking, a government could have, in order to silence opposition, so loaded . . . the agendas of the assemblies that such an opposition would not have been able to express its disquiet about one or another problem. . . . The Constitution requires the government to reserve one day a week, in each of the two assemblies, for questions freely posed by the parliamentarians.

The second motivation is that the Constitution is designed to give an immediate rather than historic character to the questions. . . . It . . . gives to Parliament the possibility to be informed each week on the most current questions, to follow the thought and action of the government.

The problem which arises is to know whether votes should be taken after question period. . . .

A government cannot disinterest itself in the position taken by an assembly. If, on an important problem, a majority reaches a conclusion opposed to that of the government, how can the government . . . survive for long?

If it wishes, in order to prevent an assembly taking such a position on an important question, to pose what has been called . . . an implicit question of confidence, it adds a supplementary mechanism of governmental responsibility. . . . [*Applause on the left, in the center, and on some benches on the right.*] . . .

I ask you to remember . . . the rules

that seem fundamental to me. "Proposals for resolutions" must be reduced and limited to the possibilities that I have indicated, that is, with respect for the legislative sphere, respect for the financial limitations, the Government having . . . the right, at any moment and without appeal, to declare that a "proposal for resolution" can be submitted only in the form of a motion of censure,* if it feels that its responsibility is being called into question. In addition, no vote must be permitted after the debate following a question. The debate ends after the last speaker. . . .

In politics only one judgment counts: that is the judgment of History. Rest assured that if you follow the Constitution very strictly and very rigorously History will completely approve and will forget those who wrongly criticize you. [*Very lively applause on the left, in the center, and on the right. On the left and in the center, the deputies arise.*] . . . .

M. le Président: M. Legaret has the floor. [*Applause on the right.*]

M. Jean Legaret: My dear colleagues, this is a singular debate from which one of the participants disappeared after having spoken so that one who wishes to reply to him finds before him only the deserted ministers' bench. . . .

Contrary to what the Prime Minister said a moment ago, I do not at all believe that the parliamentary regime is essentially a problem of mechanism. It is above all a state of mind . . . a confirmed spirit of collaboration between government and Parliament, a strict respect for the rights of each by each. . . .

Ministerial responsibility is an essential principle of our parliamentary regime. . . . The government, in a parliamentary regime, can govern only in accord with the Assembly. If that which it fears [*that is, the systematic, prolonged opposition of a majority of the Assembly*] occurs, it will be because a grave dissatisfaction has arisen in the country and the conflict can be resolved only by the fall of the government with, as a possible consequence, dissolution.

Do not break the thermometer in order not to see the disease. It will be because a cause for a hostile vote exists that there will be hostile votes and not because proposals for resolutions will have been submitted. . . .

Do not oblige us tomorrow to utilize excessive procedures because intermediate procedures will not have been provided. Do not lead an assembly which wants only to draw the attention of the government to certain points to wield the extremely heavy weapon of the motion of censure. . . .

Let us not be obliged to utilize tomorrow those weapons to which the Prime Minister alluded earlier when he enumerated those which he considers our weapons. We have, certainly, the possibility to reject the budget. Everyone knows that, in parliamentary life, the rejection of the budget is the most disastrous example that can be presented. It is in absolutely hopeless cases, before an absolute impossibility of agreement, that parliaments come to reject budgets, which means simply the paralysis of the whole country. [*Applause on the right, on the extreme left, in the center left, and on certain benches in the center.*] . . .

One of the misfortunes of our Assembly is that we discuss this matter with memories of the end of the

* A vote on a "proposal for resolution" would have been an ordinary vote in which the positions of all members of the assembly would be recorded. Only the supporters of a motion of censure have their votes recorded, and, therefore, it is not known whether the remaining members support the government or are indifferent. Also, 10 per cent of the members must sponsor a motion of censure and they may not sponsor another such motion during the same legislative session. Thus, the motion of censure is much more difficult to invoke than a "proposal for a resolution" (*Ed. note*).

Fourth Republic still fresh. That is inevitable, but I fear that we may be haunted a bit too much by the memory of the ministerial instability of the Fourth.

M. Roger Souchal: Now, there's something, you admit it!

M. Jean Legaret: My dear colleague, your reaction supports my thesis, for it is not the function of past disappointments, but rather of hopes for the future to build the future regime of the country.

*M. Louis Terrenoire:** Monsieur Legaret, will you permit me to interrupt you?

M. Jean Legaret: With pleasure.

M. le Président: M. Terrenoire has the floor with the permission of the speaker and of the president. [*Light laughter.*]

M. Louis Terrenoire: Thank you, *M. le Président.*

M. Legaret, you ask that we not be haunted too much by memories of the Fourth Republic. However, they are fresh in our mind, especially during this month of May.

Yet, you know that one of the evils of the Fourth Republic was precisely that by twisting the Constitution one could be both in the majority and in the opposition at the same time and that the government never knew on what majority it could count.

Through your words, M. Legaret, are you not in the process of showing us that you long to continue the errors of the Fourth Republic for, as a member of the majority, you rise in opposition to the proposals and the theses of the Government. [*Protests on the right and on the center left.—Applause on the left and in the center.*]

M. Jean Legaret: M. Terrenoire, thank you for bearing water to my mill. So, permit me to say to you—

M. Henry Bergasse: Will you also permit me to interrupt you, my dear colleague?

M. Jean Legaret: Willingly.

M. le Président: M. Bergasse has the floor, with the permission of the speaker.

M. Henry Bergasse: I apologize for having to tell M. Terrenoire, in the name of the group of Independents, that M. Legaret is exercising his personal freedom in his speech.

The manner of thinking of the Independents will be specified thus in an absolutely complete manner. It does not say that it will consist in complete adherence to the Government's policy, but we will formulate our thought exactly.

In any case, M. Legaret has the right, in his own name, and by virtue of the freedom that he enjoys as a principle of the Republic, to express himself as he wishes at the tribune. [*Lively applause on the right, in the center right, on certain benches in the center, and on the extreme left.*]

M. Louis Terrenoire: M. Legaret, will you permit me to reply to M. Bergasse?

M. Jean Legaret: Willingly.

M. le Président: M. Terrenoire has the floor, with the permission of the speaker, whom I ask please to conclude after that.

M. Louis Terrenoire: Thank you and I also thank M. Bergasse for the particulars he has just furnished, for my observation was not addressed to the group of Independents but rather to M. Legaret alone.

M. Jean Legaret: I, in turn, thank you for these particulars, M. Terrenoire. I further believe that M. Bergasse has given you a perfect reply, both for the Independents and in my own name.

I will take the liberty, nevertheless, of adding, in my own name, that the fact of belonging to the majority does not constitute a permanent allegiance; otherwise, what are we doing here? [*Lively and prolonged applause on the right, on the extreme left, on the*

* Chairman of the parliamentary group of the Gaullist Union for the New Republic (*Ed. note*).

center right, and on certain benches in the center.]

M. Pierre Picard: Thanks for the warning!

M. Roger Souchal: Now we understand very well why you want a vote.

M. Jean Legaret: Finally, M. Terrenoire, permit me to declare to you that, if some of us have fought against the regime of parties and their monolithic nature, it is disturbing to see that you would have the Fifth Republic begin, under your aegis, with a monolithic nature that goes as far as imperative mandates. [*Applause on the right, on the extreme left, in the center right, and on certain benches in the center.*]

M. Louis Terrenoire: Without a majority contract no democracy is possible.

M. Jean Legaret: I have not signed a contract with you. I intend to preserve my complete freedom, and there are still a certain number among us deputies who have to render accounts only to our consciences and to our constituents. [*Lively applause on the right, on the center right, on certain benches in the center and on the extreme left.*]

M. le Président: M. Legaret, will you please conclude.

M. Jean Legaret: . . . I ask your pardon if my speech has aroused some passion and if I myself have been a party a bit to a certain passion. . . .

M. le Président: . . . In continuing this discussion, M. Ballanger has the floor. [*Exclamations on various benches.—Applause on certain benches on the extreme left.*] I invite the Assembly to hear the speaker in silence.

*M. Robert Ballanger.** Mesdames, messieurs, . . . The new Constitution . . . grants to Parliament an extremely reduced role and . . . makes of our Assembly an organism without real powers.

Naturally, the rules that we are called on to vote for can be neither liberal nor very democratic, since it is a question of applying a Constitution which has neither the one nor the other of those qualities. [*Exclamations on numerous benches in the center and on the left.*]

M. le Président: M. Ballanger, I ask for silence on your behalf, but do not use it abusively.

M. Robert Ballanger: M. le Président, I believe that I am expressing ideas which are not only my own, but also those of a certain number of colleagues—

M. Roger Souchal: They are also those of Khrushchev!

M. Robert Ballanger: —and I do not have the impression that I have abused my right of speaking from this tribune.

During the referendum campaign we vigorously fought the Constitution. —[*New exclamations in the center and on the left.*]

In the center: Very fortunately, you were beaten.

M. le Président: My dear colleagues, the general discussion on a subject such as this is very important . . . Therefore, it is in the interest of all to listen in silence to all the speakers. [*Applause.*]

M. Robert Ballanger: I thank *M. le Président* and I dare to hope that his appeal will be heard by those of our colleagues who have shown themselves to be particularly intolerant.

M. Roger Souchal: Is reciprocity assured?

M. Robert Ballanger: We consider . . . this Constitution to be . . . an authoritarian constitution of a presidential, even monarchic, type, [*Laughter on numerous benches.*] power coming from above, the policies of France being conceived by a single man and implemented by a team chosen by him. Parliament is here as a sort of pseudo-democratic decoration, but it is practically without real power.

Several voices: And in Moscow?

M. Robert Ballanger: We were elec-

* Speaking for the Communist group (*Ed. note*).

ted six months ago and our assembly has sat in all—again I am being generous—two weeks.

M. Raymond Dronne: That is longer than the presidium in Russia has sat!

M. Robert Ballanger: And still, we have sat in order to do what? If, after six months of parliamentary sessions, an inventory had to be made of the legislative work, the job would be easy as we have passed only a single bill. Obviously, that is not much!

M. Roger Souchal: What counts is the inventory of the governmental work.

M. Robert Ballanger: . . . All the speakers in the general discussion have agreed that Parliament has two rights and two duties that are essential: to legislate and to control the government's action . . . I intend to show that neither of these are respected by the text which is proposed to us.

The right to legislate is also the right to initiate laws. Yet, for all practical purposes, Parliament is deprived of it today . . . Since the beginning of the session, 151 private members' and government bills have been submitted. Yet, . . . only 58 of these bills—including the government's bills—have been declared receivable. It is true that, among these bills, is a very important private member's bill on the regulation of vagrants! [*Light laughter.*] But all private members' bills concerning national life and bearing on important subjects such as housing, education, the needs of different categories of the population, have been returned to their authors by the steering committee of the National Assembly. . . .

The voters have sent us here not only to speak but also and above all to defend the political program on which we were elected, to translate our views into votes . . . , finally to assume our responsibilities. . . .

[*Despite the resistance of a substantial majority of the deputies, a prolonged debate on the general principles and details of the proposed rules, and extensive parliamentary maneuvering, the government's view prevailed on all significant questions, including the prohibition of "proposals for resolutions" and votes after question period. A key vote was the defeat, 307 to 222, of an amendment to an article concerning question period that would have permitted "orientation motions" to be voted upon after question period, provided the steering committee of the Assembly did not rule that they were implicit motions of censure. When the rules as a whole were voted on, the result was announced thus:*]

M. le Président: Here is the result of the counting of the ballots:

Number of ballots cast	528
Absolute majority	265
Yeas	434
Nays	94

The National Assembly has adopted them. [*Applause on numerous benches.*]

M. le Rapporteur: I thank the Assembly for the vote that it has just taken. . . .

M. Fernand Darchicourt: Long live parliamentary democracy in spite of it! [*Exclamations on various benches on the left and in the center.*]

M. le Président: I call the attention of the *rapporteur* and of M. Darchicourt to the fact that, in spite of their good intentions regarding parliamentary democracy, . . . the results of the balloting must not be made the subject of comments. . . .

C. Germany

42. Parliamentarism in Western Germany: The Functioning of the Bundestag*

BY GERHARD LOEWENBERG

It had been my original intention to include here an excerpt from a debate in the Bundestag to illustrate its functioning, but the following article seems to describe it more vividly than could such an excerpt from the unusually dull Bundestag proceedings. Consequently, I have departed from the principle that has guided my selection of readings generally.

The author is a member of the Department of Political Science at Mount Holyoke College.

Although universal male suffrage as the basis for a representative assembly existed in Germany half a century earlier than in Great Britain, the Reichstag never occupied as important a position in the German constitutional order as the House of Commons did in the British. Neither in its representative function of integrating the community (in Friedrich's terms), nor in its deliberative function as a law-making and supervisory body, did the Reichstag ever achieve the significance that would warrant describing the German system of government, either under the Second Empire or the first Republic, as a parliamentary system. The popularly elected Reichstag under Bismarck, in form so advanced for its time, existed under a constitutional system whose "artfully manufactured chaos" permitted, in reality, the exercise of authoritarian government with little parliamentary interference. When, during the latter years of the first World War, the Reichstag demonstrated an increasing ability to call governments to account, this apparent development of a parliamentary system gained a fleeting constitutional recognition during the last days of the Empire and paved the way for the provisions of the Weimar Constitution under which the Government was to be responsible to the Reichstag. Nevertheless, the republican Reichstag never

* From *American Political Science Review*, vol. LV, no. 1, March, 1961, pp. 87-102. Reprinted by permission.

actually fulfilled its constitutional functions, and in difficult times fell victim to the habits of the authoritarian past, manifesting themselves in the autonomy of the army and the bureaucracy, and the irresponsible behavior of the political parties and the President. "Surely the new constitution granted the Reichstag unquestioned leadership in the formation of policy," a political analyst of the Weimar epoch has written. "The weakness and unsureness of the practice of parliamentary government had an all the more profound effect." [1]

If there was a single motivation behind the Bonn Constitution, it was the intention of correcting what were regarded as the constitutional errors of Weimar in the expectation of thereby preventing a repetition of the history of the first Republic.[2] But to the extent that the fate of Weimar was determined not by flaws in the juridical structure but by malfunctioning of the basic institutions, the problem of parliamentary government in Germany is not primarily constitutional. The question is whether parliamentary institutions—which are not, in one form or another, new in Germany—can in reality function as a parliamentary system of government. To the extent the question can be answered, it requires a study not so much of constitutional texts but of what is now recognized in Germany too as the "living constitution." [3] Whether the Bundestag provides a real basis for a German parliamentary system, as the Reichstag failed to do, depends therefore on its operation. Can it create Governments and hold them accountable? Does it serve as a training ground for governmental leaders? What role does it play in the law-making process? Does it represent and integrate the conflicting interests of the community?

I. COMPOSITION

Under the electoral law of May 7, 1956,[4] the third in the short history of the German Federal Republic but the first to claim permanence, the Bundestag consists of 516 deputies, of whom 22 are non-voting members representing Berlin, in recognition of the special status of that city under four-power occupation.[5] Half the deputies are elected in single-member constituencies by plurality in a single ballot; the other half according to a system of proportional representation for which there is a second vote offering a choice among party lists. The seats filled from the party lists are distributed among the parties in a manner calculated to bring the seats won by each party in the single-member districts up to a total which stands in the same proportion to the total membership of the Bundestag as the party's popular vote bears to the total vote cast in the nation. In effect, this electoral system is therefore not a cross between proportional representation and a plurality system, as is often

1. Karl Dietrich Bracher, *Die Auflösung der Weimarer Republik* (Stuttgart, 1957), p. 29.

2. John Ford Golay, *The Founding of the Federal Republic of Germany* (Chicago, 1958), pp. 113-122.

3. See Dolf Sternberger, *Lebende Verfassung* (Meisenheim am Glan, 1956), *passim*.

4. *Bundesgesetzblatt*, I, p. 383, as amended by the law of December 23, 1956, *BGBl.* I, p. 1011.

5. The number of deputies can be increased by the election of deputies in single-member constituencies in excess of the number to which a party is entitled by proportional representation. Three such "superproportional" victories occurred in the election of 1957 and the third Bundestag therefore consists of 519 members. Although the members representing Berlin officially have no vote in the House, they do vote in its committees and in their party groups, in the election of the Bundestag President, and when the House acts as part of an electoral college in the selection of the Federal President and of half the members of the Constitutional Court. They take part in debate, may introduce bills, and otherwise participate fully and influentially in all the activities of the body.

incorrectly maintained. Instead it is an attempt to personalize proportional representation. Party representation in the Bundestag under this system is identical to what it would be under proportional representation on a nationwide basis even though half the members of the Bundestag are elected in single member constituencies. The splintering effect of straight proportional representation has been limited, however, by a provision which excludes from the proportional distribution of seats those parties failing to obtain at least five percent of the total national vote or, alternatively, three seats in single member districts. Without abandoning proportionality—which all parties except the CDU regard as essential to their survival—the electoral system does thereby modify two of the most criticized features of proportional representation, its tendency to cause the proliferation of tiny parties, and the anonymity of representation which accompanies election from party lists.

The five-percent clause has been notably successful in reducing the number of party groups in the Bundestag. In the average Reichstag of the Weimar Republic, seven out of thirteen parties represented had obtained less than five percent of the popular vote, and it is generally believed that their presence contributed to the paralysis of that institution. In the first Bundestag, elected under a law which for the first time contained a minimum clause (less stringent than the present one), there were still six such parties out of a total of ten, holding 62 seats among themselves. But with the introduction of the present five-percent clause in 1953, only two out of six parties represented in the second Bundestag, holding 17 seats, and in the third Bundestag, only one out of four parties, holding 17 seats, had obtained less than five percent of the popular vote; and these parties qualified for representation only because they had won several single-member constituencies as the result of alliances with another party upon which they became totally dependent. In 1960, the parliamentary group of the last of the splinter parties split and disappeared, leaving only three parties in the Bundestag, the two largest holding 90 percent of the seats.[6]

The effort to personalize proportional representation has had the effect of giving control over the nominating process, and so ultimately over the selection of the membership of the Bundestag, to local and state party organizations, and substantially denying it to the party's national leadership. In an attempt to "democratize" the parties internally by imitating the American primary and convention system, the electoral law places the nomination of candidates in the hands of assemblies of party members elected for that purpose in each *Land,* for the list candidates, and in each constituency, for the constituency candidates.[7]

In the single-member constituencies, local considerations have increasingly dominated the selection process. While in the first Bundestag, one-third of the members elected in constituencies resided outside of their districts, in the third Bundestag only one-fifth did so, some of whom were ministers or high party officials whose residences were in Bonn, although many had previously resided in the districts electing them.[8] In addition to this growing residence "requirement," qualifications for nomination in the single-member constituencies include prominence in local politics, and, in the case of sitting members, attention to constituency business. In the 1957 election about ten percent of sitting members were denied renomination,

6. *Die Welt* (July 2, 1960), p. 1.

7. Karl-Heinz Seifert, *Das Bundeswahlgesetz* (Berlin u. Frankfurt, 1957), pp. 126-132, 161-2.

8. Klemens Kremer, *Der Abgeordnete* (Munich, 1953), p. 24; U. W. Kitzinger, *German Electoral Politics, A Study of the 1957 Campaign* (Oxford, 1960), p. 64.

frequently because of local dissatisfactions.[9]

Although constituency nominations are generally subject to an understanding between the local and the *Land* or federal organizations of the party, in law as well as in fact the local organization has the last word. The influence of the central party organization is greatest when the local party has no candidate or is unable to agree on one, or when the central organization recommends the nomination of a leading party personality; it tends to be greater in the centralized SPD than in the CDU, but in a vigorous contest with the local organization, it is hardly ever successful.

Nomination in a single-member constituency, so heavily under local influence, has an importance even beyond the 242 Bundestag seats which are filled in this way, because of the growing tendency of the two big parties to reinsure constituency candidates by also giving them a second nomination high on the party's *Land* list. As a result, in the third Bundestag, 151 of the 169 SPD members had contested a single-member constituency, while among the 270 CDU members, 216 had done so.

Personal prestige is attached to winning a constituency, and those who are elected both in a constituency and from a list choose to represent the former, while those failing in a constituency but winning a place through the lists tend to "adopt" the constituency which they have contested, undertaking there the responsibility for local party work and fence mending. Yet success has been rare for those who have sought to develop an independent personal reputation among the voters. Election returns substantiate the ability of some very few prominent members of the Bundestag to develop a personal popularity in their constituencies independent of their parties. For example, Dr. Carlo Schmid obtained 6,082 more votes in his Mannheim district (No. 176) in 1957 than his party did, thereby winning his seat while his party received fewer votes than the CDU in the constituency. Dr. August Dresbach, a locally popular CDU maverick, received 56 percent of the vote cast while his party won only 50.1 percent in his Ruhr district (No. 71). Generally, however, statistics show that the voter is guided by party designation rather than by consideration of the personality of the constituency candidate. The 1953 election returns revealed that only two to three percent of the voters split their ballots because of a preference for the district candidate of a party different from the party whose list they supported. An opinion poll in 1953 disclosed that even among voters who had made their choice of party only 36 percent knew the name of its local candidate, and only two to four percent of all voters cited the personality of the district candidate as a motivation for their vote.[10] The 1957 election returns indicated, if anything, a decline in the tendency of voters to "split" their ballots for any reason.[11]

Although the voter thus does not appear to be much influenced by the personality of the local candidate, and, as will be shown, the deputy has little opportunity to serve his constituency by his public actions in the Bundestag, the method of selection contributes to the heterogeneity and, in that sense, to the representative character of the parliament. Because candidates on the party lists are selected with an eye to having a balanced list according to complex considerations of geography, denomination, social class, interest group, age, profession, and sex, there

9. Kitzinger, *op. cit.*, pp. 62-64.

10. Wolfgang Hirsch-Weber/Klaus Schütz, *Wähler und Gewählte* (Berlin, 1957), pp. 299, 335-7, 340-5.

11. Statistisches Bundesamt, *Statistik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, Band 200, Heft 2, pp. 33, 38-41.

is great variety also among the members chosen in this way.

The nomination on the lists is susceptible to the influence of the central organizations of the parties and permits the introduction of national criteria in the choice of candidates. The deliberate planning of parliamentary groups by each party on the national level is widely regarded in Germany as a necessity in view of the complexity of modern parliamentary work, and the consequent requirements of expertise in its performance. Each party feels the need to assure itself of a group in the Bundestag, which is not only "representative" but offers it specialization in the various subjects of legislation and includes men capable of undertaking ministerial responsibilities.[12] But the parties vary in their ability to accomplish this objective. A small party like the Free Democrats, because it experiences relatively severe fluctuations in electoral fortunes, is unable to plan its group in the Bundestag and regards this inability as a great weakness. Among the large parties, the centralized SPD is more successful than the CDU in exercising federal control over nominations. At the 1960 CDU party conference, Adenauer renewed a proposal to reform the electoral law so that about fifty seats in the Bundestag could be filled from among candidates on a federal list which could be centrally planned.[13]

Because the nomination of deputies is under the influence of such a great variety of factors, it is not surprising that the occupational background of deputies covers a wide range. In the second and third Bundestag, about twenty percent of the deputies were businessmen, another twenty percent came from the professions, including a growing proportion of lawyers, ten percent from agriculture, and five percent from journalism. Nearly twenty percent of the deputies were employed by trade unions, political parties, and various interest groups, and another twenty percent were government officials. Incidental to their occupations, 33 percent of the members of the second Bundestag and 38 percent of the third belonged to trade unions, three-fourths of these being in the SPD. Although the religious affiliation of deputies is sometimes difficult to determine, there is a fairly even balance between Catholics and Protestants since the CDU makes a special effort to have about one-third Protestant deputies in its own ranks, and there are very few Catholic deputies in any other party. Women numbered just under ten percent of the membership of the two Bundestage.[14]

Although there is almost no continuity between the membership of the Weimar Reichstag and the Bundestag, there has been a considerable degree of continuity among the three Bundestage. In the second Bundestag there remained only 16 members who had sat in the Reichstag, but it included 260 of the 420 members of the first Bundestag, and the third

12. Hans Peters, "Zur Kandidatenaufstellung für Freie demokratische Wahlen," in Theodor Maunz, ed., *Vom Bonner Grundgesetz zur gesamtdeutschen Verfassung, Festschrift zum 75. Geburtstag von Hans Nawiasky* (Munich, 1956), p. 349.

13. *Die Welt* (April 28, 1960), p. 4.

14. For the second Bundestag, see Fritz Sänger, ed., *Handbuch des Deutschen Bundestages,* 3d ed. (Stuttgart, 1954); cf. *Kürschners Volkshandbuch; Deutscher Bundestag, 2. Wahlperiode, 1953/57* (Darmstadt, 1954), pp. 60-61. For the third Bundestag, see *Bundesanzeiger,* No. 210 (October 31, 1957), p. 3, and *Die Gegenwart,* Vol. 12, No. 22 (November 2, 1957), pp. 688-690. A study of the occupational background of the members of the first Bundestag produced similar results. See Otto Kirchheimer, "The Composition of the German Bundestag, 1950," *Western Political Quarterly,* Vol. III (December, 1950), pp. 590-601. On trade unionists in the Bundestag, see Kurt Hirsche, "Gewerkschafter im Bundestag," *Gewerkschaftliche Monatshefte,* Vol. 8 (December, 1957), pp. 705-710.

Bundestag contains 351 of the 519 members of the second.[15] Of the factors accounting for the turnover, which represents 32 percent of the second Bundestag, several are non-recurring, such as the elimination of the BHE and the defeat of many deputies from the minor parties, particularly those who had changed their affiliation among these parties during the parliamentary terms. There was evidence also that in the CDU those deputies elected against most expectations in the surprising victory of 1953 were subject to a more careful screening at the renomination than they had received in the first instance. Only about one quarter of the turnover is accounted for by voluntary retirement.[16]

A substantial and possibly growing stability in the composition of the Bundestag indicates that its membership is composed not of sometime political amateurs, but of professional politicians making a career of their positions. Forty percent are either government officials or officers of political parties or pressure groups, and the remainder have occupational skills which are regarded as applicable to parliamentary work, many of them holding several elective offices. This professionalism in its composition characterizes the work of the Bundestag, especially in its committees. The reduction in the number of parties represented in it strongly affects its functioning in the system of government. And the introduction of personal representation of single-member constituencies gives it a claim to being an assembly representative of the nation in its variety.

II. THE DEPUTY AS AN INDIVIDUAL

The classic liberal conception of the deputy as "representative of the whole people," "not bound by orders and instructions," and "subject only to (his) conscience," expressed in successive German constitutions for a century, is repeated in the Basic Law (Article 38). The deputy, thus regarded as an autonomous individual rather than as the agent of a political party or interest group, correspondingly enjoys certain rights and privileges, and must personally meet certain qualifications and obligations.

To be eligible to be a Bundestag deputy, a person must be 25 years of age and a German citizen for at least a year. Persons who have lost their civil rights by sentence of a court, or who are disqualified from voting because of mental disability, are disqualified.[17] Certain offices are incompatible with membership in the Bundestag, in order to preserve the independence of the respective government institutions. The Federal President, members of the Bundesrat, judges of the Federal Constitutional Court, and officials of the Federal Audit Office may not serve in the Bundestag. In addition, membership in the ministry of a *Land* is not in practice regarded as compatible with Bundestag membership. Civil servants, judges, and members of the armed forces except draftees, however, are merely placed in temporary retirement upon accepting a Bundestag seat, a gesture toward the establishment of political neutrality in the administration, the judiciary, and the military.

The constitution provides that "deputies are entitled to appropriate compensation adequate to insure their independence" (Art. 48, para. 3) which has been interpreted both as a rejection of the idea of a parliament of notables and a recognition of the demanding nature of modern parliamentary work which allows deputies little time to pursue their own pro-

15. *Kürschners Volkshandbuch, op. cit.*, p. 51; *Bundesanzeiger, op. cit.*, p. 3.

16. Kitzinger, *op. cit.*, pp. 75-79.

17. Law of May 7, 1956, para. 16.

fessions.[18] The parliamentary salary is therefore regarded not as a supplement paid for an avocation, but as compensation in itself adequate to provide a livelihood to deputies who may have no other source of income; it may not be refused. After several changes, the figure was set in 1958 at DM 1100 ($262.) per month, tax exempt; and in order to eliminate what it regards as the periodic embarrassment of revising its own salary, the Bundestag tied it to the salary of Cabinet Ministers, setting it at 22.5 percent of that of Ministers. To this is added a monthly tax free sum of DM 600 ($143.) for office expenses, DM 500 ($119.) for other expenses, an allowance for air and automobile travel and free use of the federal railways and busses.[19] However, the idea of a pension for deputies has so far remained highly controversial because of a general concern that the financial provision for deputies shall not contribute toward the professionalization of politics, but shall rather encourage members to maintain their private occupations, even if they cannot actively engage in them while they hold office.

For this reason also, efforts have recently been made to arrange the parliamentary calendar in such a way as to concentrate the work of each month into a two- or at most three-weeks period, allowing deputies free time at regular intervals to spend in their constituencies, in addition to the time available during the Christmas, Easter, and a three-months summer recess. During its term of office—which is constitutionally set at four years except in case of dissolution—the first Bundestag met in 282 sessions, the second in 227. The third Bundestag has aimed to reduce this comparatively low figure still further; in its first two years it held only 80 sessions, or about half as many as during the comparable period in the second Bundestag. The limited number of sessions, however, is not purely an effort to allow deputies free time; it is also a reflection of the Bundestag's pattern of work, as is revealed by the fact that the deputy spends by far the greatest amount of his time in committee and party group meetings. The average work week consists of party group meetings Monday and Tuesday, committee meetings Wednesday, Thursday and Friday, and, sometimes simultaneously, plenary meetings of the House in the afternoons and evenings of the latter half of the week. However, the plenary sessions take place only during the first two weeks of each month, and the party group and committee meetings only during the first three, leaving the last week of each month wholly free of sessions. The Rules of Order (para. 16) establish the obligation of members to participate in the work of the Bundestag and provide for a deduction from the deputy's salary for absences from sessions and roll-call votes. Under the scale of compensation established in 1958, the penalty is set at DM 50 per session for absence not previously excused by the President, DM 30 for excused absences, and DM 25 for failure to participate in roll-call votes; and there are no longer any *per diem* allowances for attendance, which were believed to be responsible for the proliferation of meetings.

The constitution grants deputies the traditional parliamentary privileges designed to allow them the fullest freedom in the exercise of their mandates. For their actions or utterances in the Bundestag, members cannot be called to account outside the House, although, remembering the abuse of this privilege by radical parties during the Weimar Republic, the Bundestag itself may allow an exception to this priv-

18. See the remarks of the President of the Bundestag in introducing the latest reform of parliamentary salaries, Deutscher Bundestag, 3. Wahlperiode, 23. Sitzung, April 18, 1958; reprinted in *Das Parlament,* Vol. 8, No. 16 (April 23, 1958), pp. 3-4.

19. Law of May 27, 1958, *BGBl.* I, p. 379.

ilege in case of defamatory insults. Furthermore, while he holds his seat, no deputy may be arrested for a criminal offense except with the permission of the Bundestag, or unless he is apprehended in the act or on the following day (Article 46). Since these privileges are not personal, but intended to safeguard the independence of the Bundestag, the Bundestag itself to a considerable extent determines their application. Immunity cases are handled by its Committee on Rules of Order and Immunity, which acts on the basis of general principles according to which immunity will be waived in all severe criminal indictments, and in all trivial cases such as traffic violations, but not in any proceedings having a political character or implication which calls the prestige or authority of the House into question.[20]

As in the case of the rules of procedure of any parliamentary body, the standing orders of the Bundestag protect the minority, although a large category of minority rights cannot be exercised by the individual deputy alone but belong to groups of from five members to one-third of the body. By himself, a deputy cannot, among other things, obtain membership on a committee, or propose bills, move interpellations, or pose questions of confidence. He may, however, move amendments during the second reading of bills and resolutions and move the tabling of motions (Rules of Order, para. 29, 81). More important, he is able to put questions orally to members of the Government during question period.

When the question hour was introduced in the Bundestag, for which there was no precedent in German parliaments, the hope was expressed that it would offer the deputy the possibility of informing himself rapidly, would dispose efficiently of numerous matters of a constituency or regional nature, and would "enliven the relations between legislature and executive."[21] The first two aims have been increasingly realized as deputies gradually became accustomed to the unfamiliar procedure. More important, deputies have been able to expose ministerial weaknesses and administrative shortcomings by means of spontaneous supplementary questions, whose effectiveness was increased last year when, in imitation of the procedure of the House of Commons, the right to pose follow-up questions was extended to all deputies in addition to the original questioner.[22] Nevertheless, the question period has failed to attain the general importance of its British counterpart. Despite a recent increase in frequency, it is held only four times each month on the average, and the length of questions and answers makes it possible to dispose of only 15 to 25 questions each time, leaving the rest to be answered in writing. More than twice as many are answered orally every day at Westminster, four days a week. The party practice forbidding members to introduce on their own authority questions on which party policy exists has denied the individual deputy the possibility that this procedure might afford him a unique opportunity to distinguish himself. Finally, the fact that secretaries of state who are civil servants may answer for their ministers, and the turgid style of most of the questions and answers themselves

20. *Geschäftsordnung des deutschen Bundestages*, Beschlossen am 6. Dezember, 1951, para. 114. See the annotation to this paragraph as well as Appendix 4 in the *Text und Kommentar* von Heinrich G. Ritzel und Helmut Koch (Frankfurt, 1952), pp. 190-7; xvi-xxxvii. The *Geschäftsordnung* is hereinafter cited in the text as "Rules of Order."

21. Dr. Mende, rapporteur, Deutscher Bundestag, I. Wahlperiode, 179. Sitzung, December 6, 1951, Appendix 1, p. 7449 D, quoted in Ritzel-Koch, *Geschäftsordnung, op. cit.*, p. 186.

22. *Stuttgarter Zeitung*, September 29, 1960, p. 2.

diminishes the chance to "enliven" the relationship between Government and Bundestag.[23]

Debates in the Bundestag are thoroughly organized in advance. Time is allocated among the parties in proportion to their strengths and they in turn distribute it among their members in accordance with their own parliamentary strategy.[24] In recognizing speakers, the President is instructed to have regard for the "suitable disposition of and appropriate organization of the deliberation, the various partisan positions, and the strengths of the parties" (Rules of Order, para. 33) and he is bound by the division of time among the parties who in turn control their own speakers. Most important speeches represent the agreed position of the party group which has heard and approved them. The maverick deputy, who receives special consideration from the Speaker of the House of Commons, for example, has little chance of being heard in the Bundestag, for he must either convince his party to give him a share of its time, or, independent of party, must claim from the President the five minute minimum time in debate which the rules provide (para. 39). This is a part of the reason why two-fifths of the members of the second Bundestag never participated in debate.[25]

In effect, both electoral considerations and the rules of procedure make the position of the deputy without party affiliation almost untenable. Since the first Bundestag election in which two independent deputies were elected who had no support from or affiliation with any political party, no independents have successfully contested any Bundestag seats. However, subsequent to elections, a certain amount of independence with respect to party affiliation exists. Normally, deputies, once elected, join the parliamentary group of their party in the Bundestag and remain with it as long as they hold their seats. This gives the groups, particularly of the largest parties, a high degree of stability. Even in cases of deaths or resignations, the strength of the group is maintained since the electoral law provides for an automatic replacement by the candidate next on the party list in the respective *Land*. By-elections which might alter party strengths are generally regarded as upsetting, and are provided only in the rare instances of vacancies occurring in single-member districts where the party of the outgoing deputy has no *Land* list or has been outlawed by the Constitutional Court.[26]

Nevertheless, a certain number of members, occasionally including leading personalities, particularly among the small parties, shift their group affiliation during a parliamentary session. In the first Bundestag, with the party system not yet fully formed, the number of groups was quite large and the formation and dissolution of groups was not uncommon. Under these circumstances, 52 members were involved in 96 changes of party groups and at one time or another 31 members, including an ex-Communist deputy who had been arrested in the Soviet zone, were listed as independent of any group.[27] In the second Bundestag, splits in two of the smaller parties, the Free Democrats and the All-Ger-

23. See the exchange between the deputy Rademacher and Minister of Justice Schäffer on the possibility of formulating answers to questions in a more concise and objective manner. Deutscher Bundestag, 3. Wahlperiode, 37. Sitzung, June 26, 1958, reprinted in *Das Parlament*, Vol. 8, No. 27 (July 9, 1958), p. 3.

24. Ritzel-Koch, *Geschäftsordnung, op. cit.*, p. 70.

25. *Die Gegenwart*, Vol. 12, No. 16 (August 10, 1957), pp. 486-7.

26. Law of May 7, 1956, para. 48 and 49.

27. Emil Obermann, *Alter und Konstanz von Fraktionen* (Meisenheim am Glan, 1956), pp. 46, 83-86.

man Bloc, explain more than half of a total of 85 changes in which 45 deputies were involved.[28] These demonstrations of a certain independence are, however, peripheral manifestations of decreasing quantitative importance, even if they continue to afford an occasional member the chance to demonstrate his individuality. In law, the mandate, under Article 38, is personal, and does not belong to the party. No legal ties bind a deputy to a party group. In fact, only through a party can a deputy secure a Bundestag seat and exercise his mandate effectively. It is therefore not surprising that deputies who choose to change party affiliations after their election are widely called upon to resign their seats and are often regarded as having betrayed their mandate; usually they fail to be re-elected. In reality, Article 38, while preventing the legal monopolization of parliamentary activity by the parties, cannot disguise with Burkean idealism the reality of party power, and the personalization of proportional representation does not prevent the coalescence of the deputies in the Bundestag into strict party blocs.

III. THE DEPUTY AND HIS PARTY

The parties in the Bundestag are not only informal organizations of the greatest significance; they are also formally recognized in the Rules of Order which impose requirements on them and accord them privileges. A *Fraktion,* or party group, must be an "association of Members of the Bundestag belonging to the same political party" (para. 10, sec. 1). It cannot therefore be an association of convenience or of the moment. It must have a minimum of 15 members, a figure subject to the fresh determination of each Bundestag and one which deprived the Communists of *Fraktion* status when it was first adopted in 1952. The Bundestag provides *Fraktionen* with meeting rooms and offices in the Bundeshaus, and each is granted a monthly maintenance allowance out of public funds of DM 1000 ($238.) plus DM 50 ($12.) per member. At the direction of each *Fraktion,* the disbursing office of the Bundestag transfers a proportion of the parliamentary salary of each deputy directly to the *Fraktion* to which he belongs.[29] Under the Rules of Order, committees of the Bundestag are appointed by the *Fraktionen* (para. 68, sec. 2), each *Fraktion* having representation on each committee and a number of committee chairmanships in direct proportion to its size (para. 12). The agenda of the Bundestag is prepared by agreement among the *Fraktionen* in the Council of Elders in which they are all represented (para. 14), and the division of speaking time must reflect the strengths of the *Fraktionen* (para. 33, sec. 1). The presentation of bills and written questions to the Government requires the support of a number of deputies equivalent to the minimum size for a Fraktion (para. 97, sec 1; 110). In these respects the Bundestag recognizes the *Fraktion* rather than the individual deputy as the unit of its membership, and formally contributes to the dependence of the deputy on the party.

Each *Fraktion* has its own organization, which is quite complex in the case of the two large parties. The party group, a parliament in itself in the case of the 287-member CDU *Fraktion,* in each case has a chairman, several vice chairmen, an executive committee, and one or more parliamentary floor leaders. In addition, the *Fraktionen* have "working groups" which parallel some of the committees of the Bundestag, composed of the party members on these committees. In the CDU and SPD their chairmen

28. *Bundesanzeiger,* No. 204 (October 23, 1957), p. 4.

29. Kremer, *op. cit.,* p. 29.

are elected by the *Fraktion* and are included in its executive committee.

This leadership in each parliamentary group overlaps to a considerable extent the leadership of the party outside the Bundestag. In the case of the CDU, the parliamentary group antedated the national party organization. In the case of the venerable organization of the SPD, its national leaders from the start held Bundestag seats and led the parliamentary party as well. In the first Bundestag, 77 out of the 185 most important figures in the CDU were Bundestag deputies and constituted two-thirds of the *Fraktion;* 45 out of 169 SPD leaders sat in the Bundestag, constituting nearly one-third of the *Fraktion;* in the FDP, 38 out of 79 national party leaders made up 72 percent of its Bundestag *Fraktion*.[30] These figures are impressive particularly since the Bundestag is by no means the only parliamentary body in the German federal system of government. In the second and third Bundestage, the correspondence between parliamentary and national party leadership has increased still further, and at the highest levels of leadership a completely interlocking directorate exists.

The parliamentary leaders of the parties, therefore, are not mere agents of other more powerful figures on the outside; they lead their *Fraktionen* with the full authority they command throughout the party organization. Since they are their parties' national leaders, their election by the *Fraktion* is often a foregone conclusion. At the opening of the third Bundestag in 1957, the CDU *Fraktion* re-elected its leader with 203 out of 210 votes, the SPD re-elected its leader with 134 out of 152 votes in spite of the criticism he had attracted for the party's election defeat, and the FDP elected as leader its former deputy leader with 34 out of 39 votes.[31] Real competitions for leadership are not usually resolved by elections in the parliamentary group but by an informal process in which all sections of the party participate.

The position of the leadership within each parliamentary group is formidable. In the CDU the chairman, in the other parties the executive committee, calls meetings of the *Fraktion,* usually weekly, prepares their agenda, and chairs the deliberations. The executive committees furthermore propose positions on policy and assignments to Bundestag committees, for the approval of the *Fraktion*. Decisions are made by majority vote, frequently after discussions which are the more thorough and sometimes acrimonious because of their relative privacy. The *Fraktionen* determine not only the general positions they will take in the Bundestag, but consider the Bundestag agenda point by point, under the guidance of the relevant working groups on each issue, taking positions on every question, and determining the arguments and the speakers to be used to express that position. The decisions taken in the party meeting effectively bind the actions of the deputies in the Bundestag.

The wording relative to party discipline varies in the Standing Orders of the various *Fraktionen*. The CDU, anxious to distinguish itself from what it regards as coerced discipline in the Marxist parties, implies the right of free vote in stating that

> Since the *Fraktion* and its chairman must be informed about the position of the *Fraktion* in the plenary sessions of the Bundestag, deputies who have misgivings about accepting the decision of the majority are in every case obliged to express their differing viewpoint

30. Rudolf Wildenmann, *Partei und Fraktion* (Meisenheim am Glan, 1955), pp. 154 *ff*. Corrected for statistical errors.

31. See *Die Welt*, November 6, 1957; *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, October 31, 1957; and *Die Welt*, November 13, 1957, respectively.

promptly to the *Fraktion* and its chairman. . . .[32]

However, the freedom of CDU deputies is considerably circumscribed by the Standing Orders which provide that

> Bills and resolutions, interpellations and parliamentary questions which members of the *Fraktion* wish to introduce must undergo the following procedure: (a) submission of the respective proposal to the *Fraktion* secretariat; (b) referral to the competent working group; (c) following examination by the working group, presentation to and discussion in the executive committee; (d) in case of rejection by the executive committee, presentation to the *Fraktion* if requested by the mover. . . .[33]

Without making any reference to voting discipline, the Standing Orders of the SPD govern the actions of its deputies even more extensively than those of the CDU:

> (2) The *Fraktion* appoints the speakers who will support the position of the party in the Bundestag.
>
> (3) A member of the *Fraktion* who wishes to participate in the Bundestag debate, must give notice to the party foreman of the relevant committee and the parliamentary floor leader.
>
> . . . .
>
> (5) Questions for the question period are introduced by way of the parliamentary floor leader. Written questions addressed to the Government, and interpellations, resolutions and bills for introduction in the Bundestag must first be presented to the Executive Committee (of the *Fraktion*). The mover has the right to defend his motion at the meeting of the executive committee. If the executive committee rejects the proposal, the *Fraktion* must be informed at the request of the mover.[34]

The FDP also requires the approval of the executive committee for any motions made by a member in the Bundestag, and provides that "public declarations in the name of the *Fraktion* are made by the chairman or the appointed member of the executive committee or the *Fraktion*."[35]

The voting behavior of Bundestag deputies confirms the effectiveness of party discipline. Although there are interesting variations between parties, among the four parties represented continuously throughout the life of the first and second Bundestage, none exhibited less than ninety percent voting cohesion (see Table I below). The two largest parties were also the most disciplined. In the SPD discipline was nearly perfect, deviation from the vote

TABLE I. PARTY UNITY IN THE BUNDESTAG: PERCENT OF THOSE VOTING IN ROLL CALLS WHO VOTED WITH THE MAJORITY (OR PLURALITY) OF THEIR FRAKTION *

SPD	99.9	99.7	99.8
CDU/CSU	93.6	95.0	94.5
FDP	91.3	89.5	90.5
DP	89.8	90.2	89.9

32. *Arbeitsordnung der CDU/CSU Bundestags-fraktion, 2. Bundestag* (mimeographed, n.d.), para. 10, sec. 2.

33. *Ibid.*, para. 13, sec. 1.

34. *Geschäftsordnung der Fraktion der SPD im Bundestag* (n.d.)

35. *Geschäftsordnung der Bundestagsfraktion der FDP, in der Fassung vom 13. November 1957* (mimeographed), para. 12.

* The results of roll call votes are given in an appendix to the official *Stenographischer Bericht* of the session in which they took place. The deputies are listed by their *Fraktionen*, indicating which of the three alternative votes each cast: "yes," "no," or "abstain." The results of the roll calls by party in the first Bundestag are available in Heinz Markmann, *Das Abstimmungsverhalten der Parteifraktionen in deutschen Parlamenten* (Meisenheim am Glan, 1955), pp. 142-145. The roll call votes in the second Bundestag are available in *So haben sie abgestimmt!, Register und Tabellen der namentlichen Abstimmungen im Bundestag (2. Wahlperiode) 1953-1957*, Herausgegeben vom Vorstand der SPD, Bonn, 7/57.

of the majority of the *Fraktion* occurring, with minor exceptions, only as scattered abstentions. The members of the CDU showed nearly perfect voting unity in over half the votes. Nevertheless, in a significant six percent of the votes, more than one quarter of the *Fraktion* deviated from the remainder. As Kirchheimer has pointed out,[36] this tended to occur on questions of social policy on which members of the CDU left wing joined the SPD, occasionally creating a new majority. Among the ten instances of such a CDU division during the first Bundestag, the chief issues were the creation of a federal unemployment insurance office, the question of the death penalty, the equalization of tax burdens among the *Laender,* and aspects of the labor-management law, the Federal Labor Court, and the civil service; only one foreign policy issue was involved. In the second Bundestag, this division occurred eight times, the issues being the commercial activity of consumers' cooperatives, the taxation of municipally owned utilities, social insurance, business holidays, and the organization of the Federal Social Court.[37]

These statistics are based on an examination of only that portion of all votes taken in the Bundestag which are subject to precise analysis, namely those taken by roll call. The demand for a roll call is the right of a minority of fifty under the Rules of Order (para. 57) and is used to assign public responsibility for a decision. It is liable to be demanded for the most important issues. Roll call votes therefore undoubtedly exhibit a higher than average voting discipline. A greater degree of voting freedom may exist in the Bundestag, beyond the roll call.

Furthermore, a study of party divisions in the Bundestag cloaks the fact that a large number of decisions are made by the consensus of at least the two major parties. An analysis of the role of the SPD as an Opposition in the first Bundestag shows that fully 84.3 percent of all laws passed had its approval and that it voted against only 13.7 percent. The laws it opposed naturally tended to be those of then greatest political importance, including appropriations and foreign policy. But in the field of domestic policy, in the immediate postwar period, a remarkable degree of bipartisanship existed.[38]

In measuring party discipline, the standard used is concurrence with the position taken by the largest number of deputies in a *Fraktion,* not the position imposed by a leader. The determination of the party's position may therefore leave the deputy an area of freedom to express his individual views and to persuade his colleagues, giving him a part in the development of the position he is then expected to support. But this role is exercised in the privacy of the party meeting, not on the floor of the House and varies greatly among parties and issues and individuals.

The fact remains that when the most controversial issues are decided on the floor of the Bundestag, the deputies vote in party blocs. The discipline is so extensive that it allows little opportunity for a deputy to develop an individual voting record, nor does it permit the impression that the outcome is the result of individual wills. It is a level of discipline comparable to that which existed in the Reichstag of the Weimar Republic and denotes a degree of party organization and control in Parliament traditional in Germany.[39]

36. "West German Trade Unions: Their Domestic and Foreign Policies," in Hans Speier and W. Phillips Davison, *West German Leadership and Foreign Policy* (Evanston, 1957), p. 159.

37. Roll call votes nos. 2, 26, 66, 68, 105, 106, 108, and 152 in the second Bundestag.

38. *Die Gegenwart,* Vol. 12, No. 21 (October 19, 1957), pp. 657-9.

39. See Heinz Markmann, *Das Abstimmungsverhalten der Parteifraktionen* (Meisenheim am Glan, 1955), Part 1, which presents in detail the roll call votes by parties in the Reichstag but contains errors in the statistical analysis.

The discipline which the parties exercise over their deputies in the Bundestag extends in theory to the committees of the House. The Standing Orders of the CDU declare that "the Members of a committee are requested to remember that they belong to the committee not only as individuals but that they are regarded in the Bundestag and in public as representatives of their entire *Fraktion*. If, in the opinion of some committee members, this basic principle should be disregarded in decisive questions, then the executive committee of the *Fraktion* must be informed without delay" (para. 9, sec. 2). The parties appoint a foreman to lead their deputies in each committee who, according to the SPD rules, "is responsible to the *Fraktion* and its executive committee for the work in the (Bundestag) committee" (para. 22). To this end, the foreman is obliged to call a meeting of his party group in advance of committee sessions to discuss the agenda (para. 23) and to maintain contact with the work of other committees and with the leaders of the *Fraktion* (para. 24, 25); the CDU has similar arrangements (para. 9, sec. 1). Each committee member is responsible for providing a replacement in case of his inability to attend a session (SPD Rules, para. 7; CDU Rules, para. 11, sec. 2). The FDP, with a much smaller parliamentary group, does not organize its participation in committees in such formal detail, but in practice it has comparable arrangements.[40]

However, in his committee work, the deputy is not susceptible to the influence of party discipline as completely as in his voting behavior. The Bundestag, following the example of most modern parliaments, has a highly developed system of specialized committees which play an important role in the legislative process. The committees receive bills and resolutions after a usually formal first reading in the House at which no vote is taken. They therefore consider bills in advance of any decision made by the whole House, and prior to any public commitments by the parties (Rules of Order, para. 79). They work in relative privacy, attendance being limited to Bundestag members, members of the Government and the Bundesrat, or their representatives, and such witnesses as may be invited to testify. The written summary of their deliberations is available on a restricted basis to participants in the committee's work; the press receives briefings which the committees control. Although the rules of the House provide for public committee hearings in the American manner, this procedure has almost never been used (para. 73).[41]

As an expression of the importance of committee work, committees may and do meet while the House is in session. In comparison with 227 sessions held by the whole House during the second Bundestag, its committees held 4169 meetings, an average of over 100 for each committee, and the average deputy sat on two committees. The more burdened committees met more frequently than the whole House.[42]

Although each *Fraktion* names its proportionate share of the committee membership (Rules of Order, para. 68), the need for expertise in committee work and the need, so far as possible, to represent all sections of each party on every committee and representatives of special interests on the relevant committees, seriously restrict the parties' choice.[43] In many cases the experts are at the same time

40. Bruno Dechamps, *Macht und Arbeit der Ausschüsse* (Meisenheim am Glan, 1954), pp. 148-154.

41. *Ibid.*, pp. 73-74, 156-161. By decision of the Bundestag, the meetings of the committees on Foreign Affairs, Defense, and All-German and Berlin Questions, are open only to their members.

42. Statistics from *Bundesanzeiger*, October 23, 1957, p. 4; *Bulletin des Presse und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung*, No. 198 (October 23, 1957), p. 1814.

43. Dechamps, *op. cit.*, p. 146.

the representatives of the special interests and they virtually appoint themselves. Furthermore, even after the reorganization of the committees at the start of the third Bundestag and the reduction in their number from 38 to 26, there still remained 688 committee places for 519 deputies, some of whom, including members of the Government, for example, had no time for committee work at all. With the burden of work on many individual deputies very great, the parties often have difficulty finding volunteers to fill their allotted places. The committee chairmen are also appointed by the *Fraktionen,* each *Fraktion* naming a proportion of the chairmen equivalent to the proportion of the seats of the House which it holds (Rules of Order, para. 12). The determination of the specific chairmanships assigned to each party is a matter of bargaining among them, and the bargains once made establish precedents by which parties regard the chairmanship of certain committees as their preserve, to be filled by men of their choice who in turn stake a personal claim to the chairmanship. These elaborate customs were tested and sustained even against Adenauer's opposition during the dispute at the time of the organization of the third Bundestag over the reappointment of the controversial SPD leader Herbert Wehner to the chairmanship of the Committee for All-German and Berlin Questions.[44] That committee chairmanships may be in the hands of the Opposition presents the Government with some difficulties but it is made tolerable by the fact that the chairman does not possess the autocratic powers of his American counterpart. If a chairmanship goes to a member of an opposition party, the deputy chairmanship is generally given to a member of a governing party and *vice versa.* Furthermore, members of the Government or their delegates participate in committee meetings and committees may not pigeonhole bills referred to them (Rules of Order, para. 33 (3), 47, 60 (2), 69 (2).)

Committee assignments are formally made for the duration of the legislative term, but the informal customs so circumscribe the choices that there is considerable continuity in committee composition from term to term, changes occurring chiefly because of fluctuations in the parties' strengths. For example, half of the committees of the first Bundestag retained their chairmen in the second. Among 26 committee chairmen appointed at the beginning of the third Bundestag, 15 had presided over the same or equivalent committees at the close of the second. The chairmen of eight other committees belonged to the same political party as their predecessors. Of the eleven changes of committee chairmen, four occurred because the previous chairmen did not return to the Bundestag after the election, two because the chairmen had been elevated to the Government, and three because of the defeat of the smaller parties in the election and the proportionate reduction in their chairmanships. Only the two remaining changes were, apparently, simply personnel changes and neither of these represented a change in the party of the chairman. The stability thus revealed in the committee chairmanships is similarly true of the committee memberships.[45]

"Our committee system," an acute observer has written, "is generally dominated by the spirit of specialization and expertise." [46] To the extent that this is true, party loyalty is not the only motivation of the deputy in the committee. In committee work the deputy is not as fully bound by the discipline of his party group as he is

44. *Die Welt.* November 27, 28, 29, 1957.

45. The committee memberships can be found in the *Amtliches Handbuch des Deutschen Bundestages* (Neue Darmstadter Verlagsanstalt), issued for the 2d and 3d Wahlperioden with periodic revisions.

46. Dolf Sternberger, "Das System der Ausschüsse," *Die Gegenwart,* Vol. 8, No. 195 (November, 1953), p. 751.

on the floor of the House. He enjoys some autonomy. He is open to the influence of special interests, can bring his technical knowledge to bear, and is in a good position to influence the viewpoint of his party, as well as to be guided by it, and even to persuade his counterparts on the committee from other parties. Since the legislative work of the Bundestag is effectively done in its committees, the role of the deputy in committees significantly modifies the view of him as a mere part of a party voting machine. It is here that the professional composition of the Bundestag most directly affects its work.

IV. GOVERNMENT AND PARLIAMENT

In analyzing the German parliamentary system, the role of the Bundestag in its relationship with the Government is of crucial importance. The constitutional arrangement of this relationship was heavily influenced by an almost certainly incorrect interpretation of the Weimar experience. Although only two out of twenty Weimar cabinets were overthrown by the Reichstag, cabinet instability under the Weimar constitution was taken as an argument for restricting the power of the popularly elected house to dismiss the Government of the day.[47] That power, traditional in the parliamentary systems of western Europe, had been new in Germany under the Weimar constitution and in abandoning it, the framers of the Basic Law returned part way to the constitutional arrangements of the second Empire, under which the Government existed independently of Parliament and was not responsible to it. The Weimar experience of "presidential government" was interpreted, on the other hand, in favor of Parliament. It was taken as an argument against presidentially appointed cabinets and in favor of compelling the parties in Parliament to accept the responsibility for constructing Governments.

As a result, the most important constitutional power of the Bundestag *vis-à-vis* the Government is the appointment of the Chancellor, which requires the approval of its members under all circumstances. A Chancellor must be elected by an absolute majority of the Bundestag, or if this proves impossible after fourteen days, he may be elected by a plurality unless the President chooses under these circumstances to dissolve the Bundestag (Article 63). But in effect this power has been transferred from the Bundestag to the electorate, after its first exercise in 1949 when Adenauer was chosen by a single vote. Subsequently, the reduction in the number of parties and their voting discipline made it increasingly unlikely that any one except the leader of the party obtaining the greatest number of seats would be elected Chancellor. Under the influence of Adenauer's political style, the personality of the party leader, in effect the party's candidate for the Chancellorship, became a major issue of the Bundestag election and in selecting parliamentary representatives the voters in effect elected the Chancellor, and the Bundestag in 1953 and 1957 merely ratified their choice. The SPD drew the inevitable consequence of this development in 1960 when it "nominated" Willy Brandt, mayor of Berlin, and its most attractive public figure, as its Chancellor "candidate" although he was not even a member of the Bundestag. It went still further by "nominating" a team of eleven leaders for the election campaign who would presumably constitute a part of a Social Democratic Government, only five of whose members were Bundestag deputies, and three of whom were past or present Minister-Presidents of the *Laender*. This recruitment of national leaders in part from state governments, reminiscent of the American pattern, was explained by the SPD

47. *Cf.* Golay, *op. cit.*, ch. 3.

as an effort to present to the voters "personalities who had proven themselves through the exercise of government positions . . . and had demonstrated thereby that the SPD was well able to undertake responsibility in the state."[48] The replacement of parliamentary by executive qualifications and electoral appeal for the Chancellorship is a significant departure from the parliamentary pattern.

It is consistent with this development that once the Chancellor is appointed he is remarkably free of Bundestag influence and control. He nominates and dismisses his colleagues in the Government. The Basic Law refers only obliquely to responsibility to Parliament, in the provision that "the Federal Chancellor determines the guidelines of policy and is responsible for them" while "within these guidelines each Federal Minister conducts the business of his department independently and on his own responsibility" (Article 65.) The only way the Bundestag can enforce this responsibility is by electing a new Chancellor with an absolute majority vote (Article 67). The Chancellor, on the other hand, can request the dissolution of the Bundestag if it refuses to express its confidence in him or, alternatively, can seek the declaration of a legislative emergency allowing him to by-pass the Bundestag for six months in the legislative process (Articles 68 and 81). The Chancellor can make and remake his Government, regardless of the Bundestag. Striking examples of this prerogative were displayed when Adenauer, in 1955 and 1956, maintained in his cabinet—and thereby detached from their parties—willing leaders of the GB/BHE and the FDP, when these parties in the Bundestag went over into opposition.[49] Furthermore, the Chancellor can ignore motions passed by the Bundestag censuring individual ministers or Government policy. Since the Rules of Order require one quarter of the House to support a motion to select a new Chancellor (para. 98, sec. 2), the Chancellor is not likely to be harassed by attempts to unseat him. Even if elected only by a plurality of the Bundestag, the Chancellor cannot be dismissed unless a division within the party or parties initially supporting him produces an absolute majority for someone else. It was with a recognition of the futility of this procedure that Adenauer recommended it to those within his own party who opposed his decision to continue in office instead of seeking the Presidency in 1959. In practice it is not likely that a Chancellor could survive the loss of his legislative majority in the Bundestag even though the Basic Law would permit him to remain in office. That his term is nevertheless liable to be commensurate with that of the Bundestag is due more to the present party system than to the presumed juridical magic of the requirement of a constructive no-confidence vote.

The separation between Government and Bundestag, not characteristic of the parliamentary system, stems from other factors in addition to the Chancellor's independence of Parliament and the nearly fixed tenure of his Government. Although, with four exceptions in the first Adenauer Government and one in the second, Ministers have always been members of the Bundestag, there are at present only eighteen political appointments in the Federal Government. The average Bundestag member can therefore hardly have ministerial ambitions, particularly since, in addition, parliamentary performance is not a leading qualification for ministerial appointment. In forming a cabinet, the need for regional balance, representation of all political tendencies in the governing party or coalition, confessional parity (in the case of the CDU), and executive ability in the field of the appoint

48. *Die Welt*, August 25, 1960, pp. 1-2.

49. Alfred Grosser, *La démocratie de Bonn, 1949-1957* (Paris, 1958), pp. 72-73.

ment are the chief considerations.[50] Parties do not leave it to chance that *ministrables* so qualified will be found within the ranks of their *Fraktionen* and therefore make the inclusion of such men one of the main goals of "planning" their party group at the nomination stage. To a great extent, the ministers are therefore selected in advance of the parliamentary elections, rather than being recruited from among the successful parliamentarians. This was the disillusioning experience of the highly regarded chairman of the Bundestag Foreign Affairs Committee, Kurt Georg Kiesinger, who finally decided in 1958 to resign from Parliament to become Minister-President of Baden-Wuerttemberg, partly in the expectation that this was the more direct route to a position in the Federal Government.[51]

The neglect of parliamentary experience in the recruitment of the leaders of the Government is also due to the relatively small role which parliamentary activity plays in a ministerial career. Without daily question periods in which he must defend his policies, with the right to have civil servants speak for him in the Bundestag, with no danger of being dismissed because of an adverse vote, and with no responsibility for the leadership of his *Fraktion* in the Bundestag, since it has its own wholly separate organization, German ministers do not stand or fall on their parliamentary reputations. Moreover, there are no parliamentary secretaries to orient their Ministers to Parliament (nor to enable parliamentarians to test their ministerial ambitions); the immediate subordinate of the Minister is a permanent civil servant.

On the occasions when ministers must defend themselves in the Bundestag, the rules give them a strong advantage. Interpellations, which may be moved by thirty members (Rules of Order, para. 105), may be initiated by the majority parties themselves to offer the Government an opportunity to justify a policy at a convenient moment. More often, however, they are moved by the Opposition, as was true of 19 out of 24 interpellations debated during the first two years of the third Bundestag. Even then the Government sets the date for the discussion (para. 106). In addition, ministers have, on this occasion as on all others, the right to be recognized at any time (para. 47), enabling them to take the initiative from the Opposition by anticipating its case for the interpellation with a declaration of Government policy preceding it.[52] The allotment of time for debates, including interpellations, has been made by agreement among all parties in the House, ever since the disappearance of splinter parties and extremist groups which made such consensus difficult in the first Bundestag. However, the division of time among the parties recognizes their relative strength, giving the governing parties an advantage equivalent to their majority, and still leaving ministers the right to be heard at any time in addition. Furthermore, under the Rules of Order, a majority of the Bundestag can close debate (para. 30) or change the allotment of time, even after the debate has begun (para. 39). The Government can, therefore, through its control of the majority, control the duration of debate. In 1958, an interpellation debate on atomic armament, which had attracted wide public attention, was ended by the use of this power in advance of

50. This was particularly evident in the difficult task of forming the third Adenauer Government. See, for example, the articles by Jürgen Tern in the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, September 21, 1957 and October 5, 1957.

51. *Die Gegenwart*, Vol. 13, No. 25 (December 13, 1958), pp. 786-7.

52. This has occurred twice, in the 152d session of the second Bundestag (June 22, 1956) and in the 9th session of the third Bundestag (January 23, 1958). For the more recent occasion, see *Das Parlament*, Vol. 8, No. 4 (January 29, 1958), p. 3.

the time agreed upon by the parties when it seemed to be causing the Government embarrassment. That in this isolated instance of its use the power of closure was put to partisan advantage exposed its significance as a potential instrument of Government control over the Bundestag.[53] The Constitutional Court subsequently declared that the conditions under which the debate had been held were constitutional. Employing an argument which appears to assume a separation of powers between Government and Bundestag rather than a parliamentary relationship, the Court specifically justified the right of members of the Government not to be limited by the debating time allotted to the majority parties. "In the speeches of members of the Government," the Court said, "primarily the viewpoint of the Government is expressed, which need not coincide with that of the parliamentary majority." [53a]

Appropriations debates have become the main occasions, next to interpellations, when Government policy must be defended in the Bundestag. In addition to its general advantage in debating time, the Government enjoys a special privilege in budgetary questions because of the constitutional stipulation that "decisions of the Bundestag and the Bundesrat which increase the budget expenditure proposed by the Federal Government or include new expenditure or will cause new expenditure in the future, require the consent of the Federal Government" (Article 113). The very existence of this provision is important in determining the relationship between the Government and the Bundestag, in spite of the fact that during the first and second Bundestage it was only once employed to "veto" a decision of the House.[54] Although in the Appropriations Committee the Government budget may undergo change, on the floor of the Bundestag the budget debate becomes a debate on policy, department by department, because of the Opposition's recognition that it will have no chance to change details in the budget by a vote on the floor.

The dominant position of the Government is demonstrated not only by the advantages it enjoys in defending itself before the Bundestag but by the initiative it exercises in legislation. In postwar Germany, an unusual amount of detailed legislation has been passed, in part explained by the need to reconstruct the legal order, in part by Parliament's insistence on precision in legislation. Despite a constitutional division of powers between the central government and the *Laender,* the legislative competence of the central government is very extensive because of a broadly constructed concurrent powers clause (Articles 72 and 74).

Constitutionally, bills may be introduced in the Bundestag by at least fifteen of its members, by the Bundesrat —in which case the bill must be accompanied by the opinion of the Government—or by the Government, which must accompany its bill with the opinion of the Bundesrat (Article 76). But in practice, during the first and second Bundestage, most bills were introduced by the Government. Of 1682 legislative proposals, 918 were made by the Government, accounting for 72 percent of the 1052 pieces of legislation ultimately enacted. Some 715 bills were proposed by members of the Bundestag, but these accounted for only 26 percent of all legislation passed. This latter category, moreover, included bills inspired by the Government but introduced by Bundestag

53. Deutscher Bundestag, 3. Wahlperiode, 21. Sitzung, March 25, 1958. See the remarks of Deputies Rasner, Mommer, Bucher, Arndt, and Mende, reprinted in *Das Parlament*, Vol. 8, Nos. 13-14 (April 2, 1958), pp. 9, 20.

53a. *BVerfGE.* 10, 4. at p. 19.

54. See Wilhelm Henrichs, *Artikel 113 des Grundgesetzes,* Schriftenreihe des Instituts "Finanzen und Steuern," Heft No. 55 (Bonn, 1958).

members in order to by-pass the requirement that official Government bills receive the opinion of the Bundesrat before their introduction. Also included in this group were bills having all-party approval, and introduced in this fashion to assure their support by the entire House. Therefore, not all bills introduced by members of the Bundestag represent their individual proposals, or even the proposals of the opposition parties. The Bundesrat has made very little use of its legislative initiative, having introduced only 49 bills which constituted just two percent of legislation enacted.[55] The legislative influence of the Bundesrat rests on the fact that, because of an unexpectedly broad interpretation of a constitutional provision (Article 84), more than half of all bills require Bundesrat approval for their passage, and because the remainder may be subjected to a Conference Committee between the Bundesrat and the Bundestag in which the Bundesrat tends to prevail.[56]

In effect, therefore, the Government proposes, and it is the role of the Bundestag to dispose. In spite of party discipline, the House may express its own will, particularly on matters of legislative detail, in the privacy of the committee room or in the party meeting of the majority. But in public its legislative powers are exercised by a well disciplined majority normally controlled by the Government. Such special powers to supervise the Government as the constitution grants to the Bundestag, such as the right to have its own Defense Commissioner to assist it in overseeing the armed forces (Article 45b), and its ability to demand the presence of any member of the Government (Article 43, sec. 1) are also liable to become in practice subject to the Government's control. Even investigating committees, which may be established by a minority of one-fourth of the Bundestag, will usually be composed of a majority of members of the Government parties and are not therefore apt to be effective as instruments by which the Bundestag may control the Government (Articles 44, 45, 45a). They have seldom been instituted and have attracted only limited attention. Politically, the House as a whole does not have a will of its own to oppose to the Government.

It is the Opposition in the Bundestag which alone has this will, and therefore the exercise of a parliamentary control over the Government depends in many respects upon the Bundestag minority. In this connection the right of a minority of one-third plus one to block constitutional amendments (Article 79, sec. 2) has been important because of a relatively frequent use of the amending process in Germany. Ten changes were made in the Basic Law in ten years, some of them very controversial, and more are in prospect. After the election of 1953 three minor parties were included in the Government to enable it to enact amendments permitting rearmament; since 1957 all amendments have required the approval of both major parties because the SPD commanded more than one-third of the seats of the Bundestag. But the right of parliamentary debate, which means the right to criticise the Government publicly, is potentially the Opposition's chief weapon. The shortcomings of debate in the Bundestag are therefore particularly significant. The Rules of Order, which favor the Government so heavily, have already been mentioned, as has the relative infrequency of plenary sessions. Still more important is the formality of debating style, which discourages public attention. The major speeches are

55. Statistics from *Die Bundesgesetzgebung*, 1953, pp. 5-7; *Bundesanzeiger*, October 23, 1957, p. 4; *Bulletin des Presse und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung*, No. 198 (October 23, 1957), p. 1814.

56. Karlheinz Neunreither, "Politics and Bureaucracy in the West German Bundesrat," this REVIEW, Vol. LIII (September, 1959), pp. 721-2; Neunreither, "Federalism and West German Bureaucracy," *Political Studies*, Vol. VII (October, 1959), pp. 239-240.

party statements, and therefore tend to be fully rehearsed committee products. They are delivered from a rostrum, and it has proven impossible to enforce the stipulation of the Rules that all speeches be "basically extemporaneous" (para. 37). Although technical facilities have been provided to make possible interpolated questions from the floor, the deputies have limited themselves to unrecognized interruptions which tend to be vituperative comments rather than debating points. Because some of the major differences of opinion exist within the parties rather than between them, particularly on domestic issues, the extension of party discipline to the content of debate itself has obscured many issues. The failure of the Government to accord to the Bundestag the prestige of being the first audience to hear major policy statements has robbed many debates of their excitement and importance, especially when their main points have been anticipated in press conferences and radio addresses.

Efforts to interest the public in the deliberations of the Bundestag have been great and have had a wide impact. During the second Bundestag, 22 debates were televised, 15 were broadcast, and 1,850,000 visitors took the guided tour through the Bundeshaus, some of them attending the debates. Although the stenographic reports of the Bundestag are not widely distributed, a weekly newspaper, *Das Parlament,* containing verbatim transcripts of the main debates, is sold in 20,000 copies. The result of this dissemination of Bundestag debates is difficult to gauge. Although the opinion polls report a growing popular approval of the Bundestag, it is significant that the figures reveal great variations depending upon partisan sympathies. In a recent poll, 52 percent of the population responded favorably to the question, "What do you think of the Bonn Bundestag as the assembly representative of the people?" Some 81 percent of CDU sympathizers replied affirmatively, but only 35 percent of SPD supporters.[57]

That the public view of the Bundestag should be divided along partisan lines is not surprising since the Bundestag exhibits partisan division so completely in that part of its functioning most conspicuous to the public. Although authentic debate and important decisions may take place in its committees and its party groups, the Bundestag in public appears like an assembly of instructed partisans whose speeches lack the capacity either to persuade opinion or to hold attention.

The Government's independence of Parliament for its existence, the initiative it holds in the legislative process, and its freedom from parliamentary control are impressive. The position of the Government is well expressed in the symbolism of the seating arrangement of the Bundestag. There the members of the Government sit, not on the front benches of the House, but on elevated benches to the right of the President of the Bundestag, facing its members and descending to its level only to vote. Although this traditional German arrangement has recently become the subject of much critical reappraisal, it will take more than a redecoration of the chamber to alter the underlying relationship of Government and Parliament which the present arrangement expresses.

V. CONCLUSION

It is clear that the Bundestag does not occupy the position traditional in a parliamentary system. Except in the performance of constituents' errands, its members have little opportunity to serve as individual representatives of their constituencies. They act with a high degree of party discipline and what individual contribution they make to parliamentary deliberation is made privately on the basis of their expert skills—and special interests—on sub-

57. *Die Welt,* August 29, 1960, p. 2.

jects of legislation rather than publicly on the basis of their personal judgments on great political issues or their individual capacity to articulate the issues persuasively in debate. The Bundestag is not a training ground for governmental leadership. Instead, it functions under the leadership of a Government which it does not effectively choose or control. In addressing itself to the electorate, partisan divisions are so conspicuous that it is handicapped in its function of education, persuasion, and integration of the community.

But in drawing these conclusions, is one saying anything more than that the German Bundestag is subject to the same erosion of functions which the French National Assembly and the British House of Commons have also experienced under the influence of political phenomena common in modern industrial states? Of the replacement of the powerful Assembly of the Fourth French Republic by its shadow under the Fifth, Kirchheimer has written that

> in France, as everywhere else, the legislature—constitutional provisions notwithstanding—has ceased to be a decisive factor in political life, having yielded many of its functions to the administration and the political parties.[58]

In Great Britain, "the exaltation of the executive (both Cabinet Ministers and civil servants) at the expense of the House of Commons" is no longer doubted.[59]

Yet the German situation is not entirely comparable. Whereas one can speak of the decline of Parliament in western Europe, as one has for at least two generations, the case of Germany is different because parliamentarism there was never fully established. If the function of the French and British parliaments is in fact seriously declining, there remain in these states strong habits of parliamentary government which limit the power of the parties, the civil service, and the Government day by day, and which may still, in a crisis, be expected to save constitutional government by checking the concentration of power. In Germany this residue of parliamentarism is lacking. In fact, this comparison only reveals the special handicap of German parliamentarism: that it is being developed in times not hospitable to it.

Furthermore, although single characteristics of the functioning of the Bundestag find their counterparts in other Parliaments, the combination of them is not duplicated. If voting discipline is as strong in the House of Commons, party control there does not extend to the content of the debate. If the recruitment of the Government is developing some of the characteristics of the American system, the American system is not parliamentary in nature and has distinctive checks and balances. If the system of specialized committees is reminiscent of France's under the Fourth Republic, the role of the committees in France was played in the context of plenary meetings of the Assembly far more significant than those of the Bundestag.

After only eleven years of operation, the postwar German system of government is still undergoing rapid change and development. The party complexion of the second Bundestag was significantly different from the first; the third Bundestag has reformed the committee system, working schedule, and system of compensation of the second; and important changes in the rules of procedure and the physical arrangements of the House are in prospect. The relationship between the Chancellor and the Bundestag can only be provisionally described so long as it is nearly impossible to distinguish be-

58. "France from the Fourth to the Fifth Republic," *Social Research*, Vol. 25 (Winter, 1958), p. 413.

59. For a recent example of this critique, see *The Economist*, Vol. CXCVI (August 20, 1960), p. 705.

tween the institutional characteristics of the office and the personal style of its only incumbent so far. Nevertheless, it is important to recognize that at the moment the parliamentary forms which have been reestablished in Western Germany do not function as a parliamentary system of government. Instead, their pattern of operation compares more closely to that of previous German constitutional systems than to the regimes of Great Britain and Western Europe in which the concept of parliamentary government originated.

D. The Soviet Union

43. Soviet Deputies at Work*

BY IRINA KHUTSISHVILI

The Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. is bicameral, the Soviet of the Union being based on single-member constituencies of between 300,000 and 600,000 inhabitants and the Soviet of Nationalities containing representatives of the territorial units of the Union in proportion to their population. The Supreme Soviet in its structure and composition, and in the powers attributed to it by the Soviet Constitution, bears a close resemblance to democratic parliaments, but its functions and purposes are quite different. The backgrounds and attitudes of the more than 1,300 members as illustrated by the following article on typical deputies and the character and style of the "debates" as reflected in the excerpts from the proceedings of the December, 1960, session of the Supreme Soviet indicate its role as a channel of communication between the people and the rulers and as a means of honoring outstanding workers rather than as a parliament for the confrontation of opposing views on public policy or the elaboration of legislation and control of the political executive.

The Standing Commissions of both Chambers of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., the Budget Commissions of the Soviet of the Union and the Soviet of Nationalities and the Economic Commission of the Soviet of Nationalities are in session at the Kremlin.

On December 20 the Supreme Soviet will begin the session at which it will endorse the programme for national economic development, and the State Budget for 1961. The Government of the U.S.S.R. has submitted the draft programme and the draft budget to the commissions, whose members have heard the reports of the Government at a joint session of the Standing Commissions and have discussed the drafts in the appropriate sub-commissions.

The findings and recommendations

* From *Moscow News*, December 14, 1960.

of the sub-commissions have been reviewed at the plenary meetings of the commissions.

I attended a meeting of the Budget Commission of the Soviet of Nationalities, or, to be more precise, a meeting of the sub-commission which discussed the budgets and plans of the Baltic Republics. The Government of the Lithuanian Republic . . . requested additional appropriations from the all-Union budget for town improvement and for the re-equipment of research centres.

The members of the sub-commission have made a thorough study of the plans and the budget of that Republic, and studied how they fit in with the U.S.S.R. economic plan and the budget for 1961.

In the interval I interviewed some of the members of the sub-commission. They include Vasily Dikan, a deputy from the Ukraine, who is a turner at the Kharkov Tractor Works, and Eva Karachan, a Byelorussian deputy who is a team leader in the "Novaya Zhizn" Collective Farm. . . .

Dikan and Karachan have one striking thing in common—they do exemplary work and they work not only for their own sake but for the sake of other people. Dikan was one of the workers who during the first Five-Year Plan helped to build the pioneer tractor plants in our country and later helped to make the first Ukrainian tractor; as to Eva Karachan, when Soviet power came to West Byelorussia she became the first woman tractor driver in her village . . . and she has merited the title of Hero of Socialist Labour.

This is the third time that Dikan has been elected deputy. He told me: "I have spent some 30 years working my lathe, have never held any post of authority and at the outset I had plenty of difficulties in finding my way about in the budget. I know where I stand now and slowly but surely I am becoming an economist."

For Eva Karachan this is her first term. She was a member of the Board of her collective farm, then a deputy to the rural Soviet and then to the district Soviet of Working People's Deputies.

I asked these two deputies whether their sub-commission would agree with the request of the Lithuanian Government.

"The session of the Supreme Soviet will have the final say on that question," Eva Karachan replied, "but I believe our sub-commission will agree." . . .

Alexander Gorev . . . for 30 years . . . has worked as a mason in Moscow. In 1958 Muscovites elected him to the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. For three years he has been a member of the Budget Commission of the Soviet of the Union, working on the sub-commission for transport, communications, the construction of electric power stations and the gas and chemical industry. The Chairman of the sub-commission is Alexander Zademidko, a mining engineer.

The mason and the mining engineer are complementary to each other on the sub-commission. The mining engineer has a good knowledge of the gas and chemical industry, but the mason is the best expert there can be on all construction affairs.

Here, for example, are some of the amendments and recommendations submitted by the sub-commission of which deputies Gorev and Zademidko are members and which was instrumental in solving some vital national problems.

1. In chemistry: that the number of uncompleted projects at research institutions be reduced and work on particular problems speeded up . . .

2. In electric power station construction: that better use be made of the huge pool of construction machines.

3. In the gas industry: that the delay in putting compressor stations into commission be eliminated. . . .

"In view of the great territory of our country those who are building gas pipelines have to lay them across des-

erts and marshes, forests and mountains," Gorev said. "We should see to it that the builders are provided with good working and living conditions. When we discussed this year's budget, we drew the attention of the Central Administration of the Gas Industry to the need to improve the cultural and welfare services for the building workers. The Administration has drawn the necessary conclusions. This year the builders of the gas pipelines received twice as many moveable buildings as they did last year not only for comfortable dwellings but for good canteens, shops, etc. Whenever I have to decide on one or another question," mason Gorev said in conclusion, "I first of all think of the working man and I always ask myself whether he would benefit from the decision." . . .

44. Proceedings in the Supreme Soviet

AGENDA *

Moscow, December 20, 1960. The sixth session of the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet of the fifth convocation opened in the Kremlin at 10:00 hours today. The session . . . at separate meetings of the two houses has endorsed the following agenda:

1. The state plan for the development of the Soviet Union's national economy in 1961.
2. The U.S.S.R. state budget for 1961 and the implementation of the 1959 budget.
3. The international situation and foreign policy of the Soviet Union.
4. Endorsement of decrees issued by the Presidium of the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet.

BUDGET REPORT †

Minister of Finance, Vasily Garbuzov: Comrade deputies: The state budget of the U.S.S.R. for 1961, submitted by the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. for consideration and adoption by the Supreme Soviet, has been worked out in correspondence with the plan for the development of the national economy for the forthcoming year. . . . The budget insures the further upsurge of socialist economy and culture, the consolidation of our homeland's might, and the enhancement of the Soviet people's well-being with the necessary financial resources.

The working people of the U.S.S.R. are successfully giving life to the grand program for the comprehensive building of communism, mapped out by the 21st CPSU Congress, under the wise leadership of the Communist Party. The targets of the first two years of the seven-year plan for the output of industrial production have been exceeded by far. Thousands of new enterprises of socialist industry, equipped with the most progressive machinery, are being commissioned. . . .

Despite unfavorable weather, the workers of socialist agriculture have in a number of the country's regions achieved an increase in the output of many major kinds of agricultural produce this year.

* Compiled from reports by Radio Moscow.
† Radio Moscow.

Our country has achieved outstanding accomplishments in the development of science. In the decisive sectors of science and technology, the Soviet Union has won world leadership. . . .

The successful implementation of the targets of the first two years of the seven-year plan makes it possible to express the firm conviction that the seven-year plan will be prefulfilled. This means that the material-technological basis of communism will be created at a more accelerated rate and the great historical task of catching up with and outstripping the economically most developed capitalist countries in the level of per capita output will be accomplished in a shorter period. The great achievements of the U.S.S.R., of all the countries of the socialist camp, serve as an inspiring example for the working people of the whole world. They show the true road to the sacred goal of mankind—communism. . . .

As a result of the successful implementation of the historic decisions of the 20th and 21st CPSU Congresses, there has been in recent years a further development and perfection of Soviet finances, and also an altered structure of revenue and expenditures of the U.S.S.R. state budget . . .

Great changes have taken place during the last few years in the budgets of the union republics, in connection with the important measures taken toward an extension of the rights of the union republics and the increase of their role in the economic and cultural buildup. As a result of the reorganization of the administration of industry and building almost all of industry was transferred to the management of the union republics; in addition, agricultural, trade, and other enterprises were transferred to the management of the union republics. All this has caused a rapid growth in the budgets of the union republics and a considerable increase in their share in the U.S.S.R. state budget. . . .

Comrade deputies, the increase in the budgetary receipts anticipated for this year is based on the increasing accumulations of the socialist economy. The revenues from state and cooperative enterprises and organizations in 1961 will reach 72 billion rubles, that is, 5.5 per cent more than in 1960 and 1.5 times more than in 1955, on the eve of the 20th CPSU Congress. This revenue will constitute 91.2 per cent of all budgetary receipts in the coming year. . . .

The successful fulfillment of the tasks related to the mobilization of socialist accumulations by the enterprises and organizations represents a decisive prerequisite for financing the economic and cultural construction projects planned . . . for the coming year.

The July 1960 plenum of the CPSU Central Committee has stressed the necessity of . . . reducing production costs. . . . Specialization of production represents one of the reserves on the basis of which basic production costs can be reduced. One must say, however, that many *sovnarkhozes* still fail to pay due attention to this problem. The CPSU Central Committee and the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. recently passed a decision on expanding the specialized production of spare parts for automobiles, tractors, and agricultural machines, and on the specialized production of instruments. . . .

At the same time there are enterprises which use raw and auxiliary materials in an uneconomical manner. The Leninakanskiy Textile Combine of the Armenian Sovnarkhoz, for example, used for the production of yarn 90 tons of cotton fibers above the plan within nine months of the current year; the cotton industry of the Tadzhik Sovnarkhoz also used too much raw material. . . .

Comrade deputies, the . . . budget . . . is characterized by a further reduction of the revenues which the budget receives from the population. . . . The . . . budget envisages the complete abolishment of taxes on workers and employes with wages . . . up to

500 rubles per month. . . . This fact again reflects the care of the Communist Party and of the Soviet Government for increasing the well-being of the working people. The time will soon come when all workers and employees will be fully freed from taxes. In capitalist countries the taxes imposed upon the population represent . . . 70 per cent or more of all budget revenues. . . .

Budget expenditure:

Comrade deputies, the state budget of the U.S.S.R. for 1961 envisages expenditures of 77.5 billion rubles, that is 4.9 billion more than in the current year. . . . The basic part of the funds . . . 61 billion rubles . . . will be used to finance the national economy and social cultural measures. . . .

Comrade deputies: The 1961 state budgets of the union republics are fixed at a sum of 42.8 billion rubles. . . . These provide the indispensable funds for the realization of the plans for the economic and cultural development of each union republic. . . . The 1961 budgets of the union republics have been drawn up in correspondence with the law on the budgetary rights of the union republics adopted by the third session of the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet, which reflects the further development of the principles of democratic centralism in the U.S.S.R. budgetary system, safeguarding the observation of the sovereign rights of the union republics, the unity of the budgetary system, and the financial policy of the Soviet State. . . .

The monetary needs of the union republics are satisfied by their own revenues and also by allocations from all-union revenues. In 1961 the allocations to the republic budgets out of all-union revenues will amount to 16.8 billion rubles. . . .

Comrade deputies: The fulfillment of the 1961 U.S.S.R. state budget will contribute to the successful implementation of the tasks of the seven-year plan and to the further improvement of the working people's living standard. The Soviet people are performing great deeds. They are confident of their strength and by their heroic labor they are bringing closer the victory of communism in our country under the leadership of the Communist Party and of its Leninist Central Committee. [*Prolonged Applause*] . . .

*Deputy N. Bairamov, Turkmenian Republic:** . . . Comrade deputies! Along with all Soviet people, the working people of Turkmenistan are selflessly striving for the successful fulfillment of the seven-year plan. . . .

Socialist agriculture is progressing. Even though we failed to meet this year's plan for the procurement of raw cotton, we sold the state more of it than last year. . . .

The construction of the Kara-Kum Canal has been a great and joyous event in the life of the Turkmenian people. An irrigation and shipping canal 540 km. long was built under the most difficult conditions of arid desert in an unprecedentedly short time. . . .

Comrade Deputies! . . . I ask that the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet take into consideration the following requests of ours in approving the national economic plan and the budget for 1961. There is hardly need to speak of how important machinery is in agriculture. Yet the tractors and farm machinery earmarked for our republic are slated for delivery for the most part in the third and fourth quarters of 1961. We ask the U.S.S.R. State Planning Committee to have the allotted tractors and other farm machinery delivered to Turkmenia in the first and second quarters.

In 1961 the republic is called on to deliver 25,000 tons of cotton-seed-oil cake to the all-Union fund. The recent unfavorable climatic conditions are

* These excerpts are reprinted from "Supreme Soviet Discussion of 1961 Plan and Budget," *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, published at Columbia University, vol. 13, nos. 1 and 2, February 1 and 8, 1961. Reprinted by permission.

causing difficulties in the wintering of livestock on the distant pasture lands. We ask the U.S.S.R. State Planning Committee to leave with the republic all the oil cake produced. . . .

Deputy J. J. Matulis, Lithuanian Republic: . . . The housing resources of the Lithuanian Republic's cities and workers' settlements were seriously damaged during the last war. All told, some 2,000,000 square meters of dwelling space was destroyed. Damage was especially severe in the republic's largest cities. A great deal was done in the years after the war to rehabilitate the devastated cities, with the result that prewar housing resources had been restored in 1958. By that time, however, because of the growth of industry, the number of city dwellers had increased approximately 30 percent over the 1940 figure; this means that there is relatively less dwelling space available for the urban population.

We ask that the U.S.S.R. State Planning Committee and the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers' State Scientific-Economic Council be instructed, when working out the plans for the succeeding years of the seven-year plan, to provide for elimination of the existing disproportion in housing and communal construction in the Lithuanian Republic. . . .

Deputy G. F. Antosyak, Moldavian Republic: . . . As everyone knows, Moldavia is a land of orchards and vineyards. In conferring the Order of Lenin on the republic on May 14, 1959, Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev indicated that Moldavia should head in one direction—toward becoming the orchard of the Soviet Union. Carrying out these instructions, the working people of Moldavia have sharply increased orchard and vineyard plantings . . .

The increase in the production of agricultural raw materials calls for a rapid build-up of production capacity. However, the country's machine-building industry has not been adequately meeting the needs of the food industries for technological equipment.

For example, 100 mechanized grape-processing production lines with a capacity of 20 to 30 tons an hour are scheduled to be introduced in the wine industry over the seven-year period. These lines are not thus far being produced.

We ask the Supreme Soviet to instruct the U.S.S.R. State Planning Committee to prepare proposals for expanding the production of food machinery in the country and for improving the supply of equipment for the food industry. . . .

Deputy T. Ya. Kiselev, Belorussian Republic: . . . Some questions of great importance for further developing production forces and advancing the Belorussian Republic's economy have not been fully solved in the draft economic plan and budget for 1961. . . .

Many years' experience has confirmed the great economic effectiveness of investments in reclamation. These expenditures are generally recouped in two years. The technical possibility and economic practicality of reclamation work in Belorussia, above all in the Polesye lowlands, are based on a scheme for the complex use of water and land resources drawn up and approved by the U.S.S.R. State Planning Committee. . . .

It is extremely necessary to increase the volume of reclamation work in the Belorussian Republic to 1,500,000 hectares in the current seven-year period, as against 700,000 hectares specified in the control figures, and to increase the 1961 figure by at least 50,000 hectares. In order to carry out this work, it is necessary that the 1961 budget provide additional funds and that more reclamation equipment be sent to the republic.

Belorussia has enormous deposits of potassium salts. These are sufficient to supply raw material to several such combines as the Soligorsk Potassium Combine, now under construction, for

100 years. We consider it advisable to begin construction of a second potassium combine in 1961. . . .

Concluding remarks, Deputy V. N. Novikov, vice-chairman of U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers and Chairman of U.S.S.R. State Planning Committee: . . . The government has instructed me to report that all the recommendations of the Budget and Economic Committees of the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet and of the Deputies will be carefully considered, and decisions will be adopted on them. . . .

The Budget Committees of the Council of the Union and the Council of Nationalities . . . proposed increasing the output of consumer goods, including leather footwear, confectionery items and fruit and berry wines . . . by a total of 120,600,000 rubles. The Council of Ministers, having examined these proposals, considers it necessary to adopt them and to make the corresponding changes in the 1961 plan. . . .

The Economic Committee of the Council of Nationalities raised the important question of carrying out more extensive specialization and cooperation in industry.

In accordance with decisions adopted in the republics and economic councils, considerable work is now being done to develop specialization in many industries. . . . It is necessary to concentrate efforts on using the appropriations made for these purposes promptly and fully in order to achieve unconditional fulfillment of the established assignments for specialization. At the same time the U.S.S.R. State Planning Committee, the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers' committees and the Union-republic Councils of Ministers will continue work in the direction of further broadening specialization in industry and agriculture. . . .

Deputy Kiselev proposed the construction of a second potassium combine in Belorussia based on the use of the large reserves of potassium salts. . . . [*This proposal deserves*] serious attention and will be considered along with the 1962 plan. . . .

Deputies Melnikov, Batiyev, Kondratyev, Khramstov, Tashenev and Smirnov, . . . and others expressed their views on . . . including a number of other projects in the plan.

In examining these questions it should be taken into account that the plan submitted for 1961 provides for a greater absolute increase in capital investments than in any preceding year. Therefore a further increase in allocations for capital construction might cause serious difficulties in ensuring material resources for capital work. . . . The questions raised by individual deputies concerning the construction of certain installations of republic or local importance . . . should be examined by the Union-republic Councils of Ministers, which have been allocated large sums for carrying out such important work. . . .

Deputy V. F. Garbuzov, U.S.S.R. Minister of Finance. . . . The budget Committees of the Council of the Union and the Council of Nationalities have submitted a proposal to increase budget revenue by 113,200,000 rubles . . . At the same time, the Budget Committees have proposed that budget expenditures for capital repair of housing and social and cultural buildings, improvement of cities and workers' settlements, acquisition of supplies and equipment for social and cultural institutions, road repair and other measures be increased by a total of 70,000,000 rubles.

The Economic Committee of the Council of Nationalities has proposed that state capital investments for the Union republics be increased by 18,000,000 rubles. Thus it is proposed that the expenditures of the 1961 state budget be increased by 88,000,000 rubles.

The Budget Committee propose that the excess of additional revenue over expenditures, totaling 25,200,000 rubles,

be used to increase the reserve fund of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers.

I have been instructed to report that the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers agrees with the proposals . . . and deems it advisable to adopt them.

The Deputies who spoke at the session raised the question of providing additional budget allocations for specific measures.

In their speeches Deputies Malinin, Bairamov, Mamedaliyev, Kiselev, Gegeshidze, Konduchalova, Vakhabova and Panev proposed that additional allocations be made for the capital repair of housing and social and cultural buildings, for acquisition of supplies and equipment for education and public health institutions, for municipal improvements and for other purposes.

I consider it necessary to report that the 1961 budget . . . provides . . . a . . . large increase in allocations for the above measures. . . . [*Therefore,*] it is not deemed possible to increase them further at this time. When necessary, the Union-republic Councils of Ministers can make expenditures over and above those stipulated in the plan by using additional income received in fulfilling the Union-republic budgets. . . .

Deputies Dzhavakhishvili, Lukss, Mamedaliyev, Veimer, Afanasyev, Movsesyan, Lugovoi, Gegeshidze and Dyadyk made a number of comments and proposals aimed at improving financial work. Deputy Kitayev discussed the fact that the existing norms of economic expenditures for the maintenance of rural Soviets do not meet their present needs. The U.S.S.R. Ministry of Finance will carefully study the questions raised by the Deputies, and the necessary proposals will be submitted to the government for consideration. . . .

Part VI

EXECUTIVES

A. The United Kingdom

Neville Chamberlain was Stanley Baldwin's designated successor to the Prime Ministership at the time of the latter's retirement in 1937. He served until forced out in 1940 because of Allied military reverses early in World War II. He was succeeded by Winston Churchill, who headed a coalition wartime cabinet until the Labor party won the 1945 elections and installed its leader, Clement Attlee, in No. 10 Downing Street. When the Conservatives recaptured the majority in 1951, Churchill returned to office until he retired because of age in 1955 and was replaced by Sir Anthony Eden, his designated successor. Eden resigned in the wake of the 1956 Suez crisis and was succeeded by Harold Macmillan.

Chamberlain, Churchill, Attlee, and Eden have published brief comments on the office they held, Chamberlain in a collection of speeches and the other three in memoirs.

These selections are intended not only to give views on the office by insiders but also to convey impressions of the personalities of the types of men who fill it.

45. The Prime Ministership: Ultimate and Inescapable Responsibility*

BY NEVILLE CHAMBERLAIN

I suppose I need hardly say to you that the resolution which has just been read to me is very gratifying to me at this moment when I have just assumed the duties and responsibilities that attach to the office of Prime Minister. I am entering on them at an age when most people are thinking of retiring from active work, but I have hitherto led a sober and a temperate life. I am

* From Neville Chamberlain, *In Search of Peace*, G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York, 1939, pp. 3-4. Reprinted by permission.

informed that I am sound in wind and limb, and I am not afraid of the physical labours which may be entailed upon me. Indeed, I do not think it is the long hours or the hard work that form the most alarming aspect of the duties of a Prime Minister. It is rather, as it seems to me, the knowledge that in all the perplexities and the problems which rise up day after day in front of any Government in these troublous times, the ultimate responsibility of the final decision must rest upon the shoulders of the Prime Minister. No major point of policy can be decided, no real fateful step can be taken without the assent, either active or passive, of the Prime Minister, and if things go wrong he can never escape the reflection "I might have prevented this if I had thought or acted differently."

I believe it is that ultimate and inescapable responsibility which is the real root of the anxieties which have worn down the energies of our recent Prime Ministers, and it is that responsibility which now lies in front of me. And so, while I have been waiting in that little room to know what is to become of me, I have not been so much racked by anxieties as to the result of your deliberations, but I have rather been thinking how much easier my sleep would be to-night if your choice had fallen upon somebody else. But, though I have never sought this or any other office, I have never thought it right to shirk any duties which other people thought me capable of performing. I shall have the good fortune to be able to count upon the assistance of a lady whose affection and understanding have for many years made all my troubles seem light.

There is only one thing which is essential if the Government of which I am now the head is to be an effective force for the things which you and I want to see done, and that is that you and I should work together in mutual confidence and trust. And it is because this resolution has not only declared your choice of me as your leader but has also promised me your whole-hearted support that I shall gladly and definitely accept the charge, and on my side I promise you to devote myself with all my strength to an endeavour to prove worthy of your trust. The pleasure that you have given me by passing this resolution has been very much increased by the knowledge that it was proposed and seconded by Lord Derby and Mr. Churchill. I would like to thank them very warmly for consenting to do so, and for their words, which, although I was not here to listen to them, I know them well enough to be able to guess were both gracious and generous.

I know you will forgive a personal note if I say that ever since Friday last my thoughts have reverted continually to my father and to my brother. Both of them had qualifications far greater than I for the highest Ministerial office. Both of them might have attained it if it had not been that, by the chances of political fortune, they had to choose between their natural ambition and national interests which seemed to them to be paramount. I look upon my position to-day as the continuation—perhaps I may say the consummation—of their life work, and it has therefore been a matter of the keenest satisfaction to me that my election should have been proposed by two men for both of whom I have long entertained the highest respect and admiration, and of whom I would like particularly to remember to-day that each of them began his political career with the strong interest and approval of my father, and each of them subsequently became the personal friend of my brother until the date of his death.

I am very conscious of the difficulty of succeeding one who led our party for so many years, and who had succeeded in obtaining from them such an unusual amount of respect and affection. I know well that I do not

possess some of those qualities which have specially distinguished Mr. Baldwin and have given him his great place. My only consolation is that I do not know anyone else who does possess them. He and I have known each other now for 14 years, during which I have been his close personal friend, and, in spite of differences of temperament which are almost as obvious as our differences in personal appearance, our outlook on politics and on people have been very much the same. Although every man must have his own method of work, the main principles which guided him are the ones which I shall endeavour to follow. . . .

46. An Opportunity for Service*

BY NEVILLE CHAMBERLAIN

As I have been listening, my Lord Mayor, to your kind and friendly words and looking round this familiar room, my thoughts have gone back to another occasion thirty-one years ago when another member of my family was similarly honoured. I can well remember my father's emotion on that occasion. Indeed, I never saw him nearer to a breakdown than he was in making that speech, when he strove to express his sense of the obligations that had been so constantly showered upon him by the city of his adoption: and now it is my turn to try to find words to say how deeply I appreciate all the kindnesses that have been shown me by my fellow-citizens throughout my life, and particularly to thank you for the signal honour you have bestowed upon me by asking me to be your guest to-night as the first son of Birmingham to become Prime Minister of the United Kingdom.

I should like to add that the value of the compliment you have paid me is more than doubled by the gracious tribute you have been kind enough to pay to my wife—a lady on whom I think some thoughtful good fairy bestowed at her birth just those very qualities that are so desirable and which are not always found in the wife and helpmeet of a statesman.

Well, my Lord Mayor, I suppose that in time I shall get used to being addressed as Prime Minister, but at present I feel rather like one of those centenarians who are interviewed by enterprising representatives of the Press and are summoned to account for the good fortune that they do not appear obviously to have deserved. I have been running over in my mind various answers which these venerable gentlemen give on these occasions, but I am afraid they do not seem exactly to suit my case. I cannot pretend I have been a lifelong abstainer from alcohol, or from tobacco, or that I am in the habit of spending a few minutes in simple exercises every morning before break-

* From Neville Chamberlain, *In Search of Peace*, G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York, 1949, pp. 13-14. Reprinted by permission.

fast. If I told you that I have never told a lie, I suppose probably you would not believe me. [*Laughter.*] Any suggestion that the moment I stepped out of my cradle I formed the ambition to become Prime Minister before I died I am afraid has not the slightest foundation in truth. And so, I suppose, the only explanation I can give is that I was born and bred in Birmingham. And when I have said that, what other explanation is necessary?

After all, there can be only a few Prime Ministers in a generation, and there must always enter an element of chance into the question as to whether the office falls to one or another of those who are capable of filling it. In my case, unlike my father and my brother, the die has been cast in my favour; but I should not be my father's son if I did not recognise that what matters is not the luck that assigns the office, but what is made of it when it comes.

I regard my present position not as a prize, but as an opportunity for service, and any satisfaction I may derive from it will not be permanent unless I can feel when I lay it down that I have used my opportunity wisely in the interests of the country as a whole.

47. The Post I Liked the Best*

BY WINSTON S. CHURCHILL

THE morning of the tenth of May dawned, and with it came tremendous news. . . . The Germans had struck their long-awaited blow. Holland and Belgium were both invaded. Their frontiers had been crossed at numerous points. The whole movement of the German Army upon the invasion of the Low Countries and of France had begun.

At about ten o'clock, Sir Kingsley Wood came to see me, having just been with the Prime Minister. He told me that Mr. Chamberlain was inclined to feel that the great battle which had broken upon us made it necessary for him to remain at his post. Kingsley Wood had told him that, on the contrary, the new crisis made it all the more necessary to have a National Government, which alone could confront it, and he added that Mr. Chamberlain had accepted this view. At eleven o'clock, I was again summoned to Downing Street by the Prime Minister. There once more I found Lord Halifax. We took our seats at the table opposite Mr. Chamberlain. He told us that he was satisfied that it was beyond his power to form a National Government. The response he had received from the Labour leaders left him in no doubt of this. The question, therefore, was whom he should advise the King to send for after his own resignation had been accepted. His demeanour was

* From Winston S. Churchill, *The Second World War*, Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, 1948/49, vol. I, pp. 662-667, and vol. II, pp. 8-16. Reprinted by permission.

cool, unruffled, and seemingly quite detached from the personal aspect of the affair. He looked at us both across the table.

I have had many important interviews in my public life, and this was certainly the most important. Usually I talk a great deal, but on this occasion I was silent. Mr. Chamberlain evidently had in his mind the stormy scene in the House of Commons two nights before, when I had seemed to be in such heated controversy with the Labour Party. Although this had been in his support and defence, he nevertheless felt that it might be an obstacle to my obtaining their adherence at this juncture. I do not recall the actual words he used, but this was the implication. His biographer, Mr. Feiling, states definitely that he preferred Lord Halifax. As I remained silent, a very long pause ensued. It certainly seemed longer than the two minutes which one observes in the commemorations of Armistice Day. Then at length Halifax spoke. He said that he felt that his position as a peer, out of the House of Commons, would make it very difficult for him to discharge the duties of Prime Minister in a war like this. He would be held responsible for everything, but would not have the power to guide the assembly upon whose confidence the life of every Government depended. He spoke for some minutes in this sense, and by the time he had finished, it was clear that the duty would fall upon me—had in fact fallen upon me. Then, for the first time, I spoke. I said I would have no communication with either of the Opposition Parties until I had the King's commission to form a Government. On this the momentous conversation came to an end. . . .

[*Later*] a message arrived summoning me to the Palace at six o'clock. . . . I was taken immediately to the King. His Majesty received me most graciously and bade me sit down. He looked at me searchingly and quizzically for some moments, and then said: "I suppose you don't know why I have sent for you?" Adopting his mood, I replied, "Sir, I simply couldn't imagine why." He laughed and said: "I want to ask you to form a Government." I said I would certainly do so.

The King had made no stipulation about the Government being national in character, and I felt that my commission was in no formal way dependent upon this point. But in view of what had happened, and the conditions which had led to Mr. Chamberlain's resignation, a Government of national character was obviously inherent in the situation. If I had found it impossible to come to terms with the Opposition Parties, I should not have been constitutionally debarred from trying to form the strongest Government possible of all who would stand by the country in the hour of peril, provided that such a Government could command a majority in the House of Commons. I told the King that I would immediately send for the leaders of the Labour and Liberal Parties, that I proposed to form a War Cabinet of five or six Ministers, and that I hoped to let him have at least five names before midnight. On this I took my leave and returned to the Admiralty.

Between seven and eight, at my request, Mr. Attlee called upon me. He brought with him Mr. Greenwood. I told him of the authority I had to form a Government and asked if the Labour Party would join. He said they would. I proposed that they should take rather more than a third of the places, having two seats in the War Cabinet of five, or it might be six, and I asked Mr. Atlee to let me have a list of men so that we could discuss particular offices. . . .

I invited Mr. Chamberlain to lead the House of Commons as Lord President of the Council, and he replied by telephone that he accepted and had arranged to broadcast at nine that night, stating that he had resigned, and urging everyone to support and

aid his successor. This he did in magnanimous terms. I asked Lord Halifax to join the War Cabinet while remaining Foreign Secretary. At about ten, I sent the King a list of five names, as I had promised. The appointment of the three Service Ministers was vitally urgent. I had already made up my mind who they should be. Mr. Eden should go to the War Office; Mr. Alexander should come to the Admiralty; and Sir Archibald Sinclair, leader of the Liberal Party, should take the Air Ministry. At the same time I assumed the office of Minister of Defence, without, however, attempting to define its scope and powers. . . .

During these last crowded days of the political crisis, my pulse had not quickened at any moment. I took it all as it came. But I cannot conceal from the reader of this truthful account that as I went to bed at about 3 a.m., I was conscious of a profound sense of relief. At last I had the authority to give directions over the whole scene. I felt as if I were walking with Destiny, and that all my past life had been but a preparation for this hour and for this trial. . . .

It is probably easier to form a cabinet, especially a coalition cabinet, in the heat of battle than in quiet times. The sense of duty dominates all else, and personal claims recede. Once the main arrangments had been settled with the leaders of the other parties, with the formal authority of their organisations, the attitude of all those I sent for was like that of soldiers in action, who go to the places assigned to them at once without question. The party basis being officially established, it seemed to me that no sense of Self entered into the minds of any of the very large number of gentlemen I had to see. If some few hesitated, it was only because of public considerations. Even more did this high standard of behaviour apply to the large number of Conservative and National Liberal Ministers who had to leave their offices and break their careers, and at this moment of surpassing interest and excitement to step out of official life, in many cases forever.

The Conservatives had a majority of more than one hundred and twenty over all other parties in the House combined. Mr. Chamberlain was their chosen leader. . . . To accept me as Prime Minister was to them very difficult. It caused pain to many honourable men. Moreover, loyalty to the chosen leader of the party is the prime characteristic of the Conservatives. If they had on some questions fallen short of their duty to the nation in the years before the war, it was because of this sense of loyalty to their appointed chief. None of these considerations caused me the slightest anxiety. I knew they were all drowned by the cannonade.

In the first instance I had offered to Mr. Chamberlain, and he had accepted, the leadership of the House of Commons, as well as the Lord Presidency. Nothing had been published. Mr. Attlee informed me that the Labour Party would not work easily under this arrangement. In a coalition the leadership of the House must be generally acceptable. I put this point to Mr. Chamberlain, and, with his ready agreement, I took the leadership myself, and held it till February, 1942. During this time Mr. Attlee acted as my deputy and did the daily work. His long experience in Opposition was of great value. I came down only on the most serious occasions. These were, however, recurrent. . . .

There was considerable pressure by elements of the Labour Party, and by some of those many able and ardent figures who had not been included in the new Government, for a purge of the "guilty men" and of Ministers who had been responsible for Munich or could be criticised for the many shortcomings in our war preparation . . . But this was no time for proscriptions of able, patriotic men of long experience in high office. If the censorious people could have had their way, at

least a third of the Conservative Ministers would have been forced to resign. Considering that Mr. Chamberlain was the leader of the Conservative Party, it was plain that this movement would be destructive of the national unity. Moreover, I had no need to ask myself whether all the blame lay on one side. Official responsibility rested upon the Government of the time. But moral responsibilities were more widely spread. A long, formidable list of quotations from speeches and votes recorded by Labour, and not less by Liberal Ministers, all of which had been stultified by events, was in my mind and available in detail. No one had more right than I to pass a sponge across the past. I therefore resisted these disruptive tendencies. . . .

My experiences in those first days were peculiar. One lived with the battle, upon which all thoughts were centered and about which nothing could be done. All the time there was the Government to form and the gentlemen to see and the party balances to be adjusted. I cannot remember, nor do my records show, how all the hours were spent. A British Ministry at that time contained between sixty and seventy Ministers of the Crown, and all these had to be fitted in like a jigsaw puzzle, in this case having regard to the claims of three Parties. It was necessary for me to see not only all the principal figures, but, for a few minutes at least, the crowd of able men who were to be chosen for important tasks. In forming a Coalition Government the Prime Minister has to attach due weight to the wishes of the party leaders about whom among their followers shall have the offices allotted to the Party. By this principle I was mainly governed. If any who deserved better were left out on the advice of their party authorities, or even in spite of that advice, I can only express regret. On the whole, however, the difficulties were few. . . .

In deference to prevailing opinions expressed in Parliament and the press it was necessary that the War Cabinet should be small. I therefore began by having only five members, of whom one only, the Foreign Secretary, had a Department. These were naturally the leading party politicians of the day. For the convenient conduct of business, it was necessary that the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the leader of the Liberal Party should usually be present, and as time passed the number of "constant attenders" grew. But all the responsibility was laid upon the five War Cabinet Ministers. They were the only ones who had the right to have their heads cut off on Tower Hill if we did not win. The rest could suffer for departmental shortcomings, but not on account of the policy of the State. Apart from the War Cabinet, no one could say "I cannot take the responsibility for this or that." The burden of policy was borne at a higher level. This saved many people a lot of worry in the days which were immediately to fall upon us. . . .

In my long political experience I had held most of the great offices of State, but I readily admit that the post which had now fallen to me was the one I liked the best. Power, for the sake of lording it over fellow-creatures or adding to personal pomp, is rightly judged base. But power in a national crisis, when a man believes he knows what orders should be given, is a blessing. In any sphere of action there can be no comparison between the positions of number one and number two, three, or four. The duties and the problems of all persons other than number one are quite different and in many ways more difficult. It is always a misfortune when number two or three has to initiate a dominant plan or policy. He has to consider not only the merits of the policy, but the mind of his chief; not only what to advise, but what it is proper for him in his station to advise: not only what to do, but how to get it agreed, and how to get it done. Moreover, number two

or three will have to reckon with numbers four, five, and six, or maybe some bright outsider, number twenty. Ambition, not so much for vulgar ends, but for fame, glints in every mind. There are always several points of view which may be right, and many which are plausible. I was ruined for the time being in 1915 over the Dardanelles, and a supreme enterprise was cast away, through my trying to carry out a major and cardinal operation of war from a subordinate position. Men are ill-advised to try such ventures. This lesson had sunk into my nature.

At the top there are great simplifications. An accepted leader has only to be sure of what it is best to do, or at least to have made up his mind about it. The loyalties which centre upon number one are enormous. If he trips, he must be sustained. If he makes mistakes they must be covered. If he sleeps, he must not be wantonly disturbed. If he is no good, he must be poleaxed. But this last extreme process cannot be carried out every day; and certainly not in the days just after he has been chosen.

The fundamental changes in the machinery of war direction were more real than apparent. "A Constitution," said Napoleon, "should be short and obscure." The existing organisms remained intact. No official personalities were changed. The War Cabinet and the Chiefs of the Staff Committee at first continued to meet every day as they had done before. In calling myself, with the King's approval, Minister of Defence, I had made no legal or constitutional change. I had been careful not to define my rights and duties. I asked for no special powers either from the Crown or Parliament. It was, however, understood and accepted that I should assume the general direction of the war, subject to the support of the War Cabinet and of the House of Commons. The key-change which occurred on my taking over was, of course, the supervision and direction of the Chiefs of the Staff Committee by a Minister of Defence with undefined powers. As this Minister was also the Prime Minister, he had all the rights inherent in that office, including very wide powers of selection and removal of all professional and political personages. Thus for the first time the Chiefs of Staff Committee assumed its due and proper place in direct daily contact with the executive Head of the Government, and in accord with him had full control over the conduct of the war and the armed forces. . . .

48. Forming a Cabinet*

BY CLEMENT ATTLEE

For many years I had given a good deal of thought to the problem of the machinery of government, having realized that the old pattern needed reforming in the light of the wide extensions of government activity and the inevitable increase in the number of departmental Ministers. In 1940 it had been thought right, for war purposes, to have a small cabinet. This was in accordance with the precedent set in 1916 after experience had shown the need for it. The question I had to answer was, "What should be the size and composition of the cabinet in peacetime?" After the First World War there had been a return to prewar practice of a cabinet composed of twenty or even more Ministers. Its composition was largely on traditional lines. Certain offices were held to carry cabinet rank, and therefore the holders must be included. Sometimes holders of the offices were included because of their personal standing. But there was no definite theoretical basis.

I was aware that there was a view held in some quarters that a cabinet should be composed of only a few members without departmental responsibilities—a cabinet of "overlords"—its function being essentially that of dealing with large matters of policy. It was to be an instrument of decision. I had myself been attracted by this idea though I was well aware that considerations—both political and personal—would make it difficult to adopt in its entirety. Having had experience of the working of a system in which senior Ministers were given a general oversight over a range of functions, and being aware of the crucial problem of securing supervision without blurring the responsibility of departmental Ministers, I approached my task of forming a government with all these considerations in mind.

Cabinets in the past had been composed of the holders of certain offices. Some, such as the Secretaries of State, had always been included; others, such as Postmaster General, Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, and First Commissioner of Works, had sometimes been excluded. The great offices of State, such as Lord President of the Council and Lord Privy Seal, which carry practically no departmental responsibilities, have almost always been cabinet offices, although the Lord Privy Seal has been on one or two occasions omitted from the cabinet. The result of this had been that, not infrequently, an office—for instance, that of Secretary of State for War—was held by a man, not on account of his fitness for it, but because his position in the party hierarchy demanded his inclusion in the cabinet. There had been a good deal of clearing of the ground by the Act of 1937, which removed anomalies of remuneration and restrictions on the number of Ministers who could sit in the House of Commons. In the wartime govern-

* From *As It Happened*, Viking Press, New York, 1954, pp. 212-219. Reprinted by permission.

ment new posts had been created, for instance, that of Minister of State. There had also been evolved the device of Minister of cabinet rank, equal to a cabinet colleague in status and salary but outside the cabinet. There was now a good deal more room for manoeuvre than previously. I had always felt the need for making very full use of senior non-departmental Ministers for the supervision of particular groups of Ministers and to have men in the cabinet free from absorption in departmental detail and available for considering major policy.

In my view, the inclusion of other Ministers in the cabinet must be decided by two considerations—the personality of the holder of the office and the importance, for the time being, of the subject dealt with by him. I was, of course, aware of the views of the permanent officials, who set considerable store by the status of the Minister whom they served.

As I have said, when I formed my administration the war with Japan was still raging and it was necessary to include the three Service Ministers in the cabinet. I was fortunate in having at hand A. V. Alexander, who had had seven years' experience as First Lord of the Admiralty; Jack Lawson, who had served in the First World War and had held office as Under Secretary of State at the War Office; and Lord Stansgate, who had a very fine record as an airman and had been a cabinet Minister. It was my intention before long to set up a Ministry of Defence, when the Service Ministers would cease to sit in the cabinet. Herbert Morrison was Lord President and Arthur Greenwood was Lord Privy Seal, thus providing for two senior Ministers whose duties would be co-ordination. The former was also to lead the House of Commons. Lord Addison became Secretary of State for the Dominions and Leader of the House of Lords, and there could have been no better choice. Although getting on in years he had a young spirit, and had the quality of tact and sweet reasonableness essential for a Leader in a House with a large Opposition majority.

It is already known that I hesitated for some hours as to whether Bevin should take the Exchequer and Dalton the Foreign Office, or the reverse. Various reasons impelled me to my final decision, which was, I think, justified in the event. Tom Williams was the obvious choice for Minister of Agriculture, and it might have been thought that Chuter Ede would be chosen for Education, for he had great experience, but I needed a man of particular quality for the Home Office, which is a post where mistakes can easily be made. Ellen Wilkinson had done well as a junior Minister, and I knew she was an enthusiast for education. George Hall had had experience in several offices, but I chose him for Colonial Secretary. There were two positions which would be of great importance in view of our legislative programme and of the urgency of the problems to be faced by their occupants—Fuel and Power, and Health. Shinwell had had experience in the former department and had plenty of vigour. For Health I chose Aneurin Bevan, whose abilities had up to now been displayed only in opposition, but I felt that he had it in him to do good service. Stafford Cripps took another key office—the Board of Trade. Another major problem was that of India, and for that I chose Pethick-Lawrence, who went to the Lords. He was well known by Indians for his keen sympathy with their aspirations, and he also brought to the cabinet his great knowledge of finance. George Isaacs (an experienced trade unionist) as Minister of Labour, and Joseph Westwood, as Secretary of State for Scotland, completed the team, making a cabinet of nineteen, for whom four were in the House of Lords. In my view, this was larger than was desir-

able, but, even so, important Ministers, such as those dealing with Food and Transport, remained outside.

Nowadays, it is inevitable—if cabinets are to be kept to a reasonable size—that important departments should not be included. In theory it is, I think, right that Ministers in charge of purely administrative departments, such as the Post Office, Supply and Works, should not be in the cabinet; but as far as possible they should have the same status and pay as their cabinet colleagues. Of course, such Ministers are summoned to cabinet for particular items of business, but there is the danger that a Minister in charge of a department may feel himself left out of discussions on policy and, indeed, feel neglected. To a large extent this has been met by the development of a system of cabinet committees. I had had a good deal of responsibility for arranging committees during the wartime government, and the experience so gained stood me in good stead when making arrangements for governmental machinery in the Labour administration.

It was unavoidable that, at the start, the general age level among Ministers was rather high. There was a great deal of ability among the large number of new Members brought into the House by the General Election, but, clearly, time was required to find out where this new ability lay. However, I brought into the ranks of the junior Ministers as many young men as possible. I took for the English Law Officers two able young barristers without previous Parliamentary experience. I also included among the Under Secretaries two new Members and a number of younger members of the party who had come into the House only recently.

The choosing of Ministers is, I think, the most difficult of all tasks which fall to the lot of a Prime Minister, while their dismissal is the most distasteful. Yet it is essential, if a party is to live, to bring on the younger members. On a number of occasions I had to tell Ministers that the time had come when they must give place to younger men and, in one or two instances, to tell them that I thought that they were not quite up to their jobs. I should like to record that, with the exception of one person who was clearly unfit, all of my colleagues took my decision with complete loyalty and never displayed the least resentment. Nevertheless, it is a most distasteful thing to have to say to an old friend and colleague that it is time for him to make room for a younger man, and I am eternally grateful to my colleagues for their magnanimity.

William Jowitt, who had served as Attorney General in the second Labour government and as a Law Officer and Minister in the wartime administration, became Lord Chancellor. . . . He had been put in my charge when he was a new boy at my preparatory school. Lady Jowitt had lived next door to us at Putney. I recall quite clearly sitting next to them at a big service in St. Paul's Cathedral and thinking how surprised my mother would have been if she could have seen what happened to these three children.

Two of my former Parliamentary Private Secretaries were included in the government—Arthur Jenkins as Under Secretary for Education, and John Dugdale as Parliamentary Secretary to the Board of Admiralty. I therefore had to find someone else for this post, which is one of great importance. It is essential for a Prime Minister to keep in touch with all members of the party and to have early knowledge of currents of opinion. This a wise Parliamentary Private Secretary can do. He is also largely responsible for seeing people and thus sparing the Prime Minister's time. There was a wide choice, but, other things being equal, I saw no reason why I should not select someone from my old school. For the first time there

were Old Haileyburians in the Labour party in the House of Commons. One of these, Christopher Mayhew, had already been taken by Herbert Morrison, though Morrison was soon to lose him to Ernest Bevin, who wanted him as Under Secretary. I chose Geoffrey de Freitas, who had had somewhat the same background as myself —as barrister, social worker, and municipal councillor—together with war experience, scholarship, and athletic distinction; he was an air officer and a Cambridge man. He very quickly acquired a knowledge of his job and did his work admirably, but after a few months it was clear that he would be well suited to fill a vacancy that had occurred at the Air Ministry. He was succeeded by a trade unionist, Arthur Moyle, who is with me still and has been described with justice as the ideal Parliamentary Private Secretary.

It is not without interest to recall that, after the 1931 election debacle, with the very strong feeling that had naturally arisen against MacDonald in the Labour party, proposals were made to restrict the powers of any future Labour Prime Minister. He was to have colleagues selected by the party to act with him in choosing members of the government. The passage of time and further experience has led to these proposals being tacitly dropped. In my view, the responsibility of choosing the members of the government must rest solely with the Prime Minister, though in practice he will consult with his colleagues. If he cannot be trusted to exercise this power in the best interests of the nation and the party without fear, favour, or affection, he is not fit to be Prime Minister. I am quite sure that the method of the Australian Labour party, whereby a number of members are elected by the Caucus and all that is left to the Prime Minister is to fit the pieces into a jigsaw puzzle as best he may, is quite wrong.

49. Civil Servants, Ministers, Parliament, and the Public*

BY CLEMENT ATTLEE

When I succeeded Mr. Churchill as Prime Minister and returned to the conference at Potsdam, I took with me precisely the same team of civil servants, including even the principal private secretary, as had served my predecessor. This occasioned a lively surprise among our American friends who were accustomed to the American system whereby the leading official advisers of the President and of the members of his Cabinet are usually politically of his and their own color. The incident brought out forcibly the very special position of the British

* From *The Civil Service in Britain and France*, edited by William A. Robson, The Hogarth Press Ltd., London, 1956, pp. 16-24. Reprinted by permission.

Civil Service, a position which has developed during the past hundred years as the result of the Trevelyan-Northcote reforms.

I do not think that this remarkable attribute of impartiality in the British Civil Service is sufficiently widely known nor adequately recognized for what it is—one of the strongest bulwarks of democracy. I am often at pains to point this out and did so at a recent conference of Asiatic socialists in Rangoon where I told them, to their surprise, that the same men who had worked out the details of Labor's Transport Act were now, at the behest of a Conservative Government, engaged in pulling it to pieces.

I doubt if this impartiality is sufficiently realized even here at home. There were certainly some people in the Labor Party who doubted whether the civil servants would give fair play to a socialist government, but all doubts disappeared with experience.

In this article I propose to say something of the relationship between the civil servant, the Minister, Parliament, and the public, drawing on what has now become a considerable experience.

The first thing a Minister finds on entering office is that he can depend absolutely on the loyalty of his staff and, on leaving office, he will seldom be able to say what the private political views are even of those with whom he had worked most closely. The second thing that he will discover is that the civil servant is prepared to put up every possible objection to his policy, not from a desire to thwart him, but because it is his duty to see that the Minister understands all the difficulties and dangers of the course which he wishes to adopt. Of course, a weak Minister may give way to this opinion voiced by one so much more experienced than himself. This may be gratifying to the civil servant who likes to run the office himself, regarding the Minister as a necessary evil, but, more usually, the Minister who takes this line of least resistance will have forfeited the respect of his staff and, if the Prime Minister is doing his job, will forfeit his office. The strong Minister, on the other hand, will argue with his advisers refuting, if he can, their arguments and seeking to persuade them of the validity of his point of view. After a reasonable period of discussion, he will say: "Well, this is my policy, I don't want to argue it any more. Now let us consider how best to implement it." He will then find the civil servant doing his utmost to help and throwing himself into the work with enthusiasm.

I recall, in this regard, a time when I was working with the late Lord Addison, Minister of Agriculture in the second Labor Government, when he was framing the Agricultural Marketing Bill. Sir Arthur Street, an outstanding civil servant, offered a most strenuous opposition to it, but three weeks later one could have got an affiliation order against him as its only begetter.

Civil servants must develop philosophical minds in relation to Ministers. They have to take what is given to them but, in my opinion, they prefer a "difficult" Minister to one who is of no account. They like to have someone who will put up a fight, someone in whom they can have some pride.

The civil servant in the higher ranks has not only a long personal experience, but also has that mysterious tradition of the office wherein is somehow embalmed the wisdom of past generations. Of course, sometimes it is necessary to react violently against the tradition which was formed for a different state of society.

I suppose that a good departmental Minister is born not made. There are people who somehow manage to weld the whole of the department into a devoted team. Two men, in my experience, had this gift of inspiring their officials, from the highest to the lowest, in an exceptional degree—Lord Addison and Ernest Bevin.

Lord Addison—or Dr. Addison as he then was—managed to get through the House of Commons, although Labor was in a minority, several important Bills. I recall, in particular, the Agricultural Marketing Bill. I remember how he called together the whole of the marketing staff and discussed his proposals with them. Even the most junior was encouraged to make suggestions. In consequence, he got the whole of the department enthusiastically behind him. He had the gift of persuasion which he carried also to the House of Commons where he got not only his own supporters on the committee but eventually his political opponents working as members of a team trying simply to do a good job of work.

It is well known how Ernest Bevin, a man of a very different background from most of the men of the Foreign Service, got not only the respect but the affection of all his staff—from ambassadors to messengers. This was partly due to the fact that he took such pains to see that everyone had a square deal. Every official felt that Ernest Bevin had an interest in him.

The good civil servant studies his Minister's ways and saves him trouble. Some Ministers like to read everything for themselves; others have but a slight appetite for the written word and like what they do read to be predigested. Some like to do their work by personal contact; others are better as correspondents. Some do not know how to concentrate on essentials; others are caught out by lack of attention to detail.

A particular relationship is that between the Minister and his official private secretary. The latter is generally comparatively junior. Appointment to the private office usually means that he is regarded as promising. I always compare this to the appointment of a regimental officer to the staff. Certainly a young man chosen for the Prime Minister's secretariat may congratulate himself on having taken a step up. I have had many private secretaries—all of them very good—yet the post is exacting.

The secretary needs a great tact, firstly, in dealing with the Minister and, secondly, in relation to the senior civil servants with whom he is brought into contact. The secretary must study the idiosyncracies of his master and learn how tactfully to prevent him making a blunder. He must know how to help him, for Ministers differ very much in their methods of work. He is, too, brought into contact with the Minister's home and family. Here again tact may be required.

I should think that it must be very difficult to switch suddenly after a change of government from serving an adherent of one party to being the helper of a member of another, but I have known private secretaries who have made the transition without apparent difficulty and who have served blue and red with equal loyalty.

The relationship of the high-up civil servant and the junior Minister is sometimes difficult. In the absence of the Minister, the Permanent Secretary considers himself in charge—as indeed he is—but the Under-Secretary is a member of the Government and, in particular, is a politician and a member of Parliament. Although new to office and perhaps somewhat raw, he is better versed in some matters than the civil servant. This naturally leads on to the relationship of the civil servant to Parliament of which more anon, but Sir William Harcourt's famous dictum, "The Minister exists to tell the civil servant what the public won't stand," is always to be borne in mind.

It has to be remembered that the Under-Secretary of to-day is perhaps the Cabinet Minister of tomorrow. I have known instances in the past where the permanent officials used to treat the Under-Secretary as of very little account. This is not a wise thing to do, for the young Minister must be trained and given responsibility if he is to grow up. Besides he may be the

Minister of the future and a man of influence.

Every Minister naturally wants to get hold of the ablest civil servant for the headship of his department. If he is a junior departmental Minister he should look any gift horse presented to him by the Permanent Secretary to the Treasury very narrowly. He would be wise to consult his colleague under whom the postulant has served. He may, of course, be a brilliant and rising young man but, quite likely, he is a failure who is being passed on to the less experienced pending his welcome retirement.

On the other hand, a Minister should not be selfish. If there is a brilliant man coming on, he should not stand in the way of his promotion and transfer to another department, for the good of the whole must come first.

I was once asked what was the function of the civil servant in relation to the House of Commons. I replied that he sat in a dark seat under the gallery and listened to his Minister dropping bricks. But this is only part of the truth. The civil servant has to keep an eye on the House of Commons at all times.

I always consider that question time in the House is one of the finest examples of real democracy. One questioner may ask about world-shaking events, while another will ask why Mrs. Smith of 5 Slum Alley, Coketown, was refused public assistance, or why the Post office at Little Pedlington was closed last Friday. The effect of questions to the Minister and still more questions asked publicly in the House, is to keep the whole of the Civil Service on their toes. It is very seldom that any British civil servant is accused of rudeness or arrogance of the kind that is found sometimes in the *petit fonctionnaire* in other countries. At the time of writing the public mind is somewhat exercised over the Crichel Down affair. Undoubtedly, there was here a case where some civil servants failed to live up to the high tradition, but it should not be taken as typical. Indeed, the very fact of the interest aroused by this instance emphasized how exceptional it was. Complaint of arrogance or rudeness can always be made to the local member of Parliament. I believe that this is thoroughly salutary though it has a less useful side. It may induce in the civil servant a certain hesitation and nervousness in dealing with affairs. It may also lead to an overcentralization. This is due to the Permanent Secretary feeling too strongly the need for not embarrassing his Minister.

When I became Postmaster-General, I found what I considered to be an overcentralization in that office. Everything was channelled through the Permanent Secretary, Sir George Murray, and though this was partly due to the somewhat autocratic habit of mind of that distinguished public servant, it was also due to the fact that any minor mistake in the widespread network of the postal, telephone and telegraph services might be made the subject of a question in the House. As a matter of fact, I took certain steps towards decentralization and to a system of public relations. I might add that it was this fear of the effect on administration of detailed day-to-day parliamentary supervision that was a factor in setting up public boards in nationalized industries instead of following the Post Office precedent.

A civil servant should rarely, if ever, be mentioned by name in the House. Everything that he does is the act of the Minister and it is the duty of the Minister to defend his servants and to take full responsibility.

Here comes in the need for Parliamentary experience. A Minister who has been long in the House understands its temper and what are the points on which his party feels strongly. This knowledge is necessarily outside the range of the official. Thus a neat and tidy scheme put up by a devoted civil servant may be

technically correct, but it may not be acceptable to the House of Commons.

An example occurred when I was working with the late Lord Addison. A Bill was put up by a civil servant. As we were a minority government we expected to have difficulty in getting our legislation through. The ingenious official drafted a Bill with a minimum number of clauses on the ground that this would give few opportunities for long discussions on "Clause stand part." All the meat of the Bill was put into schedules. I had to point out that nothing annoyed members more than a Bill which was obscure and meaningless without constant reference to schedules. I redrafted it to make it simple and intelligible and, despite a larger number of clauses, it went through.

Equally, the Minister is more in touch with the ordinary man and woman than the civil servant. Something which seems quite reasonable to the middle-class professional may not go down with working people. I always found the late George Tomlinson a good touchstone in these matters. I would say: "Well, what do you think of this, George?" He would answer: "It looks all right, but I've been trying to persuade my missus about it for the last three weeks and I can't convince her." It is the business of the Minister to bring in the common touch.

I expect that in his heart of hearts the civil servant thinks of Parliament as a necessary nuisance. He is liable to be called off from what he regards as more important work to search out the answer to some question which seems to him of little importance. The plan embodied in a Bill to which he has given so much work is likely to be altered in committee, probably, in his view, for the worse, while he is likely to waste a lot of time in the precincts of the House waiting for business which, after all, does not come on at the expected time. He may prepare an admirable note for his Minister on an amendment which is not called. Worse still, his Minister may have failed to understand it and may suffer humiliation at the hands of the Opposition while he sits impotently by. It may be, too, that, despite all his care in arming himself with every possible point of information, someone asks for some particular figures which he has not got, to the disgust of the agitated Parliamentary Private Secretary whom his Minister has despatched to seek light from "under the gallery." Sometimes, he has a sweet revenge when the persistent interlocutor of today is the Minister of yesterday and he is able to tell his Minister that action now so roundly condemned was in fact the work of that very man.

The civil servant, in dealing with the House, will find an invaluable assistant in the Parliamentary Private Secretary if he is worth his salt. He can often persuade a member to withdraw an awkward question or to arrange for a question to be put which will enable the Minister to show himself in a favorable light. The P.P.S. also knows what is going on in the House and can give timely warning that business which was thought to be going to take an hour is unlikely to last more than ten minutes, thus enabling the civil servant to avoid the disgrace of having his Minister absent when he should be in the House.

The civil servant soon learns that sufferance is the badge of all his tribe. He learns to expect more kicks than ha'pence. For some reason the press, for the most part, tend to regard him either as an idle parasite or as a meddling busybody. The first conception is no doubt a hangover from an earlier age when the happy beneficiaries of the patronage system fleeted the time merrily, but even today he is often thought of as a consumer of many cups of tea, enjoying a sheltered life. A certain type of business man is prone to regard the civil servant as someone who is battening on the com-

munity. He is one of "a horde of officials." All officials move in hordes. If he were doing precisely similar work for the business man he would become "a valuable member of my staff."

The civil servant must never defend himself publicly. That is left to his Minister, but if the latter does it, the journalist says: "Of course, he has to defend his subordinates." Nowadays the institution of public relations officers has done something to mitigate this hostility to officials, especially since the extension of Governmental activity has brought so many more in contact with officials who, generally, are both courteous and helpful. Here and there, as is inevitable, you do find the "jack in office," but he is a rare bird.

When I was Postmaster-General, there was then a good deal of criticism of postal officials in the press and every little mistake was publicized, but later when I was able to arrange for some advertising of the telephone in the press there was a magical change.

There is one matter which causes some difficulty. Formerly, with few exceptions, the higher ranks of the Civil Service were filled by arts graduates. The specialist in science or technology was very rare, but nowadays progress of scientific inventions has meant that a different type of worker is required. But the competition for first-class scientific minds is intense and the ordinary Civil Service rates of pay compare unfavorably with what is offered in private industry. This inevitably sets up a strain in the administrative machine. The same difficulty may occur in relation to technicians or people from the world of business. In war the difficulty hardly arises but in peace-time it is very real and has not yet been solved.

I have said little here about the lower grades of the Civil Service though much of what I have said applies to them as much as to the administrative class. I am sure that some promotion is desirable as a stimulus. The Post Office sets a good example here for there are many instances of telegraph boys eventually arriving at positions of great importance. This, however, is part of the wider problems of recruitment and organization with which it is not my purpose to deal.

In general, the civil servant must be content with anonymity and obscurity until, in due course, his name appears in the higher categories of the birthday honors. Perhaps, after his retirement, he may become widely known. Every now and again there appears in the ranks of the Civil Service a bright star like Lord Waverley who shines brilliantly in a wider firmament but, for the most part, the civil servant must rest content with the consciousness of good work honestly done.

He may, at all events, feel that however modest his own achievements, he forms part of a service unequalled in all the world—one of the causes of a just pride in his fellow countrymen.

50. More than *Primus Inter Pares**

BY SIR ANTHONY EDEN

Though I knew that I had figured high in opinion polls for Prime Minister, before and after my resignation in 1938, I had never seriously given that office a thought. The first time I had cause to do so was in December 1940, when the death of Lord Lothian, our Ambassador in Washington, led to changes in the Government. Mr. Churchill then told me firmly that, in his judgment, I must succeed him if he were incapacitated from any cause during the war and on that account I must become a member of the War Cabinet. . . .

In June 1942 Mr. Churchill gave more authority to his decision about me in a formal submission to the King, at His Majesty's request. The long era as crown prince was established, a position not necessarily enviable in politics.

Perhaps this experience helped to dampen my exhilaration when the time came to succeed, on April 6 . . .

Earlier conversations between Sir Winston and myself had fixed the approximate date of the handover as the spring of 1955, and before I left for the Bangkok Conference at the end of January, we had agreed that my journey home would have to be speeded. I was sorry to have to do this, for I had looked forward to longer visits to Rangoon, Delhi and Baghdad. On the other hand, I realized that the new Prime Minister would need to give answers to a number of pressing questions. I was determined not to be drawn into doing this until I had assumed office and had had an opportunity to take my bearings from that position. Though I had sat for many years in Cabinets and presided over them on a number of occasions, I knew how different the stage would look to me when I had the principal responsibility.

A Prime Minister is still nominally *primus inter pares,* but in fact his authority is stronger than that. The right to choose his colleagues, to ask for a dissolution of Parliament and, if he is a Conservative, to appoint the chairman of the party organization, add up to a formidable total of power. Some of the responsibility for consultation overseas must also be his. Every Foreign Secretary, however individual or influential he may be, knows how much it strengthens him to discuss his problems with a colleague of experience. Many scores of times after a prolonged examination together of the draft of a telegram or a speech I have heard Sir Winston say, "Two heads are better than one"; not the kind of phrase popularly associated with him. Then there are the telegrams to colleagues in the Commonwealth, often from Prime Minister to Prime Minister and therefore calling for personal scrutiny. In financial and economic business, so infinitely more strenuous and perplexing in these years than it was before the war, a Chancellor of

* From Sir Anthony Eden, *Full Circle*, Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, 1960, pp. 294-298. Reprinted by permission.

the Exchequer is wise if he shares his burdens to some extent with the Prime Minister; clearly he cannot share them with the whole Cabinet.

I have sat in Cabinets or attended them under four Prime Ministers, MacDonald, Baldwin, Chamberlain and Churchill. I thought Baldwin's method of frequent consultation alone with each of his principal colleagues was good, and I followed it. His failing lay in not always supporting the result with sufficient authority, but that is another matter. My colleagues knew that I was always available to each one of them and we saved the Cabinet some extra stress of business that way.

The most important question I had to decide soon was whether I should ask Her Majesty for the dissolution of Parliament and a general election. The arguments for and against were nicely balanced. There is, of course, no obligation upon a new Prime Minister to seek a dissolution, so long as he commands a majority in the House of Commons. The country has no love for general elections, and if public opinion judges an appeal to the country to be uncalled for, it is likely to resent it. . . .

51. Churchill's Finest Hours

By piecing together excerpts from his speeches and lead paragraphs from news items in *The Times* (London), I attempt in the following reading to illustrate the way in which Winston S. Churchill used the powers of the British Prime Minister to rally a disheartened nation from impending defeat in the early months of World War II. The tone he set in his first months in office carried through to the moment "five years and three months" later, as he says rather bitterly in his memoirs, when, "all our enemies having surrendered unconditionally or being about to do so, I was immediately dismissed by the British electorate from all further conduct of their affairs."

May 13—The Prime Minister (Mr. Churchill): I beg to move,

> "That this House welcomes the formation of a Government representing the united and inflexible resolve of the nation to prosecute the war with Germany to a victorious conclusion."

On Friday evening last I received His Majesty's Commission to form a new Administration. It was the evident wish and will of Parliament and the nation that this should be conceived on the broadest possible basis and that it should include all parties, both those who supported the late Government and also the parties of the

Opposition [*Hear. Hear.*] I have completed the most important part of this task. A War Cabinet has been formed of five Members, representing, with the Opposition Liberals, the unity of the nation. The three party Leaders have agreed to serve, either in the War Cabinet or in high executive office. The three Fighting Services have been filled. It was necessary that this should be done in one single day, on account of the extreme urgency and rigour of events. A number of other positions, key positions, were filled yesterday, and I am submitting a further list to His Majesty tonight. I hope to complete the appointment of the principal Ministers during to-morrow. . . . I considered it in the public interest to suggest that the House should be summoned to meet to-day. . . . [*Cheers.*]

To form an Administration of this scale and complexity is a serious undertaking in itself, but it must be remembered that we are in the preliminary stage of one of the greatest battles in history . . . [*Hear. Hear.*] In this crisis I hope I may be pardoned if I do not address the House at any length to-day. [*Hear. Hear.*] . . . I would say to the House, as I said to those who have joined this Government: "I have nothing to offer but blood, toil, tears and sweat."

We have before us an ordeal of the most grievous kind. We have before us many, many long months of struggle and of suffering. You ask, what is our policy? I will say: It is to wage war, by sea, land and air, with all our might and with all the strength that God can give us; to wage war against a monstrous tyranny, never surpassed in the dark, lamentable catalogue of human crime. [*Loud cheers.*] That is our policy. You ask, what is our aim? I can answer in one word: It is victory [*Cheers.*], victory at all costs [*Cheers*], victory in spite of all terror, victory, however long and hard the road may be; for without victory, there is no survival. [*Cheers.*] Let that be realized; no survival for the British Empire, no survival for all that the British Empire has stood for, no survival for the urge and impulse of the ages, that mankind will move forward towards its goal. [*Cheers.*] But I take up my task with buoyancy and hope. I feel sure that our cause will not be suffered to fail among men. At this time I feel entitled to claim the aid of all, and I say, "Come then, let us go forward together with our united strength." [*Loud and prolonged cheers.*]—*Speech to the House of Commons.*

May 13—The new Prime Minister met the House of Commons (summoned individually by telegram) today, and received a vote of confidence which to all intents and purposes was unanimous.

An unaccustomed scene confronted members who crowded the Chamber . . . , and it took them some little time to adapt themselves. The Opposition seemed to have disappeared overnight, and the House was indeed a Council of State united in support of the Government. . . .

The House gave vent to its feelings by cheering Mr. Churchill loudly as he entered. . . .

Mr. Churchill had a second welcoming cheer when he rose to ask the House for its confidence in his Government. . . . Briefly, and in calm, deliberate tones, . . . he called for a united war effort. . . .

The division figures were 381 votes for the Government and none against. . . . The House of Lords passed unanimously a similar vote of confidence.

May 14 (Bournemouth)—The Labour Party Conference, which opened here today . . . has carried with only insignificant opposition the following resolution giving full support to the Government under Mr. Churchill. . . :

> This conference endorses the unanimous decision of the National Executive Committee that the Labour Party should take its share of responsibility as a full partner in a

new Government, which, under a new Prime Minister, commands the confidence of the nation. This conference further pledges its full support to the new Government in its efforts to secure a swift victory and a just peace.

May 15—Mr. Eden, the new Secretary of State for War, broadcasting last night, appealed to the country to give immediate support to the scheme to create a new force for home defence to be known as the "Local Defence Volunteers." Their purpose, he indicated, would be to guard against possible landings by German parachute troops in this country.

May 15—Mr. Mackenzie King, the Canadian Prime Minister, has received the following telegram from Mr. Churchill . . . :—

> "The people of the British Commonwealth unite once more in arms to resist the terrible scourge of barbarism, and will not flinch or weary till duty is done and justice reign."

May 18—Mr. Churchill flew back to London early yesterday morning after a hurried visit to Paris. As soon as the news of the German advance was received on Thursday he realized that inter-Allied discussion would be helpful. Clearly it could more conveniently be held in Paris. Within a few hours he was in conference with M. Reynaud,* M. Daladier,§ and General Gammelin.†

It was a time for rapid decision in coordinating all arms of the Allied forces; and on both sides yesterday, British and French, the meeting was said to have been of greatest benefit.

* The French premier (*Ed. note*).

† The French supreme military commander (*Ed. note*).

§ French Minister of War who was transferred to Minister of Foreign Affairs on May 18 (*Ed. note*).

May 18—My dear Neville,—You have been good enough to consult me about the leadership of the Conservative Party. I am, of course, a Conservative. But as Prime Minister of a National Government, formed on the widest basis and comprising the three parties, I feel that it would be better for me not to undertake the leadership of any one political party.

I therefore express the hope that your own leadership of our party will remain undisturbed by the change of Government or Premiership, and I feel sure that by this arrangement the cause of National unity will best be served. . . . *Letter from Churchill to Neville Chamberlain and released publicly.*

May 20—A Cabinet meeting was called yesterday afternoon to consider the grave news coming from France. The westward drive of the Germans . . . called for a review of the plans to meet the pressing danger. . . . The Prime Minister presided.

May 20—It has been announced that, as far as his duties allow, the Prime Minister will lead the House of Commons. But, in view of the pressure of events, he has asked Mr. Attlee, the Lord Privy Seal, to act as Deputy-Leader.

May 21—Mr. Denman asked the Prime Minister, whether, in the absence of a substantial Opposition, he will introduce legislation for the temporary suspension of the salary of the Leader of the Opposition?

The Prime Minister (Mr. Churchill): In view of the formation of a Government embracing the three main political parties, His Majesty's Government is of opinion that the provision of the Ministers of the Crown Act, 1937, relating to the payment of a salary to the Leader of the Opposition, is in abeyance for the time being. . . .

Mr. Maxton: The answer seems to indicate that not only is the salary of

the Leader of the Opposition being put into abeyance, but that there is an attempt being made to put opposition into abeyance—[*Hon. Members: "No," and "You leave that to us."*]—I am asking whether any reasonable method of discussion will be taken to decide how the affairs of the House are to be conducted in the new situation?

The Prime Minister: If any attempt has been made to suppress the idea of criticism in this House it is apparent already that it has failed. With regard to the methods of dealing with the questions relating to business and debate I think those are very proper matters to be considered and no doubt they will be considered.—*Question period in the House of Commons.*

May 21—The Prime Minister: With regard to the Business of the House, tomorrow, as already announced, we shall take the Second Reading of the Treachery Bill. I think it is desirable that we should ask the House not only to take the Second Reading, but the Committee and remaining stages so that the Bill may become law as early as possible. It will also be necessary, in connection with the formation of the Local Defence Volunteer Force, to have a small bill to amend the National Service (Armed Forces) Act. We shall ask leave to bring in this bill to-morrow, and, in view of its urgency, we desire to pass it through all its stages on the same day.—*House of Commons speech.*

May 20—I speak to you for the first time as Prime Minister in a solemn hour for the life of our country, of our Empire, of our Allies, and, above all, of the cause of freedom.

A tremendous battle is raging in France and Flanders. The Germans . . . have penetrated deeply and spread alarm and confusion in their track. . . . It would be foolish . . . to disguise the gravity of the hour. It would be still more foolish to lose heart and courage. . . . We may look with confidence to the stabilization of the front in France. . . .

We must expect that as soon as stability is reached on the Western Front the bulk of that hideous apparatus of aggression which dashed Holland into ruins and slavery in a few days will be turned on us. . . . There will be many men and women in this island who, when the ordeal comes on them, as come it will, will feel a comfort, and even a pride, that they are sharing the peril of our lads at the front . . . and are drawing away from them a part at least of the onslaught they have to bear.

Is not this the appointed time for all to make the utmost exertions in their power? If the battle is to be won, we must provide our men with ever-increasing quantities of the weapons and ammunition they need. . . .

Our task is not only to win the battle but to win the war.

After this battle in France abates its force there will come a battle for our island, for all that Britain is and all that Britain means. That will be the struggle.

In that supreme emergency we shall not hesitate to take every step, even the most drastic, to call forth from our people the last ounce of effort of which they are capable. The interests of property and the hours of labour are nothing compared with the struggle for life and honour and freedom to which we have vowed ourselves. . . .

If this is one of the most awe-striking periods in the history of France and Britain, it is also beyond doubt the most sublime. Side by side, unaided except by their kith and kin in the great Dominions and the wide Empires which rest beneath their shield, the British and French have advanced to rescue not only Europe, but mankind, from the foulest and most soul-destroying tyranny that has ever darkened and stained the pages of history.

Behind them, behind us, behind the Armies and Fleets of Britain and

France gather a group of shattered States and bludgeoned races—the Czechs, the Poles, the Norwegians, the Danes, the Dutch, the Belgians—on all of whom the long night of barbarism will descend unbroken even by a star of hope unless we conquer, as conquer we must, as conquer we shall.—*Radio broadcasts by Churchill.*

May 22—The Lord Chancellor took his seat on the Woolsack at 4 o'clock.

Their lordships subsequently received the Emergency Powers Defence Bill which had just passed the House of Commons and it was rapidly passed through all its stages. . . .

Their lordships rose at 12 minutes past 6 o'clock.—*Proceedings in the House of Lords.*

May 22—The National Service (Armed Forces) Bill . . . was brought in and passed through all its stages.—*Proceedings in the House of Commons.*

May 23—For the second time in six days Mr. Churchill has been to France to confer with the French leaders. . . . Yesterday Mr. Churchill met both M. Reynaud and General Weygand. . . .

May 23—A bill conferring on the Government complete power of control over persons and property for the prosecution of the war was given a swift passage in both houses of Parliament yesterday and received the Royal Assent by Commission in the House of Lords.

May 24—Mr. E. Bevin, Minister of Labour and National Service, will address the conference of trade union executive committees, which to-morrow will consider the measures taken by the Government to control all industry and labour during the war. . . . It is probable that a message will be received from the Prime Minister, but Mr. Churchill will not attend.

May 28—The Prime Minister (Mr. Churchill): . . . The situation of the British and French Armies now engaged in a most severe battle and beset on three sides and from the air, is evidently extremely grave. . . . The House should prepare itself for hard and heavy tidings. I have only to add that nothing which may happen in this battle can in any way relieve us of our duty to defend the world cause to which we have vowed ourselves [*Cheers*]: nor should it destroy our confidence in our power to make our way, as on former occasions in our history, through disaster and through grief to the ultimate defeat of our enemies. [*Loud cheers*]—*Speech in the House of Commons.*

June 3—New men, new methods, and sharper determination distinguished the meetings of the Supreme War Council held in Paris at the week-end. . . . It was the first to meet with the new Prime Ministers and new Military commanders on each side.

Since he became Prime Minister . . . Mr. Churchill had seen M. Reynaud three times privately—twice in Paris, once in London.

June 4—(3:40 p.m.) The Prime Minister (Mr. Churchill): . . . [*After describing in detail for about 20 minutes the grave situation at the battle front, he concluded with a warning concerning the possibility of an invasion attempt by the German forces.*] I have, myself, full confidence that if all do their duty, if nothing is neglected, and if the best arrangements are made, as they are being made, we shall prove ourselves once again able to defend our island home, to ride out the storm of war, and to outlive the menace of tyranny, if necessary for years, if necessary alone. [*Cheers*] At any rate, that is what we are going to try to do. That is the resolve of His Majesty's Government—every man of them. [*Cheers*] That is the will of Parliament and the nation. The British Empire and the French Republic, linked together in their cause and in their

need, will defend to the death their native soil, aiding each other like good comrades to the utmost of their strength. Even though large tracts of Europe and many old and famous States have fallen or may fall into the grip of the Gestapo and all the odious apparatus of Nazi rule, we shall not flag or fail. We shall go on to the end. We shall fight in France, we shall fight on the seas and oceans, we shall fight with growing confidence and growing strength in the air, we shall defend our island, whatever the cost may be. We shall fight on the beaches, we shall fight on the landing grounds, we shall fight in the hills; we shall never surrender, [*Loud cheers*] and even if, which I do not for a moment believe, this island or a large part of it were subjugated and starving, then our Empire beyond the seas, armed and guarded by the British Fleet, would carry on the struggle, until, in God's good time, the new world, with all its power and might, steps forth to the rescue and the liberation of the old. [*Loud and prolonged cheers.*]

June 5—Mr. Attlee, replying yesterday to a question in the House of Commons, gave much new information about the way in which the machinery of Government is now organized under the direction of the War Cabinet of five members.

In matters of defence policy the Prime Minister is assisted by a Defence Committee, which comprises the three Service Ministers, with the Chiefs of Staff as advisers. Questions of foreign policy continue to be submitted by the Foreign Secretary to the War Cabinet at its daily meetings. Economic and home affairs are being dealt with by five Ministerial bodies . . . the Production Council . . . the Economic Policy Committee . . . the Food Policy Committee . . . the Home Policy Committee . . . and . . . Civil Defence Committee. The work of these five committees is concerted and directed by a committee of which Mr. Chamberlain is chairman. . . .

The main object of this new scheme of organization is to obtain quick decisions on important matters of policy, while securing the highest degree of coordination in directing the various phases of the nation's war effort. It is understood that many existing committees . . . have been scrapped on the ground that their number was excessive and their methods over-elaborate or too leisurely.

June 13—Mr. Churchill returned to London yesterday with Mr. Eden and General Sir John Dill, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, after having had long conversations both on Tuesday and yesterday morning with M. Reynaud, Marshal Petain [*French Deputy Premier (Ed. note)*] and General Weygand [*French supreme military commander, replacing Gammelin (Ed. note)*]. . . . Immediately after returning . . . Mr. Churchill presided over a meeting of the War Cabinet. Later he had an audience of the King.

June 18—Mr. Churchill broadcast the following message last night:—

The news from France is very bad, and I grieve for the gallant French people who have fallen into this terrible misfortune.

Nothing will alter our feelings towards them or our faith that the genius of France will rise again.

What has happened in France makes no difference to British faith and purpose.

We have become the sole champions now in arms to defend the world cause. We shall do our best to be worthy of that high honour. We shall defend our island, and, with the British Empire around us, we shall fight on unconquerable until the curse of Hitler is lifted from the brows of men.

We are sure that in the end all will be well.

June 18—(3:49 p.m.) The Prime Minister (Mr. Churchill): [*With reference to reports that members of the House of Commons planned to use a sched-*

uled secret session to assess responsibility for the events leading up to the outbreak of the war, Mr. Churchill said:] There are many who would hold an inquest in the House of Commons on the conduct of the Governments—and of Parliaments, for they are in it, too—during the years which led up to this catastrophe. They seek to indict those who were responsible for the guidance of our affairs. This also would be a foolish and pernicious process. There are too many in it. Let each man search his conscience and search his speeches. I frequently search mine.

Of this I am quite sure, that if we open a quarrel between the past and the present, we shall find that we have lost the future. Therefore, I cannot accept the drawing of any distinctions between Members of the present Government It was formed at a moment of crisis in order to unite all the parties and all sections of opinion. It has received the almost unanimous support of both Houses of Parliament. Its Members are going to stand together, and, subject to the authority of the House of Commons, we are going to govern the country and fight the war. It is absolutely necessary at a time like this that every Minister who tries each day to do his duty shall be respected, and their subordinates must know that their chiefs are not threatened men, men who are here to-day and gone to-morrow, but that their directions must be punctually and faithfully obeyed. Without this concentrated power we cannot face what lies before us. I should not think it would be very advantageous for the House to prolong this Debate this afternoon under conditions of public stress. . . . We are to have a Secret Session on Thursday, and I should think that would be a better opportunity for the many earnest expressions of opinion which Members will desire to make and for the House to discuss vital matters, as I have said before, without having everything read the next morning by our dangerous foes. . . .

[*The Prime Minister described the war situation in some detail, painting a generally somber picture but expressing qualified confidence that any invasion attempt could be repulsed. He concluded with some comments on the surrender offer of France the previous day and with this paragraph:*]

What General Weygand called the "Battle of France" is over. I expect that the battle of Britain is about to begin. Upon this battle depends the survival of Christian civilisation. Upon it depends our own British life and the long continuity of our institutions and our Empire. The whole fury and might of the enemy must very soon be turned on us. Hitler knows that he will have to break us in this island or lose the war. If we can stand up to him all Europe may be free, and the life of the world may move forward into broad, sunlit uplands; but if we fail then the whole world, including the United States, and all that we have known and cared for, will sink into the abyss of a new dark age made more sinister, and perhaps more prolonged, by the lights of a perverted science. Let us therefore brave ourselves to our duty and so bear ourselves that if the British Commonwealth and Empire lasts for a thousand years men will still say, "This was their finest hour."—*Speech to the House of Commons. A similar speech was broadcast to the British people the same day.*

B. France

52. The *Mystique* of Leadership*

BY CHARLES DE GAULLE

In 1932 an unknown French army major named Charles de Gaulle wrote the book, *Le Fil de l'Epée (The Edge of the Sword)*, from which the following selection is taken. Eight years later he acted in accordance with its precepts to assume in exile the leadership of his defeated nation. After resigning from governmental leadership in 1946 in the face of increasing opposition, he remained twelve years out of power. In 1958 he was called again to the chief executive office of his nation to create and preside over the Fifth French Republic.

These are hard days for authority. Current custom attacks it and legislation tends to weaken it. In the home and in the factory, in the State and in the street, it arouses impatience and criticism rather than confidence and obedience. Jostled from below whenever it shows its head, it has come to doubt itself, to feel its way, to assert itself at the wrong moment; when it is unsure, with reticence, excuses, and extreme caution; when it is overconfident, harshly, roughly, and with a niggling formalism.

This decay of public authority has followed hard on the heels of a decline in the moral standards, both in society and in politics, from what they were in an older Europe. For many centuries, whether from conviction or self-interest, men have sought a basis for power, and, for an élite, a justification which led to the creation of hierarchies. But cracks have appeared in the fabric of these old conventions, and it is now in a sorry state. Our contemporaries, by reason of their shifting beliefs, their anemic traditions, and exhausted loyalities, have lost the sense of deference and no longer wish to observe the rules of conduct which were once firmly established.

"Nos dieux sont décrépits et la misère en tombe."

A crisis of this kind, no matter how general it may appear to be, cannot last indefinitely. Men, in their hearts, can no more do without being controlled than they can live without

* From *The Edge of the Sword*, translated by Gerard Hopkins, Criterion Books, New York, 1960, pp. 55-66. Reprinted by permission.

food, drink, and sleep. As political animals they feel the need for organization, that is to say for an established order and for leaders. Authority may totter on its shaken foundations, but sooner or later the natural equilibrium which lies at the base of all things will provide it with new ones, better, or less good, but, in any case, firm enough to establish discipline in a new form. These new foundations are, even now, emerging into the light of day. They are apparent in the recognition given to the value of individuals, and to the ascendancy of a few men. What the masses once granted to birth or office, they now give to those who can assert themselves. What legitimate prince was ever so blindly obeyed as is now the dictator who owes his rise to nothing but his own audacity? What established authority ever so left its mark upon events as does the proficiency of an engineer in the modern world? What conquerors were ever so wildly acclaimed as are our athletes who owe success only to their own endeavors?

This transformation of authority cannot but have its effect upon military discipline. In the army, as elsewhere, they say: "Respect is disappearing." But in fact it has only changed its object. To be obeyed, the man in command must today rely less on his rank than on his own value. We can no longer confuse power and its attributes.

This does not, of course, mean that none of the things in which discipline used to be steeped can be dispensed with. Men do not change so quickly or so completely, nor does human nature move by leaps and bounds. Authority exercised over other people still depends to a large extent upon the aura which surrounds rank and seniority. At the same time, the ascendancy exercised by the personality of the master, and his consequent ability to ensure obedience, have always existed. But in these unsettled times, and in a society where traditions and institutions have been violently disturbed, the conventions of obedience are growing weaker, and the mainspring of command is now to be found in the personal prestige of the leader.

Prestige is largely a matter of feeling, suggestion, and impression, and it depends primarily on the possession of an elementary gift, a natural aptitude which defies analysis. The fact of the matter is that certain men have, one might almost say from birth, the quality of exuding authority, as though it were a liquid, though it is impossible to say precisely of what it consists. Even those who come under its influence frequently feel surprised by their own reactions to it. This phenomenon has something in common with the emotion of love which cannot be explained without the presence of what we call "charm," for want of a better word. Still stranger is the fact that the authority exerted by certain individuals has often nothing to do with their intrinsic gifts or abilities. It is no rare thing to find men of outstanding intellect who are without it, whereas others far less highly endowed possess it in a very high degree.

But though there is something in what we call a "natural gift of authority" which cannot be acquired, but comes from the innermost being of some individuals, and varies in each, there are also a number of constant and necessary elements on which it is possible to lay one's finger, and these can be acquired or developed. The true leader, like the great artist, is a man with an inborn propensity which can be strengthened and exploited by the exercise of his craft.

First and foremost, there can be no prestige without mystery, for familiarity breeds contempt. All religions have their holy of holies, and no man is a hero to his valet. In the designs, the demeanor, and the mental operations of a leader there must be always a "something" which others cannot altogether fathom, which puzzles them,

stirs them, and rivets their attention. In saying this I do not mean that he must shut himself away in an ivory tower, remote from, and inaccessible to, his subordinates. On the contrary, if one is to influence men's minds, one must observe them carefully and make it clear that each has been marked out from among his fellows, but only on condition that this goes with a determination to give nothing away, to hold in reserve some piece of secret knowledge which may at any moment intervene, and the more effectively from being in the nature of a surprise. The latent faith of the masses will do the rest. Once the leader has been judged capable of adding the weight of his personality to the known factors of any situation, the ensuing hope and confidence will add immensely to the faith reposed in him.

This attitude of reserve demands, as a rule, a corresponding economy of words and gestures. No doubt these things are of the surface only, but they play a large part in determining the reaction of the crowd. There would even seem to be some relationship between a man's inner force and his outward seeming. No experienced soldier has ever underrated the importance of appearances. Whereas ordinary officers must be content with behaving correctly in front of their men, the great leaders have always carefully stage-managed their effects. They have made of this a very special art, as Flaubert very well knew when, in *Salammbô,* he described the stimulus imparted to the vacillating troops by the calculated arrival of Hamilcar upon the scene. Every page of the *Commentaries* provides us with evidence of the studied manner in which Caesar moved and held himself in public. We know how much thought Napoleon gave to showing himself in such a manner as to impress his audience.

Sobriety of speech supplies a useful contrast to theatricality of manner. Nothing more enhances authority than silence. It is the crowning virtue of the strong, the refuge of the weak, the modesty of the proud, and pride of the humble, the prudence of the wise, and the sense of fools. The man who is moved by desire or fear is naturally led to seek relief in words. If he yields to the temptation it is because by *externalizing* his passion or his terror he can come to terms with them. To speak is to dilute one's thoughts, to give vent to one's ardor, in short, to dissipate one's strength, whereas, what action demands is concentration. Silence is a necessary preliminary to the ordering of one's thoughts. One calls troops to attention before explaining what is expected of them. Since everything that comes from the leader is in the highest degree contagious, he can be sure, in that way, of establishing an atmosphere of calmness and alertness, provided he does not say a word more than is necessary. Men instinctively distrust an officer who is prodigal of speech. *Imperatoria brevitas* said the Romans. Regulations have always laid it down that orders should be concise and to the point, and we, today, have only too good reason to know how easily authority is undermined when it is swamped under floods of paper or drowned in torrents of oratory. . . .

But this systematic habit of reserve adopted by the leader produces little or no effect unless it is felt to conceal strength of mind and determination. It is no rare thing to come on men whose impassivity has earned them a brief reputation for sphinx-like wisdom, though they are very soon seen to be no better than nitwits. It is precisely from the contrast between inner power and outward control that ascendancy is gained, just as style in a gambler consists in his ability to show greater coolness than usual when he has raised his stake, and an actor's most notable effects depend upon his skill in producing the appearance of emotion when he is keeping strong control of himself. Barrès had only to look at the statues of Alexander,

with their evidence of combined passion and serenity, of the august and the terrible, to understand how he came to possess that authority which enabled him, for thirteen years of the most exacting trials and tribulations, to maintain order among a host of jealous underlings and unruly troops, and to impose Hellenism on a corrupt and savage world.

What, above all else, we look for in a leader is the power to dominate events, to leave his mark on them, and to assume responsibility for the consequences of his actions. The setting up of one man over his fellows can be justified only if he can bring to the common task the drive and certainty which comes of character. But why, for that matter, should a man be granted, free gratis and for nothing, the privilege of domination, the right to issue orders, the pride of seeing them obeyed, the thousand and one tokens of respect, unquestioning obedience, and loyalty which surround the seat of power? To him goes the greater part of the honor and glory. But that is fair enough, for he makes the best repayment that he can by shouldering the risks. Obedience would be intolerable if he who demands it did not use it to produce effective results, and how can he do so if he does not possess the qualities of daring, decision, and initiative?

The masses are the less deceived in this matter since, deprived of a master, they soon suffer from the results of their own turbulence. Not even the best trained and most experienced sailors could get their ship out of harbor if there were not someone to direct the operation. No four men, even though each was as strong as Hercules, could lift and carry a stretcher without there being somebody to see that they move in step. A disorganized crowd faced by the need to act is fearful, and the apprehension of each man's neighbor adds to his own. "Fear is the mainspring of assemblies." . . .

It follows that the stuffed dummies of the hierarchy can never enjoy prestige, for they are parasites who take everything and give nothing in return, weak-kneed creatures forever trembling in their shoes, jumping jacks who will turn their coats without scruple at the first opportunity. They can often safeguard their official careers, their rank if they are soldiers, their portfolios if they are ministers. They even, on occasion, receive the deference which custom and convention accords to their office, which the Chancellor Pasquier boasted of enjoying "in spite of the thirteen different oaths of allegiance which he had taken." But such cold and shrewd intelligences can never command the confidence and enthusiasm of others. Those tributes are due only to leaders who show their worth in action, face difficulties and overcome them, stake their all upon the throw. Characters of this temper radiate a sort of magnetic force. For those who follow them they are the symbol of the end to be achieved, and the very incarnation of hope. The devotion of lesser men, which finds a point of concentration in the person of the leader, blends the joy they feel in having satisfied him with pride in having done what they were told to do. "Will this day be fortunate for us?" Caesar once asked a centurion. And the centurion replied: "You will be victorious. As to me, whether I live or die, I shall, by tonight, have deserved praise from Caesar." The victory of Hanau rejoiced Coignet because "it has given the Emperor another happy day."

It is essential that the plan on which the leader has concentrated all his faculties shall bear the mark of grandeur. It must, indeed, respond to the cravings felt by men who, imperfect themselves, seek perfection in the end they are called upon to serve. Conscious of their own limitations and restricted by nature, they give free rein to unlimited hopes, and each measuring his own littleness, accepts the need for collective action on condition that

it contribute to an end which is, in itself, great. No leader will ever succeed in asserting himself unless he can touch that spring. All whose rôle it is to command and direct the crowd are fully aware of this fact. It is the basis of eloquence. There is not an orator but will dress up the poorest argument in the garments of greatness. It is the springboard of political parties, each one of which unceasingly declares that universal happiness is the end and purpose of its program. Consequently, whatever orders the leader may give, they must be swathed in the robes of nobility. He must aim high, show that he has vision, act on the grand scale, and so establish his authority over the generality of men who splash in shallow water. He must personify contempt for contingencies, and leave it to his subordinates to be bogged down in detail. He must put from him all that smacks of niggling and leave it to the humdrum individuals to be circumspect and wary. The question of virtue does not arise. The perfection preached in the Gospels never yet built up an empire. Every man of action has a strong dose of egotism, pride, hardness, and cunning. But all those things will be forgiven him, indeed, they will be regarded as high qualities if he can make of them the means to achieve great ends. Thus, by satisfying the secret desires of men's hearts, by providing compensation for the cramped conditions of their lives, he will capture their imagination, and, even should he fall by the way, will retain, in their eyes, the prestige of those heights to which he did his best to lead them. But he who never rises above the commonplace and is content with little, will never be of much account. At most he will be remembered as a good servant, but never as a master who can draw to himself the faith and the dreams of mankind.

It is, indeed, an observable fact that all leaders of men, whether as political figures, prophets, or soldiers, all those who can get the best out of others, have always identified themselves with high ideals, and this has given added scope and strength to their influence. Followed in their lifetime because they stand for greatness of mind rather than self-interest, they are later remembered less for the usefulness of what they have achieved than for the sweep of their endeavors. Though sometimes reason may condemn them, feeling clothes them in an aura of glory. In the concourse of great men Napoleon will always rank higher than Parmentier. So true is this that history gives a sort of somber magnificence to certain men whose claim to fame rests merely on the fact that they were the instigators of revolt and brutalities, because their crimes were committed in the name of some high-sounding cause.

Aloofness, character, and the personification of greatness, these qualities it is that surround with prestige those who are prepared to carry a burden which is too heavy for lesser mortals. The price they have to pay for leadership is unceasing self-discipline, the constant taking of risks, and a perpetual inner struggle. The degree of suffering involved varies according to the temperament of the individual; but it is bound to be no less tormenting than the hair shirt of the penitent. This helps to explain those cases of withdrawal which, otherwise, are so hard to understand. It constantly happens that men with an unbroken record of success and public applause suddenly lay the burden down. For, in addition to everything else, the leader who keeps himself, perforce, in isolation from his fellows, turns his back upon those simpler pleasures which are the gift of unconstraint, familiar intercourse, and, even, of friendship. He must accept the loneliness which, according to Faguet, is the "wretchedness of superior beings." Contentment and tranquility and the simple joys which go by the name of happiness are denied to those who fill

positions of great power. The choice must be made, and it is a hard one: whence that vague sense of melancholy which hangs about the skirts of majesty, in things no less than in people. One day somebody said to Napoleon, as they were looking at an old and noble monument: "How sad it is!" "Yes," came the reply, "as sad as greatness."

C. Germany

53. The German Chancellor and His Cabinet*

BY RICHARD HISCOCKS

THE Federal Republic of Germany is not a "pure" parliamentary regime in that the members of the cabinet are responsible to the Chancellor rather than to either house of the legislature. Therefore, the office of Chancellor is somewhat more important than in the typical parliamentary system. Only one man, Dr. Konrad Adenauer, has held office as Chancellor since the creation of the Bonn Republic in 1949.

The author of the following selection teaches at the University of Manitoba.

DURING Dr. Adenauer's tenure of office, and probably during his lifetime, it will not be possible to reach more than a provisional judgment on his methods and technique as Chancellor. The loyalty of his colleagues and the prejudices of his opponents are both obstacles in the way of reaching a fair and balanced conclusion. Yet there is sufficient evidence on which to build up an impression that may come close to the truth.

As there is much to criticize in Dr. Adenauer's political methods and much that is a serious danger to German democracy, it would be well to consider first the more favourable aspects of his chancellorship. In reaction to his great popularity in 1953 there has been a tendency in Germany recently to criticize the Chancellor excessively and to underrate his achievements.

Article 65 of the Basic Law lays down that 'Federal Chancellor determines, and is responsible for, general policy.' This sentence can be interpreted in two different ways. Taken literally it gives the Chancellor great powers. Considered in conjunction with Article 63, however, which provides that the Chancellor is elected by a majority of the Bundestag, it implies that he will exercise these powers more circumspectly, in the same way as his authority is exercised as chairman of the democratic party to which he owes his support in the Bundestag; that is to

* From Richard Hiscocks, *Democracy in Western Germany*, Oxford University Press, London, 1957, pp. 120-128. Reprinted by permission.

say, as *primus inter pares,* after the fullest consultation with his colleagues. If he does not do so, his party can withdraw their support and elect another chairman who will have the confidence of the Bundestag. Constitutionally Dr. Adenauer was entitled to choose the purely literal interpretation of Article 65, and this is what he did. In view of his own background and the circumstances in which he took office, it was hardly a surprising choice. Democratic procedure cannot be learned in a day, or even a few months, and a country under foreign occupation is not the best place in which to learn it.

At the age of eighty Dr. Adenauer has still lived more than half his life under the Empire. His first experience of democratic politics came after the second World War, and his first post in the Federal Government was that of Chancellor. After studying law he made his career in municipal administration until 1933. As mayor of Cologne for sixteen years, he exercised great personal authority and was subject to only very limited democratic control. When he became Chancellor in 1949, the Federal Government, under the Occupation Statute, was still subject in many fields to the authority of the Allied Powers. He was therefore responsible in any case to the Allied High Commissioners. It would have added greatly to the difficulties of his already very delicate task had he emphasized his responsibility to his Cabinet colleagues as well. In negotiating with the High Commissioners, the Chancellor's position was stronger if he could obtain the best terms possible on his own authority and then submit them to the Cabinet for formal approval, although for bargaining purposes mention could usefully be made of his responsibility to the Bundestag and the German people. The special circumstances of the time therefore partly justified Dr. Adenauer's authoritarian conception of his office. After he had become accustomed to this conception it was difficult for an old man to initiate a change.

Sound democratic procedure has been established as a result more often of effort and courage from below than of free concessions from above. The responsibility for not insisting on a more democratic interpretation of the chancellorship rests less with Dr. Adenauer himself than with his colleagues in the government, more particularly with the members of his own party, to whom he mainly owes his position. The C.D.U. as a whole no doubt feels that, in view of his great services to the country, a fundamental change is best left until after his retirement. Resignation is the best means of protest open to individual members of the Cabinet. But to this course German politicians are reluctant to resort. The G.V.P. describes its leader, Dr. Heinemann, as 'the only German minister of the twentieth century who gave up his office and income for reasons of conscience.' The worst example of reluctance has been given by Dr. Dehler. Since his party left the coalition in February 1956, and to some extent previously, the F.D.P. leader has repeatedly made clear that for some years he has objected to the Chancellor's methods and certain aspects of his policy. Yet he neither withdrew the F.D.P. from the government nor resigned the leadership of a party which tolerated policies and methods of which he disapproved. His criticism, after events had already forced matters to a head, has therefore lacked the weight of a protest dictated by principle.

Dr. Adenauer is anti-militarist and anti-totalitarian by conviction. He suffered severely under National Socialism himself and showed uncompromising courage in his attitude to Hitler. In so far as the only real alternative to autocracy today is some form of government based on popular consent, he is a democrat at heart, in spite of his personal qualities of character. He has used his great authority to keep in check anti-democratic extremists

both on the Left and on the Right. Calm and unassuming in appearance, with a capacity for humour and quick repartee, he greatly excels the majority of his countrymen in parliamentary manner. He can express himself simply, briefly, and clearly, and he never indulges in all-too-prevalent tendency to emotionalism and ranting.

Moreover, nothing has done more than Dr. Adenauer's stable and effective government to reconcile the German people to democracy. He has given them a strong lead, which they like. He has pursued a clear policy, which they can follow. In contrast to the Weimar leaders, he has proved that as a democracy Germany could regain with astonishing rapidity economic strength and a respected place among the nations. In spite of its faults, his government has provided a good transitional stage for a nation without a democratic tradition.

From a democratic point of view, however, the faults have been considerable. So far as the Cabinet is concerned they have been revealed in two main ways: in Dr. Adenauer's relations with his colleagues and in the technique he has developed to make his conception of Cabinet government work effectively.

The Chancellor's autocratic attitude in the Cabinet has given rise to much comment and complaint. The best concrete example that can be cited is the case of Dr. Heinemann. Having resigned on a question of principle, the ex-minister made plain the reasons for his action. He disapproved both of the Chancellor's policy of rearmament and of the procedure he had adopted to implement it. He maintained that Dr. Adenauer had first transmitted to the Allied High Commissioners a memorandum favouring German participation in a European defence force and then two days later had convened the Cabinet to consider it. 'I neither want nor am able to bear responsibility,' he said, 'when the Chancellor's task of determining general policy is so interpreted that no genuine discussion takes place for the purpose of arriving at a common point of view and when anyone who does not willingly acquiesce in the policy can only expect reproaches.'

Dr. Adenauer does not conceive the Cabinet as a team inspired by a common political purpose, to which each member should make some effective contribution. In his view it is rather a board of experts, each member of which has his own specialist field, while the chairman or director has virtually the sole responsibility for planning the political campaign in which they as a body are engaged. Thus it is possible that such outstanding figures as Professor Erhard or Herr Schaffer, the Minister of Finance, can be reproached publicly by the Chancellor for diverging in their own fields from the general plan that he has in mind. Were the plan the result of joint discussions and were the team-spirit in the Cabinet well developed such reproaches would scarcely be conceivable. During Dr. Adenauer's first government the F.D.P. was treated as a respected and fully-fledged partner whose leaders were heard with attention. But once the C.D.U. had gained an absolute majority the Chancellor's Olympian detachment was hardly modified by the obvious desirability of holding the coalition together.

Dr. Adenauer has thus given himself a very exacting task, which would be beyond the powers of the average statesman. In addition, he retained in his own hands the control of foreign relations until the Allied occupation ended in May 1955.

To assist him in carrying the burden he appointed two state-secretaries to be responsible to him personally, one for foreign affairs and one as a kind of general chief-of-staff. So long as the Chancellor remained his own Foreign Minister the existence of a State-Secretary for Foreign Affairs was a logical arrangement, and Professor Hallstein, who held the appointment, continued

to serve in English terminology as Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, when Dr. von Brentano became Foreign Minister in the spring of 1955. But the second post was of a more questionable character. The official concerned is not comparable to the British Cabinet Secretary, whose duty it is to serve the Prime Minister and the Cabinet as a whole. He is a high-ranking civil servant working for the Chancellor personally, as if the chancellorship were a department in itself. The present holder of the office, Herr Globke, has been the subject of special controversy owing to his past career. He was a member of the Nazi Party and wrote the commentary to the Nuremberg anti-Jewish Law. He was not therefore a wise choice for such a key post, mild though his personal sentiments towards the Jews appear to have been. He is also a highly efficient administrator with a capacity for devoted, even fanatical service to his master. These qualities and this past record have given him a sinister reputation as a kind of *éminence grise*. Certainly without his assistance Dr. Adenauer would be unable to pay so much attention to purely tactical problems as he does or to concern himself in so much detail with questions of personnel; and this in itself would be a good thing. The Chancellor's comprehensive supervision of so many aspects of political life contributes to his personal power, but is not really desirable. Magnanimity in personal relations and a greater delegation of authority to existing office-holders would be a good substitute for the present rigid control and would have a healthy influence on the country's political future. The Chancellor could then concentrate on those high-level decisions which should be his real concern.

Furthermore, the State-Secretary's great influence, reinforcing as it does the Chancellor's own position, is upsetting the balance of the constitution. Herr Globke has more power than any Cabinet minister apart from the Chancellor. The Basic Law makes provision for a deputy-chancellor, an office still held by Herr Blücher. But during Dr. Adenauer's absences from Bonn, Herr Blücher has never acted for him in the way that might be expected. While sick or on holiday the Chancellor has formed the habit of calling ministers and officials to him wherever he is, usually in Switzerland or the Black Forest. Herr Globke remains in Bonn as his effective representative to whom most people turn when the Chancellor's decision is required. Herr Blücher is little more than a figure-head who acts for the Chancellor on purely formal occasions.

Another method the Chancellor has developed to strengthen his position in relation to the Cabinet is the formation of informal or semi-formal committees on special subjects. These report to him personally and strengthen his position with the weight of expert opinion when his proposals are submitted to the Cabinet. They diminish the authority not only of the Cabinet but also of the individual ministers concerned. Examples are the Economic Co-ordinating Committee, sometimes called the Economic Cabinet, under the chairmanship of Herr Blücher, the Defence Council, under Dr. Adenauer himself, and the Social Committee. A further rival to the Cabinet's influence is the habit of holding conferences of the parties in the coalition. These meetings are attended by the party chairmen, the managing secretaries, and experts on the subjects to be discussed. In such circumstances the German system of government at present cannot accurately be called Cabinet government. A leading political scientist has described it well as 'Chancellor-Democracy.'

Dr. Adenauer is highly sensitive to press criticism, and his sensitivity has led him from time to time to take action which is hardly compatible with a truly democratic attitude towards freedom of the press. During 1952 he

ordered copies of the weekly magazine, *Der Spiegel,* to be seized, because it contained an article critical of him. Since then he or his representatives have on a number of occasions complained to the owners or publishers of newspapers regarding the points of view expressed in articles. In one case, the publisher having defended his editor's freedom of expression, the Chancellor invited the editor to call on him in Bonn and discuss the matter. No exception can be taken to the invitation, but the whole episode reveals a concern about public criticism on the part of the Chancellor which may easily lead to abuses unless the press jealously defends its rights. In another case Dr. Adenauer's State-Secretary demanded the withdrawal of a draft speech of the Chancellor's which had been sent to an important press agency in error by a C.D.U. representative and already distributed. When the agency refused, the Secretary threatened 'war to the knife.'

On several occasions the Federal Government made systematic plans to increase its control over the press and radio. In 1952 a draft federal press law, which was drawn up by the Ministry of the Interior, provided for the banning of papers and newspapers 'hostile to the State,' though it came to nothing. Later an attempt was made to establish a Ministry of Information for the purpose of 'enlightening the public' and preparing them for the legislation proposed by the government. Owing to the strong reactions of the foreign, and later of the German press, the plan was first replaced by one for a Co-ordinating Information Committee and finally quashed. An effort was also made to pass a federal radio law which would have given the Bonn Government a large measure of control over broadcasting. It was defeated by the strong opposition of the *Laender,* who justifiably considered it an encroachment on their rights.

In the selection and handling of his ministers Dr. Adenauer has shown little regard for the basic principles upon which efficient democratic government depends. In his first Cabinet four out of thirteen ministers were not members of the Bundestag when they were appointed—a high proportion even at such a critical and exceptional time. The prestige of ministerial office was not enhanced by the creation in 1949 of a Ministry for Bundesrat Affairs and in 1953 of a Ministry for Family Affairs and four Ministries for Special Tasks. The temporary appointment of two or three Ministers without Portfolio, as the Ministers for Special Tasks really were, would have been a reasonable price to pay for the formation and maintenance of a coalition, but the invention of two new ministries so much less important than the main departments of government was an unfortunate and somewhat cynical expedient. The principle of collective responsibility in the Cabinet has also not been enforced. Not only has the Chancellor sometimes criticized his ministers in public without intending that they should resign: at the time of the Saar Agreement in 1955 four members of the Cabinet did not vote for the government, and one actually voted against it, without being required to relinquish their posts. Ministers have also sometimes failed to fulfil promptly the duty, which should also be considered a privilege, of attendance in the Bundestag when required in accordance with the terms of the Basic Law. In this they have not been uninfluenced by the Chancellor's own attitude towards parliament.

In one respect Dr. Adenauer has not made sufficient use of his powers. Confident of his own influence and ability, and content with the complicated balance of representation that he has achieved, he has been reluctant to change his ministers between elections purely on grounds of inefficiency or inaptitude for a certain office. This rather uncharacteristic trait in a statesman who is outstandingly efficient him-

self has not contributed to the reputation of democracy in Germany.

The best defence that can be made for Dr. Adenauer's methods is that he was so deeply convinced of the desirability and rightness of his main aims —the reinstatement of his country, the integration of Europe, and the settlement of the feud between Germany and France—that he overlooked or underrated the dangers of the means he was employing to achieve them. Some of the strongest critics of his methods will whole-heartedly approve of his objectives. Yet during the formative period of the new German republic the small interest taken by the Chancellor in the development of democratic habits and conventions has had serious implications for the future.

Opposition to Dr. Adenauer's system has led to criticism of the Basic Law and the 'constructive vote of no-confidence.' A constitution which gives so much power to one man, it has been suggested, is seriously at fault. Yet it is unlikely that the combination of a dominant personality and an absolute majority in the Bundestag will soon recur. The constitution meanwhile will be open to a more democratic interpretation. The danger that Dr. Adenauer's system will survive him is modified by the improbability that he will have a successor comparable in ability.

D. The Soviet Union

54. Views on Political Leadership*

BY JOSEF V. STALIN

For a quarter of a century the grim visage of Josef Stalin dominated the Soviet landscape. As one of the greatest and most ruthless tyrants of all times, he ruled every aspect of his nation's life.

The interview with Emil Ludwig took place during an early year in this reign before the Stalinist dictatorship had developed its full force and fury. The resolution by the Council of Ministers and the CPSU Central Committee was issued at the time of the despot's 70th birthday, when the whole Communist world was convulsed in a frenzy of adulation. It illustrates the extent of the demi-god's grip on the power structure of his nation and the lengths to which his megalomania had driven him.

Ludwig: . . . For more than twenty years I have been studying the lives and deeds of prominent historical personages. I believe I am a good judge of people, but on the other hand, I do not know anything about economic conditions.

Stalin: You are very modest.

Ludwig: No, that is a fact. That is why I will put questions to you that may seem queer to you. Today, here in the Kremlin, I saw certain relics of Peter the Great, and the first question I should like to ask you is this: Do you think there is any parallel between yourself and Peter the Great? Do you regard yourself as continuing the cause of Peter the Great?

Stalin: Not in any way. Historical parallels are always dangerous. The one in question is absurd.

Ludwig: But Peter the Great did a great deal to develop his country and to transplant to Russia the culture of the West.

Stalin: Yes, of course. Peter the Great did a great deal to elevate the landlord class and to develop the rising merchant class. Peter did a great deal to create and strengthen the national State of the landlords and merchants.

* From J. V. Stalin, *An Interview with the German Author Emil Ludwig*, Co-Operative Publishing Society of Foreign Workers in the U.S.S.R., Moscow, 1932, pp. 3-6, 9-12.

It should be added that the elevation of the landlord class, the encouragement of the rising merchant class, and the strengthening of the national State of these classes, was effected at the cost of the peasant serf who was bled white. As for myself, I am merely a pupil of Lenin, and my aim is to be a worthy pupil of his. The task to which I have devoted my life is to elevate another class—the working class. That task is, not to strengthen any national State, but to strengthen a socialist State—and that means an international State. Everything that contributes to strengthening that State helps to strengthen the international working class. If in my efforts to elevate the working class and strengthen the socialist State of that class; every step taken were not directed towards strengthening and improving the position of the working class, I should consider my life as purposeless.

You will see therefore that your parallel is unsuitable.

As to Lenin and Peter the Great, the latter was but a drop in the sea—Lenin was a whole ocean.

Ludwig: Marxism denies that personalities play an important role in history. Do you not see any contradiction between the materialist conception of history and the fact that you, after all, do admit the important role played by historical personalities?

Stalin: No, there is no contradiction. Marxism does not deny that prominent personalities play an important role, nor the fact that history is made by people. In *The Poverty of Philosophy* and in other works of Marx you will find it stated that it is people who make history. But of course, people do not make history according to their own fancy or the promptings of their imagination. Every new generation encounters definite conditions already existing, ready-made, when that generation was born. And if great people are worth anything at all, it is only to the extent that they correctly understand these conditions and know how to alter them. If they fail to understand these conditions and try to change them according to their own fancies, they will put themselves in a quixotic position. So you will see that precisely according to Marx, people must not be contrasted to conditions. It is people who make history, but they make it only to the extent that they correctly understand the conditions they found ready-made, and to the extent that they know how to change those conditions. That, at least, is the way we Russian Bolsheviks understand Marx. And we have been studying Marx for a good many years.

Ludwig: Some thirty years ago, when I studied at the university, many German professors, who considered themselves believers in the materialist conception of history, taught us that Marxism denied the role of heroes, the role of heroic personalities in history.

Stalin: They were vulgarisers of Marxism. Marxism never denied the role of heroes. On the contrary, it admits that they play a considerable role, with the provisos that I have just made.

Ludwig: Placed around the table at which we are now seated there are sixteen chairs. Abroad, it is known on the one hand, that the U.S.S.R. is a country in which everything is supposed to be decided by collegiums, but on the other hand, it is known that everything is decided by individual persons. Who really decides?

Stalin: No, single persons cannot decide. The decisions of single persons are always, or nearly always, one-sided decisions. In every collegium, in every collective body, there are people whose opinion must be reckoned with. In every collegium, in every collective body, there are people who may express incorrect opinions. From the experience of three revolutions we know that approximately out of every 100 decisions made by single persons, that have not been tested and corrected collectively, 90 are one-sided. In our leading body, the Central Committee of our Party, which guides all our Soviet

and Party organisations, there are about 70 members. Among these 70 members of the Central Committee there are to be found the best of our industrial leaders, the best of our co-operative leaders, the best organisers of distribution, our best military men, our best propagandists and agitators, our best experts on soviet farms, on collective farms, on individual peasant agriculture, our best experts on the nationalities inhabiting the Soviet Union and on national policy. In this areopagus is concentrated the wisdom of our Party. It is possible for every one to correct the opinion or proposals of any one individual. Every one is able to contribute his experience. Were it otherwise, if decisions had been taken by individuals, we should have committed very serious mistakes in our work. But since every one is able to correct the errors of individual persons, and since we pay heed to such corrections, we arrive at more or less correct decisions. . . .

You just asked me whether everything in this country is decided by one person. No, under no conditions would our workers now tolerate the domination of one person. Individuals of the greatest authority are reduced to non-entities as soon as they lose the confidence of the masses and as soon as they lose contact with the masses. Plekhanov used to enjoy exceptional authority. And what happened? As soon as he began to commit political errors, the workers forgot him; they abandoned him and forgot him. Another instance: Trotsky. Trotsky also used to enjoy very great authority, although of course, not as much as Plekhanov. What happened? As soon as he lost contact with the workers, he was forgotten.

Ludwig: Entirely forgotten?

Stalin: They remember him sometimes—with bitterness.

Ludwig: Do they all remember him with bitterness?

Stalin: As far as our class-conscious workers are concerned, they remember Trotsky with bitterness, with irritation, with hatred. . . .

Ludwig: I am very much obliged to you for that reply. Please forgive me if I ask you a question that may appear strange to you. Your biography contains incidents of "brigandage" so to speak. Have you ever been interested in the personality of Stenka Razin, and what is your attitude towards him as an "ideological brigand?"

Stalin: We Bolsheviks have always been interested in such figures as Bolotnikov, Razin, Pugachev, and so on. We regard the acts of these people as the reflection of the seething unrest of the oppressed classes and of the spontaneous revolt of the peasantry against the feudal yoke. We have always studied with interest the history of these first attempts at revolt on the part of the peasantry. But of course, no analogy can be drawn between them and the Bolsheviks. Isolated peasant revolts, even when they are not of the bandit and unorganised character of that of Stenka Razin, cannot be successful. Peasant revolts can be successful only if they are combined with revolts of the workers and if the peasant revolts are led by the workers. Only a combined revolt led by the working class has any chance of achieving its aim. Moreover, when we speak of Razin and Pugachev, it must never be forgotten that they were tsarists: they were opposed to the landlords, but were in favour of a "good tsar." That was their motto.

So you see, no analogy with the Bolsheviks can be drawn here.

Ludwig: Permit me to ask you certain questions concerning your biography. When I saw Masaryk, he told me that he was conscious of being a socialist already, at the age of six. What made you a socialist, and when did you become one?

Stalin: I cannot assert that I was already drawn towards socialism at the age of six. Not even at the age of ten or twelve. I joined the revolutionary movement at the age of fifteen, when

I became connected with certain illegal groups of Russian Marxists in Transcaucasia. These groups exerted a great influence on me and instilled in me a taste for illegal Marxian literature.

Ludwig: What drove you to become a rebel? Was it, perhaps, because your parents treated you badly?

Stalin: No. My parents were uneducated people, but they did not treat me badly by any means. It was different in the theological seminary of which I was then a student. In protest against the humiliating regime and the jesuitical methods that prevailed in the seminary, I was ready to become, and eventually did become, a revolutionary, a believer in Marxism as the only genuinely revolutionary doctrine.

Ludwig: But do you not grant the Jesuits any good qualities?

Stalin: Yes, they are methodical and persevering in their work. But the basis of all their methods in spying, prying, peering into people's souls, to subject them to petty torment. What is there good in that? For instance, the spying in the boarding house. At nine o'clock the bell rings for morning tea, we go to the dining hall, and when we return we find that a search has been made and all our boxes have been turned inside out. . . . What is there good in that?

55. To Comrade Stalin on His 70th Birthday*

BY THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE C.P.S.U. AND THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE SOVIET UNION

To Comrade Stalin—Great Leader and Teacher, Continuer of the Immortal Cause of Lenin:

Dear Friend, Comrade-in-Arms, teacher, and leader!

The Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks) and the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R., on your 70th birthday ardently greet you, the great colleague and friend of Lenin, brilliant continuer of his immortal cause, indefatigable builder of communism, our wise teacher and leader!

Together with Lenin you, Comrade Stalin, built up the Bolshevik Party; in close comradeship with Lenin you elaborated the ideological, organizational, tactical and theoretical foundations of Bolshevism, tempered the party in the grim battles for the liberation of the working people, turning it into the most powerful revolutionary party in the world. Fearless revolutionary, brilliant theoretician, great organizer, you, together with Lenin, confidently and boldly, staunchly and carefully led the party, the working class, to armed uprising, to the socialist revolution.

Together with Lenin you, Comrade Stalin, were the moving spirit and leader of the Great October Socialist Revolution, the founder of the first Soviet Socialist State of workers and

* From *USSR Information Bulletin*, January 13, 1950, pp. 1-3.

peasants in the world. In the years of the Civil War and foreign intervention, your genius for organization and military leadership brought the Soviet people and their heroic Red Army to victory over the enemies of the homeland. The tremendous work of setting up the national Soviet Republics, unite them into one federal state—the U.S.S.R.—was effected under your direct leadership, Comrade Stalin.

When death cut short the life of the great Lenin, you, Comrade Stalin, raised aloft the glorious banner of Lenin; courageously and resolutely you led our party along the Leninist path. The Bolshevik Party, strong by virtue of its loyalty to Leninism, blazed an uncharted path in history, the path of building socialism in a country surrounded by a ring of capitalist states.

Lenin's theory on the possibility of the victory of socialism in our country, developed and enriched by you, Comrade Stalin, was of the greatest significance for the victory of socialism. The enemies of socialism, the enemies of the Soviet people and the Communist Party vainly tried to swerve our party from the Leninist-Stalinist path, to split it up from within, to rob the working class of faith in its forces, in the possibility of building socialism. You implacably exposed the base criminal attempts of the enemies of the people ideologically to disarm the party, smash its unity, destroy Soviet power and the socialist revolution. In bitter struggle against traitors and betrayers of the cause of socialism, against Trotskyites, Bukharinites, bourgeois nationalists and other enemies, around you, Comrade Stalin, was formed that leading nucleus of our party which upheld the invincible banner of Lenin, united the ranks of the Communist Party, and brought the Soviet people on to the highroad of building socialism.

Carrying out the majestic program of the socialist industrialization of our country elaborated by you, the Soviet people in a historically short space of time turned Russia, backward technically and economically, into an advanced industrial power. Associated with your name are the mighty socialist construction undertakings of the Five-Year Plans, the giants of industry, new branches of industry which played a decisive part in strengthening the defensive ability of our State.

Under your wise leadership, Comrade Stalin, a historic turn took place in the villages in 1929, equivalent in its consequences to the revolutionary upheaval in October, 1917. The Communist Party effected the solid collectivization of agriculture, and on this basis the elimination of the kulaks as a class. A new socialist life which has delivered the working peasantry from bondage, ruin, and poverty has taken firm root in the Soviet village as a result of the victory of the collective farm system and the mechanization of agriculture.

Under the leadership of our party headed by the beloved Stalin, the Soviet Union has become a mighty industrial-collective farm power, a country of triumphant socialism. Having built socialism, the Soviet people forever abolished the exploitation of man by man, built up a new social and state system free from crises and unemployment, which ensures a steady advance of the material and cultural standards of the working people. The Constitution of the U.S.S.R., rightly called by the people the Stalin Constitution, has consolidated the majestic victories of socialism, has become a magnet, a beacon for all working mankind.

Relying on the richest experience gained from the existence of the Soviet country, you, Comrade Stalin, have evolved a harmonious and complete teaching about the socialist State. Developing Leninism, you have arrived at the brilliant conclusion about the possibility of building communism in our country and the necessity of preserving the state under communism in our country in the event that capitalist encirclement remains. This conclusion

gave the party and the people a clear perspective of struggle for the victory of communism.

With your name, Comrade Stalin, is associated the solution of one of the major problems of the Revolution—the national question. In the fraternal family of Soviet peoples, formerly oppressed nations have attained unprecedented political, economic, and cultural advancement. The friendship of the peoples of the U.S.S.R., which you inspired, is a great gain of the Revolution, one of the sources of might of our socialist homeland. With the victory of socialism, the moral and political unity of the Soviet people, closely rallied around the party of Lenin and Stalin, has become indestructible. Our people are imbued with fervent and life-giving Soviet patriotism. Under your leadership the Bolshevik Party effected a genuine cultural revolution in the U.S.S.R.

You have invested your wisdom, indomitable energy, and iron will into each change, big and small, which elevates our homeland ever higher and higher. It is our good fortune, the good fortune of our people that the great Stalin, being the leader of the party and State, directs and inspires the creative, constructive efforts of the Soviet people to the prosperity of our glorious Motherland. Under your leadership, Comrade Stalin, the Soviet Union has become a great and invincible force.

When Hitlerite Germany imposed war on the Soviet Union and mortal danger menaced our homeland, you, Comrade Stalin, headed the armed struggle of the Soviet people against fascism—the sworn enemy of mankind, roused all Soviet men and women to the Great Patriotic War, inspired the Soviet people and their armed forces to legendary deeds and exploits. The party of Lenin and Stalin united the efforts of front and rear. Your military and organizational genius brought us victory over fascist Germany and imperialist Japan. Great army leader and organizer of victory, you, Comrade Stalin, created advanced Soviet military science. In battles led by you were embodied outstanding examples of military operational and strategic art. First class military cadres, reared and fostered by you, carried out with honor the Stalin plans for routing the enemy. All honest people on earth, all future generations, will glorify the Soviet Union and your name, Comrade Stalin, as saviour of world civilization from the fascist barbarians.

In postwar conditions, guided by your directives, the entire Soviet people concentrated their creative initiative on the earliest liquidation of the aftermath of war, on the realization of the grand plans for the further development of the national economy and culture of the country of socialism, on raising the wellbeing of the people. The Lenin-Stalin ideas on socialist competition inspire Soviet patriots to new labor exploits, they have awakened great energy in the hearts of millions of Soviet people in the name of the great goal—the victory of communism.

With greatest staunchness and insight, you, Comrade Stalin, direct the foreign policy of the Soviet Union, fighting for peace and the security of nations large and small. The international authority of the U.S.S.R. as the bulwark of peace and democracy has grown immeasurably. Toilers in the capitalist and colonial countries see in you the true and staunch champion of peace and the defender of the vital interests of the peoples of all countries. You have fired the hearts of all ordinary people on the globe with an unshakable faith in the just cause of the struggle for world peace, for the national independence of peoples, for friendship among the nations.

Using your leadership, Comrade Stalin, the Soviet Union has played a decisive part in the liberation of the working people of the countries of people's democracy from fascist enslavers, from the yoke of capitalists and landlords. The peoples of these

countries are filled with gratitude to you for the unselfish and fraternal help the Soviet Union renders them in their economic and cultural development.

Great coryphaeus of science! Your classic works which develop Marxist-Leninist theory as applied to the new epoch, the epoch of imperialism and of proletarian revolutions, the epoch of the victory of socialism in our country, constitute the greatest possession of mankind, an encyclopedia of revolutionary Marxism. In these works the Soviet people and the advanced representatives of the working people of all countries draw knowledge, confidence, and fresh forces in the struggle for the victory of the cause of the working class, they find answers to the most burning problems of the present struggle for communism. Your works on the national colonial problem light up the path of the national liberation movement of peoples in the colonial and dependent countries like a bright torch. The gigantic successes of the forces of peace and democracy and socialism are illumined by Leninist-Stalinist revolutionary ideas.

Great architect of communism! You teach all Bolsheviks to be highly demanding of themselves and others, boldly to criticize shortcomings, and you warn them that one must not rest content on what has been achieved, must not be dazzled by success. You teach that criticism and self-criticism is an effective weapon in the struggle for communism, that Bolshevik modesty, a responsive and attentive attitude to the needs of the people, lofty adherence to ideas and principles in struggle against all manifestations of bourgeois ideology must be inalienable qualities of party and Soviet cadres.

Dear Comrade Stalin! You have always taught us and teach us Bolsheviks to be as the great Lenin was, to serve our people without sparing our energy, to contribute in every way to the further advance of our beloved homeland, to do everything for the victory of communism. The Bolshevik Party, the Soviet people and all progressive mankind see in you the teacher and leader, the brilliant continuer of the immortal cause of Lenin. The name of Stalin is most precious to our people, to ordinary people the world over. The name of Stalin is the symbol of the coming victory of communism. The hearts of the Soviet people and the millions of toilers of the globe are filled with fervent love for you, great Stalin!

It is a great happiness to live and work in our Soviet country, to belong to the party of Lenin and Stalin, to the heroic generation of Soviet people fighting in the Stalin epoch for the triumph of communism under the leadership of Stalin!

Accept, our teacher and leader, our best friend and comrade-in-arms, hearty wishes for many years of health and fruitful work for the good of the Bolshevik Party, the Soviet people, for the happiness of the working people of the entire world.

Long live our own Stalin!

(signed) CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION (BOLSHEVIK), COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE U.S.S.R.

56. Executive Leadership in the U.S.S.R.*

BY NIKITA S. KHRUSHCHEV

In the closing years of Stalin's rule, Georgei Malenkov had emerged as the man apparently designated to succeed him. In fact, Malenkov held both of Stalin's chief posts, Premier of the Soviet Union and head of the Secretariat of the Communist Party, for only ten days after the dictator died in 1953.

Apparently, Malenkov was forced by his colleagues in the ruling group to choose between the two posts and opted for the premiership. At that time, also, it was made clear that a collegium including Lavrentia Beria, Malenkov, Khrushchev, Kaganovich, and Molotov was to govern collectively. The *Pravda* editorial below was a key announcement of that policy. Beria was eliminated in July and gradually Khrushchev, who succeeded Malenkov in his party post, gathered most of the power into his hands. Nevertheless, as the Khrushchev interview below shows, the principle of collective leadership remained the ostensible basis of executive direction in the Soviet Union.

H. Shapiro: . . . Following the June plenary session of the Party Central Committee and now in connection with the release of Marshal Zhukov from his post, speculation arose abroad about lack of stability in the Soviet leadership. What can you say on this subject?

N. S. Khrushchev: . . . What do you mean by "unstable leadership?" Apparently this means tottering, shaky leadership. It is clear to any unbiased person that this does not describe the agencies of leadership of the Soviet Union. As for the changes in the composition of the Soviet ruling bodies, they speak for the strength of the collective leadership of our party's Central Committee. Indeed, could a weak, unstable leadership have adopted such decisions as expulsion from the Central Committee of Molotov, who had been in the leadership for decades, as expulsion of Kaganovich, Malenkov and Shepilov? Or let us take the case of

* Report of an interview by Henry Shapiro of the United Press, translated from *Pravda* and *Izvestia*, November 19, 1957, pp. 1-2, in "Three Interviews with N. S. Khrushchev," *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, published at Columbia University, December 25, 1957, pp. 7-8. Reprinted by permission.

Marshal Zhukov. Zhukov had actually shown himself to be a remarkable soldier and commander and had deservedly received high decorations. But he committed major political mistakes and therefore the Party Central Committee expelled him from the Presidium and the Central Committee. What does this indicate? It shows that the Party Central Committee corrects anyone, regardless of past services, who makes mistakes. The Central Committee expresses the will of the Party, and the people follow the Party. Therein lies the strength or, as you put it, stability of the leadership of our party and government.

H. Shapiro: . . . When you speak of the collective leadership, do you mean the Central Committee or its Presidium?

N. S. Khrushchev: I mean the Central Committee of our party. The Presidium is an executive body of the Central Committee.

H. Shapiro: Does the initiative come from the Presidium or the Central Committee?

N. S. Khrushchev: The Presidium raises questions conforming to the Party's interests, and the Central Committee considers them. The Central Committee discusses questions and adopts such decisions as conform to the interest of the Party and the people. The collective leadership consists not only of the members of the Central Committee. Collective leadership is exercised in our party from top to bottom. The Central Committee is the highest body of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. There are also the Central Committees of the Union-republic Communist Parties, and the territory, province, city and district Party committees, which also base their work on the principles of collective leadership. All this, taken together, constitutes the collective leadership of our party. This is what enables the Party to direct successfully all sectors of socialist construction.

57. Collective Leadership: A *Pravda* Editorial*

BY L. SLEPOV

In the course of tremendous creative work, the Communist Party, the directing and guiding force of Soviet society, has worked out basic principles of Party and state leadership. Closely linked with the broadest masses of the working people, our party is directing the people's efforts toward attainment of a great goal, is leading the country firmly and confidently along the path of building communism.

Our party is a militant organization, an organization of active thought and initiative, engaged in the thick of life, destroying the old and creating the

* From *Pravda*, April 16, 1953, p. 2. Translation from *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, published at Columbia University, May 9, 1953, pp. 3, 30. Reprinted by permission.

new. This determines the methods of work of Party organizations.

The Party committees are organs of political leadership. They cannot apply methods inherent in administrative-managerial agencies in their practical work. There were cases of this during the war. Wartime circumstances caused certain particular features in the methods of leadership which were to some extent justified for those conditions. But this led to serious shortcomings in the practical work of Party organizations.

This is why in many very important cases of Party work in the postwar period the Party has set the task of raising the level of Party leadership, of putting an end to such phenomena as the application in Party organizations of administrative methods of leadership, which lead to bureaucratization of Party work.

One of the fundamental principles of Party leadership is collectivity in deciding all important problems of Party work. It is impossible to provide genuine leadership if inner Party democracy is violated in the Party organization, if genuine collective leadership and widely developed criticism and self-criticism are lacking. Collectiveness and collegium principle represent a very great force in Party leadership.

Speaking of the great role of our party's Central Committee as an organ of collective leadership, Comrade Stalin pointed out in 1931 that among the Central Committee members "there are our best industrial executives, our best cooperative officials, our best supply managers, our best military men, our best propagandists, our best agitators, our best experts of the state farms, our best experts of the collective farms, our best experts of individual peasant farming, our best experts on the nations of the Soviet Union and the national policy. The wisdom of our party is concentrated in this Areopagus. Each one has the opportunity to correct anyone else's individual opinion or proposal. Each one has the opportunity to bring in his own experience."

The principle of collectivity in work means, above all, that decisions adopted by Party committees on all cardinal questions are the fruit of collective discussion. No matter how experienced leaders may be, no matter what their knowledge and ability, they do not possess and they cannot replace the initiative and experience of a whole collective. In any collegium, in any directing collective, there are people who possess diverse experience without relying upon which the leaders cannot make correct decisions and exercise qualified leadership.

Individual decisions are always or almost always one-sided decisions. Hence, the very important requirement that decisions must rest on the experience of many, must be the fruit of collective effort. If this is so, if decisions are adopted individually, serious errors can occur in work. Insofar as each person is able to correct the errors of individual persons and insofar as Party agencies in the course of practice reckon with these corrections, the decisions which result are more correct.

We still encounter leaders who violate the principle of collective decision, who settle important matters by individual decision without consulting the bureau members. This incorrect method is used, for instance, by Comrade Alamanov, First Secretary of the Dzhalal-Abad Province Party Committee. In deciding important questions he frequently disregards the opinion of bureau members, does not consult with them, does not create conditions for criticism, and resents critical comment. Comrade Svirin, Secretary of the Valuiki District Party Committee in Kursk Province, frequently decides questions of selection and assignment of personnel on his own initiative, without discussion before the district committee bureau.

It is obvious that in these cases these officials have functioned not as political

leaders but rather as poor administrators. The political leader cannot oppose himself to the collective; he always seeks to rally the party *aktiv,* to absorb the experience of the Party masses, to operate not by administrative rule but by his authority, his necessary knowledge and experience.

Rule by administrative measures [*"administrirovaniye"—a word suggestive of "bossing."*—Trans.] has nothing in common with proper methods of leadership; it can only harm Party work. Like rudeness, rule by administrative measures is evidence not of the official's will but of his lack of will, not of strength of leadership but of weakness of leadership.

The correct conduct of bureau meetings and of Party committee plenary sessions plays a tremendous role in collective discussion and decision of problems. When the Party criticizes some officials for exercising leadership by endless meetings, this does not mean that the Party condemns meetings in general. On the contrary, irregularity of bureau meetings and of Party Committee plenary sessions is nothing but violation of the collective principle in leadership and substitution of administrative measures and bureaucratic methods. The trouble is not that meetings are held but a matter of *how* they are held.

In some cases the violation of collective leadership takes the form of holding Party committee meetings without a majority of members present. This lowers the role of the committee members and does not draw them into active work.

One of the violations of collective leadership is the adoption of important decrees on the basis of questionnaires. Some leaders assume that in adopting decisions on this basis they are being efficient. This is a deeply mistaken attitude. The practice of adopting decisions on the basis of questionnaires has nothing in common with efficiency and demonstrates only a formal, bureaucratic approach. Of course, some questions which do not require discussion can be decided in this way. But all important, major decisions should certainly be discussed by the Party committee members before adoption. The questionnaire method, violating collectivity in leadership, infringes upon the elementary rights of members of the leadership collective and weakens their responsibility for the whole work of the collective.

A most widespread form of violation of collectivity is poor preparation of meetings, when unprepared questions are presented to the committee bureau, when bureau members do not receive the materials in advance and acquaint themselves with draft resolutions only at the meetings. Under these conditions discussion goes on for hours and a sensible decision is not reached. Such fruitless meetings merely demean collectivity. They are called less for actual discussion of questions than for the sake of formality. The same may be said of the plenary sessions held by some Party organizations. In many cases a parade clamor substitutes for a businesslike discussion at such sessions, and criticism and self-criticism are muted.

In order to heighten the role of bureau meetings and Party committee plenary sessions, the way in which they are held must be improved. It is necessary that meetings be well organized and attended by full quorums in order to make it possible to draw upon the experience of officials of diverse spheres of activity and in order that decisions may be adopted on the basis of criticism and self-criticism and may reflect the valuable proposals and observations expressed in the discussion.

Collectivity in work assumes that the leaders are able to hear out the opinions of Party committee members and to take into account their critical comments and proposals. Such facts cannot be tolerated, as, for example, the fact that Comrade Grukhov, First Secretary of the Rezina District com-

mittee in the Moldavian Republic, does not consult executive officials of the district, suppresses their initiative and disregards their criticism. Grukhov did not even consider it necessary to acquaint members of the district committee bureau with the report on the district committee's work, submitted to the Moldavian Communist Central Committee. The report was composed in a spirit of self-praise and did not express the collective opinion of the committee members.

Leaders cannot consider criticism of themselves as a personal affront. They must be able to accept criticism courageously and show readiness to bend their will to the will of the collective. Without such courage, without the ability to overcome one's own vanity and to bend one's own will to the will of the collective, there can be no collective leadership, no collective.

The collective principle in work is of great importance in training cadres. Without collectivity the training of serious, political leaders is inconceivable. Officials and leaders grow in the course of the work itself. Only by bringing officials into active Party life and letting them experience the full weight of the work can cadres be formed which will be worthy of promotion and which will have all the equalities inherent in the official of the Leninist-Stalinist type. Violation of the collective principle in work can lead not only to serious mistakes but can become a brake on the training of cadres as well.

For correct training of cadres it is important that they be placed under the supervision of the Party masses, that officials display readiness not only to teach the masses but to learn from the masses as well. Collectivity in work is called upon to play an important role in this connection. Where the collective principle is violated the necessary conditions for criticism and self-criticism are absent, the sense of responsibility is blunted and officials are infected by dangerous conceit and smugness. It is precisely in such a situation that some workers begin to behave as if they know everything, as if only they can say anything that makes sense, and as if the role of others is only to support their opinion.

Such a situation prepares the ground for unprincipled, alien habits of kowtowing and flattery. There are cases in which the head of a Party committee behaves incorrectly and the Party committee members accept this and, in order not to mar relations with the committee head, tolerate unprincipled behavior, do not think it necessary or possible to voice objections and even orient themselves to his views and defer to him in everything. Actually, the function of collective leadership is to correct and criticize one another. Where there is an intolerable atmosphere of kowtowing, which excludes businesslike, critical discussion of problems, where criticisms of comrades who are officials are not expressed, there are, as a rule, serious shortcomings in work.

It is necessary, in discussing and solving problems to know how to combine the collective principle with personal responsibility in carrying matters through. Just as collectivity is essential in discussing basic problems, so individual responsibility is essential in carrying matters through in order to prevent evasion of responsibility for implementing resolutions.

A resolution which does not designate someone as responsible for it or a deadline for carrying it out becomes a mere wish, a hollow declaration, implementation of which cannot even be checked. It cannot be said of such resolutions merely that they are fruitless; they are harmful because they give rise to irresponsibility and lack of personal responsibility and destroy discipline. Party and state discipline will be strengthened if an official knows that he is responsible for this or that work sector and that he will not be able to escape responsibility or to share it with other officials.

The method of collective leadership is the basic principle of Party leadership, violation of which in Party work cannot be viewed otherwise than as a manifestation of bureaucratic habits, which freeze the initiative and self-reliance of Party organizations and Party members. Strictest observance of this highest principle is the guarantee of correct leadership and a primary requisite for a further advance in Party work for successful progress along the path of building communism in our country.

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
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